Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Captain Matthew Hight trained with the Saint Lawrence Seaway Pilots Association from 2015 to 2018 to become a maritime pilot on Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. The Great Lakes Pilotage Act of 1960 requires certain ships on these waters to have a registered pilot on board. The Coast Guard oversees the registration of American pilots and supervises private pilotage associations responsible for training new pilots. Hight applied for registration in 2018, but the Pilots Association recommended denial, citing incomplete training and concerns about his temperament. The Coast Guard denied his application after an independent review.Hight challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the Coast Guard acted arbitrarily and capriciously, unconstitutionally delegated authority to the Pilots Association, and violated the First Amendment by requiring him to train with and join the Pilots Association. The district court rejected all claims, finding that the Coast Guard's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including Hight's failure to complete the required training and concerns about his temperament.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Coast Guard's decision was reasonable and supported by the record, as Hight had not completed the required supervised trips on the St. Lawrence River. The court also found that the Coast Guard did not unconstitutionally delegate authority to the Pilots Association, as the association's role was limited to providing advice and gathering facts. Finally, the court determined that Hight's First Amendment claim regarding mandatory association membership was not ripe for review, as he was not yet eligible to join the Pilots Association. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Hight v. DHS" on Justia Law

Kenneth Michael Sikorsky purchased a property in Newburgh, New York, in 2006 but fell behind on his property taxes, leading to foreclosure by the City of Newburgh in 2012. Sikorsky and the City later agreed on a contract for Sikorsky to repurchase the property, but the sale fell through when Sikorsky failed to make the required payments. The City subsequently sold the property for $350,500, significantly more than the $92,786.24 Sikorsky owed in taxes, but did not return the surplus to Sikorsky.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Sikorsky's pro se complaint, which alleged a constitutional taking and violations of New York state laws. Sikorsky, now represented by counsel, appealed the dismissal, arguing that he had stated a valid claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that he had a right to recover under new New York state laws enacted during the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Sikorsky had indeed stated a claim for a constitutional taking against the City of Newburgh and Jeremy Kaufman. The court found that the new New York laws did not provide Sikorsky with a remedy, as they only applied to properties sold on or after May 25, 2023, or to those with active proceedings under N.Y. CPLR § 7803(1) on the effective date of the act. Since Sikorsky's property was sold in June 2021 and he had not initiated an Article 78 proceeding, he lacked a local remedy.The Second Circuit vacated the District Court's dismissal of Sikorsky's constitutional taking claims against the City of Newburgh and Jeremy Kaufman and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Sikorsky v. City of Newburgh" on Justia Law

A builder, PDT Holdings, Inc. and Phillip Thompson Homes, Inc., sought to construct a duplex townhome in Dallas. They met with city officials multiple times to verify applicable restrictions and were informed of a 36-foot maximum building height limit. The builder submitted a construction plan for a 36-foot-high duplex, which the city approved. During construction, the city issued a stop-work order due to a parapet wall exceeding the height limit, which the builder corrected. Later, the city issued another stop-work order, citing a violation of the residential-proximity-slope (RPS) ordinance, which limited the height to 26 feet. Despite this, the city lifted the stop-work order, allowing the builder to complete the duplex.The builder applied for a variance from the Board of Adjustment (BOA) but was denied. They then sued the city, seeking to estop it from enforcing the RPS ordinance. The trial court ruled in favor of the builder, finding that the city was estopped from enforcing the ordinance. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the city’s mistake in issuing the permit did not warrant estoppel.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the trial court's judgment was supported by legally sufficient evidence. The court found that city officials had affirmatively misled the builder about the height limit and that the builder had relied on these misrepresentations to their detriment. The court also determined that this was an exceptional case where estoppel was necessary to prevent manifest injustice and that estopping the city would not interfere with its governmental functions. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment, estopping the city from enforcing the RPS ordinance against the builder. View "PDT HOLDINGS, INC. v. CITY OF DALLAS" on Justia Law

The petitioners, current and retired Natural Resources Police Officers employed by the West Virginia Division of Natural Resources (DNR), have been receiving a statutory "subsistence allowance" since 1996. This allowance was included in their reported "compensation" to the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board (the Board) for calculating retirement annuities under the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). In 2014, the Board discovered this inclusion was erroneous and decided to correct it by refunding overpaid contributions to active and inactive officers and adjusting retirement annuities for retired officers.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County reversed the Board's decision, finding the subsistence allowance was pensionable compensation. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court held in West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board v. Clark (Clark I) that the subsistence allowance was not "compensation" for PERS purposes and that the Board failed to correct the error in a timely manner for retired officers. The case was remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed two certified questions from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. The first question asked if the holding in Clark I required the subsistence pay received by all retired and active DNR officers to be included in calculating their pensionable income. The court answered "no," clarifying that Clark I's holding was limited to retired officers and did not apply to active and inactive officers. The second question asked if the petitioners were entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees from the Board. The court declined to answer, stating that it did not present an issue of law but rather a question of fact. View "Clark v. West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board" on Justia Law

A state agency, WorkForce West Virginia, and its Acting Commissioner, Scott A. Adkins, sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of three orders issued by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. These orders granted a writ of mandamus to the plaintiffs, denied WorkForce’s motion to dismiss, and allowed the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint. The plaintiffs, who received unemployment benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic, alleged that WorkForce engaged in illegal collection activities by attempting to recover overpayments beyond the statutory time limits.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that WorkForce’s collection activities were time-barred by West Virginia Code § 21A-10-21, which imposes a two-year statute of limitations for recovering overpayments made due to error. The court also concluded that WorkForce could not determine overpayments due to nondisclosure or misrepresentation through its administrative process and must instead pursue such claims in circuit court. Based on this interpretation, the circuit court granted mandamus and injunctive relief, ordering WorkForce to cease its collection activities and comply with the statutory time limits.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the relevant statutes. The higher court concluded that the administrative process established by the Legislature allows WorkForce to determine whether overpayments occurred due to error, nondisclosure, or misrepresentation. The court emphasized that claimants must exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, as mandated by West Virginia Code § 21A-7-19. Since the plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Appeals granted the writ of prohibition and directed the circuit court to dismiss the case. View "Adkins v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Kevin Steele, a Marine veteran, filed an original claim in 1991 for a head injury sustained during service, which he attributed to a 1980 training incident. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) examiner noted that Steele experienced occasional headaches as a residual of the head injury but deemed them non-disabling. The VA Regional Office (RO) granted service connection for the scar on Steele's scalp but did not explicitly address the headaches in its decision. Steele did not appeal this decision.In 2013, Steele filed a new claim for various conditions, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), and was awarded a 50% disability rating effective from March 6, 2013. In 2016, he filed a claim for service connection for headaches, which the RO granted with an effective date of October 14, 2015. The Board of Veterans Appeals later adjusted the effective date to March 6, 2013. Steele appealed, arguing that his 1991 claim for headaches remained open and should entitle him to an earlier effective date.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's decision, holding that Steele's 1991 claim for headaches was implicitly denied and thus finally adjudicated in 1991. The court applied the implicit denial rule, which provides that a claim can be deemed denied if the VA's decision provides sufficient notice that the claim was considered and rejected. The court found that the 1991 RO decision and notice letter provided Steele with reasonable notice that his claim for headaches was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision, agreeing that the Board and the Veterans Court did not legally err in their application of the implicit denial rule. The court held that the reasons provided for the explicit denial of Steele's head injury claim in 1991 were sufficient to implicitly deny the related claim for headaches, thus closing off the earlier filing date. View "STEELE v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

George and Maria Dernis borrowed money from Premier Bank, which was involved in fraudulent lending practices. The loans were secured by mortgages on their personal real estate. After Premier Bank collapsed, the FDIC was appointed as receiver and sold some of the bank's loans, including the Dernises' loans, to Amos Financial in 2014. The Dernises claimed that the FDIC was aware of the fraudulent nature of the loans and failed to take remedial action. They filed a lawsuit against the FDIC, which was dismissed by the district court. They then filed an amended complaint against the United States under the FTCA, alleging various torts based on the FDIC's conduct.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the amended complaint, determining that most of the claims were not timely exhausted under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The court also found that the sole timely claim was barred by the FTCA’s intentional torts exception under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The court dismissed the action with prejudice and entered final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the Dernises failed to timely exhaust their administrative remedies for most of their claims. The court also held that the only timely claim was barred by the FTCA’s intentional torts exception, as it involved misrepresentation, deceit, and interference with contract rights. The court rejected the Dernises' argument that the FDIC’s "sue-and-be-sued" clause provided a broader waiver of sovereign immunity, noting that the United States was the sole defendant and the FTCA provided the exclusive remedy for tort claims against the United States. View "Dernis v United States" on Justia Law

Nick Feliciano, an air traffic controller with the Federal Aviation Administration and a Coast Guard reserve petty officer, was called to active duty in July 2012 under 10 U.S.C. §12301(d). He served until February 2017, primarily escorting vessels to and from harbor. Despite his active-duty service, Feliciano did not receive differential pay, which compensates federal civilian employees for the pay gap between their civilian and military salaries when called to active duty during a national emergency.Feliciano sought relief from the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming he was unlawfully denied differential pay. The Board rejected his claim, and Feliciano appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. He argued that under 5 U.S.C. §5538(a) and 10 U.S.C. §101(a)(13)(B), he was entitled to differential pay because he was called to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency. The Federal Circuit, referencing its decision in Adams v. Department of Homeland Security, held that Feliciano needed to show a substantive connection between his service and a particular national emergency, which he failed to do.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Federal Circuit's decision. The Court held that a federal civilian employee called to active duty under "any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency" is entitled to differential pay if the reservist's service coincides temporally with a declared national emergency. The Court determined that no substantive connection between the service and the national emergency is required. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Feliciano v. Department Of Transportation" on Justia Law

A solar energy company, Harvey Solar I, L.L.C., applied to the Ohio Power Siting Board for a certificate to construct a solar-powered electric-generation facility in Licking County, Ohio. The project faced opposition from a local citizens group, Save Hartford Twp., L.L.C., and 11 nearby residents, who raised concerns about the environmental and economic impacts of the project, including visual impacts, flooding, wildlife disruption, noise, water quality, and glare.The Ohio Power Siting Board reviewed the application and conducted an evidentiary hearing. The board staff investigated the potential impacts and recommended approval with conditions. The board ultimately granted the certificate, subject to 39 conditions, including requirements for visual screening, floodplain coordination, wildlife impact mitigation, noise control, and stormwater management.The residents appealed the board's decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, arguing that the board failed to properly evaluate the project's adverse impacts and that Harvey Solar did not provide sufficient information as required by the board's rules. They contended that the board's decision was unlawful and unreasonable.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the board had acted within its statutory authority and had not violated any applicable laws or regulations. The court determined that the board had sufficient evidence to make the required determinations under R.C. 4906.10(A) and that the conditions imposed on the certificate were reasonable and appropriate. The court affirmed the board's order granting the certificate for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the solar facility. View "In re Application of Harvey Solar I, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Diana Penney, a pharmacy technician from 1980 to 2019, filed multiple work-related occupational disease claims due to repetitive activities at her job. She was diagnosed with low back issues, protruding disks in her neck and upper back, and carpal tunnel syndrome. Penney underwent surgeries and stopped working in August 2019 due to pain from these conditions. She sought permanent total disability (PTD) benefits from the Second Injury Fund (the Fund).An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Penney was permanently and totally disabled due to the combined effect of her occupational diseases and awarded her PTD benefits from the Fund. The Fund appealed to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, arguing that the ALJ improperly considered Penney’s preexisting occupational diseases under the relevant statutory category. The Commission disagreed and affirmed the ALJ’s award.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and held that preexisting occupational diseases do not qualify as preexisting disabilities under section 287.220.3(2)(a)a(ii)1, which requires the disability to be a “direct result of a compensable injury as defined in section 287.020.” The court noted that section 287.020 encompasses injuries by accident and explicitly excludes occupational diseases. The court emphasized that the legislature’s choice to reference only section 287.020 in the statute indicates an intent to limit qualifying preexisting disabilities to accidental injuries. Consequently, the court reversed the Commission’s decision, ruling that Penney’s preexisting occupational diseases could not be considered in determining her entitlement to PTD benefits from the Fund. View "Treasurer v. Penney" on Justia Law