Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated an investigation into potentially anti-competitive practices in the real estate industry by the National Association of Realtors (NAR). In November 2020, the DOJ and NAR reached a settlement, and the DOJ sent a letter to NAR stating that it had closed its investigation and that NAR was not required to respond to two outstanding investigative subpoenas. However, in July 2021, the DOJ withdrew the proposed consent judgment, reopened its investigation, and issued a new investigative subpoena. NAR petitioned the district court to set aside the subpoena, arguing that its issuance violated a promise made by the DOJ in the 2020 closing letter. The district court granted NAR’s petition, concluding that the new subpoena was barred by a validly executed settlement agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with the district court's decision. The court held that the plain language of the disputed 2020 letter permits the DOJ to reopen its investigation. The court noted that the closing of an investigation does not guarantee that the investigation would stay closed forever. The court also pointed out that NAR gained several benefits from the closing of the DOJ’s pending investigation in 2020, including relief from its obligation to respond to the two outstanding subpoenas. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "National Association of Realtors v. United States" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over approximately one acre of coastal land in Mississippi. The disagreement is between John Aldrich and the State of Mississippi, with the main point of contention being whether the land in question is privately owned by Aldrich or is State-owned tideland. The dispute originated from a map published by the secretary of state in 1994, which marked the boundaries between private property and Public Trust Tidelands. According to the map, the land in question was designated as State-owned tideland. Aldrich disagreed with this designation and challenged the boundary in Harrison County Chancery Court in 1998. The State responded with a counterclaim, asserting that it held fee simple title to the property.After more than two decades of inactivity and extended litigation, the chancellor ruled in favor of Aldrich in 2022, vesting title in him and adjusting the tideland boundary. The chancellor made five consequential findings, all of which the State labeled as error on appeal. The most significant finding was that a 1784 Spanish land grant, which is the root of Aldrich’s title, negated the State’s claim to fee simple title. This finding called into question which lands passed from the federal government to Mississippi upon statehood.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancery court’s decision. The court found that the 1784 Spanish land grant was valid and vested title in Aldrich. The court also found that the State failed to meet its burden of proof that the artificial filling of the land was not done pursuant to a constitutional legislative enactment and for a higher public purpose. Therefore, the court concluded that the property belongs to Aldrich. View "State v. Aldrich" on Justia Law

In this case, a government agency had approved a license to construct and operate a massive deepwater oil facility off the coast of Texas. Several environmental organizations alleged that the approval was unreasonable, arguing that the agency failed to adequately support its decision with a thorough environmental impact analysis. The groups claimed this was in violation of the Deepwater Port Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. They contended that the agency's approval was arbitrary or capricious. The environmental organizations asserted that operating the facility would produce emissions equivalent to more than 80 new coal-fired power plants and could increase the likelihood of mass oil spills along miles of the Texas coastline. They also voiced concerns about potential threats to the Gulf's marine environment.After their concerns were initially dismissed by the agency overseeing the project, the environmental organizations appealed the licensing decision. They claimed the agency had not conducted the appropriate level of review in its environmental impact statement and had not followed relevant statutory provisions during the approval process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the agency had adequately considered the environmental consequences of the facility before approving its deepwater port license. The court found that the agency's decision was not arbitrary or capricious, and as such, it denied the petition for review brought by the environmental organizations. The court ruled that the agency had taken a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of the project, provided sufficient detail for the public to understand and consider the relevant environmental influences, and evaluated alternatives in a way that permitted a reasoned choice among different courses of action. View "Citizens for Clean Air & Clean Water in Brazoria County v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Career Colleges and Schools of Texas (CCST) and the United States Department of Education over new regulations that will facilitate certain student loan discharges. The contested rule overturns recent regulations issued by the previous administration and alters thirty years of regulatory practice. The CCST challenged the regulations, arguing that they create uncertainty and potentially significant liability for its members. The district court declined to issue a preliminary injunction against the rule, stating that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated irreparable harm.CCST argued that the new regulations are beyond the Department of Education's statutory authority, violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and infringe on the due process rights of its members. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's findings, concluding that CCST is likely to succeed on the merits of its challenge and that its members will face immediate and irreparable harm if the new regulations are allowed to go into effect.The court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enjoin and postpone the effective date of the challenged provisions pending final judgment. The court ruled that the Department of Education's new regulations are likely unlawful and that their implementation would cause immediate and irreparable harm to CCST and its members. The court ordered the lower court to issue a preliminary injunction to delay the implementation of the new regulations until the case is finally resolved. View "Career Colleges and Schools of Texas v. United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

In the case, Sease Beard, a transgender inmate, alleges mistreatment and retaliation by prison officials. Beard, who identifies as a transgender woman, has been provided hormone-replacement therapy by the Missouri Department of Corrections since 2019. The issue in the case centers on whether the prison officials are shielded by qualified immunity.Beard was involved in multiple incidents with guards. In one particular incident, when a guard expressed disapproval of Beard's attire, Beard refused to change. Subsequently, several guards physically restrained Beard, used pepper spray, removed Beard's clothes, and carried Beard through the prison's hallways in view of other inmates. Following this incident, Beard filed a lawsuit against nearly everyone involved, claiming violations of state law and the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.The lower court, the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, denied the officials' motion to dismiss the case, asserting their claim to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision in part and reversed in part. The court found that certain prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity for some of Beard's claims, including a Fourth Amendment claim regarding a strip search and First Amendment retaliation claims related to denial of a promotion, restriction of shower access, and confiscation of personal property. However, the court found that other officials were entitled to qualified immunity for claims related to the denial of mental health treatment and the supervisors' inaction. The case was sent back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Beard v. Falkenrath" on Justia Law

In May 2020, Austin River Keller drove his car into a ditch and subsequently failed a breath alcohol test. The Kitsap County District Court suppressed the breath alcohol test results produced from the Dräger Alcotest 9510 machines in Keller’s case and in all other DUI cases in Kitsap County District Court. The district court concluded that the breath test results violated state statutes and regulations. The district court found that state law places strict limits on the admission of breath test results into evidence. The court also found that the Dräger machine had never rounded the mean before calculating the plus or minus 10 percent range, as required by state regulations. Instead, the Dräger was programmed to truncate the mean before performing that calculation. The district court ruled that the machine’s failure to do those necessary mathematical calculations itself rendered the results invalid and inadmissible under state law and court precedent.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the relevant statutes and regulations do not require the Dräger machine itself to perform the mean and the plus or minus 10 percent range calculation at the time of the test. The court found that the State could establish those required pieces of the foundation for admission of breath test results by doing the math discussed above in a different manner. The court reversed the district court’s evidentiary rulings and suppression order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "State v. Keller" on Justia Law

The case involves the Arkansas Voter Integrity Initiative, Inc., and Conrad Reynolds (appellants) who filed a complaint against John Thurston, the Arkansas Secretary of State, the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners, and Election Systems and Software, LLC (appellees). The appellants claimed that the voting machines approved by the state did not comply with the Arkansas Code and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) because voters could not independently verify their selections on the ballot before casting their votes. They argued that the machines printed ballots with both bar codes and the voter's selections in English, but the vote tabulator only scanned the bar codes. Since most voters cannot read bar codes, the appellants claimed that voters were unable to verify their votes as required by state and federal law. They also alleged that the appellees committed an illegal exaction by using public funds for the purchase and maintenance of these machines and that Election Systems and Software, LLC violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and committed fraud by claiming that its machines complied with state and federal law.The Pulaski County Circuit Court dismissed the appellants' complaint. The court found that the voting machines complied with the Arkansas Code and HAVA. The court also denied the appellants' motion for recusal and their motion for a new trial. The appellants appealed these decisions.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the voting process complied with the Arkansas Code and HAVA. The court also found that the appellants failed to demonstrate evidence of bias or prejudice sufficient to warrant the recusal of the circuit court judge. Finally, the court found that the appellants were not deprived of their right to a jury trial and that the circuit court did not err by denying their motion for a new trial. View "ARKANSAS VOTER INTEGRITY INITIATIVE, INC., AND CONRAD REYNOLDS v. JOHN THURSTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ARKANSAS SECRETARY OF STATE; THE ARKANSAS STATE BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS, IN ITS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND ELECTION SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a plea agreement between the State and Michael Brenum in a criminal case. The court ordered a pre-plea presentence investigation (PSI) and combined the change of plea and sentencing hearing. The risk assessment score from the PSI triggered a secondary phase of the assessment, which was referred to the North Dakota Department of Health and Human Services (Department) and Dr. Hein-Kolo. They refused to approve the secondary process of the assessment based on a pre-plea PSI, arguing that the risk assessment process should be used only after a conviction has occurred according to assessment guidelines. The district court held the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo in contempt for not completing the risk assessment.The Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo petitioned the Supreme Court of North Dakota to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a supervisory writ, arguing that the district court misinterpreted the law by ordering a risk assessment before acceptance of a guilty plea and that there is no other adequate remedy. They also argued that the issue is not appealable and no adequate alternative remedy exists.The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo, stating that the plain language of the statute gives the Department the authority to approve the secondary process of the risk assessment and the responsibility to perform that secondary process. The court also clarified that a risk assessment is conducted on “a person that committed an offense,” and a person is considered to have committed an offense only after a conviction. The court concluded that the district court may order a PSI at any time, but it may not require the Department to perform the risk assessment other than by its approved process or before the substantive requirements are met. The Supreme Court of North Dakota exercised its supervisory jurisdiction and vacated the district court’s order directing the Department to conduct a pre-plea risk assessment and the order holding the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo in contempt. View "State v. Thornton" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Joliet and five commercial truck drivers who were fined for violating city ordinances prohibiting overweight and/or overlength vehicles on nondesignated highways. The drivers challenged the city's jurisdiction to administratively adjudicate the ordinance violations, arguing they were entitled to have the violations dismissed because applicable law required that they be adjudicated in the circuit court. The hearing officer overruled the drivers' objections and denied their motions to dismiss. The drivers then filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Will County, which affirmed the decisions of the hearing officer.The appellate court reversed the decisions of the circuit court and hearing officer, following a previous First District's opinion which held that home rule municipalities are prohibited from administratively adjudicating "traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles," in addition to "reportable offense[s] under Section 6-204 of the Illinois Vehicle Code." The City of Joliet appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Illinois.The Supreme Court of Illinois found that section 1-2.1-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code does not preempt the City of Joliet's home rule authority to administratively adjudicate violations of its ordinances. Therefore, it vacated that part of the appellate court's judgment. However, the court also found that the hearing officer's administrative decisions were precluded by the Joliet Code of Ordinances, and thus affirmed, on different grounds, that part of the appellate court's judgment that reversed the judgment of the circuit court and the administrative decisions of the City. The court concluded that the administrative decisions were reversed, and the circuit court judgment was reversed. View "Cammacho v. City of Joliet" on Justia Law

The case involves Saleh Shaiban, a Yemeni national who entered the U.S. in 1999 using a false passport and B-2 visitor visa. He was eventually granted asylum in 2006. He subsequently applied for adjustment of status to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which was denied on terrorism grounds. Shaiban appealed the decision but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over his appeal and dismissed it.Shaiban initially applied for asylum in December 2000, but his application was denied in 2002. He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which also dismissed his appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded his case to a new Immigration Judge for a de novo hearing, which resulted in his asylum grant.In 2008, Shaiban applied for permanent residence. USCIS put his case on hold in 2013 due to terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act. In 2018, USCIS denied his application after determining that his participation in certain Yemeni organizations qualified as terrorist activities.Shaiban filed a suit under the Administrative Procedures Act to compel adjudication of his application for permanent residence. He argued that the government was collaterally estopped from denying his application since his previous asylum grant had determined that the terrorism bar did not apply. However, the district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, leading to Shaiban’s appeal to the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit declared that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Shaiban's case, pointing to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which identifies when courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review claims from noncitizens, and 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b), which states that the decision to adjust the status of a noncitizen granted asylum lies in the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States. The court determined that the plain language of the statutes and the Supreme Court’s precedential interpretation in Patel v. Garland led to the conclusion that the court did not have jurisdiction over Shaiban’s appeal. View "Shaiban v. Jaddou" on Justia Law