In this appeal, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review centered on the language of the utility service facilities exception ("Utility Exception") to governmental immunity contained in the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act ("Tort Claims Act"). The Commonwealth Court concluded that where a dangerous condition of the facilities of a utility system is created by the negligent action or inaction of a local agency or its employees, the Utility Exception did not apply. Because the Commonwealth Court misconstrued both the Utility Exception and the gravamen of the lawsuit in question, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Metropolitan Edison v. City of Reading" on Justia Law

SugarHouse HSP Gaming ("SugarHouse"), the holder of a Category 2 slot machine license for a casino it operated in Philadelphia, and Market East Associates, L.P. ("Market East"), an unsuccessful applicant for the Category 2 license awarded to Stadium Casino, LLC (“Stadium”), both filed petitions for review ofa Supplemental Adjudication issued by the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, in which the Board awarded the last remaining Category 2 license. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court dismissed SugarHouse's petition for review, finding it was not entitled to intervene in the proceedings on remand. In Market East's petition for review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's determination that Watche Manoukian, an individual who is an affiliate of Stadium, was not eligible to apply for a Category 1 slot machine license at the time of Stadium's application for its Category 2 license, and, thus, that Section 1304(a)(1) of the Gaming Act would not be violated by the issuance of a Category 2 license to Stadium. However, the Court reversed the Board's determination of what constitutes a "financial interest" as that term was used in Section 1330, and defined that term in this opinion. Because the Board admitted that it did not determine the nature of the specific "equity infusion" Manoukian would supply post-licensure to the trust which has an ownership interest in Stadium, the Court could not affirm the Board's conclusion that Manoukian would not be in violation of Section 1330's 33.3% limit on the possession of a financial interest in a Category 2 slot machine licensee by another slot machine licensee. Thus, the Court again remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Market East Assoc. v. PA Gaming Control Bd." on Justia Law

The issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this matter was whether a recently terminated employee was an "employee" and, thus, entitled to inspect her personnel file, according to the Inspection of Employment Records Law ("the Personnel Files Act" or "the Act"). Reading the Personnel Files Act according to its plain terms, the Court concluded that former employees, who were not laid off with re-employment rights and who are not on a leave of absence, have no right to access their personnel files pursuant to the Act, regardless of how quickly following termination they request to do so. The Court reversed the contrary holding of the Commonwealth Court. View "Thomas Jefferson Univ Hosp v. Dept of Lab. & Ind." on Justia Law

The thirty-day period under Wis. Stat. 68.13(1) during which certiorari review may be obtained for a town board’s highway order to lay out, alter, or discontinue a highway begins to run on the date that the highway order is recorded by the register of deeds. In this case, the circuit court granted the town boards’ motions to dismiss Appellant’s petitions for certiorari review of highway orders recorded in Rock and Walworth Counties. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for certiorari review in either Walworth County Circuit Court or Rock County Circuit Court because Appellant’s petitions were filed within thirty days of the dates on which the highway orders were recorded by the registers of deeds. View "Pulera v. Town of Richmond" on Justia Law

West Carrollton City Schools Board of Education (BOE) appealed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) that retained the auditor’s update-year valuation of $4,716,690 for 2011 for the two contiguous parcels of property at issue in this case. Specifically, the BOE argued, inter alia, that the BTA acted unreasonably and unlawfully by refusing either to rely on the land-sale price and actual-cost evidence to value to the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code barred the direct use of the land-sale price in Carmax Auto Superstores, Inc.’s 2008 acquisition of the property because Carmax spent more than $7 million on subsequently added improvements; and (2) neither the 2008 land-sale price nor the actual construction costs affirmatively negated the auditor’s valuation, and therefore, the BTA acquired no duty to perform an independent valuation. View "West Carrollton City Schools Board of Education v. Montgomery County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Town of Middlebury and sixteen residents and entities situated in Middlebury and nearby towns (collectively, Plaintiffs), appealed the dismissal of their appeal from the decision of the Connecticut Siting Council granting CPV Towantic, LLC’s petition to open and modify a certificate for an electric generating facility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly determined that the council had adequately considered neighborhood concerns in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. 16-50p(c)(1) where Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving that the council acted contrary to law and ignored the neighborhood concerns that were presented to it. View "Town of Middlebury v. Connecticut Siting Council" on Justia Law

Because the state proposed to use federal highway funds to widen Wisconsin Route 23, the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) issued an environmental impact statement (EIS). USDOT made a record of decision (ROD) permitting the use of federal funds. Opponents filed suit. The court denied a request for an injunction because Wisconsin can proceed using its own money regardless of whether USDOT satisfied the requirements for a federal contribution, but set aside the ROD, finding that the statement projecting 2035 traffic loads had not adequately disclosed all assumptions. USDOT issued a revised EIS with additional details about how the traffic estimates had been generated. The district court reiterated the order vacating USDOT’s ROD. The judge stated that plaintiff was entitled to a declaratory judgment but neglected to issue one. The order setting aside the ROD was appealed by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. USDOT did not appeal. Wisconsin remains free to continue the project at the state’s expense. The National Environmental Policy Act, on which the suit rests, applies only to the national government, 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). Wisconsin cannot seek relief against a judgment that does not bind it. Wisconsin does not contend that USDOT had a statutory duty to fund the project, to prepare a better EIS, or to appeal the decision. View "1000 Friends of Wisconsin, Inc v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that the minor children of a parent whom they allege was wrongfully shot and killed by a law enforcement officer could: (1) sue for loss of consortium damages under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (TCA); and (2) bring their lawsuit even if the parent’s estate did not sue for wrongful death damages. The Court held Section 41-4-12 of the TCA waived a law enforcement officer’s sovereign immunity from liability for personal injury and bodily injury damages resulting from battery, and loss of consortium damages may be characterized as either personal or bodily injury damages. Second, loss of consortium damages result from the wrongful injury or death of someone who was in a sufficiently close relationship to the loss of consortium claimant, and such damages belong to the loss of consortium claimant and not to the injured person or the decedent’s estate. View "Thompson v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine whether “Blunt Wraps,” a type of cigar wrapper made in part of tobacco and designed to be filled with smoking material and smoked, could be taxed as “tobacco products,” as that term was defined in section 39-28.5-101(5), C.R.S. (2016). The Court concluded Blunt Wraps fell within the plan language of the definition of “tobacco products” in the statue at issue, and are taxable accordingly. View "Colo. Dep't of Revenue v. Creager" on Justia Law

In 2010, Carestream Health, Inc. began purchasing gas transportation services from Public Service Company of Colorado. In 2013, Public Service discovered that it had undercharged Carestream by approximately $1.26 million for those services. When Public Service sought to recover a portion of that amount, Carestream refused to pay. Carestream filed a complaint with the Colorado Public Utilities Commission, claiming that Public Service had violated its tariff by failing to use “all reasonable means” to prevent billing errors, as required by the tariff. The Commission disagreed, and the district court affirmed the Commission’s decision. Carestream appealed, arguing that the Commission in effect, improperly added language to the tariff, thereby exceeding the Commission’s constitutionally and statutorily granted authority. Specifically, Carestream contended that the Commission added a requirement that billing errors be foreseeable before Public Service was required to take means to prevent them. Carestream also argued that the district court erred when it held that Carestream lacked standing to pursue a separate claim that Public Service violated its tariff by recovering from its general customer base that portion of the undercharge it was unable to recover from Carestream. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court, finding : (1) the Commission properly interpreted the tariff and acted pursuant to its authority; and (2) Carestream lacked standing to challenge Public Service’s recovery of the undercharge from its general customer base because Carestream suffered no injury from the action. View "Carestream Health, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law