Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves four North Carolina-based citizen groups ("Petitioners") who petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to require testing of fifty-four Per- and Poly- Fluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) prevalent in their community. The EPA granted the petition, agreeing to require testing on PFAS as a class through its own testing protocol. Petitioners sought judicial review of the EPA’s decision, contending it was in effect a denial of their petition.The district court dismissed Petitioners’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the EPA reasonably chose to grant Petitioners’ request to test the fifty-four PFAS as a category—PFAS generally—which the TSCA encourages the EPA to do. As to the EPA’s failure to adopt Petitioners’ specific testing program, the district court explained that Petitioners “have a right to petition [the] EPA to initiate proceedings for the issuance of rules and orders, but [they] do not have a right to compel the content of [the] EPA’s proceedings or to compel [the] EPA to issue a specific rule or order.”On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the EPA’s decision was a grant in fact. The court reasoned that the TSCA allows the EPA to group chemicals into scientifically appropriate categories for testing. The court also held that the TSCA does not give petitioners the unrestrained ability to force companies to conduct specific testing when the § 2603 requirements are met. The court concluded that by promptly commencing a proceeding for determining how to best test PFAS, the EPA gave Petitioners all that they were entitled to receive. View "Center for Environmental Health v. Regan" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a former coal miner, Richard McLain, who developed a serious lung condition after working underground for nearly two decades. McLain filed a claim under the Black Lung Benefits Act, alleging that his years of mine work had left him totally disabled from a pulmonary perspective. His former employer, Old Ben Coal Company, had been liquidated through bankruptcy, so Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the surety guaranteeing Old Ben’s debts under the Act, contested liability on the coal company’s behalf.The case was initially heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ), who determined that McLain was disabled within the meaning of the Black Lung Benefits Act. The ALJ's decision was based on a thorough review of the medical record and a set of medical findings regarding how to distinguish between lung disorders arising from coal dust and those arising from tobacco smoke. Old Ben appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Benefits Review Board, arguing that the ALJ erroneously treated the 2001 preamble as if it were binding law and made factual findings unsupported by the medical record. The Review Board affirmed the benefits decision in full.The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court affirmed the decision of the Benefits Review Board, emphasizing the broad discretion ALJs enjoy when evaluating competing medical theories, the weight ALJs may properly attribute to the perspective of the Department of Labor on such issues, and the significant deference owed to ALJs’ medical findings and scientific judgments on appeal. The court found no error in the ALJ's application of a regulatory preamble or in the factual findings that were challenged by Old Ben. View "Safeco Insurance/Liberty Mutual Surety v. OWCP" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Gerald Sewell, who responded to a post on Craigslist, seeking a sexual encounter. The post was made by an undercover FBI agent posing as a 15-year-old girl. The conversation between Sewell and the agent quickly turned sexual, with plans to meet later the same day. Sewell drove from Missouri to Illinois to meet the supposed minor, only to be arrested upon arrival.Sewell was indicted for attempted enticement of a minor and for traveling across state lines with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct. He pleaded not guilty and requested a jury instruction on entrapment. The district court denied this request, finding no evidence of persistent persuasion by the undercover agent or reluctance by Sewell. The court concluded that the government had used the sting operation to solicit the crime without inducing Sewell. Sewell was convicted on both counts and sentenced to concurrent ten-year sentences.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Sewell appealed the district court's denial of an entrapment instruction. The court, after reviewing the case, found no evidence of inducement, only solicitation of the crime, which is insufficient to put the entrapment defense before the jury. The court noted that it was Sewell who encouraged the supposed minor to meet for a sexual rendezvous, and he set aside any misgivings he may have had to drive across state lines to meet her. The court concluded that the government had furnished Sewell the ordinary opportunity to commit the charged crime, and he eagerly took it. The court affirmed the district court's decision, denying Sewell's requested entrapment instruction. View "USA v. Sewell" on Justia Law

The case involves the Puget Soundkeeper Alliance (Soundkeeper), an environmental organization, and the Port of Tacoma and SSA Terminals, LLC (collectively, the Port), operators of the West Sitcum Terminal, a marine cargo terminal. The dispute centers on a portion of the terminal known as "the Wharf," where stormwater runoff carries pollutants into Puget Sound. The Soundkeeper alleges that the Port violated the Clean Water Act by not implementing stormwater controls across the entire facility, including the Wharf. The Port argues that the Wharf is not subject to regulation because it does not conduct industrial activities that require a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Port. The court concluded that the Industrial Stormwater General Permits (ISGPs) issued by the Washington State Department of Ecology did not extend coverage to the Wharf, as the Wharf did not conduct the industrial activities specified in the permits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the plain text of the 2010 and 2015 ISGPs required a transportation facility conducting industrial activities to implement stormwater controls across the entire facility. Therefore, the Port needed to implement appropriate stormwater controls across the Terminal while the 2010 and 2015 ISGPs were in effect. The court also held that the ISGPs were enforceable in a citizen suit, even if they exceeded the requirements of the federal regulations.However, the court vacated the district court's decision regarding the 2020 ISGP, which was subject to an ongoing state-court challenge, and remanded the case for further consideration. The court instructed the district court to consider the effect of the state proceedings on this case. View "PSA V. PORT OF TACOMA" on Justia Law

The case involves Travis Woods, a wheelchair user, who sued the Central New York Regional Transportation Authority and its subsidiary Centro of Oneida, Inc. (collectively, "Centro"), which operate the public bus service in Oneida County. Woods claimed that Centro violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide wheelchair-accessible bus stops. He argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Centro on his claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York granted summary judgment to Centro, dismissing Woods's complaint. The court found that Centro's paratransit service and its flexible pick-up and drop-off policy were reasonable accommodations providing meaningful access to Centro’s bus service.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Woods's claims under sections 12147 and 12148 of the ADA failed as a matter of law. The court concluded that Woods had not shown that the altered portions of Centro’s bus stops were inaccessible or that Centro’s bus service was not readily accessible to individuals with disabilities. The court also found that Woods had not established that any modifications to Centro’s policies, practices, or procedures were necessary to avoid discrimination or to provide program access. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Woods v. Centro of Oneida, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves two former faculty members at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), who were accused of serious misconduct. An independent law firm was hired to investigate the allegations, and the resulting report concluded that the professors had engaged in improper activities. The professors resigned their positions as part of a settlement agreement, with no findings of misconduct or admissions of liability. A former UCLA employee requested the report under the California Public Records Act (CPRA), and the professors objected, leading to a series of legal actions known as "reverse-CPRA" actions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the professors' petitions to withhold the report, concluding that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the professors' privacy interests. The court found that the allegations of misconduct were serious and substantial, and that the public had a strong interest in knowing how the university handled such complaints. The professors appealed this decision.While the appeal was pending, the Los Angeles Times made its own CPRA request for related documents, including the investigation report and the settlement agreements. The professors sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the release of these documents, but the trial court denied their request. The court found that the professors were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim, as the analysis for the disclosure of these documents was the same as for the investigation report. The professors appealed this decision as well.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's analysis and found no reason to delay a decision on a matter concerning public transparency. The court concluded that the professors had not established a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim and were therefore not entitled to injunctive relief. View "Doe v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The case involves a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by Judge Timothy L. Sweeney of the Circuit Court of Pleasants County, West Virginia. The petition was filed against the Hearing Panel Subcommittee (HPS) of the West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Board (LDB) and several attorneys. The case stems from consolidated lawyer disciplinary proceedings concerning several lawyers who were involved with a program operated by the City of St. Marys, West Virginia, called “Slow Down for the Holidays.” The program allowed certain criminal charges to be dismissed in exchange for donations to benefit needy children and seniors during the holiday season. Judge Sweeney reported the program to the appropriate authorities, leading to disciplinary proceedings against the involved attorneys.The HPS granted a motion by one of the attorneys to depose Judge Sweeney, who then moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the requested deposition testimony and documents were protected by the judicial deliberative privilege. The HPS denied the motion to quash, leading to Judge Sweeney's petition for a writ of prohibition.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted the writ of prohibition. The court found that the HPS clearly erred in ordering Judge Sweeney to submit to a deposition and produce documents. The court held that the testimony and records sought by the subpoena were protected by the judicial deliberative privilege. The court also found that the HPS erred in failing to hold a mandatory hearing pursuant to Hatcher v. McBride, which sets forth the limited circumstances in which judicial testimony may be compelled. The court concluded that the HPS exceeded its legitimate powers by ordering Judge Sweeney to appear for a deposition and produce documents. View "State ex rel. Sweeney v. Mundy" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by the Department of Corrections (DOC) against a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff P. Mark Potanas under the State Employee Whistleblower Act. Potanas, a former superintendent of Southern State Correctional Facility (SSCF), claimed that the DOC fired him in retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. These activities included notifying the state about potential savings on a building renovation project and advocating for more mental health staff at SSCF. The DOC argued that Potanas did not engage in any "protected activity" under the Act, and thus, the trial court should have granted its request for judgment as a matter of law.The trial court denied the DOC's motion, finding that Potanas's report of potential waste and his complaints about mental health staffing were sufficient to meet the definition of "protected activity" under the Act. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Potanas, leading to the DOC's appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling, agreeing with the DOC that Potanas did not engage in protected activity under the Whistleblower Act. The court held that the Act does not encompass reports about the possibility of future waste and that reporting on a known problem or disagreeing about how to resolve a known problem is not protected activity. The court remanded the case to the trial court to vacate the jury’s verdict and enter judgment for the DOC. View "Potanas v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Percipient.ai, Inc., a company that offers a commercial computer vision (CV) platform, appealed a decision by the United States Court of Federal Claims that dismissed its case against the United States and CACI, Inc.-Federal. The case centered on the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's (NGA) procurement process for its SAFFIRE project, which aimed to improve its processes for obtaining and storing visual intelligence data. Percipient alleged that NGA and its contractor, CACI, violated the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) and other procurement-related statutes by not considering its commercial CV platform, Mirage, for the project.The Court of Federal Claims had dismissed Percipient's case, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the FASA task order bar, which limits protests related to the issuance of task orders. The court also rejected Percipient's arguments related to the Tucker Act, standing, and timeliness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. It held that the FASA task order bar did not apply because Percipient's protest was not connected to the issuance of a task order. The court also found that Percipient's protest fell within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, as it alleged a violation of procurement-related statutes. The court further held that Percipient had standing to bring the case and that its claims were timely. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "PERCIPIENT.AI, INC. v. US " on Justia Law

The case involves the Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance and the Advanced Medical Technology Association, two trade associations representing medical device manufacturers, who sued the Library of Congress and the Librarian of Congress. The dispute arose from an exemption to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) that allowed some access to the software of advanced medical devices. The trade associations claimed that the exemption violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the APA claims were barred by sovereign immunity because the Library of Congress is part of “the Congress” and therefore not an “agency” within the meaning of the APA’s judicial review provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court held that irrespective of whether the Library is an “agency,” Congress has specified that copyright regulations under Title 17 of the U.S. Code are subject to the APA. The court concluded that DMCA rules are subject to the APA just like other copyright rules, and therefore, the APA provides the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity for this suit. The court remanded the case back to the district court to assess the APA claims. View "Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance v. Library of Congress" on Justia Law