Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Crispin Torres, a former employee of the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), appealed an arbitration decision which upheld his removal from the agency for unauthorized travel and falsification of certified records. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the arbitrator did not provide substantial evidence for concluding that two key factors, consistency of penalty with similar offenses (Douglas factor 6) and potential for rehabilitation (Douglas factor 10), weighed in favor of Mr. Torres' removal. The court found that the arbitrator failed to fully consider comparator cases where similar misconduct by other ICE law enforcement officers resulted in suspension rather than removal, and did not adequately explain why Mr. Torres had no potential for rehabilitation. The court vacated the arbitrator's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "TORRES v. DHS " on Justia Law

The case involves the plaintiff-appellant, Chris Martin, who suffered a back injury in June 2016 and stopped working. He sought medical attention in February 2018 and was diagnosed with a spine disorder in May 2018. Martin applied for Social Security disability benefits and was awarded supplemental security income after an administrative law judge (ALJ) found him disabled under the Social Security Act's stringent definition. However, he was denied disability insurance benefits because his insured status for those benefits had expired on December 31, 2017, a few weeks before he was found to have been disabled. Martin appealed, arguing that the ALJ should have consulted an additional medical expert to determine whether he was disabled earlier, before his insured status lapsed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that the ALJ did not abuse her discretion in deciding not to consult another medical expert. The court explained that Social Security Ruling 18–01p allows an ALJ to decide whether to consult an additional medical expert to answer that question. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of disability insurance benefits. View "Martin v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Ohio found that the Cedar Point Police Department (CPPD), which provides security, policing, and law-enforcement services at the Cedar Point amusement park, is required to respond to valid public-records requests related to those duties. The court concluded that the CPPD is the functional equivalent of a public institution for purposes of the Public Records Act. The court ordered the CPPD to produce any records responsive to the public-records requests by relators WTOL Television, L.L.C., WKYC-TV, L.L.C., and WBNS-TV, Inc. Although the court awarded court costs to the relators, it denied their requests for statutory damages and attorney fees. The case arose after the relators, who are media companies broadcasting news in Ohio, requested records related to a guest injury at Cedar Point and alleged sexual assaults at Cedar Point employee housing. The CPPD, Cedar Fair, and Ronald E. Gilson (the director of security at Cedar Point and the chief of police of the CPPD) failed to provide the requested records, leading to the relators filing a mandamus action. View "State ex rel. WTOL Television, L.L.C. v. Cedar Fair, L.P." on Justia Law

In a collision involving a sedan owned by Murray State College and a semi truck and trailer owned by Frank Bartel Transportation (FBT), the college employee driving the sedan was killed and the FBT vehicle was destroyed. FBT submitted a claim under the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA) to the State of Oklahoma Risk Management Department of the Office of Management and Enterprise Services (OMES), which offered to settle for $25,000. FBT refused the offer, arguing that it sustained additional consequential damages of $68,636.61 for towing, vehicle storage, and vehicle rental. In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that these consequential damages fell within the "any other loss" provision of Section 154(A)(2) of the GTCA, and thus FBT's recovery was subject to that statute's $125,000 cap. The court reversed the trial court's decision which found that FBT's damages were all for loss of property and subject to the Section 154(A)(1) cap of $25,000. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "FRANK BARTEL TRANSPORTATION v. STATE" on Justia Law

In Pennsylvania, a group of casinos, including Greenwood Gaming and Entertainment, Inc., Mountainview Thoroughbred Racing Association, LLC, and Chester Downs and Marina, LLC, sued the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue. The casinos claimed that online games offered by the state lottery simulated slot machines, violating restrictions imposed by the state legislature and infringing on the casinos' share of the online market. The Commonwealth Court disagreed and dismissed their complaint.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the Commonwealth Court erred in its interpretation of the law by focusing on individual components of an online lottery game. The Supreme Court held that determining whether an online lottery game violates the prohibition against simulating a slot machine requires a subjective assessment of the game's overall appearance and effect when in play.The Supreme Court vacated the order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to focus on the overall presentation and effect of the challenged game, not on individual features. View "Greenwood Gaming v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was called upon to determine whether the ascension of an unclassified service employee to a classified service position with higher pay with the same public employer is a promotion under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) and the Veterans’ Preference Act (VPA). The case arose when Ralph E. Lynn, a classified service employee, and Aaron Novotnak, an unclassified service employee, both veterans, applied for a classified service position with the Department of Corrections (DOC). The Office of Administration (OA) deemed the position a promotion for Lynn and did not apply veterans’ preference, while it deemed the position an appointment for Novotnak and applied veterans’ preference. The DOC selected Novotnak for the position, and Lynn appealed to the State Civil Service Commission.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the ascension of an unclassified service employee to a classified service position with higher pay with the same public employer is not a promotion under the CSRA and the VPA, but rather an appointment. Therefore, it is not discriminatory under section 2704 of the CSRA to award a veterans’ preference to an unclassified service employee seeking an appointment but not to a classified service employee seeking a promotion. The court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court in part and reversed in part. The court ruled that Lynn was not entitled to veterans’ preference as he was seeking a promotion, not an appointment. However, Lynn will remain in his position due to a separate issue of technical discrimination that was not reviewed by the court. View "Department of Corrections v. Lynn" on Justia Law

In this case, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) withheld 11 documents from a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request by Appellate Advocates, arguing that the documents were privileged attorney-client communications. These documents had been prepared by DOCCS counsel to train and advise Board of Parole commissioners on how to comply with their legal duties and obligations.The New York Court of Appeals had to determine whether these documents were rightly withheld under the FOIL exemption for privileged matters. The court found that the documents reflected counsel's legal analysis of statutory, regulatory, and decisional law, and were therefore protected attorney-client communications, prepared to facilitate the rendition of legal advice or services in a professional relationship. The court rejected Appellate Advocates' arguments that disclosure was required under FOIL, noting that the privilege applied to proactive advice to assist the client in compliance with legal mandates, and was not limited to communications triggered by a client's disclosure of confidential information or a direct request for advice. The court also rejected the argument that documents identified as Commissioner training materials were categorically not exempt from disclosure.The court concluded that the documents were properly withheld under the FOIL exemption for privileged matters as they were privileged attorney-client communications. The court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "Matter of Appellate Advocates v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided a case regarding the regulation of two tracts of land in Livingston Parish, Louisiana. The landowners, Garry L. Lewis and G. Lewis-Louisiana, L.L.C. (collectively referred to as "Lewis"), had been contending with the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for ten years over the agency's assertion of jurisdiction over alleged "wetlands" on their property under the Clean Water Act.The case had a complex history, involving two Supreme Court cases, three Approved Jurisdictional Determinations (AJDs), two federal court cases resulting in two remand orders, and two appeals to the Fifth Circuit. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett v. EPA controlled the facts of this case and dictated that Lewis' property lacked "wetlands" that had "a continuous surface connection to bodies that are 'waters of the United States' in their own right," such that there was no clear demarcation between "waters" and wetlands. As a result, the property was not subject to federal jurisdiction.The court noted that Lewis' property, used primarily as a pine timber plantation, was composed of two approximately twenty-acre tracts of "grass-covered, majority dry fields, with gravel logging and timber roads on two sides of each tract." Despite this, the USACE had concluded after numerous site visits that certain percentages of these tracts contained jurisdictional wetlands, thereby restricting Lewis' development plans without a federal permit.The court rejected the government's arguments that the case was moot following the withdrawal of the 2020 AJD and that further remand was necessary for the USACE to reevaluate the jurisdictional issue. The court held that the voluntary cessation of the allegedly wrongful behavior did not moot the case as there was no reasonable expectation of non-recurrence, and remand was inappropriate as the facts and governing law made it clear that Lewis' property was not subject to federal Clean Water Act regulation.The court ultimately vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Lewis, confirming that the tracts in question were not "waters of the United States" under the Sackett ruling. View "Lewis v. USA" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled on a decade-long dispute between landowners Garry L. Lewis and G. Lewis-Louisiana, L.L.C. (together referred to as "Lewis") and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) over the federal jurisdiction of "wetlands" on their Louisiana property under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The case involved numerous Supreme Court cases, jurisdictional determinations, federal court cases, and appeals.Lewis's property was primarily used as a pine timber plantation. In 2013, Lewis requested a jurisdictional determination from the USACE to develop the property, which went unanswered until a formal request two years later. The USACE concluded in 2016 that portions of the property contained wetlands subject to CWA jurisdiction. Lewis appealed, leading to a reconsideration and a substantially unchanged jurisdictional determination in 2017. Lewis then filed suit in federal court, claiming that the Corps' action was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court found the administrative record insufficient to support the conclusion that wetlands on the property met the "adjacency" test or had a "significant nexus" to traditional navigable waters and remanded the case back to USACE for further review.On remand, USACE revised the data and applied a recently issued regulation. However, the revised determination nearly doubled the alleged wetlands on one of Lewis's property tracts. After another round of litigation and appeals, the case reached the Fifth Circuit, where Lewis argued that under no interpretation of the administrative facts could his property be regulated as "wetlands" subject to the CWA.The Fifth Circuit agreed with Lewis, drawing upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sackett v. EPA which held that the CWA only extends to wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are "waters of the United States" in their own right. The Fifth Circuit found that there was no such connection between any plausible wetlands on Lewis's property and a "relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters," and thus, there was no factual basis for federal Clean Water Act regulation of these tracts.The court also rejected the government's arguments that the appeal was moot due to the withdrawal of the 2020 jurisdictional determination, and that the case should be remanded to USACE for reevaluation. The court held that the agency's unilateral withdrawal of a final agency action did not render the case moot and that remand was not appropriate because there was no uncertainty about the outcome of the agency's proceedings on remand.Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Lewis that the tracts in question are not "waters of the United States" under the Clean Water Act as interpreted by Sackett v. EPA. View "Lewis v. USA" on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered an appeal by Mark Meadows, former White House chief of staff under President Donald Trump, who sought to move his state criminal prosecution to federal court. The state of Georgia had indicted Meadows for crimes related to alleged interference in the 2020 presidential election. Meadows argued that because these actions were taken in his official capacity, they should be heard in federal court according to the federal-officer removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). The district court denied this request because Meadows' charged conduct was not performed under the color of his federal office. The court of appeals affirmed this decision. It ruled that the federal-officer removal statute does not apply to former federal officers and even if it did, the alleged actions leading to this criminal action were not related to Meadows’ official duties. The court concluded that the former chief of staff’s role does not include influencing state officials with allegations of election fraud or altering valid election results in favor of a particular candidate, regardless of the chief of staff's role with respect to state election administration. Therefore, Meadows was not entitled to invoke the federal-officer removal statute. View "The State of Georgia v. Meadows" on Justia Law