Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Several individuals attended a Loudoun County School Board meeting intending to speak during the public-comment period about recent news involving the Board’s reinstatement of a student who had previously been arrested and allegedly threatened another student. They wished to express concerns regarding the Board’s handling of school safety, particularly in relation to this specific student. During the meeting, the School Board Chair interrupted several of these individuals, invoking a Board policy that prohibits speakers from targeting, criticizing, or attacking individual students during public comments, and advised that such concerns should instead be directed privately to school officials.After these interruptions, the affected individuals filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Their complaint alleged that, as applied to them, the Board’s policy constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment, and that the policy was unconstitutionally vague. They sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the policy against them. The district court denied both requests, finding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on either claim. The court found that the policy was a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restriction appropriate to the limited public forum of the school board’s meetings, and that the interruptions were consistent with the policy’s facial requirements, not discriminatory based on viewpoint. Furthermore, the court determined that the policy language—prohibiting comments that “target, criticize, or attack individual students”—was not unconstitutionally vague, providing sufficient notice and guidance for enforcement. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Platt v. Mansfield" on Justia Law

Ronald B. Panting, an independent contractor serving as a Designated Pilot Examiner (DPE) for the FAA, was conducting a pilot certification checkride for Michael Trubilla in a plane rented from the LeMay Aero Club, a government-affiliated organization. Both men died when the plane crashed during the checkride. Five days prior to the accident, Ronald signed a covenant not to sue the government for injuries sustained while participating in Aero Club activities, applicable to himself and his estate. His spouse, Lynne D. Panting, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging negligent maintenance of the aircraft.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied the government’s motion for summary judgment, ruling the covenant not to sue was void as against public policy under Nebraska law. The court did not address Lynne’s alternative argument that the covenant did not apply to Ronald’s activities as a DPE on the day of the crash. Following a bench trial, the district court found the government negligent and entered judgment for Lynne, awarding damages. The government appealed, challenging the district court’s decision regarding the covenant’s validity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment because the enforceability of the covenant was a purely legal issue. Applying Nebraska law, the appellate court determined the covenant was neither clearly repugnant to public policy nor the product of disparate bargaining power, and that the Aero Club did not provide a public or essential service. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of whether the covenant covered Ronald’s activities as a DPE, and for further proceedings as appropriate. View "Panting v. United States" on Justia Law

Three business entities and individuals associated with the operation of a retail store in Cedar Park, Texas, were subject to enforcement under a city ordinance banning “head shops”—stores selling items commonly used to ingest or inhale illegal substances. After receiving notices from the City, two of the appellants were charged in municipal court and fined for violating the ordinance, while the third appellant, a related business entity, was not charged. Following the municipal court’s judgment, the two charged parties appealed for a trial de novo in the county court, which annulled the municipal court’s judgment and began new criminal proceedings. They also pursued state habeas relief, which was still ongoing at the time of this appeal.Separately, the appellants filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, challenging the ordinance’s validity and constitutionality under federal and state law, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed all claims as barred by the doctrine announced in Heck v. Humphrey, which precludes certain civil claims that would imply the invalidity of existing criminal convictions. The district court also dismissed a distinct claim related to termination of utility services.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that because the municipal court’s judgments were annulled by the trial de novo and criminal proceedings were still pending under Texas law, there were no outstanding convictions to trigger the Heck bar. Thus, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims challenging the ordinance and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the standalone water termination claim, as the appellants had disclaimed any intent to pursue it. View "Kleinman v. City of Cedar Park" on Justia Law

A research scientist who had worked for over a decade at a public university in Ohio coauthored several well-regarded articles during her tenure. After she left the university for a new position, allegations of research misconduct surfaced regarding some of her publications. The university convened an investigative committee, as required by federal regulations due to its receipt of federal funding. The committee found that she had committed research misconduct and recommended barring her from future university employment, retracting or correcting certain articles, and reported its findings to relevant journals and her current employer. The scientist alleged that the committee deviated from standard investigatory procedures, failed to provide exculpatory evidence, and did not require proof of intent or recklessness.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed her complaint, which had sought equitable relief under federal and state law. The court held that sovereign immunity shielded the university’s Board of Trustees and the officials sued in their official capacities from most claims. It found several claims time-barred and determined that the remaining constitutional claims, including due process and equal protection, failed on the merits. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against individuals in their personal capacities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that sovereign immunity barred all claims against the Board of Trustees and all state-law claims against the officials in their official capacities. As to the remaining federal due process claims, the court determined that the plaintiff failed to identify a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the stigma-plus doctrine and that the alleged conduct—even if malicious or in violation of confidentiality regulations—did not amount to conscience-shocking behavior under substantive due process standards. View "Pichiorri v. Burghes" on Justia Law

A group of petitioners obtained a default judgment exceeding $8 million against two corporations for fraud and misrepresentation related to a Ponzi scheme. The corporations’ presidents had previously been found guilty of criminal fraud and ordered to pay restitution, but this did not cover all losses suffered by the petitioners. The petitioners then applied to the California Secretary of State for restitution from the Victims of Corporate Fraud Compensation Fund, relying on their default judgment as the basis for their claim.The Secretary of State determined that the applications were ineligible, treating them as resubmissions of previously denied applications and closing the file without further review. The petitioners responded by filing a verified petition in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, seeking an order directing payment from the fund. The trial court concluded it had jurisdiction, deemed the Secretary’s response a denial, and granted the petition. The court found that the Secretary had waived any objections to the sufficiency of the applications by failing to request more information and ordered payment to the petitioners.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that the trial court had jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s determination. The appellate court found insufficient evidentiary support for the Secretary’s conclusion that the applications were impermissible resubmissions, requiring that determination to be set aside. However, it also concluded that the trial court erred in finding the Secretary waived her other objections; the Secretary retains the authority to assess the merits of the applications. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded the case to the Secretary for reconsideration, specifying that the Secretary cannot reassert the resubmission determination or deny the applications solely for facial deficiencies in the underlying complaint. The petitioners’ and Secretary’s respective burdens at different procedural stages were clarified. View "Amaro v. Weber" on Justia Law

A citizen advocacy group and two individuals challenged five provisions of a city ordinance in Kerrville, Texas, that regulated "canvassing" and "soliciting" activities at private residences and public streets. The ordinance defined "canvassing" as door-to-door advocacy on topics like religion, politics, or philosophy, and "soliciting" as seeking donations or advertising services, with both activities subject to restrictions on timing, signage, permitting, and location. Plaintiffs argued that these rules chilled their protected speech, including political canvassing, religious outreach, and commercial solicitation, and feared fines under the ordinance.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas considered the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. After a hearing, the district court found that the plaintiffs had standing as to most provisions except the rule applying to minors. On the merits, the district court enjoined enforcement of the permitting requirement for solicitors but declined to enjoin the hours, signage, and street restrictions, finding those likely constitutional under intermediate scrutiny.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Fifth Circuit agreed that plaintiffs had standing except as to the minor-related provision. It held that the hours and signage restrictions—because they targeted canvassing based on content—must be reviewed under strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny, and remanded for reconsideration. The court also found the city failed to justify the streets provision even under intermediate scrutiny and remanded for further injunction analysis. It affirmed the injunction against the permitting requirement but vacated it as overbroad, directing the district court to limit relief to the plaintiffs. The Fifth Circuit denied as moot the motion for an injunction pending appeal. View "LIA Network v. City of Kerrville" on Justia Law

The case centers on the City of San José’s attempt to address a substantial unfunded liability in its employee retirement plans. The City, obligated by its charter and state law to maintain actuarially sound pension systems for its employees, decided to refinance this unfunded liability by issuing pension obligation bonds. The proposed bonds would allow the City to pay down the liability at a potentially lower interest rate, thereby aiming to relieve future budgetary pressures. The Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association and others challenged the plan, arguing that issuing these bonds would create new municipal debt exceeding current annual revenues and, under the California Constitution’s local debt limitation, would require approval by two-thirds of the City’s voters.The Santa Clara County Superior Court found in favor of the City, ruling that the unfunded pension liability was an obligation imposed by law and thus fell within an exception to the local debt limitation. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, though it reasoned that the bonds would not create new debt because the obligation already existed in the form of the unfunded liability.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The Court held that, even if the bonds were considered to create new debt, the City’s obligation to address its unfunded actuarial liability is an obligation imposed by law, not a voluntary undertaking. Therefore, the exception to the local debt limitation applies, and voter approval is not required for the issuance of the pension obligation bonds. The Court clarified that the local debt limitation does not restrict the City’s discretion in choosing how to fulfill its legally imposed pension funding obligations. View "City of San Jose v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn." on Justia Law

The case involves an individual who left his Florida residence in August 2018 to care for his terminally ill brother, a tenant in a New York City Mitchell-Lama apartment. After the brother’s death in March 2020, the petitioner sought succession rights to the apartment, which required him to prove that the apartment was his primary residence for at least one year prior to his brother’s death. The petitioner submitted various documents, including income certifications, power of attorney forms, and certain public assistance records. However, some materials listed his Florida address, and much of his supporting documentation either fell outside the relevant one-year period or was not addressed to the apartment in question.The housing company denied his application, concluding that he failed to establish primary residency during the required time. The New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) upheld this decision after an administrative appeal, finding the evidence insufficient. The petitioner then challenged the agency’s determination through a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The Supreme Court annulled the agency’s decision and granted succession rights, ruling the denial irrational. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the agency’s denial had a rational basis, especially given the petitioner’s failure to supply certain key documents such as New York State tax returns or proof of exemption.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The Court held that, under the applicable regulations, the agency’s determination that the petitioner failed to prove the apartment was his primary residence for the required period was supported by a rational basis. The Court emphasized that the agency’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and the evidence provided by the petitioner did not meet the burden required to establish primary residency for succession rights. The order dismissing the petition was affirmed. View "Matter of Mantilla v New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev." on Justia Law

A resident who lived within a business and parking improvement district in Seattle requested records relating to district operations, including staff compensation, budgets, and meeting minutes. The district was managed by DBIA Services, a private nonprofit corporation that provided services funded almost entirely by assessments on local property owners, collected by the City of Seattle. DBIA managed key district programs, including public safety, sanitation, and economic development, and often identified itself as acting on behalf of the district. When the resident could not obtain all requested information, particularly staff compensation details, he brought suit alleging that DBIA was subject to Washington’s Public Records Act.In King County Superior Court, both parties moved for summary judgment. The court found that DBIA Services and the district were not a single entity and that DBIA was not the functional equivalent of a government agency under the Public Records Act, granting judgment for DBIA. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, using an abuse of discretion standard on summary judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case de novo and concluded that DBIA Services is the functional equivalent of a government agency under the Telford test, considering factors such as the governmental nature of DBIA’s functions, the overwhelming public funding, and the risk that denying access would frustrate government transparency. The Supreme Court held that DBIA is subject to the Public Records Act, reversed the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also granted the petitioner’s request for attorney fees on appeal, to be determined by the trial court. View "Horvath v. DBIA Services" on Justia Law

Florida PACE Funding Agency initiated a proceeding in the Second Judicial Circuit to validate the issuance of $5 billion in bonds for financing certain property improvements under the PACE Act. The agency complied with statutory notice requirements, and a hearing was held where State Attorneys from the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits were represented. No party objected to the entry of final judgment validating the bonds, and the judgment became final without any appeal. Over a year later, various governmental entities—including state attorneys, counties, and tax collectors (most of whom did not participate in the original proceedings)—filed motions under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, seeking relief from the judgment, raising arguments such as lack of jurisdiction, due process violations, and alleged surprise.The circuit court allowed discovery and held an evidentiary hearing, after which it denied all motions for relief from judgment. For the parties who had not appeared previously, the court found that rule 1.540 did not apply to bond validation judgments due to the strict finality requirements of chapter 75, Florida Statutes, and that the motions were untimely and insufficient. For the state attorneys who had participated, the court concluded they were procedurally barred from seeking relief under rule 1.540 because it could not substitute for appellate review.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed whether rule 1.540 applies to final judgments in bond validation proceedings under chapter 75. The court held that chapter 75’s finality language—specifically section 75.09—precludes the use of rule 1.540 to collaterally attack such judgments after the time for appeal has expired. The court concluded that the statutory scheme is exclusive, and the rules of civil procedure do not override the statute. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motions for relief from judgment. View "State Attorneys for the Second, Seventh and Ninth Judicial Circuits v. Florida Pace Funding Agency" on Justia Law