Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was asked to determine whether Arkansas Code § 23-92-604(c), also known as Act 1103, was preempted by federal law. Act 1103 prohibits pharmaceutical manufacturers from limiting the ability of healthcare providers, who are eligible for drug pricing discounts under the Section 340B Program, to contract with outside pharmacies for drug distribution.The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) sued the Commissioner of the Arkansas Insurance Department, arguing that Act 1103 was unconstitutional because it was preempted by the Section 340B Program and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, under theories of field, obstacle, and impossibility preemption.The court, however, disagreed with PhRMA's arguments. The court found that Act 1103 did not create an obstacle for pharmaceutical manufacturers to comply with 340B, rather it assisted in fulfilling the purpose of 340B. The court also found that Act 1103 did not make it impossible for drug manufacturers and wholesale distributors to comply with the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) Program under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.Therefore, the court held that Act 1103 was not preempted by either the Section 340B Program or the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. As such, the court affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of the Intervenors and against PhRMA. View "Pharmaceutical Research and Mfrs of America v. McClain" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the designation of Samark Jose Lopez Bello as a Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker (SDNT) by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. OFAC had simultaneously designated Bello and Tareck Zaidan El Aissami as SDNTs under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act), which authorizes sanctions against individuals playing a significant role in international narcotics trafficking and those materially assisting in such trafficking.Bello sued OFAC and its Acting Director in the district court, alleging that his designation was arbitrary and capricious, exceeded OFAC's statutory authority, deprived him of fair notice and resulted in an unconstitutional seizure of property. Bello also claimed that OFAC failed to provide sufficient post-deprivation notice. The district court dismissed his claims, and Bello appealed.The appeals court affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the Kingpin Act does permit simultaneous designation of Tier 1 and Tier 2 Traffickers and that this did not deprive Bello of fair notice of prohibited conduct. The court also found that OFAC had provided sufficient post-deprivation notice to satisfy due process, given the government's strong interest in preventing asset dissipation. View "Bello v. Gacki" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard a case initiated by Adam Hart, who filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against pharmaceutical distributor McKesson. Hart alleged that McKesson provided business management tools to its customers for free in exchange for commitments to purchase drugs, which he claimed violated the federal anti-kickback statute (AKS) and several analogous state laws. The district court dismissed Hart's FCA claim, determining he failed to allege McKesson acted "willfully" as required by the AKS.On appeal, the Second Circuit held that to act "willfully" under the AKS, a defendant must knowingly act in a way that is unlawful. The court found that Hart failed to provide sufficient facts to meet this standard. However, the court disagreed with the district court's assertion that Hart's state claims were premised solely on a violation of the federal AKS. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Hart’s federal FCA claim, vacated the dismissal of the remaining state claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States, ex rel. Hart v. McKesson Corp." on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the asylum petition of a Zambian woman, Milly Kalulu. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had previously dismissed her appeal of a removal order. Kalulu, who identifies as a lesbian, claimed past persecution in Zambia on account of her sexual orientation.The Ninth Circuit agreed with the BIA that substantial evidence supported the agency’s adverse credibility determination, meaning that the agency was justified in not believing Kalulu’s testimony. The court found that Kalulu had been inconsistent in her testimony regarding when she made plans to remain in the United States and her alleged fear of future persecution if she returned to Zambia. Her demeanor during the removal hearing also contributed to the adverse credibility determination.However, the Ninth Circuit identified errors in the agency’s evaluation of the documents Kalulu provided as evidence to support her claims of past persecution. The court found that the agency had misread some of these documents and had improperly discounted their evidentiary value based on these misreadings.The court therefore granted Kalulu's petition for a review of the BIA's decision and instructed the agency to reconsider whether the documents, when properly read, independently prove Kalulu’s claims of past persecution. The court made no determination as to whether these documents do provide such proof or whether Kalulu merits any of the relief for which she applied. View "KALULU V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the management plan for the Rio Grande National Forest (RGNF) in Colorado, particularly its impact on the Canada lynx, a species listed as threatened. The United States Forest Service (USFS), tasked with managing the RGNF, revised its Land Management Plan in response to a significant spruce beetle epidemic. The revised plan was assessed by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), as required by the Endangered Species Act (ESA), to consider the plan's effects on the Canada lynx. FWS issued a Biological Opinion in 2021 concluding that the plan would not likely jeopardize the lynx's continued existence. The Defenders of Wildlife contested this conclusion, arguing that the Biological Opinion violated the ESA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and that USFS improperly relied on the opinion in preparing the plan.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the Defenders’ petition. The Court held that FWS did not violate the ESA or the APA in its assessment, and that USFS appropriately relied on FWS's conclusions. The Court noted that the FWS had reasonably considered all relevant data, including information about the Canada lynx subpopulation in Colorado, and had made a reasoned decision based on this data. The Court also found that the FWS adequately addressed the potential impact of the plan on both low-use and high-use lynx habitats. The Court concluded that because the FWS's actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, the USFS did not act arbitrarily in relying on the Biological Opinion. View "Defenders of Wildlife v. United States Forest Service" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted the "Tobacco Act," which prohibited the sale of tobacco products to anyone under 21 years old. The town of Brookline later passed an ordinance that divided potential tobacco consumers into two groups based on birth year: those born before January 1, 2000, and those born on or after that date. Retailers could sell tobacco products to the first group, but not the second. This effectively created an incremental prohibition on the sale of tobacco products in the town. Several retailers filed a lawsuit, claiming that the local law was preempted by the Tobacco Act and violated the equal protection provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution.The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the local law was not preempted by the Tobacco Act. The court reasoned that the Tobacco Act expressly permitted local communities to limit and ban the sale of tobacco products. Furthermore, the local law did not conflict with the Tobacco Act's prohibition on sales to persons under 21; instead, it augmented this prohibition by further limiting access to tobacco products.The court also held that the local law did not violate the equal protection guarantees of the state constitution. The court found that the birthdate classification in the local law was rationally related to the town's legitimate interest in mitigating tobacco use, especially among minors. The court affirmed the dismissal of the retailers' complaint. View "Six Brothers, Inc. v. Town of Brookline" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Minnesota, clerical and technical employees of the Anoka County Sheriff's Office, represented by the Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc. (the Union), submitted a petition to the Bureau of Mediation Services (the Bureau) to determine an appropriate collective bargaining unit. The County opposed the unit, proposing a broader, county-wide unit. The Bureau found the County's unit to be the more appropriate choice. The Union appealed this decision, arguing that the Bureau had made numerous errors of law.The Supreme Court held that the Bureau did not improperly compare the Union's proposed unit to that of the County's. The Court determined that under the Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA), overfragmentation is one of the "other relevant factors" that the Bureau is allowed to consider when analyzing statutory factors for a unit determination. However, the Court found that the Bureau gave priority and effectively controlling weight to its four-unit preference and the related overfragmentation concerns over the specific factors listed in PELRA. This was deemed to be an error of law.Consequently, the Court reversed the decision of the Bureau and remanded for further proceedings, instructing that a bargaining unit determination must now be made by the Bureau giving appropriate weight and consideration to the statutory factors in PELRA. View "Anoka County, Minnesota vs. Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska considered whether law enforcement officers violated the Alaska Constitution by conducting warrantless aerial surveillance of a private property with high-powered optics to investigate a tip about marijuana cultivation. The property was located in an isolated area near Fairbanks and was surrounded by trees that obstructed ground-level view. The officers' aerial surveillance aided by a high-powered zoom lens led to a search warrant, which uncovered marijuana plants, methamphetamine, scales, plastic bags for packaging, a loaded AK-47 rifle, and a large amount of cash. The defendant, McKelvey, was subsequently charged with criminal offenses.The Superior Court denied McKelvey's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the aerial surveillance, holding that although McKelvey had a subjective expectation of privacy, this expectation was objectively unreasonable given the visibility of his property from the air. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, holding that under the Alaska Constitution, a warrant was required for law enforcement to use high-powered optics for aerial surveillance of a private property.The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that conducting aerial surveillance of a person's property using high-powered optics constitutes a search that requires a warrant under the Alaska Constitution. The court reasoned that such surveillance has the potential to reveal intimate details of a person's private life and could discourage Alaskans from using their private outdoor spaces. The court concluded that the chilling effect of such surveillance outweighed the utility of the conduct as a law enforcement technique. View "State of Alaska v. Mckelvey" on Justia Law

In this case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Danny Cruz, a prisoner, hatched a plan to smuggle cell phones into prison and sell them to fellow inmates by bribing a prison guard. Upon being caught, Cruz was charged with conspiring to violate the Travel Act under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Facing an additional five years in prison, Cruz entered a plea deal in which he pleaded guilty in exchange for the prosecution's agreement to recommend that the total offense level is 14. However, the Probation Office called for a four-level enhancement because the crime involved a public official in a sensitive position, leading to a dispute over whether this enhancement should apply.Cruz argued that if the government endorsed the enhancement, it would contravene the plea agreement, and the prosecution initially supported the enhancement during a presentence conference. Subsequently, the prosecution changed its stance in a brief, taking no position on the enhancement, and reiterated this at the start of the sentencing hearing. Despite this, the District Court found that the four-level enhancement did apply, leading to a final offense level of 15 and a final Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months.The Third Circuit Court concluded that the prosecution breached the plea agreement when it initially supported the four-level enhancement, as it had promised to recommend a total offense level no higher than 14. The Court further ruled that the prosecution's later neutral stance did not unequivocally retract its erroneous position, and thus did not cure its breach. Accordingly, the Third Circuit Court vacated Cruz's sentence and remanded the case, instructing that a different judge should decide whether to grant specific performance or allow withdrawal of the plea. View "United States v. Cruz" on Justia Law

In this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision that the defendants, R.L. Vallee, Inc., and Crystal Clear Hospitality, LLC (CCH), accepted and used payments issued by the Vermont Agency of Transportation (the Agency) in connection with a condemnation order and are therefore barred from contesting the necessity of the taking or the public purpose of the Agency’s highway project under 19 V.S.A. § 506(c).The Agency sought to acquire certain property rights for a highway project. After a judgment of condemnation was issued, the Agency tendered payments to the defendants. The defendants deposited these payments into their respective accounts but maintained that they had not "used" the funds. They appealed the judgment, intending to challenge the necessity and public purpose of the project.The court held that depositing a check constitutes both "acceptance" and "use" of a payment under 19 V.S.A. § 506(c). It rejected the defendants' argument that they had not used the "funds" because the issue was whether they used the Agency’s payments when they deposited its checks into their accounts. The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the Agency was required to show that they knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their rights under § 506(c), noting that defendants are charged with knowledge of the law and were represented by counsel. Finally, the court did not address the defendants' argument that § 506(c) is unconstitutional, as the defendants failed to assign error to the lower court's decision not to address that argument. View "Agency of Transportation v. Timberlake Associates, LLC" on Justia Law