Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In the case of Planning and Conservation League et al., v. Department of Water Resources heard in the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, the court considered whether the Department of Water Resources’ (department) approval of amendments to long-term contracts with local government agencies that receive water through the State Water Project violated various laws. The amendments extended the contracts to 2085 and expanded the facilities listed as eligible for revenue bond financing. Several conservation groups and public agencies challenged the amendments, arguing they violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act (Delta Reform Act), and the public trust doctrine. However, the court held that the department did not violate CEQA, the Delta Reform Act, or the public trust doctrine, and therefore affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the department. The court found that the department used the correct baseline for its environmental impact report (EIR), properly segmented the amendments from related projects, and adequately considered the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the amendments. The court also held that the department adequately described the project and considered a reasonable range of alternatives, and that recirculation of the EIR was not required. The court rejected arguments that the amendments violated the Delta Reform Act or the public trust doctrine, finding that they did not impact "water that is imbued with the public trust." The court concluded that the department acted within its authority in approving and executing the amendments. View "Planning and Conservation League v. Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

In this case, plaintiffs Kewon English and Earl Powell were arrested for sexual assault and burglary and detained for over a year before their cases were nolle prossed and they were released. They sued Senior Investigator Joseph Clarke of the Richland County Sheriff’s Department, alleging that he had coerced them into signing false confessions. They also sued Sheriff Leon Lott and the Richland County Sheriff's Department for damages under § 1983, claiming their constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on English’s claims and dismissed Clarke’s cross-appeal. The court determined that there was probable cause to arrest English based on the victim’s identifications. Regarding English's malicious prosecution claim, the court held that even assuming probable cause was negated, Clarke cannot be held responsible for English’s continued detention. The court found no evidence that the Richland County Sheriff's Department had any unconstitutional policy or custom, and that Clarke could not be held liable for the continued detention of English. Furthermore, the court dismissed Clarke's cross-appeal, ruling that the appeal turned on a question of fact and was therefore not suitable for interlocutory treatment. View "English v. Clarke" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, which upheld the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of a claimant's application for supplemental security income. The claimant argued that the Social Security Administration's 2017 revised regulations for evaluating medical opinions were partially invalid because they did not provide a reasoned explanation for permitting an administrative law judge to avoid articulating how he or she accounts for the "examining relationship" or "specialization" factors under the Social Security Act or the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The court found that the Commissioner's decision to promulgate the 2017 medical evidence regulations fell within his wide latitude to make rules and regulations, particularly those governing the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence to establish the right to benefits. The court also joined the Eleventh Circuit in holding that the regulations were valid under the APA, as the agency's response to public comment and reasoned explanation for the regulatory changes established that the regulations were not arbitrary or capricious. View "CROSS V. O'MALLEY" on Justia Law

In this case, Zachary Silbersher, a relator, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act against Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and others. Silbersher alleged that Valeant fraudulently obtained patents related to a drug and asserted these patents to stifle competition from generic drugmakers. He also claimed that Valeant defrauded the federal government by charging an artificially inflated price for the drug while falsely certifying that its price was fair and reasonable.The district court dismissed Silbersher’s action under the False Claims Act’s public disclosure bar, ruling that his allegations had already been publicly disclosed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court.The Court of Appeals held that an inter partes patent review proceeding, in which the Patent and Trademark Office invalidated one of Valeant's patents, did not qualify as a public disclosure under the False Claims Act because the government was not a party to that proceeding, and its primary function was not investigative. The Court of Appeals also held that the allegations in Silbersher's qui tam action were not "substantially the same" as the information that had been publicly disclosed. None of the qualifying public disclosures made a direct claim that Valeant committed fraud, nor did they disclose a combination of facts sufficient to permit a reasonable inference of fraud. Therefore, the public disclosure bar did not apply. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "SILBERSHER V. VALEANT PHARMACEUTICALS INT'L" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Federal Election Commission's (FEC) dismissal of an administrative complaint by the Campaign Legal Center (CLC). The CLC alleged campaign finance violations by two presidential campaign committees, claiming that they concealed over $750 million in expenditures by routing them through sham payments to two LLCs. The FEC dismissed the complaint, invoking prosecutorial discretion. The CLC argued that the FEC's invocation of discretion was dependent on legal analysis and was thus subject to judicial review under the Federal Election Campaign Act. The district court concluded that the FEC's reliance on considerations of prosecutorial discretion was separate from its legal analysis and precluded judicial review.On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the FEC's reasons for dismissal, which included resource allocation concerns, potential litigation risks, and a shifting regulatory landscape, were distinct considerations of prosecutorial discretion that did not solely rest on legal interpretation, and therefore were not reviewable by the court. The court rejected the CLC's argument that the FEC's invocation of discretion was intertwined with its legal analysis, stating that the agency's estimation of the resource demands of the proposed investigation and its potential size and scope bore no discernable relationship to any legal inquiry. View "Campaign Legal Center v. FEC" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed an appeal of a lower court's denial of qualified immunity to a jail intake officer, Keyvon Sellers. The case arose from an incident in which a black man, Jayvon Hatchett, attacked and killed his white cellmate, Eddie Nelson, in county jail. Before the attack, Hatchett had told Sellers that he had previously stabbed a white man after watching videos of white police officers shooting black men. Despite this admission, Sellers did not inform other jail staff of Hatchett's racially motivated violence. Nelson's survivors sued Sellers, alleging that his failure to share this information constituted deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to Nelson, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Sellers violated Nelson's clearly established constitutional right by failing to protect him from a known risk of harm. The court concluded that Sellers had fair warning that his inaction was unconstitutional. Therefore, he was not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Nelson v. Sellers" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the NAACP and other plaintiffs' emergency motions for an injunction to halt the implementation of Mississippi's House Bill 1020 (H.B. 1020). This law created a new lower court for Jackson’s Capitol Complex Improvement District (CCID), which allegedly has a disproportionate share of Jackson's white residents. The judge and prosecutors for this new court would be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court and the Mississippi Attorney General, respectively, rather than by locally elected officials, as is typical for other municipal courts in Mississippi. The plaintiffs claimed that this appointment process violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection of the law.However, the court found that plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to demonstrate a legally protected interest in the accountability of the CCID court to locally elected officials, or that H.B. 1020 would affect their voting rights by diluting the local government's control over the enforcement of its laws within the CCID's borders. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim of stigmatic harm, finding that they did not allege discriminatory treatment as required. Finally, the court found no merit in the argument that benefits from the CCID court would primarily go to a disproportionately white population, as the plaintiffs failed to show how H.B. 1020 would erect a barrier making it more difficult for members of one group to obtain benefits than another. View "NAACP v. Tindell" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision that the motion to intervene by Local Roots Cannabis Company (Local Roots) was moot due to a settlement between the plaintiffs, Liberty Wellness, LLC and Jonathan Moses, and the defendant, the City of Perry, Michigan. The litigation arose after the City refused to implement a voter-approved marijuana facility licensing scheme, which the plaintiffs sought to compel through a declaratory relief action. While the litigation was pending, Local Roots, which received a license under the City's alternative licensing regime, moved to intervene. However, before the court ruled on the intervention motion, the plaintiffs and the City settled their dispute and dismissed the case, causing the court to deem the intervention motion moot. Local Roots appealed, arguing that the stipulation of dismissal was invalid because it did not consent to it and that its intervention motion was not moot because the lower court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The appeals court held that Local Roots did not become a party under Rule 41 until the district court granted its motion to intervene and that it did not need to sign the stipulation for it to be effective, confirming the validity of the stipulation of dismissal. Furthermore, the court clarified that the dismissal of the case mooted Local Roots' motion to intervene as the lower court only retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and not to reopen the whole case. View "Moses v. City of Perry, Mich." on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Jessica Banks sued the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) for removing her four-year-old son R.B. from her custody without parental consent or a court order, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied DFPS's motion for summary judgment, finding that its employees were not entitled to qualified immunity as they had violated clearly established law.DFPS appealed the decision, but the appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court found that the removal of R.B. violated the constitutional rights of both the child and Banks, as there were no exigent circumstances that justified a warrantless removal from his mother. The court emphasized that the mere possibility of danger in the future was not enough to constitute exigent circumstances. The court also held that the law was clearly established that removing a child from their home without consent, a court order, or exigent circumstances was a constitutional violation.However, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for Linda Juarez, an Investigation Supervisor at DFPS. The court ruled that Juarez was not the ultimate decision-maker and was not actively involved in the decision to remove R.B., thereby entitling her to qualified immunity. View "Banks v. Herbrich" on Justia Law

In this case, Jordan Jones, a prisoner at North Carolina’s Avery-Mitchell Correctional Institution, sued multiple prison officials under § 1983. The suit challenged the conditions of his confinement and a transfer to another prison that he alleged was retaliatory. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants.Jones had been placed in a “dry” cell, with the water turned off, for about 17 hours after he was suspected of having ingested contraband. He was allowed to clean himself only with toilet paper, despite having to defecate three times in a portable toilet. He also had to eat a meal with his hands, which he was unable to wash. The court concluded that while the conditions of Jones's confinement were deplorable, the officials were entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because it was not clearly established in April 2015 that these conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment.However, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant Gregory Taylor on Jones's claim that his transfer to another prison was in retaliation for his filing of grievances. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Taylor ordered the transfer in retaliation for Jones's grievances, and that Taylor was not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because it was clearly established at the time of the transfer that such retaliation violated the First Amendment. The court remanded for further proceedings on this claim. View "Jones v. Solomon" on Justia Law