Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A federal prisoner was sentenced in December 2020 and, due to pending charges in another jurisdiction, was held at a detention center in Rhode Island rather than being promptly transferred to his designated Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facility in South Carolina. During this period of post-sentencing detention, the prisoner claims to have participated in programs under the First Step Act (FSA), thereby accruing approximately 150 days of time credits, which could reduce his time in custody. However, the BOP did not recognize these credits because he had not undergone a formal risk and needs assessment—the BOP’s prerequisite for awarding such credits—until his eventual arrival at the designated facility in March 2022.After exhausting administrative remedies, the prisoner filed a pro se habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, seeking recognition of his alleged FSA credits. The magistrate judge, without briefing or discovery, recommended dismissal. The district court adopted this recommendation, concluding that the BOP’s regulation reasonably required an initial assessment before credits could be earned, and applied Chevron deference to uphold the agency's interpretation. The district court also found no evidence the prisoner had “successfully participated” in qualifying programs before arrival at the BOP facility and dismissed the petition without prejudice, refusing to require a government response.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded. The Fourth Circuit held that the case was not moot, as the prisoner could still benefit from the FSA credits if his risk status changed or a warden approved his release. The court further held that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overturned Chevron deference, the district court must independently determine whether the BOP’s interpretation of “successful participation” aligns with the best reading of the statute. View "Benson v. Warden FCI Edgefield" on Justia Law

Scott Martin operated a business in Harris County, Texas, gathering contact information of criminal defendants from public court records and selling it to private attorneys. His business relied primarily on access to bail bond orders, which contained defendants’ addresses and other contact details. In June 2023, the then-presiding judge of the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law issued an administrative order instructing the district clerk to keep the contents of certain bond orders in misdemeanor cases confidential, making only the title, filing date, and page enumeration available to the public. This significantly reduced the information Martin could access, leading to substantial business losses. Martin unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of the order and then filed suit, asserting constitutional and statutory claims and seeking injunctive relief and damages.The case was heard by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The defendants, including the district clerk and judges, moved to dismiss, arguing the order did not violate any constitutional right and that they were immune from suit. The district court, after a hearing, granted the motion to dismiss. The court determined that under Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., Martin’s First Amendment claim failed because the order merely restricted access to government information, not speech. It also found no plausible claim under the Sixth Amendment or Texas law, and concluded Martin had no property interest in the information.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that restricting access to the information in government possession does not violate the First Amendment, and Martin’s other constitutional and state law arguments lacked merit. The court also rejected Martin’s ultra vires claim, finding the judge acted within her statutory authority. Thus, the dismissal was affirmed. View "Martin v. Burgess" on Justia Law

A patient experienced severe complications following a routine appendectomy at a county hospital in Wyoming, leading to a diagnosis of short bowel syndrome. The surgery was performed by a hospital-employed physician. The following day, the patient suffered further abdominal issues and was transferred to another hospital, where emergency surgery resulted in substantial removal of her small intestine. The patient, initially a minor, sued the hospital and two of its physicians for medical malpractice, alleging their negligence under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The hospital admitted the physicians were employees and that it was vicariously liable for their actions. As a defense, the hospital asserted that liability was limited by statute to $1 million.After these events, the District Court of Converse County denied the patient’s constitutional challenge to the statutory limitation, finding it was a limit on the waiver of immunity rather than damages. The case went to trial, where the jury awarded $8 million in total damages, with $3.2 million allocated against the hospital and the physician found liable. The court entered judgment for the full $3.2 million, despite the statutory limit. Motions for relief and further summary judgment followed, with the patient arguing the hospital’s operation of a statewide commercial healthcare enterprise should negate the statutory cap. The district court denied these motions, but clarified the hospital was not required to pay above the statutory limit.The Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed the case. It held the liability of the hospital and its physician is limited to $1 million under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, unless there is excess insurance coverage. The court found that operating a statewide commercial healthcare enterprise does not constitute a waiver of this statutory limitation. The judgment exceeding $1 million was reversed, and the case was remanded for entry of judgment consistent with the statutory cap. View "Memorial Hospital of Converse County v. Gates" on Justia Law

A parent applied to a state-run program providing compensation for family members who give extraordinary care to individuals with significant medical needs. The applicant’s young child required extensive daily assistance due to chronic health issues. The Department of Health and Human Services denied the application, explaining that the child’s score on a standardized assessment, created internally by the Department, did not meet the minimum threshold to qualify for the program. The assessment assigned points based on responses to a set of questions about the child’s needs, and only those scoring at least fifty percent of possible points for their age group were deemed eligible.After the application was denied, the parent pursued an administrative appeal. The administrative law judge upheld the denial, finding that, under the Department’s rules, only the assessment score determined eligibility for “extraordinary care,” and other medical details were not considered. The Department adopted this finding in a final order and denied a rehearing. The parent then appealed to the District Court of Burleigh County, which affirmed the Department’s decision.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the Department could use the assessment and its scoring rubric to determine eligibility, even though these criteria had not been formally promulgated as administrative rules. The Court held that because these tools operated as binding eligibility requirements of general applicability, they were rules under North Dakota’s Administrative Agencies Practice Act and should have been formally adopted through the rulemaking process. The Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Ferderer v. NDDHHS" on Justia Law

State officials in Florida constructed an immigration detention facility at the Dade-Collier Training and Transition Airport, located in the Florida Everglades, using state funds and employees. The facility was built on state property and managed by state law enforcement, although federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials inspected the site and occasionally coordinated the transport and detention of individuals there. The state planned to seek federal reimbursement but had not received any federal funding at the time of the events in question. Several state agencies operated under agreements with the federal government, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), allowing them to assist with immigration enforcement, but Florida retained control over the facility’s management and construction.The Friends of the Everglades, the Center for Biological Diversity, and the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. They alleged violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), claiming that officials failed to conduct a required environmental review before constructing and operating the facility. The district court issued a preliminary injunction halting further construction, requiring removal of certain structures, and prohibiting detention of additional individuals at the site. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, concluding that the construction was a final agency action and a major federal action under NEPA, and that federal officials exercised substantial control over the project.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate either a final agency action under the APA or substantial federal control necessary to trigger NEPA, given that Florida constructed and controlled the facility without federal funding or operational authority. The court also found that the district court’s injunction violated a statutory prohibition against enjoining immigration enforcement. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin statute enacted in 2023 required that electronic nicotine delivery systems (such as vapes and e-cigarettes) could only be sold in the state if they had received premarket authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), were pending FDA review as of specified dates, or did not contain nicotine. The law also imposed financial penalties and authorized private lawsuits against violators. Several businesses and consumers involved in the manufacture, distribution, retail, and use of these products challenged the statute, arguing that federal law granting the FDA authority over tobacco products preempted the Wisconsin statute. They also asserted that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause, and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent enforcement.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court found that the Wisconsin law was not preempted by federal statutes, specifically the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA). The court concluded that Congress had not intended to preempt states from imposing additional or more stringent requirements on the sale of tobacco products, and that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits or that the balance of equities favored an injunction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that the text and structure of the relevant federal statutes, including the TCA’s preservation and savings clauses, demonstrated that Congress did not preempt state authority to regulate, or even prohibit, the sale of tobacco products. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their preemption claim. View "Wisconsinites for Alternatives to Smoking v. Casey" on Justia Law

A driver was stopped by a county deputy after allegedly committing traffic violations that led the officer to suspect impaired driving. The officer noted possible signs of intoxication and requested that the driver submit to alcohol testing, which the driver refused. Under Montana’s implied-consent law, the officer seized the driver’s license and issued a notice of automatic six-month suspension. The next day, the driver petitioned for judicial review, arguing that the officer lacked sufficient suspicion for the stop and the test requests.The Eighth Judicial District Court set an evidentiary hearing, but delays resulted from a combination of the petitioner’s request for a continuance due to jury duty and procedural orders requiring both parties to file briefs before a hearing could be held. The petitioner filed a brief, but the State did not, leaving the hearing vacated. Before the court ruled, the six-month suspension expired and the license was reinstated. When the petitioner moved to reset the hearing, the State moved to dismiss the case as moot, arguing that the only relief available was the return of the license, which had already occurred. The District Court agreed and dismissed the petition as moot.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the expiration of the suspension and reinstatement of the license rendered the case moot. The court held that the case was not moot because the petitioner’s timely challenge could still result in relief, such as removal of the suspension from his driving record and potential reimbursement of reinstatement fees. The court found that the statute contemplates judicial review even after the suspension period if the challenge was timely filed and pursued. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kalafat v. State" on Justia Law

A ratepayer challenged a final order issued by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission that modified the rates charged by a public utility, the Public Service Company of Oklahoma. The utility had previously been authorized to add a charge to customer bills to pay ratepayer-backed bonds issued in response to high costs from a 2021 extreme weather event, pursuant to the February 2021 Regulated Utility Consumer Protection Act. During the rate proceeding, the utility and several other parties presented evidence and entered into a settlement agreement, which was approved by the Commission. The appellant, who did not participate in the Commission proceedings, sought reversal of the final order on the grounds that the utility did not provide sufficient evidence of a required audit, and that a Commissioner should have been disqualified. The appellant also attempted a collateral attack on orders from earlier proceedings related to the winter storm charges.The Oklahoma Corporation Commission reviewed and approved the proposed settlement and the stipulated rates after testimony and public comment. The appellant did not object at any stage of the Commission’s process, nor did he submit evidence or raise the issues he later brought on appeal. After the final order was entered, the appellant filed an appeal directly with the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, as permitted by the state constitution.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that while the appellant had standing as a ratepayer to appeal, the issues raised were not exhausted before the Corporation Commission and could not be considered for the first time on appeal. The Court further held that the appellant’s collateral attack on prior Commission orders was both procedurally barred and statutorily prohibited. The Supreme Court affirmed the final order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission. View "GANN v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA." on Justia Law

Two builders’ associations, whose members are largely non-union construction contractors, challenged a federal procurement mandate issued by executive order in February 2022. The order, issued by the President, presumptively requires all contractors and subcontractors on federal construction projects valued at $35 million or more to enter into project labor agreements with unions. The order allows for three specific exceptions if a senior agency official provides a written explanation. The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council issued regulations implementing the order, and the Office of Management and Budget provided guidance. The associations argued that the mandate unfairly deprived their members of contracting opportunities and brought a facial challenge under several statutory and constitutional grounds, seeking to enjoin the mandate’s enforcement.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the associations’ motion for a preliminary injunction. It found that the associations were likely to succeed on their claim under the Competition in Contracting Act, since the government was not meaningfully applying the order’s exceptions, but concluded that the associations would not suffer irreparable harm because they could challenge individual procurements in the United States Court of Federal Claims. The district court did not consider irreparable harm as to the associations’ other claims.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction, although for different reasons. The Eleventh Circuit held that the associations were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their facial challenge under the Competition in Contracting Act, the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, the First Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, and the National Labor Relations Act. The court emphasized that the existence of written exceptions in the executive order precluded a facial invalidity finding, and that the government acted within its statutory and proprietary authority. The court affirmed the district court’s order. View "Associated Builders and Contractors Florida First Coast Chapter v. General Services Administration" on Justia Law

In 2021, the United States seized over 700,000 barrels of crude oil from two tankers in the Mediterranean Sea. The government alleged that the oil belonged to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), an entity it claimed materially supported the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The government further asserted that NIOC’s activities included supplying, transporting, and selling oil to benefit the IRGC, which used these resources to fund terrorist activities targeting the United States. A Turkish commodities trading company, Aspan Petrokimya Co., claimed ownership of the seized oil and sought to recover the proceeds from its sale.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the government’s forfeiture complaints without prejudice, finding that the government had not adequately pled that NIOC’s sale of oil affected foreign commerce. The government then filed an Amended Complaint consolidating the cases and providing additional factual detail. The district court denied Aspan’s renewed motion to dismiss, concluding that the amended allegations sufficiently addressed the jurisdictional element and all other statutory requirements. To expedite appellate review, Aspan admitted the complaint’s factual allegations, consented to judgment on the pleadings, and appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss de novo. The appellate court held that the government needed only to allege NIOC’s ownership of the property at the time of the offense, not at the time of seizure. The court also found that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleged that NIOC’s material support of the IRGC substantially affected foreign commerce, and that NIOC’s actions were calculated to influence the U.S. government. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. All Petroleum-Product Cargo Onboard the M/T Arina" on Justia Law