Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Brian Benjamin, a state senator in New York from 2017 to 2021, who was indicted on charges of federal funds bribery, honest services wire fraud, conspiracy to commit each of those offenses, and falsifying records. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed three of the charges on the ground that the indictment failed to allege an explicit quid pro quo between Benjamin and his campaign donor. The government appealed this decision.According to the allegations, Benjamin agreed to allocate state funds to a non-profit organization controlled by a real estate developer in his district, in exchange for campaign contributions. The developer was allegedly aware of the quid pro quo arrangement and proceeded to provide funds to Benjamin's campaign. Furthermore, Benjamin allegedly attempted to conceal this arrangement by falsifying campaign forms and providing false information during his background check when he was nominated to be lieutenant governor of New York.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that an explicit quid pro quo does not need to be expressly stated; it can be inferred from the official’s and the payor’s words and actions. The court concluded that the indictment sufficiently alleged an explicit quid pro quo, as it stated that Benjamin obtained campaign contributions in exchange for his agreement to use his official authority to obtain a state grant for a non-profit organization. Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Benjamin" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute regarding the office of constable for the District 59 election precinct in Jefferson County, Alabama. Frederick Burkes, Sr. won the 2020 Democratic party primary for the office and was declared and certified as the winner. Prior to assuming office, he filed a bond as required by state law. However, James Franklin contended that the bond was not timely filed as it was not filed within 40 days of the declaration of Burkes's election. Consequently, Jefferson Probate Judge James Naftel declared the office of constable for District 59 vacant, leading to Governor Kay Ivey appointing Franklin to the office.Burkes initiated a quo warranto action against Franklin, challenging his appointment. The trial court ruled in favor of Franklin, a decision that was appealed by Burkes. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court found that Burkes had indeed filed his official bond on time, as per § 11-2-6 of the Alabama Code. However, Burkes's argument before the trial court was framed around a perceived conflict between § 36-5-2 and § 36-23-4 of the Alabama Code, not § 11-2-6. As a result, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's decision because Burkes had not presented an argument concerning § 11-2-6 to the trial court. View "State of Alabama ex rel. Burkes v. Franklin" on Justia Law

The case originates from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The appellant, Herbie D. Vest, served on active duty in the United States Army from 1966 to 1971. In 1971, Vest filed a claim for service connection for hearing loss and tinnitus, which was granted at a 0% rating. A subsequent request for an increased rating was denied. In 1972, Vest sent a letter to the Veterans Administration Regional Office (RO) expressing his belief of an error in their decision. In 2016, Vest submitted a claim for compensation for Meniere's disease and "ears-ringing," which was granted at a 60% disability rating, which Vest disputed.In 2020, Vest argued that his 1972 letter constituted a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) and should be considered as such. However, the RO did not accept the letter as an NOD. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals found that the letter expressed dissatisfaction with the decision on his hearing loss disability, but did not express disagreement with the decision regarding tinnitus. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed Vest's appeal, holding that they did not have jurisdiction to address the question of defective notice. The court noted that Vest did not argue that he had submitted an NOD with the initial decision concerning tinnitus, and he didn't challenge the Board’s determinations that the letter was not an NOD for the tinnitus decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the appeal by the Veterans Court due to lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the absence of an NOD on the 1971 tinnitus claim and the lack of any decision by the Board on that claim defeat jurisdiction in the Veterans Court. View "Vest v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The case involves the Mississippi Division of Medicaid and the Women’s Pavilion of South Mississippi, PLLC. Women's Pavilion, a physician-owned OBGYN clinic, challenged Mississippi Division of Medicaid's calculation of the "encounter rate," a set amount of money per visit by a Medicaid patient. Medicaid set the clinic’s encounter rate at $157.94, which was partially based on the compensation of the five physician owners of the clinic.Women’s Pavilion appealed this decision and requested an administrative hearing. The hearing officer evaluated whether Medicaid’s initial decision was supported by substantial evidence, affirming the reimbursement rate. However, Women’s Pavilion appealed again, arguing that the hearing officer applied the wrong standard of review.The Hinds County Chancery Court agreed with Women’s Pavilion, holding that the hearing officer should have made his own findings of fact and determinations of the issues presented, rather than merely evaluating whether Medicaid’s initial decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court vacated Medicaid’s final decision and remanded the matter back to Medicaid.The Mississippi Division of Medicaid appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Hinds County Chancery Court, stating that the hearing officer had erred by applying the standard of review for courts reviewing a final administrative decision, rather than following Medicaid’s own administrative rules governing provider appeals. The case was remanded back to Medicaid for further proceedings under the proper standard of review. View "Mississippi Division of Medicaid v. Women's Pavilion of South Mississippi, PLLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a case brought by John E. Federinko against Forrest County and its coroner, Butch Benedict, Jr. Federinko, the father of Alison Dawkins, disagreed with the findings of the county's investigation into his daughter's death by suicide. He argued that the county had a ministerial duty to perform an autopsy and to obtain postmortem blood and vitreous fluids, which they had failed to do. His subsequent private autopsy suggested that his daughter's death may have been a homicide.The court, however, ruled that Forrest County had no duty to perform an autopsy and did not breach any duty to obtain or attempt to obtain postmortem blood and fluids. They found that even if Federinko's suspicions were correct and his daughter's death was not a suicide, that would not change the county's obligations. The court concluded that Federinko failed to allege a tortious act, rendering the issue of discretionary-function immunity moot. Therefore, the trial court's denial of Federinko's motion for partial summary judgment, as well as its grant of Forrest County's motion for summary judgment and subsequent dismissal of the case, were affirmed. View "Federinko v. Forrest County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

Maximo Espinal, a security guard, was arrested by Houston police officers for aggravated assault. Although a grand jury initially indicted Espinal, the charges were subsequently dropped. Espinal then sued the officers involved and the City of Houston, claiming he had been subjected to false arrest, malicious prosecution, and assault. The district court dismissed all of Espinal's claims based on the officers' qualified immunity and immunity under Texas law.Espinal's arrest occurred after he had a heated interaction with a plainclothes police officer, M.T. Long, who was trespassing on the property Espinal was guarding. After Espinal instructed Officer Long to leave, the officer returned with multiple police vehicles and arrested Espinal. Espinal alleged that the officers made no effort to view or collect video surveillance evidence that he said would prove his innocence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court ruled that the officers had probable cause for Espinal's arrest. Furthermore, the court found that even if the officers had lacked probable cause, the grand jury's subsequent indictment of Espinal shielded them from liability under the independent intermediary doctrine. The court also rejected Espinal's claim that he had been maliciously prosecuted, finding that Espinal failed to allege that the officers had misled the grand jury. Finally, the court ruled that Espinal's assault claim was barred by the Texas Tort Claims Act. View "Espinal v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

The case involves Joseph A. Jakuttis, a former officer and detective in the Dracut Police Department, who also served as a Task Force Officer for the federal Drug Enforcement Administration's Cross Borders Initiative. Jakuttis brought multiple federal and state claims against the Town of Dracut, certain Dracut police officers, and members of the federal law-enforcement task force. He alleged that he was demoted and faced retaliation after reporting serious criminal activities implicating two Dracut police officers, which he learned from a confidential drug informant.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Jakuttis's Bivens claims against Michael V. O'Hanlon and Richard P. Poirier, Jr., and his §1983 claim against the Town of Dracut, David J. Chartrand Jr., and Demetri Mellonakos. The court ruled that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as they could have reasonably thought that Jakuttis was speaking as part of his official duties rather than as a private citizen when he reported the misconduct, thus not clearly violating his First Amendment rights.The court also affirmed the dismissal of Jakuttis's state-law tort claims against Poirier, as Poirier was deemed to be acting within the scope of his federal employment during the relevant times. However, the court remanded the Massachusetts Whistleblower Act claim against the Town of Dracut and the Intentional Interference with Advantageous Economic Relationship claim against Chartrand and Mellonakos to the District Court. The court reasoned that these state-law claims should be resolved by a state court due to reasons of comity. View "Jakuttis v. Town of Dracut" on Justia Law

This case involves the Temple of 1001 Buddhas and others, who own a property in Fremont, California. They appealed against the City of Fremont's decision to uphold nuisance orders relating to their property based on alleged violations of the local building code. The plaintiffs argued that the appeals process used by the City of Fremont was preempted by section 1.8.8 of the California Building Code, which requires appeals to be heard by an independent agency or board, or the city's governing body. They also raised issues about the fairness of their administrative appeal hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four concluded that the City of Fremont's appeals process did conflict with the state law in relation to enforcement determinations based on violations of Fremont’s Building Standards Code. However, it rejected the plaintiffs' claims about procedural unfairness and zoning violations.The court reversed part of the judgment and directed the trial court to issue appropriate mandamus relief. This included compelling Fremont to establish an appeals board or authorized agency to hear appeals, or provide for an appeal to its governing body as required by section 1.8.8 of the Building Code. Furthermore, Fremont was compelled to set aside the administrative hearing decision sustaining the nuisance determinations in NOA 3 that are premised on violations of the Fremont Building Standards Code and to provide for an appeal for those nuisance determinations. View "Temple of 1001 Buddhas v. City of Fremont" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington heard a case involving Assurance Wireless USA LP, a telecommunications company that provides wireless services to low-income consumers as part of the federal "Lifeline" program. Assurance contested the Department of Revenue's tax assessments on the reimbursements they received for their services, arguing that the transactions were not retail sales. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) upheld the tax assessments, finding that the transactions did constitute retail sales and that the tax burden fell on the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), the nonprofit appointed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to administer the Lifeline program.The Supreme Court agreed that the transactions were retail sales and that USAC, not the Lifeline consumers or the FCC, bore the legal incidence of the tax. However, the Court concluded that USAC operates as an instrumentality of the federal government, meaning that the retail sales tax violated the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine as applied in this case. The Court ultimately reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the BTA for further proceedings in line with this opinion. View "Assurance Wireless USA, LP v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

This case involved a group of businesses (referred to collectively as Taxpayers) who filed applications for adjustments to the fair market value of their properties for tax year 2020 in the state of Utah. They claimed that their properties' values had decreased due to "access interruption" caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and associated government guidelines, which they argued constituted a circumstance beyond their control under Utah Code section 59-2-1004.6 (the Access Interruption Statute).The Utah State Tax Commission rejected this argument, maintaining that the pandemic did not qualify as an "access interruption event" under the Access Interruption Statute. It reasoned that the statute applies only if access was interrupted due to any of thirteen enumerated events or due to a similar event as determined by the Commission via administrative rule. Because the pandemic neither fit into any of the enumerated categories nor was included in the Commission's administrative rules, the Commission ruled that the statute did not apply.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah agreed with the Commission's reasoning, holding that the Access Interruption Statute allows only the Commission to add to the statute’s list of qualifying circumstances if the Commission determines by rule that the additional event is similar to the events enumerated in the statute. Because the pandemic was not an enumerated event and had not been added by administrative rule, the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's decision. View "Miller Theatres v. Tax Commission" on Justia Law