Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Several landowners in Walton County, Florida, owned beachfront properties that were affected by a county ordinance enacted during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. In March and April 2020, the county first closed public beaches, then issued a new ordinance that closed all beaches—public and private—making it a criminal offense for anyone, including private owners, to access or use their own beachfront property. The ordinance was enforced by law enforcement officers who entered private property, excluded owners, and threatened arrest for violations. The ordinance remained in effect for about a month, after which it expired and was not renewed.The landowners filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, raising several claims, including a Takings Clause claim under the Fifth Amendment, and seeking both damages and prospective relief. The district court dismissed the claims for prospective relief as moot, finding the ordinance had expired and was unlikely to recur. On the merits, the district court granted summary judgment to the county on all damages claims, holding that the ordinance was not a per se physical taking but rather a use restriction, and that the government’s actions during a public health emergency were entitled to deference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the claims for prospective relief, agreeing that the ordinance’s expiration rendered those claims moot. However, the court reversed the district court’s judgment on the Takings Clause claim, holding that the ordinance constituted a per se physical taking because it barred owners from their property and allowed government officials to physically occupy and control access. The court remanded for a determination of just compensation, holding that no public emergency, including COVID-19, creates an exception to the Takings Clause. View "Alford v. Walton County" on Justia Law

The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) planned to conduct geotechnical work, such as soil and groundwater testing, in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta as part of preparations for the Delta tunnel project, a major water conveyance initiative. Several municipal, tribal, and public interest groups objected, arguing that DWR could not begin this geotechnical work until it certified that the tunnel project was consistent with the Delta Plan, as required by the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009. The plaintiffs asserted that the geotechnical work was an integral part of the overall project and that separating it constituted impermissible “piecemealing” under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Sacramento County agreed with the plaintiffs, issuing preliminary injunctions that barred DWR from conducting geotechnical work before submitting a certification of consistency. The court found that the geotechnical work was part of the covered action under the Delta Reform Act and that DWR’s project description in its Environmental Impact Report (EIR) included this work. The court also determined that the plaintiffs had a strong likelihood of success on the merits and would suffer procedural harm if the injunction was not granted.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s orders. The appellate court held that the Delta Reform Act does not require DWR to submit a certification of consistency before engaging in geotechnical work that precedes construction. The court reasoned that the purposes of CEQA and the Delta Reform Act differ, and the Act does not incorporate CEQA’s whole-of-the-action requirement or prohibition against piecemealing. The court directed the trial court to vacate the preliminary injunctions and reconsider the motions in light of this interpretation. View "Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

A mining company sought to develop an open pit gold mine in the Kuskokwim River watershed, on lands owned by Alaska Native Corporations. To operate the mine, the company needed state permits for a natural gas pipeline right-of-way across state lands and for water appropriations to dewater the mining pit and support operations. Local tribes objected, arguing that the mine and its associated infrastructure would have significant impacts on the watershed, which is culturally and economically important to them. The Department of Natural Resources approved the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits after considering the impacts of the permitted activities themselves, but not the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project.The tribes appealed the Department’s decisions to the Commissioner, arguing that both the Water Use Act and the Alaska Constitution required consideration of the cumulative impacts of the whole mining project. The Commissioner denied the appeals, finding that the Department was only required to consider the effects of the permitted activities themselves. The tribes then appealed to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage. The superior court affirmed the Department’s decisions, ruling that the agency was not required to conduct a cumulative impacts analysis of the entire mine project under either statute or the constitution.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether the Department was required to consider the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project when granting the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits. The court held that neither the Water Use Act nor the Right-of-Way Leasing Act required consideration of downstream effects of mining activity enabled by the permits. The court also held that Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution did not require the Department to consider the costs and benefits of developing private resources on private lands when deciding whether to grant permits for the use of state resources. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgments. View "Orutsararmiut Native Council v. Boyle" on Justia Law

A state agency, the Department of Family and Community Services (DFCS), leased office space from JBG Memorial (JBG) in Anchorage under a fifteen-year agreement set to expire in February 2023, with options to renew. As the lease neared expiration, DFCS applied for and received a waiver from the Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOT&PF) commissioner to procure new office space through a single source process, bypassing the usual competitive bidding. DFCS informed JBG that it would not renew the lease and would vacate, but did not provide details about the new lease. JBG requested public records but did not receive them before the lease expired. DFCS remained in the property on a month-to-month basis until it entered a new lease at Anchorage Business Park. JBG received the requested records only after the new lease was signed.JBG filed suit in the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, seeking to enjoin the termination of its lease, void the new lease, and require proper bid procedures. JBG also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent DFCS from vacating. The State moved to dismiss, arguing JBG had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. JBG admitted it had not done so but claimed exhaustion was excused due to lack of meaningful access, bias, futility, and irreparable harm. The superior court dismissed the complaint, finding JBG had not pled facts sufficient to excuse exhaustion, and awarded attorney’s fees to the State as the prevailing party.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the superior court’s dismissal. The court held that JBG was required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review and failed to establish any valid excuse for not doing so. The court also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the State. View "JBG Memorial, LLC v. State of Alaska, Department of Transportation and Public Services" on Justia Law

A cannabis cultivation business was licensed to operate in Vermont but became the subject of regulatory action after laboratory testing detected myclobutanil, a prohibited pesticide, in its products. The business had previously entered into a corrective action plan with the regulatory board following similar violations in 2023, agreeing to remediation, penalties, and compliance measures. In 2024, after further detections of myclobutanil in both retail and on-site samples, the regulatory board issued a notice of violation with immediate effect, including a stop-sale order for all of the business’s products, a recall requirement, and a proposed license revocation.The business contested the notice and requested a hearing before the Cannabis Control Board. At the hearing, it raised several arguments, including challenges to the Board’s authority under the Vermont Constitution, claims of bias by the Board chair, and alleged due process violations. The Board chair denied a motion for recusal, and after hearing testimony and reviewing evidence, the Board found that the business had violated its corrective action plan and used unauthorized pesticides. The Board dismissed one violation as duplicative but upheld others, ultimately revoking the business’s license. The business appealed to an appellate officer, who affirmed the Board’s decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, applying a standard that precludes reweighing factual findings unless clearly erroneous or affected by legal error. The Court held that the Board acted within its statutory authority in issuing a stop-sale order for all products, that the Board’s interpretation of its regulations was reasonable, and that the business failed to preserve or adequately brief its constitutional and evidentiary arguments. The Court also found no due process violation regarding the impartiality of the Board chair, as the business did not make an evidentiary record to support its claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the revocation of the business’s license. View "In re Holland Cannabis, LLC" on Justia Law

A commuter airline that had provided federally subsidized air service to a small community in West Virginia for several years sought to continue serving that community under the Essential Air Service (EAS) program. In 2024, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) solicited bids for a new three-year EAS contract. Four airlines, including the incumbent, submitted proposals. The DOT evaluated the applications based on five statutory factors: reliability, agreements with larger carriers, community preferences, marketing plans, and total compensation requested. After reviewing the proposals and soliciting input from the local community, which favored a different airline, the DOT selected a new carrier that offered larger aircraft, a codeshare agreement with a major airline, and a subsidy request within the competitive range.The incumbent airline challenged the DOT’s selection in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, and exceeded its statutory authority. The petitioner contended that the DOT failed to meaningfully analyze the statutory factors and improperly chose a more expensive proposal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the DOT’s order under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a). On the merits, the court found that the DOT’s findings regarding each statutory factor were supported by substantial evidence and that the agency’s reasoning was adequately explained. The court concluded that the DOT’s selection process was reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious, and that the agency did not exceed its statutory authority. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and upheld the DOT’s selection of the new EAS carrier. View "Southern Airways Express, LLC v. DOT" on Justia Law

While incarcerated at High Desert State Prison in Clark County, Brian Caperonis was killed by other inmates. His father, William Joseph Caperonis, acting individually and as the special administrator of Brian’s estate, filed a civil complaint against the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) and several of its employees. The claims included civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wrongful death, and various negligence claims related to Brian’s death.NDOC moved to dismiss the state law negligence claims, arguing that the estate had failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243. NDOC asserted that, as the estate stands in the shoes of the decedent, it was required to file an administrative claim before pursuing litigation. William opposed, contending that the exhaustion requirement applied only to living inmates and not to the estates of deceased prisoners. The Eighth Judicial District Court denied NDOC’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plain language of the statutes and the relevant administrative regulations did not extend the exhaustion requirement to estates of deceased inmates.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed NDOC’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the administrative exhaustion requirements in NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243 do not apply to the estate of a deceased prisoner. The court reasoned that the statutory language is limited to “a person who is or was” in NDOC custody and does not contemplate survival claims by estates. The court also found that the administrative regulations provide no mechanism for an estate to pursue such remedies. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Nevada denied NDOC’s writ petition, affirming the district court’s decision. View "Department of Corrections v. District Court" on Justia Law

Two police associations negotiated collective bargaining agreements with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and the City of Las Vegas to designate certain dates—specifically Christmas Eve, New Year's Eve, and Juneteenth—as paid holidays in addition to those recognized by Nevada statute. These agreements provided for increased holiday pay on those days. The Nevada Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS), which is responsible for collecting retirement contributions based on employees’ regular compensation, refused to collect contributions on the additional holiday pay for these negotiated holidays, arguing that only holidays listed in Nevada’s statutory list qualified.The associations filed an action for declaratory relief in the Eighth Judicial District Court, seeking to compel PERS to collect retirement contributions on the negotiated holiday pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the associations, ordering PERS to collect the appropriate employer contributions for holiday pay on Christmas Eve, New Year's Eve, and Juneteenth. PERS appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case de novo, as it involved questions of statutory interpretation and no disputed facts. The court held that, under the plain language of NRS 288.150(2)(d) and NRS 286.025, PERS is required to collect retirement contributions on all holiday pay negotiated in collective bargaining agreements, not just those for statutory holidays. The court also determined that Juneteenth became a legal holiday in Nevada in 2021 following the federal declaration, and contributions for that holiday are required retroactively to 2022, when it was included in the agreements. The court rejected PERS’s arguments regarding its authority and potential conflicts with the Internal Revenue Code. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "PUB. EMPLOYEES' RET. SYS. OF NEV. VS. LAS VEGAS MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASS'N" on Justia Law

A hospital operating in Weston, West Virginia, sought to construct a new facility approximately four miles from its current location, at a cost of about $56 million. The hospital’s current site is about sixteen miles from another hospital in Buckhannon, which holds a critical access hospital (CAH) designation, allowing it to receive higher Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements. The Buckhannon hospital argued that the construction of the new facility within twelve mountainous miles of its own would jeopardize its CAH status and financial stability.Previously, the West Virginia Health Care Authority denied the Weston hospital’s application for a certificate of need, finding that the project would harm the Buckhannon hospital and was not a superior alternative under state law. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed this denial. However, after legislative amendments in 2023 raised the capital expenditure threshold for certificate of need requirements to $100 million, the Weston hospital requested a determination from the Authority as to whether its new project required such a certificate. The Authority, applying an unwritten guideline, concluded that a certificate of need was unnecessary for the relocation of an existing facility within the same service area if the cost was below the new threshold. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, finding the relevant statute ambiguous and deferring to the Authority’s interpretation.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and held that the statutory language requiring a certificate of need for the “construction . . . of a health care facility” is clear and unambiguous. The court determined that the construction of a new hospital building, even as a relocation, falls within this requirement, regardless of the capital expenditure amount. The court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case to the Authority for further proceedings consistent with its interpretation. View "St. Joseph's Hospital of Buckhannon v. Stonewall Jackson Memorial Hospital Co." on Justia Law

Bedford Recycling, Inc. applied to the Monroe County Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) for a conditional use permit to operate a scrap metal collection and sorting facility on property zoned for mineral extraction. The county’s zoning ordinance did not specifically allow scrap metal recycling, so Bedford sought approval under the category of “Central Garbage/Rubbish Collection Facility.” The BZA granted the permit after a public hearing in which Bedford acknowledged the facility would not handle solid waste, a typical requirement for the permit. Subsequently, Republic Services, a neighboring property owner, filed for judicial review, arguing that Bedford’s facility did not meet the ordinance’s requirements. While preparing written findings to support its decision, the BZA’s attorney concluded that granting the permit was a legal error, as Bedford’s proposed use did not fit the permit’s definition.After several meetings and changes in BZA membership, the Board voted to revoke Bedford’s permit, finding that the facility was essentially a scrap yard, which was not a permitted use in the zoning district. Bedford then sought judicial review in the Monroe Circuit Court, which found that the BZA lacked statutory authority to revoke the permit based on a change in reasoning or alleged legal error, and reinstated the permit. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the BZA could correct its own legal error and revoke the permit.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court held that administrative bodies like the BZA have only the powers expressly granted by statute and possess no inherent or common law authority to reconsider or revoke final decisions absent explicit legislative authorization. The Court disapproved prior appellate decisions that recognized an “error of law” exception. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order vacating the BZA’s revocation and reinstated Bedford’s conditional use permit. View "Monroe County Board of Zoning Appeals v. Bedford Recycling, Inc." on Justia Law