Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, ruled in favor of the Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association (VCERA) in a dispute over the calculation of retirement benefits for county employees. VCERA had adopted a resolution excluding compensation for accrued but unused annual leave hours exceeding a calendar year allowance from the calculation of retirement benefits, following a Supreme Court decision in a similar case (Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v. Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Assn.). VCERA sought a judicial declaration that its resolution was legal, which was granted by the trial court. The Criminal Justice Attorneys Association of Ventura and Ventura County Professional Peace Officers’ Association appealed this decision, arguing that the resolution was not mandated by the Supreme Court decision or the relevant statutes. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that VCERA was required to comply with the Supreme Court decision and the relevant statutes, which were designed to prevent pension spiking by excluding income designed to artificially inflate a pension benefit. View "Ventura County Employees' Retirement Association v. Criminal Justice Attorneys Association of Ventura County" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Leslie Fisher sued officers Randall Jordan, Matthew Rice, and John Trefelet of the Michigan State Police for violating federal and state law by arresting her without probable cause. Fisher and her husband were arrested after the officers executed a search warrant and found marijuana growing in their garage. All charges against Fisher were eventually dismissed in state court. She then filed a federal lawsuit against the arresting officers.The officers moved for summary judgment, invoking qualified immunity in response to Fisher's federal claims of arrest and prosecution without probable cause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and governmental immunity for her state claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, concluding that they had probable cause to arrest Fisher.On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the officers had probable cause to believe that Fisher had committed the crime of possession of at least 5,000 grams of marijuana with the intent to distribute, based on various pieces of evidence. This included the fact that Fisher lived at and owned the site of the marijuana cultivation operation, and that she admitted to using marijuana grown by her husband. The court also found that the large quantity of marijuana in the Fishers' garage supported probable cause to infer intent to distribute.The court further concluded that the officers were entitled to governmental immunity from Fisher's state law claims, as the probable cause analysis for federal Fourth Amendment claims is the same under Michigan law. Since the officers had probable cause to suspect that Fisher possessed an illegal quantity of marijuana with the intent to distribute, they were entitled to governmental immunity from Fisher's state law claims. View "Fisher v. Jordan" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, a US citizen, Abdoulai Bah, had his life savings of $71,613 seized by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) under suspicion of being the proceeds of illegal activities. The CBP returned the money with interest two-and-a-half years later. Bah then sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), seeking damages for personal injury and property damage, arguing that the seizure of his money prevented him from conducting business, caused him to lose his livelihood, and resulted in health problems.The District Court dismissed Bah's case, asserting that the United States was immune from Bah's claims. The court held that the FTCA did not permit Bah's claims as they were seeking prejudgment interest— a type of relief for which the United States has not waived sovereign immunity.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the District Court's decision. The appellate court held that the Detention Exception of the FTCA, under which Bah's claim was filed, only waives sovereign immunity for "injury or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property while in the possession of any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer," but it does not waive immunity for personal "injury" or "loss" incurred due to the government's seizure of property. As such, the court concluded that Bah's cash was not injured or lost in the sense meant by the FTCA, and his personal injuries were not covered under the Act. Furthermore, the court determined that Bah's claim of "loss" was really a claim for "loss of use" of his cash, which is not covered under the FTCA. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of Bah's case. View "Bah v. USA" on Justia Law

The case was an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit against a lower court's decision that the structure of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs, By Two, L.P., and Consumers’ Research, argued that the CPSC's structure violated the separation-of-powers doctrine because the President could only remove the CPSC's commissioners for cause. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs, but the appellate court reversed this decision.The appellate court held that the CPSC's structure was constitutional and did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. The court based its decision on the Supreme Court's precedent in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, which allowed for-cause removal protections for commissioners of independent agencies like the CPSC. The court noted that while the CPSC does exercise substantial executive power, this alone does not remove it from the protection of the Humphrey’s Executor exception. The court also pointed out that the CPSC's structure was not novel or lacking historical precedent, which further supported its constitutionality.The court emphasized that any changes to the Humphrey’s Executor exception would have to be made by the Supreme Court, not the lower courts. Until such a change occurred, the CPSC's structure remained constitutional. Thus, the court reversed the district court's decision and sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. View "Consumers’ Research v. Consumer Product Safety Commission" on Justia Law

In this case, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute that limits reimbursement of reestablishment expenses in condemnation proceedings to $50,000. The appellant, Applied Building Sciences, Inc., an engineering firm, was forced to move its operations when its leased building was condemned for public use by the South Carolina Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways. The company sought reimbursement for reestablishment expenses exceeding $560,000 but was limited by state statute to $50,000. The company argued that the cap was unconstitutional under the Takings Clauses of the South Carolina and United States Constitutions. The court found that reestablishment expenses are separate from damages awardable as just compensation under both constitutions, thus upholding the constitutionality of the statutory cap. The court affirmed the lower court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Department of Commerce, Division of Public Railways. View "Applied Building Sciences v. SC Dept of Commerce" on Justia Law

Alphonso Mobley Jr. filed an original action in mandamus under Ohio’s Public Records Act against Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney Melissa A. Powers, seeking records related to former R.C. 309.16 and a records-retention schedule. He also requested awards of statutory damages and costs. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a limited writ of mandamus in part and denied in part. The court denied the writ as moot concerning some of the requested records, granted a limited writ regarding others, deferred ruling on the request for an award of statutory damages, and denied the request for an award of costs.The court determined that the prosecutor had provided Mobley with the records-retention schedule and the records created to meet the requirements of former R.C. 309.16(A)(2) for the years 2016 through 2020. However, the court found a genuine question of fact regarding whether the prosecutor provided Mobley with all the records that her office created to meet the requirements of former R.C. 309.16(A)(1) for the years 2016 through 2020. The court thus ordered the prosecutor to provide these records or certify that they do not exist. The court deferred ruling on Mobley’s request for statutory damages until the prosecutor has complied with the limited writ. Mobley’s request for an award of court costs was denied as he had filed an affidavit of indigency. View "State ex rel. Mobley v. Powers" on Justia Law

This case pertains to a public records request made by Marcellus Gilreath to the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) and its director, Matt Damschroder. Gilreath sought access to specific records related to him, including his case history in the Client Registry Information System Enhanced (CRIS-E), his Ohio Benefits case history, his overpayment records, and records of any investigation into his alleged theft of food stamps.After not receiving a response from ODJFS or Damschroder for several months, Gilreath filed a mandamus action, following which ODJFS provided him with some of the requested records. Gilreath then requested that the court issue a writ of mandamus to compel ODJFS and Damschroder to allow him to inspect the provided documents in their native electronic format, to search for additional records, and to organize and maintain their emails in a manner that they can be made available for inspection. He also sought an award of statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Ohio denied Gilreath's request for a writ of mandamus, finding that ODJFS and Damschroder had no obligation to allow him to inspect the records in their native electronic format. The court also found that ODJFS and Damschroder did not possess or control the county emails Gilreath sought, and that his request for these emails was not sufficiently clear. Furthermore, the court determined that Gilreath had not requested ODJFS and Damschroder to organize and maintain their emails in his original complaint.However, the court did grant Gilreath's request for an award of statutory damages, awarding him $1,000 due to the significant delay in ODJFS's response to his public records request. The court denied his requests for court costs and attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Gilreath v. Cuyahoga Job & Family Services" on Justia Law

In Georgia, plaintiffs Kristen Lovell, Lori Tullos, and Virginia McFaddin filed complaints against Brad Raffensperger (in his official capacity as the Secretary of State of Georgia), the Columbia County Board of Elections, the Morgan County Board of Elections and Registration, and various individuals associated with these entities, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The superior courts dismissed the actions, reasoning that they were barred by sovereign immunity as they failed to name the proper defendants as required by the Georgia Constitution.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of the actions. The court ruled that under the Georgia Constitution's Paragraph V, which provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for actions seeking declaratory relief from acts of the state, actions must be brought exclusively against the state and in the name of the State of Georgia or against the relevant local government entities. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to comply with this requirement as they named as defendants the Secretary of State (not the State of Georgia) and their local boards of election and their board members (not the relevant counties). Due to this failure to comply, the trial courts were correct to dismiss the actions. View "LOVELL v. RAFFENSPERGER" on Justia Law

In August 2018, Mary Collington was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Jesse Curney, a deputy with the Clayton County Sheriff’s Department, who was acting within the scope of his official duties at the time. Initially believing Deputy Curney was a Clayton County police officer, Collington sent notice of her claims to the Clayton County Chief of Police, the Clayton County Commissioners, and the District Attorney of Clayton County. Collington later filed a lawsuit against Clayton County, asserting that she suffered injuries caused by the negligence of Deputy Curney.Upon motion to dismiss by the defendants, the trial court dismissed Collington's claims, concluding that Collington's claims against the Sheriff should be dismissed as she had failed to present timely notice to the Sheriff's office under OCGA § 36-11-1. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to determine whether OCGA § 36-11-1 applies to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a motor vehicle, and if so, whether presenting such a claim to the county commission satisfies the claimant's duty under the statute.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that OCGA § 36-11-1 does apply to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle. Furthermore, the court decided that because a claim against a county sheriff in his official capacity for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is a claim against a county under OCGA § 36-11-1, presenting the claim to the county governing authority satisfies the statute's presentment requirement. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "COLLINGTON v. CLAYTON COUNTY" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was presented with a case involving police officers who shot and killed Schaston Hodge after he refused to pull over his vehicle, led the officers on a chase, and exited his car with a gun in his hands. The officers' actions were captured on their bodycam footage. Hodge's mother, Shandra Hodge, filed a suit against the officers, Joshua Engleman and Robert Litvin, as well as the Texas Department of Public Safety (TDPS) and the City of Dallas, alleging excessive force and failure to train and supervise. The district court granted the officers' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity (QI), treating the dismissal as an implicit conversion to summary judgment, even though the footage was not included in the pleadings.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the lower court's decision. The court found that the bodycam footage showed a complete account of the incident, including Hodge raising a gun and pointing it at one of the officers. The court concluded that the officers' use of deadly force was reasonable given the circumstances they faced. As a result, the court held that the officers did not violate Hodge's Fourth Amendment rights and were entitled to QI. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the officers. View "Hodge v. Engleman" on Justia Law