Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Jessica De'Andrea, a patrol officer with the Montgomery Police Department, was involved in a motor vehicle collision while on duty. The driver of the other vehicle, Clint Walters, later sued De'Andrea individually for negligence, resulting in a $550,000 judgment against her after a jury trial. De'Andrea alleged that the City of Montgomery, which had procured liability insurance and acted as a self-insurer for its employees, failed to properly defend her, did not communicate settlement or appeal options, and refused to satisfy the judgment. She claimed these failures led to her bankruptcy and brought multiple claims against the City, including breach of contract, bad faith, fraudulent misrepresentation, and violations of the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act.The Montgomery Circuit Court denied the City's motions to dismiss, finding it was not apparent beyond doubt that De'Andrea could prove no set of circumstances entitling her to relief. The City then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus, seeking dismissal of all claims on the basis of statutory immunity and other defenses.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed only the City's immunity defense as to the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, because the City had not preserved immunity arguments for the other claims in the lower court. The Court held that municipal immunity under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, does not automatically bar all fraudulent misrepresentation claims, as such claims can be based on innocent or mistaken misrepresentations, not just intentional torts. The Court denied the City's petition for a writ of mandamus, allowing De'Andrea's claims to proceed. The City may raise its other defenses on appeal if necessary. View "De'Andrea v. City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

A property owner challenged an annual assessment levied by a city for the maintenance of landscaping and lighting improvements within a maintenance district. The assessment, originally set at $196.23 per residential lot in 1996, had increased to $300 per lot by the 2022–2023 tax year. The property owner argued that this increase violated Proposition 218, a constitutional amendment that restricts local governments’ ability to impose or increase taxes, assessments, and fees without voter approval. The city had not submitted the assessment to voters after Proposition 218’s passage, asserting that the assessment was exempt from Proposition 218’s requirements as a preexisting assessment for certain public services.The Superior Court of California, County of Solano, found in favor of the city. The court determined that the assessment was exempt from Proposition 218 and that the increase to $300 did not constitute an “increase” under the law because it did not exceed a range established before Proposition 218 took effect. Judgment was entered for the city, and the property owner appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the assessment had been “increased” within the meaning of Proposition 218 and the implementing statutes because the per-lot rate was higher than the rate in effect when Proposition 218 became law. The court rejected the city’s argument that a flat per-lot assessment does not involve a “rate” and found that the statutory definition of “rate” includes a per-parcel amount. The court also concluded that only ranges adopted in compliance with Proposition 218’s procedures could shield subsequent increases from voter approval requirements. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "Thacker v. City of Fairfield" on Justia Law

Lauren Richwine, through her business Death Done Differently, provides services as a “death doula,” assisting clients and their families with end-of-life planning, emotional support, and guidance on funeral arrangements. Richwine is not a licensed funeral director, and her website notes that her services are performed under the supervision of a licensed funeral director. In 2021, a complaint was filed with the Indiana Public Licensing Agency alleging that Richwine was practicing funeral services without a license. Following an investigation, the Indiana Attorney General sought a cease-and-desist order from the State Board of Funeral and Cemetery Service, which was approved. The order prohibited Richwine and her company from advertising or providing certain services related to funeral planning, community death care, and support with funeral homes.After the cease-and-desist order was issued, Richwine and Death Done Differently filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division, arguing that enforcement of the Indiana statute against them would violate their First Amendment rights. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining enforcement of the statute against the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed, arguing that the plaintiffs had waived their rights by signing the cease-and-desist agreement and that federal abstention doctrine barred the suit. The district court rejected these arguments, finding no clear and unmistakable waiver of federal rights and no ongoing state proceeding that would justify abstention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that the Indiana statute, as applied to Richwine and Death Done Differently, burdens substantially more speech than necessary to further the state’s interests in public health, safety, and consumer protection. The court found that the statute’s restrictions on the plaintiffs’ speech and advertising likely violate the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Richwine v. Matuszak" on Justia Law

West Central Agri Services operates a grain handling facility in Missouri, where employees load grain into railcars by accessing the tops of the cars, which are about fifteen feet above the ground. Employees open and close lids on the railcars to facilitate grain transfer, and a Trackmobile moves the railcars into position. An OSHA inspector, investigating an unrelated explosion, discovered that employees frequently worked atop railcars without wearing fall protection personal protective equipment (PPE), despite the facility having a fall protection system in place on one track and safety training instructing use of such equipment. Supervisors were aware of the lack of PPE use, and employees were not disciplined for noncompliance.Following the investigation, the Secretary of Labor cited West Central for a willful and serious violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(d)(1)(i), which requires employers to ensure employees use appropriate PPE for identified hazards. After a three-day evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission upheld the citation and imposed a penalty of $122,878.80, finding that West Central recognized the fall hazard and failed to enforce PPE use. The Commission denied discretionary review of the ALJ’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has exercised statutory authority over the working conditions on top of railcars, specifically through its 1978 policy statement asserting jurisdiction over walking-working surfaces and employee protection around railcars. As a result, the FRA’s authority preempts OSHA’s jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1). The court vacated the citation and reversed the ALJ’s order, concluding that OSHA cannot enforce its PPE regulation for employees working on top of railcars at this facility. View "MFA Enterprises, Inc. v. OSHRC" on Justia Law

A group of single-family residential (SFR) water customers challenged the City of San Diego’s tiered water rate structure, which imposed higher rates for increased water usage, arguing that these rates exceeded the proportional cost of service attributable to their parcels as required by California Constitution article XIII D, section 6(b)(3) (enacted by Proposition 218). The City’s water system serves a large population and divides customers into several classes, but only SFR customers were subject to tiered rates; other classes paid uniform rates. The City’s rates were based on cost-of-service studies using industry-standard methodologies, including “base-extra capacity” and “peaking factors,” but the plaintiffs contended these methods did not accurately reflect the actual cost of providing water at higher usage tiers.The Superior Court of San Diego County certified the case as a class action and held a bifurcated trial. In the first phase, the court found that the City failed to demonstrate, with substantial evidence, that its tiered rates for SFR customers complied with section 6(b)(3), concluding the rates were not based on the actual cost of service at each tier but rather on usage budgets and conservation goals. The court also found the City lacked sufficient data to justify its allocation of costs to higher tiers and that the rate structure discriminated against SFR customers compared to other classes. In the second phase, the court awarded the class a refund for overcharges, offset by undercharges, and ordered the City to implement new, compliant rates.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s judgment with directions. The appellate court held that the City bore the burden of proving its rates did not exceed the proportional cost of service and that the applicable standard was not mere reasonableness but actual cost proportionality, subject to independent judicial review. The court found substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings that the City’s tiered rates were not cost-based and thus violated section 6(b)(3). The court also upheld class certification and the method for calculating the refund, and directed the trial court to amend the judgment to comply with newly enacted Government Code section 53758.5, which affects the manner of refunding overcharges. View "Patz v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Tim Landholt was arrested in South Carolina after failing to pay child support, pursuant to a bench warrant issued by a family court judge. After Landholt appeared in court, paid a fine, and resolved the matter, the warrant was supposed to be recalled, but the clerk’s office failed to do so. Over five years later, Landholt was arrested again on the same, now-stale warrant and spent three days in jail. He then brought a negligence claim under South Carolina law against Jeanette McBride, in her official capacity as the Richland County Clerk of Court, alleging that the failure to recall the warrant caused his wrongful arrest and detention.Landholt initially filed suit in state court, asserting both federal and state-law claims. After procedural delays and amendments, the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. A magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment to McBride on the negligence claim, finding her immune under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, specifically S.C. Code § 15-78-60(2), which provides immunity for administrative actions or inactions of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature. The district court adopted this recommendation, holding that the immunity applied even to non-discretionary (ministerial) acts, and granted summary judgment to McBride.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that, under South Carolina precedent, immunity under S.C. Code § 15-78-60(2) applies only to discretionary, not ministerial, acts. Because the record did not establish that the failure to recall the warrant was a discretionary act, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to McBride on this ground and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Landholt v. Corley" on Justia Law

A university revoked a student’s bachelor’s degree in social work after being informed by a state agency that, during her internship, she accessed confidential information in a state database without authorization. The university retroactively changed her grade for the internship course to failing, notified her that her degree and diploma were invalid, and initiated disciplinary proceedings. The student, who had already graduated and obtained a social work license, challenged the university’s actions, arguing that her procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho dismissed the student’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that she did not have a protected property interest in her degree, grade, or the disciplinary process, and that, even if such an interest existed, the university provided adequate process. The court also concluded that she failed to plausibly allege that she was unable to pursue a career in social work, and held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because any rights at issue were not clearly established.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the student’s university degree is a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that the university failed to provide adequate process before revoking it. Specifically, the court found that the student plausibly alleged she was denied sufficient time to present her defense and was not allowed to cross-examine university-affiliated witnesses at her conduct hearing. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the procedural due process claim on these grounds and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the dismissal of the substantive due process claim and the grant of qualified immunity to the defendants for monetary relief. The appeal of the denial of a preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot. View "DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a Nebraska resident, received Medicaid benefits administered by the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (NDHHS). In April 2024, she was sent a notice stating her Medicaid eligibility was ending due to income exceeding program standards. The notice informed her of her rights to request a conference or appeal and outlined the process for a fair hearing. She did not appeal the termination, and her coverage ended on May 1, 2024. Subsequently, she filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals, alleging that the termination notices failed to meet due process requirements and seeking class certification, declaratory and injunctive relief, including reinstatement of benefits until proper notice was provided.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska considered only her individual claims, as she did not challenge the court’s decision to exclude class claims on appeal. The district court denied her request for a temporary restraining order, finding she was unlikely to succeed because her claims sought retroactive relief barred by sovereign immunity and because the notices likely satisfied due process. The court then dismissed her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding she had not alleged an ongoing violation of federal law and was not seeking prospective relief, as required to invoke the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s alleged due process violation was a discrete past event—the issuance of the notice and termination of benefits—not an ongoing violation. The court further held that the relief sought was retrospective, not prospective, and thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The court concluded that the Ex parte Young exception did not apply, and affirmed the dismissal. View "Filyaw v. Corsi" on Justia Law

Starbuzz International, Inc. and Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc. distributed shisha, a product containing less than 50 percent tobacco, in California between October 2012 and September 2015. During this period, they paid over $2.8 million in excise taxes under the state’s Tobacco Products Tax Law, which imposed taxes on “tobacco products” as defined by statute. Starbuzz later filed refund claims, arguing their shisha did not meet the statutory definition and was not taxable. The Office of Tax Appeals (OTA) agreed, finding the definition ambiguous and resolving it in Starbuzz’s favor, granting full refunds. After a rehearing, a second OTA panel reaffirmed this decision.Following these administrative victories, Starbuzz requested payment of the refunds from the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration. The Department, however, declined to issue the refunds immediately, citing a statutory requirement to review whether Starbuzz had collected the excise tax from its customers and, if so, whether those amounts had been returned to them. Starbuzz filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, arguing the Department had a ministerial duty to pay the refunds and was barred by res judicata from conducting further review. The trial court rejected Starbuzz’s arguments and denied the petition, entering judgment for the Department.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Department’s obligation to review for excess tax reimbursement under section 30361.5 was distinct from the refund claim adjudicated by the OTA. The court found that res judicata did not apply because the primary right at issue in the OTA proceedings (freedom from improper taxation) was different from the right asserted in the current action (immediate refund without review for excess reimbursement). Thus, the Department could require a review before issuing refunds. View "Starbuzz International v. Department of Tax and Fee Administration" on Justia Law

A state agency issued a new revocable permit to a company for seed research operations on state-owned conservation land. The agency declared that an environmental assessment (EA) was not required, reasoning that the land’s use was not changing and that there would be minimal or no significant environmental impact. In making this determination, the agency relied on a 1982 finding of no significant impact (FONSI) that had been issued for sugar cane cultivation, not for seed research involving restricted use pesticides and genetically modified organisms. The agency did not analyze the potential environmental impacts of the new seed research activities.A group of plaintiffs challenged the agency’s exemption declaration in the Environmental Court of the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the agency failed to take a “hard look” at the environmental impacts and did not follow proper procedures under the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act (HEPA). The environmental court granted summary judgment in favor of the agency and the company, upholding the exemption. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) found that there were genuine issues of material fact and gaps in the agency’s record, and remanded the case to the environmental court for further proceedings to reassess the exemption.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that whether an agency has followed proper procedures or considered appropriate factors in declaring an EA exemption are questions of law reviewed de novo. The court concluded that the agency did not follow proper procedures or consider appropriate factors in its exemption declaration, as its record was insufficient and failed to address the environmental impacts of seed research operations. The court vacated the ICA’s judgment and the environmental court’s orders, and remanded the case with instructions that the agency must prepare an EA regarding the possible environmental impacts of the seed research use. View "Ke Kauhulu O Mn v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law