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The First Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Kenneth Currier in this action brought by Mark Reenstierna alleging defamation and other torts. Reenstierna, a real estate appraiser, was brought before the New Hampshire Real Estate Appraisal Board for a disciplinary hearing. During the hearing, the Board considered as evidence a report on Reenstierna’s work written by Currier at the Board’s request. Reenstierna later filed suit against Currier alleging that Currier knowingly and purposely submitted a false report to the Board and that the purported deficiencies cited against Reenstierna in Currier’s report constituted material misrepresentations of fact. The district court concluded that New Hampshire’s absolute witness immunity doctrine precluded the use of Currier’s report to establish liability on Reenstierna’s claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Currier’s statements in his reported were shielded in this action by New Hampshire’s absolute witness immunity doctrine as set forth in Provencher v. Buzzell-Plourde Associates, 711 A.2d 251, 255 (N.H. 1998). View "Reenstierna v. Currier" on Justia Law

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Mainstay Business Solutions (Mainstay), a division of the Blue Lake Rancheria Economic Development Corporation, was a tribal government-sponsored entity of Blue Lake Rancheria, a federally recognized Indian tribe. Mainstay operated a temporary staffing business, assigning temporary workers to its clients. It also operated an employee leasing business in which employees of Mainstay’s clients were placed on Mainstay’s payroll and leased back to the clients. The California Self-Insurers’ Security Fund (SISF) assumed the workers’ compensation obligations when Mainstay defaulted on its obligations to self-insure. SISF then sued Mainstay, Mainstay’s clients and others to recover its costs and liabilities. Among other things, the trial court granted SISF’s motion for judgment on the pleadings against Mainstay’s clients. Mainstay’s clients filed a petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition to challenge the trial court’s order. SISF argued on appeal: (1) writ review was not appropriate because the main issue presented was rendered moot by the enactment of Labor Code section 3701.9. On the merits, Mainstay’s clients argued: (2) SISF’s claim was subject to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers Compensation Act and should have been brought before the Workers Compensation Appeals Board; and (3) their agreements with Mainstay in compliance with Labor Code section 3602(d) serve to bar SISF’s civil action. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "American Cargo Express v. Super Ct." on Justia Law

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The Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) may not forfeit earned time an inmate accrued before his refusal of or removal from the Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP). For more than a decade, the IDOC policy stopped only the ongoing accrual of earned time for inmates upon a refusal or removal from SOTP without forfeiting previously accrued earned time. This interpretation was upheld by the Supreme Court in Holm v. State, 767 U.W.2d 409 (Iowa 2009). In 2016, the IDOC changed its policy to additionally forfeit all previously accrued earned time upon a refusal or removal from SOTP and applied that change retroactively. The district court concluded that the new IDOC policy interpretation and application to a certain inmate whose release was delayed by more than three years due to the new policy was contrary to Holm and violated the state and federal Ex Post Facto Clauses. The Supreme Court applied stare decisis and the interpretation fixed in Holm and affirmed. View "State v. Iowa District Court for Jones County" on Justia Law

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In 2011, Cosenza sought disability benefits on behalf of her minor son. An ALJ determined that J.M.F. was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied her request for review. Cosenza argued that the ALJ improperly found that her son’s autism and Asperger’s syndrome were not “medically determinable” impairments. The district judge granted Cosenza summary judgment and remanded under 42 U.S.C. 405(g); 5), terminating the case in the district court. On remand, another ALJ conducted a hearing in March 2016. In June Cosenza filed a motion in the closed federal case to hold the Commissioner in contempt “for not following court-ordered remand.” In July the ALJ ruled against Cosenza. Cosenza did not wait for the decision to become final but moved for summary judgment in the closed federal case and filed a letter with the Appeals Council requesting review. The district court granted the agency’s motion to strike, reasoning that it had relinquished jurisdiction over Cosenza’s first case; as to most recent decision, the administrative appeals process had not finished so no final decision existed for judicial review. Cosenza had not shown that the Commissioner violated the court’s remand order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A district court lacks jurisdiction under the Social Security Act to review an ALJ’s unfavorable decision until the agency’s decision is final; the Appeals Council has not yet decided whether to review the ALJ’s decision. View "Cosenza v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court upholding the order of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) rescinding George Zipf’s driver’s license revocation. Zipf was arrested at a sobriety checkpoint for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Consequently, the Department of Motor Vehicles revoked his driver’s license. The OAH found insufficient evidence that the DUI arrest was lawful and rescinded the driver’s license revocation. The circuit court upheld the OAH’s order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence that Zipf’s DUI arrest was lawful, and therefore, the circuit court erred in upholding the OAH’s order. View "Reed v. Zipf" on Justia Law

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Wiseman filed suit seeking to recover "carrying charges" it paid Southern on the theory that those charges were not permitted by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. The trial court ruled that the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (Department) has exclusive jurisdiction over Wiseman's claims because its allegations directly implicate the sale of alcohol. The Court of Appeal held that, although the Department does have exclusive jurisdiction to issue, deny, suspend and revoke alcoholic beverage licenses according to terms of the ABC Act and regulations adopted pursuant to it, the consequences of committing a violation of the ABC Act by imposing charges of the type collected by Southern from Wiseman in this case were not limited to those which the Department may impose on its licensees and did not bar the contract, unfair competition and declaratory relief claims alleged in Wiseman's complaint. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order sustaining Southern's demurrer and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wiseman Park v. Southern Glazer's Wine and Spirits" on Justia Law

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The circuit court erred in granting a writ of mandamus in favor of the Nicholas County Board of Education (Board) requiring the West Virginia Board of Education and the State Superintendent of Schools (collectively, the WVBOE) to approve the Board’s amended consolidated educational facilities plan (CEFP), which constituted a prerequisite to the Board’s efforts to consolidate four Nicholas County schools and its Career and Technical Education Center. The circuit court found (1) the WVBOE lacks the authority to reject a county board’s CEFP if the county complies with certain regulatory requirements; and (2) the WVBOE’s stated reasons for rejecting the CEFP amendment were arbitrary and capricious. The Supreme Court held (1) the WVBOE is vested with authority to exercise its discretion in accepting or rejecting an amended CEFP, and mere procedural compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements does not entitle a county board of education to approval of its proposed plan; and (2) the reasons adopted by the WVBOE for rejection of the plan were neither arbitrary nor capricious. View "West Virginia Board of Education v. Board of Education of the County of Nicholas" on Justia Law

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When Arvada, Colorado police officers responded to a reported domestic disturbance in Terry Ross’s home, Ross went into a bedroom and shot himself. Officers radioed for an ambulance whose crew delivered him to the hospital. There, doctors treated Ross’s wounds as Arvada officers kept watch over him. When Ross, and later his estate, could not pay for his care, the hospital billed the City of Arvada nearly $30,000. The question presented by this case was essentially whether Arvada had to pay the tab. The trial court and court of appeals said yes; both read Colorado’s “Treatment while in custody” statute as entitling the hospital to relief. Relying on Poudre Valley Health Care Inc. v. City of Loveland, 85 P.3d 558 (Colo. App. 2003), the trial court decided the statute assigned police departments (or any agency that detains people) a duty to pay healthcare providers for treatment of those in custody. The court of appeals affirmed on essentially the same grounds. The Colorado Supreme Court, however, concluded the statute did not create any duty to a healthcare provider. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the hospital’s claim for unjust enrichment survived. Because that claim was contractual, the Court concluded the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act did not prohibit it. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Arvada ex rel. Arvada Police Department v. Denver Health" on Justia Law

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Claimant Lydia Diamond appeals the summary judgment decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Labor denying her claim for PPD benefits associated with the C3-4 levels of her spine. In April 2001, claimant was injured in a motor vehicle collision while delivering newspapers for employer. The crash exacerbated claimant’s preexisting right carpal tunnel syndrome. She underwent right carpal tunnel release surgery in February 2002, and had a surgical release of her left carpal tunnel in January 2003. After the surgeries, it became clear that claimant had unresolved neck pain relating to the work accident. Her doctor diagnosed disc herniations in her cervical spine and in September 2003 performed discectomies at the C5-6 and C6-7 levels of her cervical spine and a two-level cervical fusion at C4-C6. The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a workers’ compensation award of permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits based on damage to the C4-6 levels of claimant’s cervical spine precluded a subsequent award of PPD benefits, more than six years later, for damage to the C3-4 levels of claimant’s spine that arose, over time, from the same work injury. Claimant appealed the grant of summary judgment by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor that denied her claim for PPD benefits associated with the C3-4 levels of her spine. The Commissioner determined that claimant’s request for the additional PPD benefits amounted to a request to modify the prior PPD award and was time-barred. The Supreme Court concluded, based on the specific language of the initial PPD award, it did not purport to encompass injury to other levels of claimant’s cervical spine beyond the C4-6 levels. Accordingly, claimant was not seeking to modify the prior PPD award but, rather, sought PPD benefits for physical damage not encompassed within a previous PPD award. Her claim was therefore timely, and accordingly the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Diamond v. Burlington Free Press" on Justia Law

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This case involved a challenge under the Compelled Support Clause of the Vermont Constitution to the Town of Cabot’s grant of federally derived but municipally managed funds for the purpose of repairs to a historic church. Relying on Chapter I, Article Three of the Vermont Constitution, plaintiffs challenged the Town of Cabot’s award of a grant to fund repairs to the United Church of Cabot, and sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the grant. Defendants moved to dismiss the case on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing. With respect to the Town’s motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that plaintiffs did have standing on two independent bases: (1) as municipal taxpayers; or (2) alternatively, under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the federal Constitution. The court rejected the argument that municipal taxpayer standing did not apply because the funds at issue originated from federal coffers. Just as federal taxpayers have standing to pursue certain Establishment Clause claims, as recognized in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968), state taxpayers have standing to advance Compelled Support claims under the Vermont Constitution. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded plaintiffs had standing to challenge the grant. However, the Court determined the evidence did not support the issuance of an injunction. The Court therefore affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Taylor v. Town of Cabot" on Justia Law