Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A woman was struck and injured by a bus in Bangor, Maine. The bus was operated as part of a public transit system known as the Community Connector, which serves several municipalities and the University of Maine. The City of Bangor oversees daily operations of the Community Connector, but the precise extent of involvement by the neighboring towns and cities is disputed. It is also unclear whether the bus that struck the plaintiff was running on a Community Connector route or a Bangor-only route; the buses for both services look the same.The plaintiff filed a complaint in the Penobscot County Superior Court against the City of Bangor, the Community Connector, and several neighboring towns and cities, alleging negligence and asserting that the Community Connector operated as a joint venture among the defendants. The municipalities moved for summary judgment, arguing they were immune from suit under the Maine Tort Claims Act. The Superior Court denied summary judgment, holding that the municipalities had not established that there were no material disputes of fact regarding their involvement or possible joint venture status. The court also denied a motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court considered whether the municipalities were entitled to immunity as a matter of law. The Court found that key factual questions remained unresolved, including whether the municipalities exercised direct control over the bus or its driver and the nature of their participation in the Community Connector. Because these factual disputes must be resolved by the trial court before determining the applicability of immunity, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory, leaving the issue of immunity to be addressed after further factual development in the trial court. View "Fisher v. Town of Hampden" on Justia Law

A sign operator installed two advertising signs near Interstate 85 in Atlanta in 1993, after obtaining permits under the city’s 1982 sign code. These permits were renewed several times. In 2015, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the city amended its sign code, removing several content-based provisions but allowing lawful, nonconforming signs to remain. When the sign operator later sought to upgrade the signs, the city approved the changes, but private parties challenged the decision. The Superior Court of Fulton County found that the original permits were unlawful under the 1982 code, making the signs illegal. The city then ordered removal of the signs and issued citations when the order was not followed.The sign operator, joined by the property owner and its president, sued the City of Atlanta in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, seeking a declaration that the 1982 sign code was unconstitutional under the First Amendment and seeking to enjoin its enforcement. The district court initially dismissed some claims for lack of jurisdiction, then reconsidered and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the code was content-based and subject to strict scrutiny, which the city had not attempted to satisfy.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs only had standing to challenge the provision of the 1982 code that applied to their signs—section 16-28.019(7)—rather than the entire code. The court further held that this provision, which distinguished between on-premises and off-premises signs, was content-neutral under the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Austin v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and injunction and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the provision meets the applicable intermediate scrutiny standard. View "Anderson v. City of Atlanta, Georgia" on Justia Law

A company that had previously operated a federal warehouse under contract with the government challenged the government’s decision to override an automatic statutory stay that halted performance of a newly awarded contract to a competitor. After the incumbent’s contract expired, the government solicited new bids and awarded the contract to another company. The incumbent protested this decision to the Government Accountability Office, which triggered an automatic stay under the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) that prevented the new contractor from beginning performance. A few weeks into the stay period, however, the government determined that urgent and compelling circumstances warranted overriding the stay, and it allowed the new contractor to begin work.The incumbent then filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims, contending that the government’s override was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court of Federal Claims ruled in favor of the incumbent, issuing a declaratory judgment that the override was arbitrary and capricious. The court found that in the context of a CICA stay, the protestor was not required to prove the traditional four equitable factors for injunctive relief, since Congress had provided for an automatic stay mechanism.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the government argued that the case was moot after the override was withdrawn, but the Federal Circuit found the dispute to be capable of repetition yet evading review. On the merits, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims, holding that a protestor seeking to set aside a CICA stay override need only show that the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious, and is not required to satisfy the four-factor test for equitable relief. The judgment was affirmed and costs were awarded to the protestor. View "LIFE SCIENCE LOGISTICS, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

Two Dartmouth College students were arrested in Hanover, New Hampshire, prompting Valley News to file a Right-to-Know request to obtain their arrest records. After months of email exchanges between the Town of Hanover, Valley News, and the students’ attorney, Hanover decided not to release the records, citing ongoing criminal prosecution despite the students’ attorney assenting to disclosure. Hanover based its refusal on exemptions derived from prior case law, specifically the Murray exemptions, which mirror certain provisions of the federal Freedom of Information Act regarding law enforcement records.Hanover initiated an action for declaratory judgment in the Superior Court, seeking a ruling on whether it was legally required to release the arrest records in light of the pending prosecutions. Valley News counterclaimed, seeking an order for disclosure with redactions. The Superior Court ordered Hanover to disclose the records and awarded Valley News attorney’s fees and costs. Upon Hanover’s motion to reconsider, the court upheld the disclosure order but reversed the award of fees and costs, reasoning that Hanover had made a good faith effort in navigating unsettled law. Neither party appealed this order. After Hanover released the records, Valley News moved to reopen the case for an award of attorney’s fees and costs, which the Superior Court denied, finding Hanover neither knew nor should have known its conduct violated the Right-to-Know Law.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. It held that Valley News’s motion was timely and that, under the Right-to-Know Law, Hanover knew or should have known that at least some of the records, especially publicly available information, were not exempt from disclosure. The court found that the lawsuit was necessary to enforce compliance and that Hanover’s blanket denial was improper. The court reversed the Superior Court’s denial of attorney’s fees and costs and remanded for an award to Valley News. View "Town of Hanover v. Valley News" on Justia Law

A licensed electric supplier in Connecticut sought to withdraw its electric supplier license after previously entering into a settlement agreement with the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) to resolve various regulatory allegations. This agreement required the supplier to voluntarily stop serving customers in Connecticut for six years but did not expressly require the withdrawal of the license itself. Around the same period, PURA completed a cost-allocation proceeding related to the redesign of residential billing formats, and ordered the supplier to pay an allocated assessment of approximately $179,000. The supplier then moved to withdraw its license, asserting it had no further obligations, but PURA denied the motion without prejudice and directed payment of the assessment before considering license relinquishment.The supplier filed an administrative appeal in the Superior Court for the judicial district of New Britain, challenging PURA’s denial of its withdrawal motion. The supplier argued that the ruling was an appealable final decision in a contested case, or in the alternative, a declaratory ruling. The Superior Court granted PURA’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the denial was not a final decision in a contested case because no statute or regulation required PURA to provide a hearing on motions to withdraw a license. The court also declined to treat the supplier's complaint as a declaratory judgment action.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed whether the denial of the motion to withdraw was appealable as either a final decision in a contested case or a declaratory ruling. The court held that the supplier had waived its declaratory ruling argument by taking the opposite position in the trial court. The court further held that PURA was not statutorily required to provide a hearing on a motion to withdraw a license, so the matter was not a contested case. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Clearview Electric, Inc. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

A county board created a port authority in 2003 to encourage economic development, administering a business park on contaminated land formerly operated by a lumber company. In 2022, the port authority entered into agreements with a private company to clean up and potentially develop the property, culminating in the sale of 105 acres for $1.6 million, with a credit for cleanup costs. The plaintiff alleged that between May 2022 and April 2025, the port authority failed to provide adequate public notice of its meetings or opportunities for public participation regarding the land transactions, in violation of Montana’s open meeting and right to participate laws.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, reviewed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought to halt any actions pursuant to the port authority’s decisions during the contested period and to void the land sale and related contracts. The District Court denied the injunction, reasoning that the relief sought would not merely enforce open meeting laws but would invalidate completed transactions and disrupt the property’s new ownership and development. The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, particularly given the significant passage of time and changes to the property. The court did not resolve contested factual issues about notice or participation, nor did it make any final rulings on the underlying claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court manifestly abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion because the plaintiff failed to establish all required elements for preliminary injunctive relief. The Supreme Court emphasized that the lower court had not decided the merits of the open meeting law claims and left those questions for future proceedings. View "Torgison v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

Two individuals who are transgender women, one living in Montana and the other in Alaska, challenged recent Montana laws and administrative policies that restrict the ability to amend the sex designation on birth certificates and driver's licenses. These state actions, enacted in response to legislative changes, allow amendments to these documents only in limited circumstances such as clerical errors, not to reflect a person’s gender identity. The plaintiffs argued that these restrictions forced them to carry identification that does not match their gender identity, resulting in concrete harms such as disclosure of their transgender status during routine activities and difficulties in verifying their identity.The case was filed in the First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of equal protection, right to privacy, and prohibition against compelled speech under the Montana Constitution, as well as violations of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act. The District Court found that the plaintiffs had standing, demonstrated concrete and particularized injuries, and satisfied all four factors required for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the policies likely violated Montana’s Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against transgender individuals on the basis of sex, and that the plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm without relief. The District Court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the challenged state policies as applied to amending birth certificates and driver’s licenses.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the plaintiffs had standing and whether the District Court manifestly abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order. It held that the plaintiffs had standing and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the state policies likely constitute unconstitutional sex discrimination under Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution, warranting preliminary injunctive relief. View "Kalarchik v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a series of petitions filed by a state agency seeking to enter privately owned properties to conduct environmental, cultural, and geological investigations related to a potential water conveyance project in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. The agency pursued these entries under California’s precondemnation entry statutes, which allow entities with eminent domain authority to access property for studies necessary to determine suitability for public projects, before initiating formal condemnation proceedings. The landowners opposed these entries, arguing that, under specific provisions of the Water Code, the agency could not conduct such activities unless the project was fully authorized and funded.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County coordinated the various petitions and, after hearings, ultimately granted the agency’s requests to enter property and conduct the proposed activities. The trial court expressly found that the agency had eminent domain authority, did not need to initiate a classic condemnation action for these precondemnation activities, and was not required to comply with the project approval and funding prerequisites set forth in the Water Code. The landowners appealed these orders, maintaining their position that the agency’s authority was limited by the Water Code’s project approval requirements.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the appeal. The appellate court held that the Water Code’s project approval and funding requirements apply only to formal condemnation proceedings and not to precondemnation entry and testing activities authorized by the precondemnation entry statutes. The court relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court, which established that these statutes provide a constitutionally valid process for temporary entry and testing, regardless of whether such activities amount to a taking. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the agency entry to perform the investigative activities. View "Dept. of Water Resources Cases" on Justia Law

A group of individuals alleged to be members of Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan criminal gang and foreign terrorist organization, were detained in Texas after the President, invoking the Alien Enemies Act, ordered their removal from the United States. On March 15, 2025, government officials placed several of these detainees, including the plaintiffs, on planes bound for El Salvador. Shortly after their departure, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) barring the government from removing the plaintiffs from the United States for 14 days. Despite the TRO, the planes continued to El Salvador, where the detainees were transferred to Salvadoran custody.The district court then began contempt proceedings against government officials, reasoning that the government’s actions violated the TRO, and threatened criminal contempt unless the government returned the plaintiffs to U.S. custody. The Supreme Court vacated the TRO, holding it was based on a legal error and filed in the wrong venue. Despite this, the district court persisted with contempt proceedings, seeking to identify and potentially prosecute the official responsible for the transfer. The government identified the Secretary of Homeland Security as the responsible party and provided declarations from involved officials. Unsatisfied, the district court ordered further hearings and investigation into the Executive Branch’s decision-making.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the government’s petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the district court’s investigation was a clear abuse of discretion. The appellate court found the TRO lacked the clarity required to support criminal contempt for transferring custody and that further judicial inquiry into Executive Branch deliberations was improper, especially given national security concerns. The court ordered the district court to terminate the contempt proceedings. View "In re: Donald Trump" on Justia Law

A U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent was denied boarding an international flight in 2019 and subsequently learned, after following the Department of Homeland Security’s redress process, that he was listed on the federal government’s No Fly List. He then sought to challenge his inclusion both on the No Fly List and the broader Terrorist Watchlist, which contains the names of individuals reasonably suspected of terrorism. Placement on the No Fly List is dependent on inclusion in the Terrorist Watchlist. The individual alleged ongoing travel and immigration-related harms due to his watchlist designations.He filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, raising constitutional and statutory claims and seeking removal from both lists. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the No Fly List claims due to the statutory requirement that such challenges proceed in the circuit court under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, and transferred those claims accordingly. The district court retained the Terrorist Watchlist claims under general federal question jurisdiction. After further briefing, the district court dismissed the remaining Terrorist Watchlist claims for lack of Article III standing, finding it could not redress the alleged injuries because removing the plaintiff from the Terrorist Watchlist would necessarily set aside the TSA Administrator’s order keeping him on the No Fly List—an action reserved for the circuit court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that while the plaintiff suffered concrete injuries from his inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist, the district court lacked authority to redress those injuries because any effective remedy would encroach on the circuit court’s exclusive jurisdiction to review and set aside TSA No Fly List orders under § 46110. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of standing. View "Khalid v. Blanche" on Justia Law