Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A police officer employed by a city in Kentucky worked a rotating schedule of 36 and 44 hours per week, but was paid for 40 hours each week without overtime for hours worked beyond 40 in a given week. After a state audit revealed the city’s payroll practices violated overtime requirements, the city issued back pay to affected employees and revised its procedures. The officer, believing the back pay was insufficient and that certain categories of compensation were miscalculated, rejected the payment and filed suit for unpaid overtime, vacation, and sick leave, as well as liquidated damages and attorney’s fees. The relevant period for the claim was limited by statute to the officer’s last three years of employment.The Bullitt Circuit Court, after a bench trial, found the city liable for unpaid overtime and vacation pay, but denied liquidated damages and retirement hazardous duty pay, and initially awarded sick leave. Upon the city’s motion to amend, the trial court corrected calculation errors, eliminated the sick leave award based on a city ordinance, and reduced the overtime award. The court also awarded only $2,500 in attorney’s fees, far less than the amount requested and supported by detailed billing records. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of liquidated damages, sick leave, and retirement hazardous duty pay, but reversed and remanded for reconsideration of statutory interest and attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals in full. It held that the trial court properly amended its judgment to correct errors based on evidence presented at trial, that liquidated damages under the wage statute are discretionary when the employer acts in good faith, that statutory interest applies from the date of judgment, and that the trial court abused its discretion by arbitrarily reducing attorney’s fees without explanation. The case was remanded for proper calculation of interest and attorney’s fees. View "WHEELER V. CITY OF PIONEER VILLAGE, KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A local government enacted an ordinance that completely prohibited its police officers from seeking or executing no-knock warrants within its jurisdiction. This ordinance was adopted after the state legislature passed a statute (SB 4, now codified in KRS 455.180 and related provisions) that did not ban no-knock warrants outright, but instead imposed strict conditions and procedural safeguards for their issuance and execution. The statute allowed no-knock warrants only in limited circumstances, subject to a clear and convincing evidentiary standard, approval by a superior officer, consultation with prosecutors, and time-of-day restrictions.The Fraternal Order of Police challenged the ordinance in Fayette Circuit Court, arguing that it conflicted with state law. The trial court found no express or implied conflict, reasoning that the statute did not require the use of no-knock warrants, but merely set conditions for their issuance, and thus the ordinance’s total ban did not conflict with the statute. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, but did not definitively resolve the conflict issue, instead remanding for further proceedings, particularly in light of collective bargaining questions.The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review and held that the local ordinance directly conflicted with the state statute. The Court reasoned that the statute authorizes law enforcement officers to seek no-knock warrants under certain conditions, while the ordinance prohibits them from ever doing so, making it impossible for officers to comply with both. The Court concluded that when a local ordinance prohibits what a state statute permits, the ordinance is void. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals and declared the ordinance null, void, and of no effect. View "LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT V. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE" on Justia Law

An unlicensed cannabis establishment, DC Smoke, applied for a medical cannabis retailer license under the District of Columbia’s Medical Cannabis Amendment Act of 2022, which allowed such applications during a designated 90-day period. Advisory Neighborhood Commission (ANC) 2C, the only entity permitted by statute to protest such applications at that time, submitted a formal protest to the District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board. After a protest hearing and review of evidence, the Board approved DC Smoke’s application in a written order issued on May 1, 2024.Following the Board’s decision, ANC 2C filed a petition for review with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on May 31, 2024. The court questioned the ANC’s standing to seek judicial review, referencing its prior decision in Kopff v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, which held that ANCs are prohibited by D.C. Code § 1-309.10(g) from initiating legal actions in the District’s courts. In response, ANC 2C Commissioner Thomas Lee filed his own petition for review, but did so after the thirty-day deadline required by D.C. App. R. 15(a)(2).The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that ANC 2C lacked standing to petition for review because the statutory prohibition on ANCs initiating legal actions in court was not implicitly repealed by the Medical Cannabis Amendment Act. The court further determined that the requirement to name a proper petitioner in a petition for review is jurisdictional, preventing the ANC from adding or substituting Commissioner Lee as a petitioner. Additionally, the court held that the thirty-day filing deadline for petitions for review is a mandatory claim-processing rule not subject to equitable tolling. As a result, both the ANC’s and Commissioner Lee’s petitions were dismissed, and the court declined to consider the merits of the Board’s licensing decision. View "ANC 2C v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board" on Justia Law

A condominium association in Southwest Washington, D.C., which owns a large complex of over 200 townhomes, challenged the way the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority (D.C. Water) calculates a stormwater runoff fee known as the Clean Rivers Impervious Area Charge (CRIAC). The association is classified as a multi-family customer because its water is supplied through several master-metered service lines, rather than each townhome having an individual meter. This classification results in the CRIAC being calculated based on the total impervious surface area of the property, rather than using a tiered system that applies to individually metered residential properties. The association argued that this method, which ties the fee calculation to how the property is metered, is arbitrary and capricious, as the metering method does not affect the amount of stormwater runoff.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to D.C. Water. The court found that D.C. Water’s classification and billing methodology were reasonable and consistent with industry standards, relying on declarations from D.C. Water officials and legislative history. The court also rejected the association’s constitutional and equal protection claims, which were not pursued on appeal.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment on the constitutional claims, as those were not contested on appeal. However, the appellate court vacated the summary judgment on the claim that D.C. Water’s use of metering as a factor in CRIAC calculation was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that D.C. Water had not provided an adequate explanation for why metering should affect the fee, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that issue. View "Capitol Park IV Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority" on Justia Law

Three non-profit corporations, each formed by littoral homeowners in the Portlock neighborhood of East Honolulu, purchased narrow beachfront reserve lots that separated their homes from the ocean. In 2003, Hawai‘i enacted Act 73, which declared certain accreted lands—land gradually added to the shoreline by natural forces—to be public property, preventing private parties from registering or quieting title to such land. Shortly after purchasing the lots, the non-profits (the Ohanas) filed an inverse condemnation action, alleging that Act 73 resulted in an uncompensated taking of accreted land seaward of their lots, in violation of the Hawai‘i Constitution. The parties stipulated that, if a taking occurred, just compensation would be based on the fair market rental value of the accreted land.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit initially granted partial summary judgment to the Ohanas, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed in part, holding that Act 73 effected a taking of existing accreted lands. On remand, after a bench trial with expert testimony, the circuit court found that the fair market rental value of the accreted land was zero dollars, based on credible evidence that the land’s use was highly restricted and had no market value. The court declined to award nominal damages or attorneys’ fees. The ICA affirmed, finding the circuit court’s factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence and that sovereign immunity barred attorneys’ fees.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the ICA’s judgment. It held that the circuit court did not err in awarding zero dollars as just compensation, nor in declining to award nominal damages, because the Ohanas suffered no compensable loss. The court further held that the just compensation clause of the Hawai‘i Constitution does not waive sovereign immunity for attorneys’ fees in inverse condemnation cases. View "Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State" on Justia Law

An employee with over twenty years of service at the State of Hawai‘i Department of Public Safety was discharged from her position as warden of a correctional facility following allegations of creating a hostile work environment and sexual harassment. The investigation led to multiple charges, some of which were sustained by a hearings officer, resulting in the Director’s decision to terminate her employment. The employee had no prior disciplinary record and had previously received recognition for her service.The employee appealed her discharge to the Merit Appeals Board (MAB), which held a contested case hearing. The MAB found credible evidence to sustain some, but not all, of the charges, including one for sexual harassment under a progressive discipline policy. However, the MAB found no credible evidence to support the charge brought under the employer’s zero-tolerance workplace violence policy. Considering the employee’s long, discipline-free record and the principle of progressive discipline, the MAB modified the discharge to a sixty-day suspension and ordered her reinstatement.The Department of Public Safety appealed to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, which reversed the MAB’s decision, concluding that the MAB exceeded its statutory authority by applying progressive discipline rather than deferring to the zero-tolerance policy. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that the MAB acted within its statutory authority under Hawai‘i law when it modified the disciplinary action from discharge to a sixty-day suspension. The Supreme Court determined that the sustained charges were not subject to the zero-tolerance policy, and the MAB’s application of progressive discipline was proper. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and affirmed the MAB’s order. View "Department of Public Safety v. Forbes" on Justia Law

After the Washington Medical Commission adopted a policy to discipline physicians for spreading COVID-19 “misinformation,” several plaintiffs—including physicians who had been charged with unprofessional conduct, physicians who had not been charged, and advocacy organizations—filed suit. The Commission’s actions included investigating and charging doctors for public statements and writings about COVID-19 treatments and vaccines. Some plaintiffs, such as Dr. Eggleston and Dr. Siler, were actively facing disciplinary proceedings, while others, like Dr. Moynihan, had not been charged but claimed their speech was chilled. Additional plaintiffs included a non-profit organization and a public figure who alleged their right to receive information was affected.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed the plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. The court found that the claims were constitutionally and prudentially unripe, and that the doctrine of Younger abstention required federal courts to refrain from interfering with ongoing state disciplinary proceedings. The district court also addressed the merits, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible First Amendment or due process claim, but the primary basis for dismissal was abstention and ripeness.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Younger abstention barred claims challenging ongoing state disciplinary proceedings (including as-applied and facial constitutional challenges, and due process claims) for all plaintiffs subject to such proceedings. The court also held that Younger abstention did not apply to claims for prospective relief by plaintiffs not currently subject to proceedings, but those claims were constitutionally and prudentially unripe because no concrete injury had occurred and further factual development was needed. The Ninth Circuit thus affirmed the dismissal of all claims. View "STOCKTON V. BROWN" on Justia Law

A journalist sought access to meetings of the Tennessee Judicial Advisory Commission, which advises the Tennessee Supreme Court on rules of practice and procedure. The Commission’s meetings had been open to the public until 2018, when they were closed following a disruption by a member of the public. The journalist argued that closing these meetings violated his First Amendment rights by denying him access to government proceedings.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee initially granted the journalist a preliminary injunction, allowing public access to the meetings. However, after discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Director of the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts, and dissolved the injunction. The journalist appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the First Amendment does not provide a general right of access to government information or proceedings. It explained that the “experience-and-logic” test, derived from Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for Riverside County, applies only to adjudicatory proceedings, such as criminal trials or formal administrative hearings. The court found that the Commission’s meetings are purely advisory and not adjudicatory in nature, as they do not involve adversarial proceedings or have binding legal effect. Therefore, the experience-and-logic test was inapplicable, and the journalist’s First Amendment claim failed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant. View "McCaleb v. Long" on Justia Law

A group of neighbors opposed the development of a public sports park on a 65-acre parcel in Maui. The State Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) sought and received a special use permit from the County of Maui Planning Commission to build the park. Several future members of the neighbors’ group, Maui Lani Neighbors, Inc. (MLN), received notice of the permit hearing, attended, and some testified, but none formally intervened in the proceedings. After the permit was granted, one future MLN member filed an administrative appeal but later dismissed it. MLN was then incorporated and filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, challenging the permit on zoning, environmental, constitutional, and procedural grounds.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit dismissed most of MLN’s claims, holding that they should have been brought as an administrative appeal of the Planning Commission’s decision under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14, and that MLN failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, but with different reasoning on some points. The ICA held that the administrative process provided an exclusive remedy for most claims, but allowed that some environmental claims under HRS chapter 343 (the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act, or HEPA) could proceed in circuit court if they did not seek to invalidate the permit.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the ICA’s judgment in most respects, but clarified that MLN’s claims under HRS chapter 343 were not subject to the exhaustion doctrine and could be brought directly in circuit court. The court held that, except for HEPA claims, MLN was required to challenge the permit through an administrative appeal, and that the declaratory judgment statute (HRS § 632-1) did not provide an alternative route. The court remanded the case to the circuit court to consider the HEPA-based claims. View "Maui Lani Neighbors v. State" on Justia Law

Several individuals who had received grants of parole under programs established by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela challenged the government’s decision to terminate those grants. The parole programs, created during the Biden Administration, allowed eligible individuals from these countries to enter the United States temporarily for up to two years, based on urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. When President Trump took office in January 2025, he issued executive orders directing DHS to end categorical parole programs, including the CHNV programs. DHS subsequently published a notice terminating the programs and revoking all existing grants of parole within thirty days, rather than allowing them to expire naturally.The plaintiffs, affected by the early termination, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court certified a class of affected individuals and granted a preliminary stay, preventing DHS from revoking their parole grants before the original expiration dates. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the categorical termination was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), in part because the agency’s rationale rested on a legal error and failed to adequately consider reliance and humanitarian interests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The First Circuit held that the relevant statute requires DHS to grant parole only on a case-by-case basis, but does not impose the same limitation on the termination of parole. The court also found that the agency’s explanation for terminating the parole programs was not so deficient as to be arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Concluding that the plaintiffs had not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, the First Circuit vacated the district court’s stay and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Noem" on Justia Law