Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Providence Retired Police and Firefighter’s Association (the Association) sought a declaratory judgment against the City of Providence (the city) regarding entitlement to occupational cancer disability benefits under Rhode Island General Laws chapter 19.1 of title 45, “Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters.” The Association argued that its retired members were entitled to these benefits under the state law, while the city contended that benefits should be processed under a local ordinance.The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Association, concluding that the state law applied to all firefighters, including those retired from the Providence Fire Department, regardless of the city's participation in the Municipal Employees Retirement System (MERS). The court relied on the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in City of East Providence v. International Association of Firefighters Local 850, which interpreted the state law to apply broadly to all firefighters.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the Superior Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Providence System, a comprehensive retirement benefits program established by a special legislative act, supersedes the general state statute. The court referenced its prior decision in Betz v. Paolino, which established that special legislative provisions for the Providence System prevail over state statutes of general application. Consequently, the court determined that the city is not required to process applications for occupational cancer benefits under the state law but should follow the local ordinance. The case was remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to enter judgment for the city. View "The Providence Retired Police and Firefighter's Association v. The City of Providence" on Justia Law

The case involves the surviving relatives of Quinn Lucas Schansman, a passenger on Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17), which was shot down over eastern Ukraine by a missile launched from territory controlled by the Russian Federation-backed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR). The plaintiffs allege that Sberbank of Russia PJSC (Sberbank) provided material support to the DPR by facilitating money transfers from donors to the DPR via correspondent accounts in the United States, which they claim proximately caused the downing of MH17.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Sberbank’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint on foreign sovereign immunity grounds. Sberbank argued that it was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) after the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation acquired a majority share in Sberbank. The district court found that Sberbank was presumptively immune under the FSIA but that the commercial activity exception applied, as the claims were based on commercial activities carried out in the United States.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that Sberbank is presumptively immune under the FSIA due to its majority ownership by the Russian Ministry of Finance. However, the court also held that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception applies to Sberbank’s conduct, as the alleged claims are based on commercial activities—facilitating money transfers—carried out in the United States. Additionally, the court held that the ATA’s immunity provisions apply to instrumentalities of foreign states and that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception applies equally to actions brought under the ATA. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schansman v. Sberbank" on Justia Law

The City of East Lansing entered into an agreement with the Lansing Board of Water and Light (LBWL) in 2016, which included a franchise fee to be charged to LBWL consumers residing within the City. The fee was collected by LBWL and remitted to the City. Plaintiff James Heos, representing a class of LBWL consumers, filed a complaint against the City, alleging that the franchise fee was an illegal tax under the Michigan Constitution's Headlee Amendment and other state laws.The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the plaintiff on most counts, ruling that the franchise fee was an illegal tax. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed this decision, directing the trial court to grant summary disposition in favor of the City, concluding that the plaintiff was not a taxpayer and thus his claim was time-barred.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the franchise fee was indeed a tax because it was used for general revenue-raising purposes, was not proportionate to any costs incurred by the City, and was not voluntary. The Court further held that the plaintiff was a taxpayer because the legal incidence of the fee fell on the LBWL consumers, not LBWL itself. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiff to pursue his Headlee Amendment claim. View "Heos v. City Of East Lansing" on Justia Law

William A., a dyslexic student, graduated from high school with a 3.4 GPA but was unable to read. His parents filed a complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), claiming the school failed to provide him with a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The school had developed an individualized education plan (IEP) for William, which included language therapy and one-on-one instruction, but he made no progress in reading fluency throughout middle and high school. His parents eventually arranged for private tutoring, which helped him make some progress.An administrative law judge (ALJ) held a due-process hearing and found that the school had violated William's right to a FAPE under the IDEA. The ALJ ordered the school to provide 888 hours of dyslexia tutoring. William's parents then sought an order in federal court for the tutoring to be provided by a specific tutor, Dr. McAfee. The school counterclaimed, seeking reversal of the ALJ's order. The district court, applying a "modified de novo" standard of review, affirmed the ALJ's findings and ordered the same relief but denied the request for Dr. McAfee specifically.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the school had not provided William with a FAPE, as his IEPs focused on fluency rather than foundational reading skills necessary for him to learn to read. The court noted that William's accommodations masked his inability to read rather than addressing it. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the school failed to provide an education tailored to William's unique needs, as required by the IDEA. View "William A. v. Clarksville-Montgomery County School System" on Justia Law

Rhonda Fleming, an inmate at Federal Correctional Institution Tallahassee (FCIT), filed a pro se lawsuit against Warden Erica Strong and the United States, alleging Eighth Amendment violations due to her exposure to mold, asbestos, and COVID-19, which she claimed caused severe health issues. Fleming sought injunctive relief and damages under Bivens and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). She alleged that despite her complaints, the prison officials, including Warden Strong, failed to address the hazardous conditions, leading to her contracting COVID-19 twice and requiring hospitalization.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida partially granted and partially denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing most of Fleming's claims, including all claims against Strong, citing that Bivens did not provide a remedy for her Eighth Amendment claim. However, the district court disagreed, finding that Fleming's Eighth Amendment claim was similar to a previously recognized Bivens claim and allowed it to proceed. The district court did not address the issue of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court had to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from the district court's order recognizing a Bivens cause of action. The Eleventh Circuit joined four other circuits in holding that the collateral-order doctrine does not extend to Bivens-extension orders that do not address qualified immunity. The court emphasized that qualified immunity adequately protects government officials from the burdens of litigation and that separation-of-powers concerns with Bivens extensions do not justify immediate appeal. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fleming v. FCI Tallahassee Warden" on Justia Law

Lisa Wheeler, a physician assistant and former Assistant Medical Director at Acadia Healthcare Company’s Asheville, North Carolina clinic, filed a complaint alleging that Acadia falsified medical records to claim payments from government healthcare programs. Wheeler claimed that Acadia, which provided methadone-assisted treatment for opioid use disorder, failed to provide required therapy and counseling services, instead fabricating therapy notes to submit fraudulent claims to Medicare, Medicaid, and other government programs.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina dismissed Wheeler’s amended complaint, concluding that she failed to adequately plead that Acadia’s false claims were material or submitted to the government. The court found that Wheeler did not sufficiently allege that Acadia’s failure to provide therapy was material to the government’s payment decisions or that false claims were actually submitted to the government.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Wheeler adequately pled her claims of presentment, false statement, false certification, and fraudulent inducement under the False Claims Act. The court found that Wheeler’s allegations of falsified therapy notes and non-compliance with federal opioid treatment standards were material to the government’s payment decisions. The court also concluded that Wheeler sufficiently alleged that Acadia submitted false claims to government healthcare programs and that the fraudulent conduct was central to the government’s decision to pay.Additionally, the Fourth Circuit held that Wheeler adequately pled her reverse false claim, finding that the stipulated penalties in Acadia’s Corporate Integrity Agreement with the government constituted an obligation under the False Claims Act. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a proposed charter amendment in Baltimore City, known as the Baby Bonus Amendment, which would mandate a one-time payment of at least $1,000 to every eligible city resident upon the birth or adoption of a child. The Maryland Child Alliance, Inc. sponsored the petition for this amendment, which was certified by the Baltimore City Board of Elections for inclusion on the ballot for the November 2024 Presidential General Election.The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, along with other city officials, filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the Baltimore City Board of Elections and the State Board of Elections, seeking judicial review, a writ of mandamus, declaratory judgment, and an injunction to prevent the Baby Bonus Amendment from being placed on the ballot. The circuit court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, declaring the Baby Bonus Amendment unconstitutional as it violated Article XI-A, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution by removing meaningful discretion from the City over an area within its legislative purview and being legislative in nature rather than proper charter material.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The Court held that the Baby Bonus Amendment did not concern the form or structure of government and encroached upon the City’s police or general welfare powers, thus violating Article XI-A, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution. The Court also declined to sever the mandatory payment provision from the amendment, concluding that the dominant purpose of the amendment would not be achieved without the $1,000 payment provision, which abrogated the City’s law-making authority in violation of the Constitution of Maryland. View "Baltimore City Board of Elections v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

Kristie Williams, a former employee of the University of Alabama at Birmingham, requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to care for her daughter, who was allegedly sexually assaulted while serving in the Marine Corps. The University approved her leave, but Williams claimed she continued to receive work-related communications and criticism from her supervisors during her leave. This led to her resignation, and she subsequently sued the University, alleging interference with her FMLA rights and retaliation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied the University’s motion to dismiss, which argued that the suit was barred by state sovereign immunity. The court reasoned that Williams might have been seeking family-care leave under the FMLA, for which the Supreme Court had previously held that Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Williams’s suit could proceed regardless of whether she sought family-care leave, active-duty leave, or servicemember-family leave. For family-care leave, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hibbs confirmed that Congress had abrogated state sovereign immunity. For active-duty and servicemember-family leave, the court concluded that Alabama waived its sovereign immunity under the plan-of-the-Convention doctrine when it joined the Union, as these provisions were enacted pursuant to Congress’s constitutional authority to raise and support the military. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the University’s motion to dismiss and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Board of Trustees of The University of Alabama" on Justia Law

D.G. sued the Orange County Social Services Agency and the County of Orange for negligence, alleging that he was sexually abused by his foster father from the mid-1970s until he was a teenager. D.G. claimed he informed his social worker that "bad people are hurting me," but no action was taken. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing there was insufficient evidence that it was aware of any abuse or risk of abuse while D.G. was in the foster home. The trial court agreed, finding the information reported was insufficient to make the abuse foreseeable and that discretionary immunity applied.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that there was no duty to protect D.G. from the unforeseeable criminal conduct of his foster father and that the social worker was immune under Government Code section 820.2 for discretionary acts. D.G. appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the County failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that a duty of care did not exist and that discretionary act immunity did not apply. The court held that the failure to investigate potential abuse when indicators were present made the harm foreseeable, thus imposing a duty of care. Additionally, the court found no evidence that the social worker made a considered decision regarding the potential abuse. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "D.G. v. Orange County Social Services Agency" on Justia Law

Environmental groups challenged the issuance of a permit by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the development of the Cainhoy Plantation in South Carolina. The plaintiffs argued that the permit violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). They claimed the permit improperly used a habitat surrogate to set the level of anticipated take of an endangered species and was issued after an Environmental Assessment (EA) rather than a more comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that they did not have a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court concluded that the Corps' decision to issue the permit based on an EA was reasonable and that the use of a habitat surrogate was justified under the circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the Corps had taken the required "hard look" at the environmental consequences of the project as mandated by NEPA and that the use of a habitat surrogate was appropriate given the impracticality of monitoring the take of individual bats. The court found that the Corps' decision to rely on an EA instead of preparing an EIS was entitled to deference and that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court also noted that the surrogate used by the Service was enforceable and set a clear standard for determining when the level of anticipated take had been exceeded. View "South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law