Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The United States Department of the Navy issued a solicitation requesting technical support for its electromagnetic spectrum resources, requiring proposals to be submitted via email by a specified deadline. eSimplicity, Inc. submitted its proposal before the deadline, but it was not received by the Contracting Officer due to the email exceeding the maximum file size and being bounced back. The Navy deemed eSimplicity's proposal untimely and did not consider it.eSimplicity filed a pre-award bid protest with the United States Court of Federal Claims. The Claims Court ruled in favor of eSimplicity, concluding that the file size was an unstated evaluation criterion and that the government control exception could apply to electronically submitted proposals. The court remanded the case for the Navy to reconsider its decision or to take other actions consistent with the court's opinion. Subsequently, the Navy issued an amended solicitation and awarded the contract to eSimplicity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that the appeal was moot because the original solicitation had expired, and the contract had been awarded under a new solicitation. The court found that there was no longer a live controversy, as the issues presented on appeal concerned the now-expired solicitation. The court also rejected the government's argument that the case fell under the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to mootness, noting that the government had other opportunities to appeal similar issues in the past but chose not to do so. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "ESIMPLICITY, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the municipality of Anchorage and the United States regarding two agreements related to the improvement of the Port of Alaska. In 2003, Anchorage and the United States, through the Maritime Administration (MARAD), signed a Memorandum of Understanding (2003 Memorandum) to upgrade and expand the port. In 2011, they signed a Memorandum of Agreement (2011 Memorandum) to address issues that arose during the project, including large-scale damage discovered in 2010.The United States Court of Federal Claims held that the United States breached the 2003 Memorandum by failing to deliver a defect-free port and the 2011 Memorandum by settling subcontractor claims without consulting Anchorage. The court awarded Anchorage $367,446,809 in damages, including $11,279,059 related to the settlement of subcontractor claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the 2003 Memorandum did not require the United States to deliver a defect-free port, as it lacked specific terms such as what was to be built, where, dimensions, deadlines, and costs. The court vacated the Court of Federal Claims' decision regarding the 2003 Memorandum and remanded for further proceedings.However, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims' decision that the United States breached the 2011 Memorandum by settling subcontractor claims without conferring with Anchorage. The court upheld the award of $11,279,059 in damages to Anchorage for this breach. The case was vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further consideration consistent with the Federal Circuit's opinion. View "ANCHORAGE v. US " on Justia Law

Malcolm Pipes, a former reservist in the United States Air Force, sought disability-retirement pay and benefits after suffering a stroke while participating in the Air Force’s Self-paced Fitness Improvement Program (SFIP). Pipes argued that he was in inactive-duty training (IDT) status at the time of his injury, which would entitle him to the benefits under 10 U.S.C. § 1204. The Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR) and the United States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) previously denied his claim, leading to this appeal.In the first appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's decision, holding that Pipes was in a duty status when ordered to participate in the SFIP. However, the court did not address whether Pipes was in IDT status when performing the SFIP. On remand, the AFBCMR and the Claims Court again denied relief, concluding that Pipes did not have the necessary advance authorization for IDT status as required by Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 36-8001.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the Claims Court's decision. The court found that the AFMAN applies to all IDT and requires advance authorization for such status. Pipes failed to provide evidence of receiving this authorization. The court also rejected Pipes's argument that the lawful order to participate in the SFIP automatically placed him in IDT status. The court noted that the Department of Veterans Affairs' grant of service connection for Pipes's stroke did not impact the determination of his duty status under the AFMAN.The court affirmed the Claims Court's judgment, concluding that the AFBCMR's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. View "PIPES v. US " on Justia Law

Enriqueta Diaz, a former county judge and resident of Maverick County, opposed the issuance of certificates of obligation for water and sewer improvements by the Maverick County Commissioners Court. She collected signatures on a petition to force an election on the issue. Despite her petition, the commissioners decided to issue the certificates without holding an election. During the meeting, Diaz heckled the commissioners, leading County Judge English Cantu to hold her in contempt and order her removal. Diaz was detained outside in the rain for several hours and later sentenced to 24 hours in jail, though she was released without being confined.Diaz filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, seeking damages for false imprisonment and bystander liability against County Judge English Cantu and three county commissioners. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, rejecting their claims of state sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, and qualified immunity. The defendants appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that constitutional county judges in Texas are not entitled to state sovereign immunity as they are considered local rather than state officers. The court also determined that English Cantu was not entitled to judicial immunity because he was acting in an administrative capacity, not a judicial one, during the commissioners court meeting. Additionally, the court found that English Cantu was not entitled to qualified immunity because he acted without discretionary authority in holding Diaz in contempt. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for the commissioners on the bystander liability claims, as the law was not clearly established that they had a duty to intervene. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Diaz v. Cantu" on Justia Law

The United States Army Corps of Engineers partnered with the City of Dallas on the Dallas Floodway Extension (DFE) project, which began in 1999. Plaintiffs Timpy Ondrusek and Barbara Ann Ondrusek Wolfe own property that Dallas attempted to condemn for the DFE. They sued the Corps and the City in federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming the Corps failed to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) to account for new information, violating the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the claims, determining the case was not justiciable. The court found the plaintiffs had not shown Article III standing and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, but the district court again concluded the case was not justiciable, noting the levee design phase was only 35 percent complete, and dismissed the case as unripe without prejudice, denying leave to amend.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found the claims against the Army Corps of Engineers were ripe for decision, as the Corps' failure to comply with NEPA presented a present controversy. The court determined the plaintiffs had standing, as they alleged a concrete and particularized risk of environmental harm to their property due to the Corps' failure to prepare an SEIS. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the suit with respect to the Army Corps of Engineers, affirmed the dismissal with respect to the City of Dallas, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ondrusek v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

Patricia Burnette Chastain was appointed as the clerk of superior court in Franklin County in May 2013 and was subsequently elected to the position in November 2013 and reelected in 2017. In July 2020, an attorney named Jeffrey Thompson filed an affidavit requesting an inquiry into Ms. Chastain's conduct, alleging various instances of misconduct, including distributing gift certificates to jurors, allowing a judicial candidate to address a jury, and acting unprofessionally with correctional officers, among other allegations.Judge John M. Dunlow initially suspended Ms. Chastain and set a hearing date. However, due to a conflict of interest, Judge Dunlow and another judge were recused, and Judge Thomas H. Lock was appointed to preside over the removal inquiry. After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Lock issued an order in October 2020 permanently removing Ms. Chastain from her position based on findings of willful misconduct. Ms. Chastain appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated the order, holding that Judge Lock lacked authority under Article IV of the North Carolina Constitution to remove her and remanded the case for reconsideration under Article VI.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that Judge Lock had the authority to preside over the removal proceeding as a replacement for the recused senior regular resident superior court judge. The court also held that procedural due process requires that removal be based only on conduct identified in the initiating affidavit. Furthermore, the court clarified that the standard for removal under Article IV is "misconduct," not "willful misconduct." The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for reconsideration of removal under the proper standards. The court also noted that discretionary review was improvidently allowed regarding the procedure for disqualification under Article VI. View "In re Chastain" on Justia Law

A police officer in Buffalo, Texas, was terminated by the City Council after engaging in a high-speed chase with a civilian in his patrol vehicle, resulting in an accident. The officer, Gregory Moliere, received a written reprimand from the Chief of Police, which he accepted. Subsequently, the City Council voted to terminate his employment. Moliere sued, claiming the City Council lacked the authority to fire him and that his due process rights were violated.The trial court dismissed Moliere's suit, finding that the City Council had the authority to terminate him. Moliere appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that there was a fact issue regarding the City Council's authority to terminate Moliere. The appellate court noted ambiguities in the City's employee manual and the police department's policy-and-procedure manual and remanded the case for further proceedings without addressing Moliere's due process claim.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the City Council had the authority to terminate Moliere under Texas Local Government Code Section 341.001, which allows the governing body of a Type A general-law municipality to establish and regulate a municipal police force. The court held that the City Council's authority to regulate the police force included the power to terminate officers for cause. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment dismissing Moliere's claims based on the alleged lack of authority to fire him.However, the Supreme Court of Texas remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address Moliere's due process claim, which had not been considered previously. View "City of Buffalo v. Moliere" on Justia Law

Donald Blazer was involved in a vehicle accident and voluntarily submitted to a preliminary breath test (PBT), which showed a blood alcohol content of .102 percent. However, he refused to submit to a blood draw. The South Dakota Department of Public Safety (Department) notified Blazer of its intent to disqualify his commercial driver’s license (CDL) for life, citing this refusal as a second violation of SDCL 32-12A-36, with the first being a 2014 DUI conviction. Blazer requested an administrative hearing, and the Department affirmed the disqualification of his CDL for life.Blazer appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the Department’s decision. The circuit court concluded that Blazer’s voluntary submission to the breath test constituted a submission to a chemical analysis, meaning his refusal to submit to the blood draw could not result in the disqualification of his CDL. The Department then appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The Court held that under SDCL 32-23-1.2, a preliminary breath test (PBT) is permitted and may be required in addition to a chemical test. The Court determined that Blazer’s refusal to submit to the blood draw constituted a refusal to submit to a chemical analysis as required by SDCL 32-12A-46. This refusal was a second violation under SDCL 32-12A-36, justifying the disqualification of Blazer’s CDL for life under SDCL 32-12A-37. The Court emphasized that a PBT is a preliminary test and does not fulfill the requirement for a chemical analysis under the implied consent laws. View "Blazer v. Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

In 1995, Grady McGowan was convicted of residential burglary. In 2020, he pleaded guilty to residential burglary again and was sentenced to nine years in prison with an additional eleven-year suspended sentence. His sentencing order noted that he might be ineligible for parole due to a prior felony conviction. The Arkansas Division of Correction initially determined McGowan was eligible for parole and provided him a parole hearing, but later rescinded this decision based on a 2022 opinion from the Arkansas Attorney General, which led to a recalculation of his parole-eligibility date.McGowan filed a petition in the Pulaski County Circuit Court seeking declaratory judgment on his parole eligibility under Act 683 of 2023. The circuit court granted declaratory relief in favor of McGowan, finding that the sentencing order did not expressly designate his ineligibility for parole as required by the statute. The court ordered the appellants to modify his parole-eligibility date but denied further relief, stating that McGowan's release was an issue for the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that McGowan's sentencing order did not contain the express designation required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-609(b)(2)(B) to render him ineligible for parole. The court also declined to remand the case for the sentencing order to be amended nunc pro tunc. The decision was consistent with the court's reasoning in a companion case, Rodgers v. Arkansas Parole Board. View "Post-Prison Transfer Board v. McGowan" on Justia Law

A former police officer, the petitioner, sought to annul the Comptroller's decision denying him accidental disability retirement (ADR) benefits. The petitioner was injured while on desk duty when his rolling chair tipped due to a rut in the floor, causing him to grab his desk and injure his shoulder and neck. He applied for ADR benefits, claiming the injury was accidental.The Comptroller denied the application, concluding that the petitioner could have reasonably anticipated the hazard. The petitioner testified that he was aware of the ruts in the floor and had been working desk duty for months. Photographs documented the floor's condition. The Comptroller determined that the injury was not the result of an "accident" as defined for ADR benefits.The petitioner challenged this decision through a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division confirmed the Comptroller's determination and dismissed the proceeding, stating that an event is not an accident if it could have been reasonably anticipated. One Justice dissented, arguing that the "reasonably anticipated" standard was inconsistent with precedent and that the chair tipping was a sudden, unexpected event.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment. The court held that a precipitating event that could or should have been reasonably anticipated by a person in the claimant's circumstances is not an "accident" for ADR benefits. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Comptroller's determination that the petitioner could have reasonably anticipated the near-fall from his desk chair, given his familiarity with the ruts in the floor and the documented condition of the precinct floor. The judgment was affirmed with costs. View "Bodenmiller v. DiNapoli" on Justia Law