Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Christian Greene, the Ombudsman for the District of Columbia Child & Family Services Agency (CFSA), was terminated from her position and subsequently filed a lawsuit against the District, claiming her termination violated the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). Greene argued that her termination was in retaliation for her disclosures about CFSA's non-compliance with the Foster Youth Statements of Rights and Responsibilities Amendment Act of 2012 (FYAA).The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of CFSA, concluding that Greene's disclosures were merely policy disagreements about the role of the Ombudsman and not protected under the WPA. The court did not address whether Greene reasonably believed her disclosures revealed unlawful activity or whether there was a causal connection between her disclosures and her termination.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that Greene's disclosures were indeed protected under the WPA. The court held that Greene reasonably believed her disclosures revealed violations of the FYAA, which required CFSA to report on the outcomes of investigations and ensure compliance with relevant laws. The court noted that Greene's belief was genuine and reasonable, given the evidence she provided and the context of her role.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. The trial court was instructed to determine whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Greene's WPA-protected disclosures were a cause of her termination. View "Greene v. D.C. Child & Family Services Agency" on Justia Law

The case involves Susan Hartnett, a public employee who worked for the Commonwealth from 1978 to 1990 and then rejoined public service in 2002, working for the city of Boston. Upon her return, her salary more than doubled compared to her 1990 salary. Hartnett continued working until 2006 and deferred her retirement until 2016. Initially, her pension was calculated without applying the anti-spiking provision of the public employee pension statute, but after an audit, the Boston Retirement System (BRS) applied the provision, reducing her pension.Hartnett challenged the application of the anti-spiking provision. The Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) and the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB) affirmed BRS's decision. Hartnett then sought judicial review in the Superior Court, which ruled in her favor, concluding that the anti-spiking provision did not apply because the years 1990 and 2002 were not "two consecutive years" under the statute. The agencies appealed, and the case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the phrase "two consecutive years" in the anti-spiking provision refers to two back-to-back years without interruption. The court found that the plain meaning of "consecutive" means following one after another without interruption, and this interpretation is consistent with the statutory scheme. The court rejected the agencies' argument that "two consecutive years" should mean two creditable years of service without another intervening year of service. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment in favor of Hartnett, ruling that the years 1990 and 2002 are not "two consecutive years" under the anti-spiking provision. View "Hartnett v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board" on Justia Law

The case involves a proposed electric substation in East Boston by NSTAR Electric Company, doing business as Eversource Energy. The Energy Facilities Siting Board (the board) granted a certificate of environmental impact and public interest to Eversource for the substation. The petitioners, Conservation Law Foundation and GreenRoots, Inc., challenged this decision, arguing that Eversource failed to show "undue delay" by two city agencies, and that the board did not properly consider environmental justice principles, among other issues.Previously, Eversource's petition to build the substation was approved by the board in 2017, with a project change approved in 2018. The petitioners intervened in the proceedings, and the board issued a decision in November 2022, granting the certificate. The petitioners then filed for judicial review in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and upheld the board's decision. The court found that the board's determination of "undue delay" by the city agencies was supported by substantial evidence. The court also concluded that the board properly considered environmental justice principles, including the equitable distribution of energy benefits and burdens. Additionally, the court found that the board's decision to issue the equivalent of a G. L. c. 91 tidelands license was lawful and supported by substantial evidence. The court affirmed the board's findings on the need for the substation, its compatibility with environmental protection, public health, and safety, and its alignment with the public interest. The decision of the board was affirmed. View "Conservation Law Foundation v. Energy Facilities Siting Board" on Justia Law

Robert Mayfield, a small-business owner operating thirteen fast-food restaurants in Austin, Texas, challenged the Department of Labor's (DOL) 2019 Minimum Salary Rule. This rule raised the minimum salary required to qualify for the White Collar Exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) from $455 per week to $684 per week. Mayfield argued that the DOL exceeded its statutory authority by imposing any salary requirement and that such a requirement violated the nondelegation doctrine.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the DOL, finding that the 2019 Minimum Salary Rule was within the DOL's authority to define and delimit the terms of the White Collar Exemption. The court also held that this delegation of authority did not violate the nondelegation doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fifth Circuit held that the DOL's authority to define and delimit the terms of the White Collar Exemption included the power to set a minimum salary level. The court found that this power was explicitly delegated by Congress and was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court also determined that the major questions doctrine did not apply, as the economic and political significance of the rule did not meet the threshold for invoking the doctrine. Additionally, the court concluded that the FLSA's purpose and the text of the exemption itself provided sufficient guidance to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine's requirements. View "Mayfield v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Three Libertarian Party candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives were disqualified from the 2024 general election ballot by the State Objection Panel for failing to comply with Iowa's statutory nomination requirements. The candidates, Nicholas Gluba, Charles Aldrich, and Marco Battaglia, were nominated at a party convention after no Libertarian candidates filed for the primary election. However, the party did not follow the required process for selecting delegates to the convention, which included holding precinct caucuses and county conventions on separate days and notifying county auditors of the delegates.The Iowa District Court for Polk County upheld the Panel's decision, finding that the Libertarian Party did not comply with Iowa Code section 43.94, which mandates that county convention delegates' terms begin the day after their election at precinct caucuses. The court ruled that strict compliance with this law was necessary, and the party's failure to follow the process invalidated the nominations. The court also rejected arguments that the objectors lacked standing and that the Panel's decision violated the candidates' First Amendment rights.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that the statutory requirements for nominating candidates by convention must be strictly followed and that the Libertarian Party's failure to comply with these requirements justified the disqualification of the candidates. The court also found that the objectors had standing to challenge the nominations and that the Panel's decision did not violate the candidates' First Amendment rights. The court emphasized that the election laws are designed to ensure a fair and orderly process for candidate nominations. View "Gluba v. State Objection Panel" on Justia Law

In 2022, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance extending the notice period for landlords pursuing at-fault evictions. The San Francisco Apartment Association and Small Property Owners of San Francisco Institute sought a writ of mandate to prevent the City and County of San Francisco from enforcing the ordinance, arguing it was preempted by state law. The trial court partially granted the petition, finding the ordinance preempted only for nonpayment of rent evictions. Both parties appealed.The San Francisco Superior Court initially ruled that the ordinance conflicted with state law only regarding nonpayment of rent, citing a split in authority on notice periods for other fault-based evictions. The court referenced Tri County Apartment Association v. City of Mountain View, which invalidated extended notice periods, and Rental Housing Association of Northern Alameda County v. City of Oakland, which allowed them. The trial court felt bound by Rental Housing and limited its ruling to nonpayment of rent.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the entire ordinance was preempted by state law. The court found that the ordinance was procedural, not substantive, as it extended the state-mandated three-day notice period to a minimum of 13 days, conflicting with the Unlawful Detainer Act's timelines. The court determined that state law fully occupies the field of landlord-tenant notification timelines, making the local ordinance invalid.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment in part, ruling that the entire ordinance was preempted by state law, and directed the superior court to issue a writ of mandate preventing the City and County of San Francisco from enforcing the ordinance. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal. View "S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F." on Justia Law

The case involves a bid protest action initiated by Oak Grove Technologies, LLC against the United States Department of the Army's award of a contract to F3EA, Inc. The contract, known as SOF RAPTOR IV, was for procuring training services for special forces. Oak Grove, a competing bidder, alleged that the bidding process was flawed and that F3EA had an unfair advantage due to an organizational conflict of interest involving the chairperson of the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB), RM.The Court of Federal Claims reviewed the case and agreed with Oak Grove, finding that the Army's evaluation process was flawed. The court enjoined the Army from proceeding with the contract award to F3EA and ordered the Army to either restart the procurement process or reopen it to accept revised proposals. The court also sanctioned the government for failing to include material evidence in the administrative record, which delayed the proceedings and increased costs for Oak Grove.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the judgment and injunction issued by the Court of Federal Claims. The appellate court held that Oak Grove had waived its argument that the Army was required to hold discussions with bidders, that F3EA was not required to include teaming agreements in its proposal, and that the Army's investigation into RM's alleged misconduct was adequate. The court also found that the Court of Federal Claims erred in determining that Lukos, another bidder, was financially irresponsible and ineligible for the contract. However, the appellate court affirmed the sanctions imposed on the government for failing to compile a complete administrative record. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "OAK GROVE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

A former chauffeur, Hyunhuy Nam, filed a lawsuit against the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, alleging violations of federal, state, and city wage-and-hour and anti-discrimination laws. Nam, a South Korean citizen and U.S. permanent resident, was employed by the Mission as a chauffeur. His duties included driving high-level officials, adhering to diplomatic protocols, and maintaining confidentiality of classified information. Nam was required to undergo a high-level security clearance and sign annual confidentiality agreements. He was eventually terminated at age 61, after his contract was extended due to his wife's job loss during the pandemic.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the Mission's motion to dismiss, holding that Nam's employment fell within the "commercial activity" exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court later granted Nam's motion for partial summary judgment, awarding him damages and interest on his wage-and-hour claims, while the remaining claims were set for trial. The Mission appealed, arguing that it was immune under the FSIA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Nam without resolving factual disputes regarding the nature of his employment. The court emphasized that the district court should have considered whether Nam's employment was governmental or commercial in nature, taking into account the context of his duties and the security measures involved. The appellate court instructed the district court to weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, and, if necessary, conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the applicability of the FSIA's commercial activity exception. View "Nam v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United" on Justia Law

In 2018, Robbie Gail Charette, a Republican candidate for Judge of the County Court-at-Law in Washington County, Texas, was indicted on four misdemeanor charges related to campaign law violations. These charges included misrepresenting the source of a campaign communication, falsely claiming to hold a public office, failing to file a personal financial statement on time, and not maintaining proper records of political expenditures. A special prosecutor pursued these charges without a prior referral from the Texas Ethics Commission (TEC).The trial court denied Charette's pretrial habeas application, which argued that the prosecution was unauthorized without prior TEC proceedings. The court found no legislative language granting the TEC exclusive authority to enforce the violations and ruled that district attorneys could independently investigate and prosecute election-related crimes. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld this decision, stating that the district court had jurisdiction over the misdemeanors and that any alleged deprivation of civil due process rights by the TEC did not affect this jurisdiction.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the TEC has exclusive jurisdiction over the offenses listed in Chapter 571 of the Texas Government Code. The court held that the TEC must make an initial determination on alleged violations before any criminal charges can be brought. Since no TEC proceedings occurred in Charette's case, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the charges. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and ordered the dismissal of the indictments against Charette. View "EX PARTE CHARETTE" on Justia Law

A psychiatrist employed at a public university's medical school participated in a panel discussion on childhood gender dysphoria, expressing views that were unpopular with his colleagues and supervisors. Following his remarks, he was demoted and his contract was not renewed after over fifteen years of employment. He sued several university officials, alleging First Amendment retaliation.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, which argued for Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity. The court found material fact disputes regarding whether the defendants retaliated against the plaintiff for his protected speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff's speech was protected under the First Amendment as it addressed a matter of public concern and was not made pursuant to his official duties. The court also found that the plaintiff's interest in speaking on the topic outweighed the university's interest in maintaining workplace efficiency. The court determined that the adverse actions taken against the plaintiff, including his demotion and contract nonrenewal, were motivated by his protected speech.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment, concluding that the defendants were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity or qualified immunity. The court held that the plaintiff's rights were clearly established and that a reasonable university official would have understood that retaliating against him for his speech was unlawful. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction as moot. View "Josephson v. Ganzel" on Justia Law