Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Brent Gordon's claim that Herriman City's policy violates his right to inspect records under the Utah Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA). Gordon did not appeal Herriman’s denial of a records request but instead sued for an injunction that would require Herriman to allow him to inspect any public record free of charge. The district court dismissed Gordon’s case, concluding that he needed to submit a formal records request and exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing suit.The district court agreed with Herriman City and dismissed Gordon’s claim. The court ruled that Gordon was not entitled to judicial review because he either did not make a formal GRAMA request or, if he did, he did not fully exhaust the administrative remedies associated with that request. Gordon appealed the district court’s decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Gordon lacked statutory standing to pursue his claim. The court explained that the injunction provision in Utah Code section 63G-2-802(1), which Gordon relied on, merely provides a remedy and does not create a right of action. The court concluded that without an express or implied statutory right to seek judicial review of Herriman’s alleged policy, Gordon lacked statutory standing to pursue this action. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate his GRAMA claim and correctly dismissed it. View "Gordon v. Nostrom" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Pinellas County and Pasco County in Florida. Pinellas County owns approximately 12,400 acres of real estate in neighboring Pasco County. Although Pinellas County once paid ad valorem taxes to Pasco County for the property, it now asserts that sovereign immunity relieves it of that obligation. Pinellas County filed a lawsuit against the Pasco County Property Appraiser, seeking a judgment declaring the property immune from ad valorem taxes and an injunction prohibiting future assessment and collection of such taxes.The trial court ruled in favor of Pinellas County, holding that as a political subdivision of the state, Pinellas County is entitled to sovereign immunity, which includes immunity from the ad valorem taxation of its properties, regardless of whether those properties are located within the boundaries of Pinellas County or in another county within the state of Florida. The Pasco County Property Appraiser appealed this decision.The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's ruling. The district court noted that each county has statutory and constitutional authority to assess ad valorem taxes on “all property in the county.” The district court also rejected Pinellas County’s primary contention that its immunity from taxation extends beyond its own borders, noting that Pinellas County had not identified any supporting authority.The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed with Pinellas County's argument that its property in Pasco County was not taxable based on principles of sovereign immunity. The court held that although a county’s real property is immune from that county’s own efforts to assess ad valorem taxes, Pinellas County has not identified any authority recognizing an immunity from taxation of the county’s property located beyond its territorial boundaries. Therefore, the court concluded that sovereign immunity does not shield a county from the obligation of paying ad valorem taxes for property owned by that county but located outside its territorial boundaries. The court approved the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal. View "Pinellas County, Florida v. Joiner" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a workers' compensation claim filed by Christine Coray after she was injured at her workplace, Idaho Regional Hand & Upper Extremity Center. Following her injury, Coray's physician recommended back surgery. However, after an independent medical examination (IME) requested by her employer and its surety, they denied liability for the surgery and ongoing benefits, arguing that Coray had recovered from the workplace injury and that the surgery was necessitated by preexisting conditions. After undergoing surgery outside of the workers' compensation system, her employer requested a second IME by a different physician. Coray refused and sought a declaratory ruling from the Idaho Industrial Commission on whether the employer must use the same physician for multiple examinations of a single injury.The Idaho Industrial Commission ruled that the employer or surety is not required to use the same physician for multiple examinations of a single injury under Idaho Code section 72-433. However, it also held that each request for an IME is subject to a reasonableness standard, and the burden of proof for establishing reasonableness falls on the employer. Coray appealed this interpretation, while the employer cross-appealed the Commission's conclusion that it bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of a second IME.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the Idaho Industrial Commission's decision. It held that the plain language of Idaho Code section 72-433 does not prohibit an employer or surety from using different physicians to perform multiple examinations of a single injury. The court also affirmed the Commission's ruling that the employer bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of its requested IME, including its choice of physician, if raised by the employee. View "Coray v. Idaho Regional Hand & Upper Extremity Center" on Justia Law

A state agency (the Agency) is under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) for alleged criminal wrongdoing by senior Agency personnel. The DOJ requested the district court to determine that certain Agency communications were not protected by the attorney-client privilege. The district court agreed, ruling that the Agency could not invoke the attorney-client privilege to avoid producing evidence and witness testimony regarding four general categories of information. The Agency did not challenge the district court’s ruling as to the first three categories, but disputed the fourth category, which pertained to any actions or communications contemplated or undertaken by the Agency to interfere in or obstruct the current Federal investigation.The district court had previously granted the DOJ's application, ruling that the Agency could not invoke the attorney-client privilege to avoid producing evidence and witness testimony regarding four general categories of information. The Agency sought to modify or rescind this order, but the district court only partially granted the Agency's motion. In April 2024, DOJ served grand jury subpoenas on two senior Agency employees. The Agency moved to quash the subpoenas, but the district court denied the motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the Agency's petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought to override the district court's order allowing grand jury testimony to proceed. The court found that the Agency failed to show a clear and indisputable right to relief. The court also denied the Agency's emergency motion to stay grand jury proceedings. The court clarified that government attorneys may assert the attorney-client privilege as to state agency communications that were conducted in confidence and for the purpose of providing legal advice. However, the court also noted that the crime-fraud exception to the privilege may apply, and left this determination to the discretion of the district court. View "In re Sealed Petitioner" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Candis Danielson, was seriously injured by dogs owned by Donald Mehrtens. She filed a lawsuit against several parties, including Mehrtens and the County of Humboldt. Danielson claimed that the County failed to discharge certain mandatory duties regarding dangerous and unvaccinated dogs under both state law and the Humboldt County Code, which she argued led to her injuries. The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer without leave to amend, leading to Danielson's appeal.The trial court found that the duties Danielson identified were not mandatory within the meaning of Government Code section 815.6, and therefore, the County was immune from liability as a matter of law. The court reasoned that even if the Humboldt County Code had created a mandatory duty to hold a potentially dangerous dog hearing, it was uncertain that the hearing would have resulted in the dog's destruction or quarantine. The court also concluded that the vaccination statutes created a mandatory duty to set up an impoundment system, but did not mandate the impound of any specific, unvaccinated animals.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division One affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the duties identified by Danielson were not mandatory and that the County was immune from liability. The court also found that Danielson failed to identify any statute creating a mandatory duty which was breached by the County, and agreed with the trial court that her claim raised a serious question of causation. View "Danielson v. County of Humboldt" on Justia Law

Ronald Tilley, the appellant, was convicted for robbing a credit union in Bangor, Maine, in 2019. His pre-sentence investigation report (PSI Report) revealed two prior convictions involving potential sexual misconduct, leading to a suggestion for special conditions of supervised release requiring Tilley to participate in sex-offender treatment. The first conviction in 2005 involved an incident where Tilley's then-wife accused him of choking and sexually assaulting her. The second conviction in 2008 was for violating a protective order and involved sexually explicit text messages allegedly exchanged between Tilley and his underage niece. Tilley objected to the sex-offender treatment conditions, leading to a compromise requiring him to undergo a Sexual Offense Assessment and Treatment Evaluation (SOATE).The SOATE, conducted by a licensed clinical social worker, placed Tilley in the "well below average risk" category for sexual recidivism due to the time elapsed since his last sexual misconduct. However, the assessment recommended caution due to a deceptive response in a sexual history polygraph. The SOATE also diagnosed Tilley with antisocial personality disorder and opioid use disorder, and recommended that he have no unsupervised contact with minors and participate in weekly group therapy for sexually problematic behavior.Based on the SOATE report, the government petitioned to add several special conditions to Tilley's supervised release terms, including participation in sex-offender treatment and restrictions on associating with minors. Tilley objected to these conditions, arguing that they were not supported by his previous convictions and that the relevance of these convictions was significantly mitigated by the time elapsed without any sexual misconduct incidents.The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted the government's petition, finding that the proposed modifications promoted the goals of supervised release. The court also found the conditions restricting Tilley's association with minors to be proportionate and reasonably related to the goals of supervised release and his history and characteristics.Tilley appealed, arguing that the district court relied on "clearly erroneous facts" in imposing the modified conditions. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case for abuse of discretion and found no clear error. The court upheld the district court's decision, concluding that the modified conditions were reasonable and supported by the record. View "US v. Tilley" on Justia Law

Jake's Fireworks Inc., a large importer and distributor of consumer fireworks, sought judicial review of several warning notices it received from the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission. The notices were issued after the Commission's staff sampled fireworks imported by Jake's Fireworks and found that about one-third of those samples indicated that the fireworks were dangerously overloaded with explosive material, rendering them "banned hazardous substances" under the agency’s regulations. The Commission's Compliance Office accordingly sent Jake's Fireworks several “Notice[s] of Non-Compliance,” requesting that the distribution of the sampled lots not take place and that the existing inventory be destroyed.Jake's Fireworks first sued the Commission in federal court in 2019, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from the agency’s enforcement of its fireworks regulations via the Notices. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, determining that the Notices did not constitute final agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act because they did not consummate the Commission’s decisionmaking process. After the dismissal of its first lawsuit, Jake's Fireworks requested an informal hearing with the Compliance Office to contest the Notices. The Compliance Office declined to hold a hearing or to revisit its findings, and Jake's Fireworks filed a second lawsuit, which was also dismissed by the district court on the same grounds as the first lawsuit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Notices did not constitute final agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court reasoned that the Compliance Office’s Notices of Noncompliance did not mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process, as it is the Commission itself, not its Compliance Office, that makes final determinations on whether goods are banned hazardous substances. The court also found that the language of the Notices confirmed that they conveyed preliminary findings and advice from agency staff rather than a final determination from the Commission itself. View "Jake's Fireworks Inc. v. United States Consumer Product Safety Commission" on Justia Law

Between 2012 and 2015, Anthony D’Ambrosio and Armando Delgado were involved in a sex trafficking ring that operated across several states. They were responsible for transporting victims, collecting money, providing security, and supplying drugs to the victims. In 2015, a federal grand jury indicted them, and in 2017, a jury convicted them of several crimes, including sex trafficking of children and transportation of an individual to engage in prostitution. As part of their sentences, the District Court required them to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as a condition of their supervised release.Delgado objected to the SORNA registration requirement at his sentencing, arguing that his offenses did not require SORNA registration. The District Court acknowledged that it was unclear whether the SORNA requirement applied to Delgado’s offenses and delegated the determination to the Probation office. Delgado appealed this decision, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, stating that the District Court did not impose any SORNA requirement. However, following his direct appeal, Probation required Delgado to register under SORNA. Delgado challenged this condition, but the District Court denied his motion, stating that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his legal challenge.D’Ambrosio, on the other hand, did not object to the SORNA registration requirement at his sentencing. The District Court required D’Ambrosio to comply with SORNA as a condition of his supervised release. D’Ambrosio first challenged the SORNA requirement in a motion to modify, which the District Court also denied on the grounds of lacking jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's decisions. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in delegating its responsibility to determine the applicability of SORNA to the Probation office and in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendants' motions to modify the conditions of their supervised release. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. D’Ambrosio" on Justia Law

The case involves James Snyder, the former mayor of Portage, Indiana, who was convicted of accepting an illegal gratuity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(1)(B). In 2013, while Snyder was mayor, Portage awarded two contracts to a local truck company, Great Lakes Peterbilt, and purchased five trash trucks from the company for about $1.1 million. In 2014, Peterbilt paid Snyder $13,000. The FBI and federal prosecutors suspected that the payment was a gratuity for the City’s trash truck contracts, but Snyder claimed that the payment was for his consulting services as a contractor for Peterbilt. A federal jury convicted Snyder, and the District Court sentenced him to 1 year and 9 months in prison. On appeal, Snyder argued that §666 criminalizes only bribes, not gratuities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Snyder’s conviction.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision. The Court held that 18 U.S.C. §666 proscribes bribes to state and local officials but does not make it a crime for those officials to accept gratuities for their past acts. The Court reasoned that the statutory text, history, structure, punishments, federalism principles, and fair notice considerations all support the conclusion that §666 is a bribery statute and not a gratuities statute. The Court concluded that a state or local official does not violate §666 if the official has taken the official act before any reward is agreed to, much less given. Although a gratuity offered and accepted after the official act may be unethical or illegal under other federal, state, or local laws, the gratuity does not violate §666. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. View "Snyder v. United States" on Justia Law

The case involves Greater Birmingham Ministries, a multi-faith, multi-racial organization that promotes voter registration efforts in Alabama, and the Secretary of State for the State of Alabama. The organization requested electronic production of several voter lists, including records of individual felons disqualified from voting by Alabama, invoking the public disclosure provision of the National Voter Registration Act. The organization argued that the records should be produced electronically and at no cost. The Secretary of State agreed to provide an electronic version of the first list of voter records at a cost of one cent per name but refused to provide any records related to felony disqualifications, asserting that the request exceeded the scope of the Act.The district court ruled that the National Voter Registration Act entitled Greater Birmingham Ministries to both sets of records and that electronic disclosure was required in the specific circumstances of this case. The court also ruled that the Act entitled the Secretary to charge a “reasonable fee,” connected “to the actual costs he incurs in producing responsive voter records.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's order. The court held that the voter records that Greater Birmingham Ministries requested are covered by the National Voter Registration Act’s public disclosure provision. However, the court ruled that the Act does not require the Secretary to turn those records over in an electronic format. Therefore, the district court’s injunction ordering the Secretary to produce the records electronically was improper. The same is true for its direction that the parties reach agreement on a reasonable fee. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Secretary of State for the State of Alabama" on Justia Law