Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

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A nonprofit organization challenged the United States Forest Service's approval of a forest thinning project in the Okanogan-Wenatchee National Forest, Washington. The project aimed to reduce wildfire risk and improve forest health through various treatments, including tree thinning and prescribed burns. The organization argued that the Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by not reopening the public comment period after significant changes were made to the project following a wildfire, and by failing to consider a reasonable range of alternatives and the cumulative effects of the project.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service, finding that the agency had complied with NEPA requirements. The court held that the Forest Service was not required to repeat the public comment process and that the Environmental Assessment (EA) considered a reasonable range of alternatives.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the Forest Service was not required to repeat the public comment process because the changes made to the project did not pose new environmental questions or render the public's comments on the Draft EA irrelevant. The court also found that the Forest Service considered a reasonable range of alternatives and that the use of condition-based management did not inherently violate NEPA.However, the court reversed the district court's decision regarding the cumulative effects analysis. The Ninth Circuit held that the EA's discussion of cumulative effects was insufficient because it did not consider the cumulative effects of the Twisp Restoration Project in combination with the Midnight Restoration Project, which was originally part of the same project. The court remanded the case for the district court to order the Forest Service to remedy the deficiencies in the EA and determine whether an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is necessary. View "North Cascades Conservation Council v. Forest Service" on Justia Law

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Continental Resources, Inc., an oil and gas production company, leases minerals from both the North Dakota Board of University and School Lands (Land Board) and the United States. The dispute centers on the entitlement to royalties from minerals extracted from the bed of Lake Sakakawea in North Dakota, which depends on the location of the Ordinary High Water Mark (OHWM). If North Dakota law and the state survey govern the OHWM, the Land Board is entitled to a larger percentage of the royalties; if the federal survey controls, the United States is entitled to a larger percentage.The United States removed the interpleader action to federal court and moved to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota denied the motion, holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(5), the United States waived sovereign immunity because North Dakota law created a lien in favor of the United States upon Continental severing the minerals. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States for lands retained since North Dakota's admission to the Union, applying federal law and the Corps Survey. It granted summary judgment in favor of the Land Board for lands reacquired by the United States, applying North Dakota law and the Wenck survey.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss, agreeing that the United States had a lien on the disputed minerals under North Dakota law. The court also affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the Land Board, holding that North Dakota law governs the current location of the OHWM for lands reacquired by the United States. The court denied the United States' motion for judicial notice of additional documents. View "Continental Resources, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

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In 2019, the Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) increased the rental fees for hangar space at state-owned airports. Five tenants, who own hangar facilities at the Northeast Kingdom International Airport and the Stowe-Morrisville State Airport, appealed the rate increases to the Transportation Board. They argued that the rent increase did not comply with the terms of their leases and was arbitrary. The leases allowed AOT to adjust rent based on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), current market value for the land, and maintenance costs for the airport. The tenants contended that AOT improperly considered changes outside the previous lease term.The Transportation Board consolidated the tenants' appeals and reviewed the administrative records and memoranda submitted by both parties. The Board found that AOT had invested significantly in airport improvements and conducted a market-value analysis for leased space. However, the Board noted that details of the analysis were not included in the administrative record. The Board concluded that AOT was permitted to consider changes to market value and maintenance costs outside of the prior lease term but admonished AOT to provide a clearer analysis in the future.The tenants appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that the rent increases were arbitrary and capricious due to a lack of transparent methodology. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's conclusion that AOT could consider changes outside the prior lease term but reversed and remanded the decision concerning the fairness of the rent increases. The Court held that the Board should have sought a complete record from AOT to determine whether the rent levels were fair and conducted a new adjudication consistent with this opinion. View "In re State Airport Hangar Lease Disputes" on Justia Law

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Sentry Dynamics, Inc. (Sentry) requested a list of all property owners' names and addresses in Ada County from the Ada County Assessor’s Office. Ada County denied the request, suspecting Sentry intended to sell the data for use as a mailing or telephone list, which is prohibited under Idaho Code section 74-120(1). Sentry filed a complaint in district court seeking access to the records. The district court ordered Ada County to release the records in an electronic format of its choosing. Ada County appealed, and Sentry cross-appealed, requesting the records in the shapefile format used by the County.The district court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho ruled that the information Sentry sought was a public record and constituted a "list of persons" under Idaho Code section 74-120(1). The court held that Sentry was entitled to the records because it agreed not to use them as a mailing list. However, the court allowed Ada County to choose the electronic format for providing the records. Ada County appealed, arguing that Sentry did not assure the data would not be used for mailing list purposes by third parties. Sentry cross-appealed, seeking the records in their original shapefile format.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that the records requested by Sentry constituted a "list of persons" and that Ada County could require Sentry to assure that the data would not be used for mailing purposes by its clients and customers. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of Ada County’s "Acknowledgment and Agreement" form went beyond the permissible inquiry under Idaho Code section 74-102(5)(b). However, the court reversed the district court's order requiring Ada County to provide the records in an electronic format, stating that the PRA does not mandate delivery in any specific format. The court concluded that Ada County was not required to produce the records because Sentry refused to certify that neither it nor its clients would use the records as a mailing list. View "Sentry Dynamics, Inc. v. Ada County" on Justia Law

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Captain Matthew Hight trained with the Saint Lawrence Seaway Pilots Association from 2015 to 2018 to become a maritime pilot on Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. The Great Lakes Pilotage Act of 1960 requires certain ships on these waters to have a registered pilot on board. The Coast Guard oversees the registration of American pilots and supervises private pilotage associations responsible for training new pilots. Hight applied for registration in 2018, but the Pilots Association recommended denial, citing incomplete training and concerns about his temperament. The Coast Guard denied his application after an independent review.Hight challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the Coast Guard acted arbitrarily and capriciously, unconstitutionally delegated authority to the Pilots Association, and violated the First Amendment by requiring him to train with and join the Pilots Association. The district court rejected all claims, finding that the Coast Guard's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including Hight's failure to complete the required training and concerns about his temperament.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Coast Guard's decision was reasonable and supported by the record, as Hight had not completed the required supervised trips on the St. Lawrence River. The court also found that the Coast Guard did not unconstitutionally delegate authority to the Pilots Association, as the association's role was limited to providing advice and gathering facts. Finally, the court determined that Hight's First Amendment claim regarding mandatory association membership was not ripe for review, as he was not yet eligible to join the Pilots Association. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Hight v. DHS" on Justia Law

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Kenneth Michael Sikorsky purchased a property in Newburgh, New York, in 2006 but fell behind on his property taxes, leading to foreclosure by the City of Newburgh in 2012. Sikorsky and the City later agreed on a contract for Sikorsky to repurchase the property, but the sale fell through when Sikorsky failed to make the required payments. The City subsequently sold the property for $350,500, significantly more than the $92,786.24 Sikorsky owed in taxes, but did not return the surplus to Sikorsky.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Sikorsky's pro se complaint, which alleged a constitutional taking and violations of New York state laws. Sikorsky, now represented by counsel, appealed the dismissal, arguing that he had stated a valid claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that he had a right to recover under new New York state laws enacted during the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Sikorsky had indeed stated a claim for a constitutional taking against the City of Newburgh and Jeremy Kaufman. The court found that the new New York laws did not provide Sikorsky with a remedy, as they only applied to properties sold on or after May 25, 2023, or to those with active proceedings under N.Y. CPLR § 7803(1) on the effective date of the act. Since Sikorsky's property was sold in June 2021 and he had not initiated an Article 78 proceeding, he lacked a local remedy.The Second Circuit vacated the District Court's dismissal of Sikorsky's constitutional taking claims against the City of Newburgh and Jeremy Kaufman and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Sikorsky v. City of Newburgh" on Justia Law

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A builder, PDT Holdings, Inc. and Phillip Thompson Homes, Inc., sought to construct a duplex townhome in Dallas. They met with city officials multiple times to verify applicable restrictions and were informed of a 36-foot maximum building height limit. The builder submitted a construction plan for a 36-foot-high duplex, which the city approved. During construction, the city issued a stop-work order due to a parapet wall exceeding the height limit, which the builder corrected. Later, the city issued another stop-work order, citing a violation of the residential-proximity-slope (RPS) ordinance, which limited the height to 26 feet. Despite this, the city lifted the stop-work order, allowing the builder to complete the duplex.The builder applied for a variance from the Board of Adjustment (BOA) but was denied. They then sued the city, seeking to estop it from enforcing the RPS ordinance. The trial court ruled in favor of the builder, finding that the city was estopped from enforcing the ordinance. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the city’s mistake in issuing the permit did not warrant estoppel.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the trial court's judgment was supported by legally sufficient evidence. The court found that city officials had affirmatively misled the builder about the height limit and that the builder had relied on these misrepresentations to their detriment. The court also determined that this was an exceptional case where estoppel was necessary to prevent manifest injustice and that estopping the city would not interfere with its governmental functions. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, estopping the city from enforcing the RPS ordinance against the builder. View "PDT HOLDINGS, INC. v. CITY OF DALLAS" on Justia Law

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The petitioners, current and retired Natural Resources Police Officers employed by the West Virginia Division of Natural Resources (DNR), have been receiving a statutory "subsistence allowance" since 1996. This allowance was included in their reported "compensation" to the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board (the Board) for calculating retirement annuities under the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). In 2014, the Board discovered this inclusion was erroneous and decided to correct it by refunding overpaid contributions to active and inactive officers and adjusting retirement annuities for retired officers.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County reversed the Board's decision, finding the subsistence allowance was pensionable compensation. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court held in West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board v. Clark (Clark I) that the subsistence allowance was not "compensation" for PERS purposes and that the Board failed to correct the error in a timely manner for retired officers. The case was remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed two certified questions from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. The first question asked if the holding in Clark I required the subsistence pay received by all retired and active DNR officers to be included in calculating their pensionable income. The court answered "no," clarifying that Clark I's holding was limited to retired officers and did not apply to active and inactive officers. The second question asked if the petitioners were entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees from the Board. The court declined to answer, stating that it did not present an issue of law but rather a question of fact. View "Clark v. West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board" on Justia Law

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A state agency, WorkForce West Virginia, and its Acting Commissioner, Scott A. Adkins, sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of three orders issued by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. These orders granted a writ of mandamus to the plaintiffs, denied WorkForce’s motion to dismiss, and allowed the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint. The plaintiffs, who received unemployment benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic, alleged that WorkForce engaged in illegal collection activities by attempting to recover overpayments beyond the statutory time limits.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that WorkForce’s collection activities were time-barred by West Virginia Code § 21A-10-21, which imposes a two-year statute of limitations for recovering overpayments made due to error. The court also concluded that WorkForce could not determine overpayments due to nondisclosure or misrepresentation through its administrative process and must instead pursue such claims in circuit court. Based on this interpretation, the circuit court granted mandamus and injunctive relief, ordering WorkForce to cease its collection activities and comply with the statutory time limits.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the relevant statutes. The higher court concluded that the administrative process established by the Legislature allows WorkForce to determine whether overpayments occurred due to error, nondisclosure, or misrepresentation. The court emphasized that claimants must exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, as mandated by West Virginia Code § 21A-7-19. Since the plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Appeals granted the writ of prohibition and directed the circuit court to dismiss the case. View "Adkins v. Bailey" on Justia Law

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Kevin Steele, a Marine veteran, filed an original claim in 1991 for a head injury sustained during service, which he attributed to a 1980 training incident. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) examiner noted that Steele experienced occasional headaches as a residual of the head injury but deemed them non-disabling. The VA Regional Office (RO) granted service connection for the scar on Steele's scalp but did not explicitly address the headaches in its decision. Steele did not appeal this decision.In 2013, Steele filed a new claim for various conditions, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), and was awarded a 50% disability rating effective from March 6, 2013. In 2016, he filed a claim for service connection for headaches, which the RO granted with an effective date of October 14, 2015. The Board of Veterans Appeals later adjusted the effective date to March 6, 2013. Steele appealed, arguing that his 1991 claim for headaches remained open and should entitle him to an earlier effective date.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's decision, holding that Steele's 1991 claim for headaches was implicitly denied and thus finally adjudicated in 1991. The court applied the implicit denial rule, which provides that a claim can be deemed denied if the VA's decision provides sufficient notice that the claim was considered and rejected. The court found that the 1991 RO decision and notice letter provided Steele with reasonable notice that his claim for headaches was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision, agreeing that the Board and the Veterans Court did not legally err in their application of the implicit denial rule. The court held that the reasons provided for the explicit denial of Steele's head injury claim in 1991 were sufficient to implicitly deny the related claim for headaches, thus closing off the earlier filing date. View "STEELE v. COLLINS " on Justia Law