Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the defendant, Kelly Vaughn Kimble, who was sentenced to 25 years to life under the former Three Strikes law, plus an additional year for a prior prison term enhancement, sought resentencing under Senate Bill No. 483. He argued that the trial court erred in resentencing him under Senate Bill 483 without applying the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. He further contended that he was entitled to application of the Reform Act’s revised penalties at his resentencing. However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District disagreed. The court held that the Reform Act created a specific resentencing process for offenders sentenced under the former Three Strikes law, which requires consideration of various factors, such as the offender's criminal history, disciplinary record, and other relevant information. The court further noted that the Reform Act provided the only path for relief under the Reform Act for defendants who had already been sentenced. Thus, the court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to automatic resentencing under the Reform Act as part of his resentencing under Senate Bill 483. The court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "People v. Kimble" on Justia Law

This case pertains to the enforcement of the California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 (the Act), a voter-enacted statute that expanded and amended the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018. The California Privacy Protection Agency (the Agency) failed to adopt final regulations by the July 1, 2022 deadline set out in the Act. The California Chamber of Commerce sought a court order to delay enforcement of the Act until one year after the agency adopted all required regulations. The trial court granted the petition in part, ruling that the Agency could not enforce any regulation until one year after that regulation became final. The Agency appealed, arguing that the Act did not mandate a one-year delay between the approval of a final regulation and its enforcement. The appellate court agreed with the Agency, finding that the Act's language did not unambiguously require a one-year delay between approval and enforcement. The court ordered a new trial court order denying the Chamber's petition and allowing the trial court to consider any remaining issues regarding the prompt development of regulations. View "California Privacy Protection Agency v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this case, Gardena Hospital in California appealed a decision regarding its reporting of patient days for the purpose of calculating Medi-Cal reimbursement. The controversy centered around whether "bed hold" days — days when a patient is not physically in the hospital's subacute section but is expected to return — should be included in the reported patient days. If these days were included, it would result in a smaller per diem reimbursement to the hospital by the state. The hospital argued that bed hold days should be excluded, pointing to the Accounting and Reporting Manual for California Hospitals (the "Hospital Manual"), which does not specifically mention bed holds. The state, on the other hand, referred to the Accounting and Reporting Manual for California Long-Term Care Facilities (the "Long-Term Manual"), which specifically states that bed hold days should be included in total patient days.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight ruled in favor of the state, affirming the lower court's decision. The court held that where two state manuals guide health care facility accounting, the one that specifically addresses the issue at hand — in this case, the Long-Term Manual's explicit reference to bed holds — governs. The court reasoned that the specific provision controls the general one and can be regarded as a correction to it. Thus, according to this holding, Gardena Hospital must include bed hold days in its reported patient days for the calculation of Medi-Cal reimbursement. View "Gardena Hospital, L.P. v. Baass" on Justia Law

The case involves Indian citizens Sanket and Nehaben Patel who sued the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Ur Jaddou, under the Administrative Procedure Act for unreasonable delay in processing their applications for U visas. After their visas were granted, the Director moved to dismiss the case for mootness and attached an exhibit showing the applications' approval. The Director then realized she had not filed the exhibit under seal, violating the rule prohibiting the disclosure of information relating to noncitizens who are U visa applicants and recipients. The Patels sought civil penalties for the disclosure of their personal information. The district court dismissed the case and denied the Patels' motion for civil penalties, stating that any disclosure was not willful.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Director's disclosure of the Patels' visa application status was not "willful" under 8 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The court reasoned that the term "willful" refers to actions that are intentional or knowing, as opposed to accidental. The court noted that the Director realized her mistake in not filing the exhibit under seal, promptly contacted the court to seal the exhibit, and the information disclosed was already revealed in the Patels’ unsealed complaint. Therefore, the disclosure was not considered willful but at most amounted to negligence. View "Patel v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

In this case heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the appellant, Dewanis Rogers, sought a reduced sentence under the First Step Act of 2018. Rogers had been found guilty in 2008 of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a protected location, following two or more prior felony drug convictions. He received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, as prescribed by statute. In 2022, Rogers requested that his sentence be reduced under the provisions of the First Step Act. The district court denied this motion, determining that Rogers was ineligible for relief under the Act. Rogers appealed this decision, disputing his ineligibility.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that even if Rogers was eligible for relief under the First Step Act, the district court could not have lawfully reduced his sentence due to the mandatory term of imprisonment prescribed by statute. The court explained that Congress had not expressly repealed the mandatory punishment for Rogers’s offense in the First Step Act, and that the change in law cited by Rogers did not appear in the sections of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 made retroactive by the First Step Act. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Rogers" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered an appeal by several Missouri public officials who were denied qualified immunity by a lower court regarding five claims arising from a murder prosecution. The murder case, involving Donald Nash who was eventually convicted for the murder of Judy Spencer, was reopened in 2007, 25 years after the crime occurred. The officials based their case on a theory that DNA evidence found under Spencer's fingernails belonged to Nash, which they asserted could not have remained present if Spencer had washed her hair after their last encounter.Nash was convicted and spent 11 years in prison until the Missouri Supreme Court set aside his conviction in 2020. The charges were dismissed after DNA testing on the shoelace used to strangle Spencer supported Nash’s noninvolvement. Nash and his wife filed a lawsuit against the officials, claiming violations of rights including unlawful arrest and detention, fabrication of evidence, failure to investigate, violations of rights of access to courts, and violation of the right to familial and marital associations.The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part the appeals on the denial of qualified immunity. The court held that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim of unlawful arrest and detention, finding that the omission of certain exculpatory facts from the probable cause affidavit negated probable cause for Nash's arrest. However, the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity for the claim alleging violation of the right to familial and marital associations, as this was not a clearly established constitutional right in 2008. The court dismissed the officials' appeal on the remaining claims due to lack of jurisdiction, as these involved genuine disputes of material fact to be resolved by a jury. View "Estate of Nash v. Folsom" on Justia Law

In the case before the Nebraska Supreme Court, Kathryn Wright was employed as a customer service agent for Southwest Airlines Co. (Southwest). In her volunteer role on a workplace social committee, she was found to have not kept adequate records of expenditures and to have spent committee funds for personal purposes. Consequently, Southwest terminated her employment. Wright then applied for unemployment insurance benefits, which were initially granted by the Nebraska Department of Labor (DOL) adjudicator. However, this decision was overturned by the DOL appeal tribunal, disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits for the week of the discharge and the 14 weeks thereafter. The district court affirmed this decision and Wright appealed.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Wright had committed misconduct connected with her work under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-628.10 (Reissue 2021). The court found that Wright's failure to keep a ledger and maintain supporting documentation for all committee expenses was misconduct connected with her work, regardless of the fact that her work on the committee was volunteer and separate from her paid job duties. The court also disagreed with Wright's argument that the committee funds were not Southwest's but her coworkers'. The court reasoned that the funds were contributed to the committee organized, promoted, supported, and regulated by Southwest, which had an interest in ensuring that the funds were spent appropriately. Therefore, Wright's failure to follow the rules harmed Southwest and was misconduct connected with her work. View "Wright v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the University of South Florida Board of Trustees (USF) sued the United States, claiming that the latter infringed a patent owned by USF regarding genetically modified mice for Alzheimer's Disease research. The USF contended that The Jackson Laboratory, with the government's authorization and consent, had been producing and using mice covered by the patent for the government. The government countered the claim by asserting it had a license to practice the patent under a provision of the Bayh-Dole Act, which addresses patent rights in work funded by the federal government. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the provision does apply and therefore affirmed the judgment of noninfringement. The court confirmed that the April 1997 work, the first actual reduction to practice of the invention, was "in the performance of work under a funding agreement." The court also rejected USF's contention that a funding agreement must be in place at the time of the relevant work, clarifying that the Act can cover work already performed before a funding agreement is executed or becomes effective. View "University of South Florida Board of Trustees v. United States" on Justia Law

In the case, Mojave Pistachios, LLC (Mojave) and other petitioners sought to challenge a replenishment fee on groundwater extractions imposed by the Indian Wells Valley Groundwater Authority (the Authority) in California. Mojave, which owns approximately 1,600 acres of land in the Mojave Desert, uses groundwater to irrigate its pistachio orchard. The Authority, created under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), determined that all groundwater extractions in the water basin where Mojave’s orchard is located would be subject to a replenishment fee, which Mojave refused to pay. The Superior Court of Orange County sustained the Authority’s demurrer to certain causes of action in Mojave's third amended complaint, finding the claims were barred by California’s “pay first, litigate later” rule which requires a taxpayer to pay a tax before commencing a court action to challenge the tax’s collection.Mojave petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three for a writ of mandate overruling the lower court's order. The appellate court concluded that the well-established “pay first” rule applies to lawsuits challenging fees imposed by a local groundwater sustainability agency under SGMA. As such, because any alleged economic harm to Mojave stems from the imposition of the replenishment fee, the “pay first” rule bars the challenged causes of action. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision and denied Mojave's petition for a writ of mandate. View "Mojave Pistachios, LLC v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves Nathan Jackson, a detention officer with the Los Angeles Police Department, who was suspended for 10 days due to several misconduct charges. These charges included reporting late for duty, reporting unfit for duty, leaving his post without authorization, and refusing to provide a doctor's note as directed. Jackson appealed his suspension to the Board of Civil Service Commissioners, which upheld the suspension. He then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asking the court to set aside his suspension and award him back pay.The superior court granted the petition in part, setting aside the suspension but upholding the findings on three of the four counts. The court also ordered the Board to reconsider whether the City's amendment of one of the counts after initial notice of proposed discipline prejudiced Jackson's defense and entitled him to back pay. The court also ordered the Board to reconsider the appropriate penalty.Jackson appealed the judgment, arguing that substantial evidence did not support the findings on any of the counts and that he was entitled to back pay as a matter of law. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, however, dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the superior court's judgment was not a final appealable judgment because it vacated the suspension and remanded the matter back to the Board for reconsideration, allowing Jackson an opportunity to challenge any ultimate adverse disciplinary action. View "Jackson v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners" on Justia Law