M.A.K. Investment Group, LLC owned several parcels of property in Glendale, Colorado. The City adopted a resolution declaring several of M.A.K.’s parcels “blighted” under state law. Glendale never notified M.A.K. of its resolution or the legal consequences flowing from it. The blight resolution began a seven-year window in which the City could begin condemnation proceedings against M.A.K.’s property. It also started the clock on a thirty-day window in which M.A.K. had a right to seek judicial review of the blight resolution under state law. Receiving no notice, M.A.K. did not timely seek review. M.A.K. argued Colorado’s Urban Renewal statute, both on its face and as-applied to M.A.K., violated due process because it did not require municipalities to notify property owners about a blight determination, or the thirty days owners had to seek review. The Tenth Circuit concluded the statute was unconstitutional as applied to M.A.K. because M.A.K. did not receive notice that Glendale found its property blighted. Because of this, the Court did not decide whether the statute was unconstitutional on its face. As for M.A.K.’s second argument, the Court held due process did not require Glendale to inform M.A.K. about the thirty-day review window. View "M.A.K. Investment Group v. City of Glendale" on Justia Law

This case centered on an agreement between the City of Rawlins, Wyoming, and Dirty Boyz Sanitation Services (Dirty Boyz) for local garbage collection and disposal. About two years after the parties executed the agreement, the State of Wyoming required Rawlins to close its landfill. Soon after, Rawlins opened a transfer station to process garbage for transport to a landfill elsewhere. Later, Rawlins adopted a flow-control ordinance requiring that all locally licensed garbage haulers take collected garbage to Rawlins’ transfer station. Dirty Boyz argued the ordinance violated the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, and was preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration and Authorization Act (FAAAA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Rawlins. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in Rawlins' favor. View "Dirty Boyz Sanitation Service v. City of Rawlins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court rendering judgment in favor of Plaintiff on its claim of unjust enrichment. On appeal, Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim was barred by collateral estoppel, that Plaintiff’s recovery was precluded by law and the terms of an agreement between the parties, the trial court’s jury instructions were improper, and the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence. In affirming, the Court held that many of Defendant’s arguments were unpreserved, inadequately briefed, or both, and that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his assignments of error. View "MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti" on Justia Law

Appellant Renewable Energy Vermont (REV) asked the Vermont Supreme Court to review a Vermont Public Utility Commission order altering technology allocations in the standard-offer program for renewable energy projects. The Supreme Court determined what REV sought was an advisory opinion and therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "In re Investigation into Programmatic Adjustments to the Standard-Offer Program (Renewable Energy Vermont, Appellant)" on Justia Law

Petitioner Alysia Webb filed a verified petition for mandamus relief with the superior court, alleging the City of Riverside (Riverside) violated Propositions 26 and 218 when it began transferring additional revenue from electric utility reserve fund accounts into the general fund without approval by the electorate. Webb contended the court improperly dismissed her case without leave to amend on a demurrer because the 120-day statute of limitations arising under Public Utilities Code section 10004.52 did not apply to her challenge of Riverside's change in calculation of its electric general fund transfer. She further argued the fund transfers constituted a tax increase because they altered the methodology used to calculate the amount of money Riverside transfers from the electric utility reserve to the general fund. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the superior court. View "Webb v. City of Riverside" on Justia Law

Yong Kang lived in North Pole and rented a house from her son Benjamin. She once owned the house, but she sold it to Benjamin about nine months before the events underlying this dispute, because, as she explained, she was getting old and did not know how much longer she would be around. Kang lived in the house with her business partner, Chong Sik Kim. The two operated a massage business in the house called Lee’s Massage, and both had business licenses under that name. Kang asked a neighbor for help with major home repairs in exchange for a used pickup truck. The neighbor injured his wrist while working on the house. A few days later the two had a dispute and terminated their arrangement; Kang paid her neighbor $500 for his work. The neighbor later sought medical treatment for his wrist; he also filed a report of injury and a workers’ compensation claim with the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board. Kang denied liability on several grounds, but the Board decided, after a hearing, that Kang was her neighbor’s employer for purposes of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act. Kang appealed to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission, which affirmed the Board’s decisions. The Alaska Supreme Court held, however, that the evidence did not support a finding that the woman was her neighbor’s employer, and therefore reversed the Commission’s decision. View "Kang v. Mullins" on Justia Law

The biological father of three children validly consented to their adoption in the face of parental rights termination proceedings. Five months later he sought to withdraw his consent. The superior court determined that withdrawal of the father’s consent to adoption would not be in the children’s best interests and denied the father permission to withdraw his consent. The father appealed, arguing the superior court clearly erred in finding that withdrawal of his consent was not in his children’s best interests. Because the superior court did not clearly err in this factual determination, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dean S. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Abigail Caudle was a 26-year-old apprentice electrician when she was electrocuted on the job while working for Raven Electric, Inc. Her mother sought workers’ compensation death benefits or other damages related to her daughter’s death. Acting on the advice of attorneys but representing herself, she brought a claim before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, arguing in part that the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act was unconstitutional because it inadequately compensated for her daughter’s life, particularly given the circumstances of her daughter’s death, and because it failed to consider her future dependency on her daughter. The Board denied her claim, and the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. The Commission also ordered the mother to pay the employer’s attorney’s fees and costs. The Alaska Supreme Court held that the mother’s constitutional rights are not violated by the Act. However, the Court reversed the Commission’s award of attorney’s fees. View "Burke v. Raven Electric, Inc." on Justia Law

The North Carolina State Board of Certified Public Accountant Examiners lawfully took disciplinary action against a certified professional and her corporation (collectively, Petitioners) for failure to follow a rule requiring compliance with the terms of a peer review contract, and the Board’s decision was based on substantial evidence. The Board found that Petitioners, a certified public accountant (CPA) and her firm, failed to comply with required auditing standards and failed to fulfill the terms of a peer review contract. The Board determined that this conduct violated rules and standards promulgated by the Board. The Board suspended the firm’s registration, imposed monetary penalties on the CPA, and revoked the CPA’s certificate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board’s action was not an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power; and (2) the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, notwithstanding a procedural error alleged by Petitioners. View "In re Johnson" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit granted a petition for review of the differential treatment by Galveston Port to petitioners, who operate shuttle buses, as compared to taxis and limos. The court held that the FMC's decision accepting that shuttle buses were treated differently than taxis and limos was not sustainable. In this case, petitioners were plainly injured when they were charged more than the other commercial passenger vehicles and the FMC never determined whether the Port justified the differential treatment based on legitimate transportation factors. The court vacated FMC's orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Santa Fe Discount Cruise Parking v. FMC" on Justia Law