Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Five Indian citizens entered the United States on F-1 student visas, completed their studies, and enrolled in “optional practical training” (OPT) programs. They allege that the organizations providing their OPT programs failed to deliver any actual training or work, and ultimately ceased communication. After returning to India for brief visits, each attempted to reenter the United States. At the airports, immigration officials revoked their visas. Four were subjected to expedited removal, while the fifth was permitted to withdraw his application for entry. All five returned to India and subsequently filed suit from abroad.The plaintiffs brought their case in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, invoking the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to challenge the administrative findings that they had misused the OPT program. They claimed they never received notice of any administrative proceedings or an opportunity to respond. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(A)(i), which generally bars judicial review of individual determinations or claims arising from expedited removal orders under §1225(b)(1). The court found that the plaintiffs’ attempt to challenge the underlying findings, rather than the removal orders themselves, did not avoid the jurisdictional bar.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that §1252(a)(2)(A)(i) precludes judicial review not only of expedited removal orders but also of the underlying justifications for those orders. The court further concluded that the administrative findings regarding the OPT programs were not “final” agency actions reviewable under the APA, as they were merely steps leading to the removal orders. Thus, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs’ claims. View "Dubey v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The case concerns the repeal of a regulation that had banned the use of personal watercraft, commonly known as jet skis, in two designated Critical Habitat Areas (CHAs) in Alaska: Kachemak Bay and Fox River Flats. The Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) Commissioner originally enacted the ban in 2001, citing concerns about the potential impact of jet skis on fish, wildlife, and their habitats. In 2021, after a review process that included public comment and consideration of scientific literature, the Commissioner repealed the ban, reasoning that technological improvements had reduced the environmental impact of jet skis and that existing studies did not conclusively demonstrate significant harm in these specific northern marine environments.Conservation groups challenged the repeal in the Superior Court for the Third Judicial District, Anchorage, arguing that the Commissioner lacked statutory authority to repeal the regulation and that the repeal was inconsistent with the statutory purpose of protecting critical habitat. The superior court granted summary judgment to the conservation groups, finding that the Commissioner did not have the authority to repeal the ban and that the repeal conflicted with the purpose of the CHA statutes. The court reinstated the ban and awarded attorney’s fees to the conservation groups.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the superior court’s decision de novo. The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner had both implied statutory authority and delegated authority from the Boards of Fisheries and Game to enact and repeal regulations governing uses within CHAs. The Court further found that the repeal was consistent with the statutory purpose of the CHA statutes, was reasonable, and was not arbitrary or in conflict with other laws. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision, directed entry of summary judgment in favor of the State, and remanded for further proceedings regarding prevailing party status and attorney’s fees. View "Department of Fish & Game v. Cook Inletkeeper" on Justia Law

After the birth of a child who qualified as an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) in Alaska took emergency custody due to the mother’s substance use during pregnancy. Initially, no relatives were available for placement, so the child was placed with a non-relative foster parent. Nearly two and a half years later, the mother requested that the child be placed with his great-grandmother. OCS denied this request, citing unsafe conditions in the great-grandmother’s home, including excessive clutter that posed safety risks. The great-grandmother made some improvements but did not sufficiently address the concerns. OCS also expressed doubts about her judgment and ability to protect the child, referencing past incidents involving other family members.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, held a placement review hearing after the great-grandmother requested judicial review of OCS’s denial. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that OCS did not abuse its discretion in denying the placement, determining that the great-grandmother’s home remained unsuitable and that her past actions raised concerns about her ability to prioritize the child’s needs. The court also concluded that OCS was not required to provide the great-grandmother with reasonable efforts to make her home suitable, as she was not the child’s parent or guardian.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska considered whether ICWA required OCS to demonstrate “active efforts” to assist the great-grandmother in overcoming obstacles to placement. The court held that ICWA’s active efforts requirement applies to preserving or reunifying the family unit with a parent or Indian custodian, not to extended family members seeking placement. Therefore, OCS was not required to provide active efforts to the great-grandmother in this context. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision upholding OCS’s denial of placement. View "Betsy F. v. State" on Justia Law

An attorney based in Oklahoma developed a business model to help out-of-state clients enter the state’s medical marijuana industry, which is governed by strict residency and disclosure requirements. He created a two-entity structure: one company, with nominal Oklahoma-resident owners, obtained the necessary state licenses, while a second company, owned and operated by out-of-state clients, ran the actual marijuana operations. The attorney did not disclose the true ownership structure to state authorities, and in some cases, marijuana was grown before the required state registrations were obtained. State authorities began investigating after noticing irregularities, such as multiple licenses listing the same address and repeated use of the same Oklahoma residents as owners, many of whom had little or no involvement in the businesses.Oklahoma state prosecutors charged the attorney with multiple felonies related to his business practices, including conspiracy and submitting false documents. While those charges were pending, a federal grand jury indicted him for drug conspiracy and maintaining drug-involved premises, based on the same conduct. In the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, the attorney moved to enjoin his federal prosecution, arguing that a congressional appropriations rider barred the Department of Justice from spending funds to prosecute individuals complying with state medical marijuana laws. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion, finding that the attorney had not substantially complied with Oklahoma law, particularly due to nondisclosure of ownership interests and failure to obtain required registrations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the appropriations rider does bar the Department of Justice from spending funds to prosecute private individuals who comply with state medical marijuana laws. However, the court found that the attorney failed to substantially comply with Oklahoma’s requirements, so the rider did not protect him. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the injunction. View "United States v. Stacy" on Justia Law

Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation manufactures Entresto, a drug used to treat chronic heart failure. MSN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. sought approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market a generic version of Entresto by submitting an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA). MSN’s application excluded certain methods of use protected by Novartis’s patents and claimed that the generic drug contained the same active ingredients as Entresto. The FDA approved MSN’s application, prompting Novartis to challenge the approval, arguing that the generic’s labeling and composition were unlawfully different from Entresto.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed Novartis’s claims under the Administrative Procedure Act. Novartis argued that the FDA’s approval of MSN’s ANDA and denial of Novartis’s citizen petitions were arbitrary and capricious, particularly regarding the omission of patented dosing regimens and indications from the generic’s label, and the determination that the generic contained the same active ingredients as Entresto. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the FDA, finding that the agency’s actions were reasonable and consistent with statutory and regulatory requirements. Novartis appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the FDA reasonably concluded the generic drug’s labeling changes were permissible to avoid patent infringement and did not render the generic less safe or effective for non-patented uses. The court also found that the FDA’s determination that the generic and Entresto shared the same active ingredients was supported by scientific evidence and regulatory guidance. The court applied de novo review to legal questions and deferred to the FDA’s scientific expertise, ultimately upholding the agency’s approval of MSN’s ANDA. View "Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

An instrumentality of Iran attempted to wire nearly $10 million through an American bank, but the funds were blocked by the U.S. government under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) due to Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Two groups of plaintiffs, each holding substantial judgments against Iran for its support of terrorist acts, sought to attach these blocked funds to satisfy their judgments. The funds had been frozen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and were the subject of a pending civil-forfeiture action initiated by the United States.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially quashed the plaintiffs’ writs of attachment. The court reasoned, first, that the funds were not “blocked assets” as defined by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) and thus were immune from attachment. Second, it held that the government’s earlier-filed civil-forfeiture action invoked the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, barring any subsequent in rem proceedings against the same property. The district court also noted that the existence of the Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund suggested Congress did not intend to encourage individual attachment actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The court held that the funds in question are “blocked assets” under TRIA, as they remain frozen by OFAC and are not subject to a license required by a statute other than IEEPA. The court further held that the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not bar multiple in rem proceedings filed in the same court. Accordingly, the court concluded that neither sovereign immunity nor the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine prevented the plaintiffs from seeking attachment of the funds and reversed the district court’s order quashing the writs of attachment. View "Estate of Levin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Two individuals brought a lawsuit under the False Claims Act, alleging that a telecommunications company, through a controlled shell entity, fraudulently obtained nearly $113 million in bidding credits during a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum license auction. The core claim was that the shell entity misrepresented its independence and concealed its relationship with the larger company, which, if disclosed, would have disqualified it from receiving small business credits. The relators asserted that the shell entity never operated as a genuine business and had an undisclosed agreement to transfer licenses to the larger company after a regulatory waiting period.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia twice dismissed the case, first without prejudice and then with prejudice, finding that the public-disclosure bar of the False Claims Act applied. The court concluded that the alleged fraud had already been publicly disclosed through the shell entity’s FCC filings, and that the relators’ complaint did not materially add to the information already available.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that, even assuming the prior FCC filings constituted public disclosures of substantially the same fraud, the relators qualified as “original sources” because their allegations materially added to the publicly disclosed information. Specifically, the relators provided new evidence that the shell entity never functioned as an independent business and plausibly alleged an undisclosed agreement to transfer licenses, both of which were not revealed in the public filings. The court found that these additions were significant enough to potentially influence the government’s decision to pursue the case. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. U.S. Cellular Corp." on Justia Law

Several electricity generators challenged a change in how they are compensated for producing reactive power, a component of electricity necessary for grid stability but not directly consumed by end users. For many years, the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) provided generators with cost-based compensation for reactive power, in addition to market-based payments for real power. In 2022, MISO amended its tariff to eliminate separate compensation for reactive power, meaning neither transmission owners nor independent generators would receive payment for producing it within a standard range. This change was approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and given immediate effect, despite objections from generators who argued they had made investments and entered contracts in reliance on the prior compensation structure.FERC approved MISO’s tariff amendment and denied requests for rehearing, concluding that the comparability standard justified the change and that generators’ reliance interests were either unsupported or outweighed by other considerations. FERC reasoned that generators should not have expected compensation for reactive power to continue indefinitely, especially since prior orders had made such compensation contingent on similar treatment for transmission owners. Generators petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that FERC failed to adequately consider their short-term financial reliance on the previous compensation scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to adequately consider the generators’ short-term reliance interests before allowing the tariff change to take immediate effect. The court did not address the substantive validity of the tariff amendment itself but found that FERC’s explanation was insufficient regarding the abrupt elimination of compensation. The court granted the petitions for review, set aside FERC’s orders, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Capital Power Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the operator of a day-care center and various officials and employees of the Alabama Department of Human Resources (ADHR) and the Elmore County Department of Human Resources (EDHR). The operator applied to renew the day-care’s license, but a background check revealed that one employee, V.F., had a prior indicated report for child abuse. ADHR officials informed the operator that the license could not be renewed unless V.F. was terminated or cleared. After V.F. was terminated, further disputes arose regarding documentation and access to the facility. ADHR officials subsequently reported alleged deficiencies, leading to the temporary suspension and eventual revocation of the day-care’s license, as well as the operator’s arrest. The criminal charges were later dismissed, and after an administrative hearing, the day-care was relicensed.Previously, the administrative law judge (ALJ) conditionally affirmed ADHR’s decision to revoke the license but allowed for relicensing if the facility met standards. The Montgomery Circuit Court affirmed the ALJ’s decision, and the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals dismissed a further appeal as moot after the license was reissued. The operator and the day-care then filed a new lawsuit in circuit court against the DHR employees, alleging various torts and seeking declaratory relief. The DHR employees moved to dismiss, arguing collateral estoppel based on the prior administrative proceedings. The circuit court granted the motion, dismissing the claims.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the circuit court properly dismissed the claims on collateral estoppel grounds. The Court held that, because the circuit court considered materials outside the complaint, the motion to dismiss was converted to a summary judgment motion. The Court found that the plaintiffs failed to adequately argue that collateral estoppel did not apply and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Supreme Court of Alabama thus affirmed the dismissal of the claims. View "Williams v. Dodd" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in 2016 of conspiracy to commit robbery, burglary, robbery, and first-degree kidnapping, receiving concurrent sentences including 8 to 20 years for robbery and 5 years to life for kidnapping. In November 2022, the Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners assessed him as a high risk to reoffend, denied parole, and scheduled his next hearing for January 2025. The petitioner requested a reassessment, arguing the risk level was incorrect. The Board found an error, reassessed him as moderate risk, and held a new hearing in April 2023, but again denied parole and rescheduled the next hearing for November 2025, nine months later than originally set.The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, arguing that the Board unlawfully punished him for seeking reconsideration by delaying his next parole hearing. He claimed this delay was vindictive and violated his due process rights, relying on the presumption of vindictiveness established in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), and its progeny.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the presumption of vindictiveness may generally arise in parole proceedings if the Board, upon reconsideration, extends the time before a prisoner may be considered for parole again. However, the court concluded that the presumption does not apply when the Board corrects its own error without prompting from an outside tribunal. The court further found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate actual vindictiveness. The Board acted within its statutory discretion in scheduling the next hearing, and the petition for writ relief was denied. View "Stewart v. Board of Parole Commissioners" on Justia Law