Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska dealt with an appeal against the termination of parental rights of two parents, Elena F. and Ronan F., by the State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services, Office of Children’s Services. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) had removed the two Indian children from their parents' home due to reported domestic violence and later terminated both parents' rights after two years. The parents appealed, arguing that OCS failed to make active efforts to reunify the family.The court found that the OCS made active efforts to reunify Elena with her children even in light of her serious mental illness, substance abuse, and her increasingly violent threats and behavior. As such, the court affirmed the termination of Elena's parental rights.However, the court found that the OCS did not make active efforts to reunify Ronan with his children. The court noted that there was no evidence that two out of three caseworkers assigned to Ronan made any efforts toward his reunification with his children. Therefore, the court reversed the termination of Ronan's parental rights. View "Ronan F. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

In North Dakota, the Sargent County Water Resource District ("District") initiated an eminent domain action to acquire permanent and temporary easements over five properties adjacent to Drain 11 for a drainage project ("Project"). The landowners argued that the project was unlawful because it did not qualify as “maintenance” and exceeded the six-year maximum maintenance levy without the approval of the majority of landowners. The District countered that the landowners’ arguments were foreclosed because they did not appeal the District’s “Resolution of Necessity” and their arguments were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. The district court ruled that the landowners’ arguments were not foreclosed and granted condemnation of the property for the Project.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court held the landowners' arguments were not foreclosed and the district court did not err in reaching this conclusion. The Court ruled that the landowners were not precluded by res judicata or collateral estoppel from challenging whether the Project was authorized by law in defending against an eminent domain action.However, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's finding that the Project was a use authorized by law and that no landowner vote was required for the Project. The Court concluded that the Project as currently designed and approved exceeded the statutory maximum maintenance levy and could not proceed without the approval of the majority of landowners as required by state law. The judgment was therefore reversed. View "Sargent Cty. Water Resource District v. Beck" on Justia Law

In this case, the Plaintiff, Paul Steven Wynn, had sued Rex Frederick, in his official capacity as a magistrate, and Great American Insurance Company for negligence. The Plaintiff claimed that Frederick was negligent in sending a custody order to UNC Hospitals, instead of the Sheriff's Office, resulting in a delay in the involuntary commitment of the Plaintiff's nephew, who subsequently assaulted and paralyzed the Plaintiff.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that magistrates, as state officials, are not included in the phrase "other officers" under North Carolina General Statute § 58-76-5, which speaks to the waiving of sovereign immunity for certain officials covered by a statutory bond. The court came to this conclusion by examining the structure and history of the statute, which revealed that the statute only encompasses county officers and not state officers. As such, the court found that the statute does not waive the magistrate's sovereign immunity.Furthermore, the court held that judicial immunity applies to both official and individual capacity claims, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, which had limited the defense of judicial immunity to individual capacity claims only. The court, however, did not decide whether the magistrate's conduct in this case constituted a judicial act, as it found that the claim was independently barred by sovereign immunity. The decision of the Court of Appeals was therefore reversed. View "Wynn v. Frederick" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina was tasked with interpreting N.C.G.S. § 14-208.12A, which allows for the removal of a registered sex offender from the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry ten years after initial registration. The defendant, Larry Fritsche, had argued that since he had registered as a sex offender in Colorado more than ten years ago, he was eligible for removal from the North Carolina registry. However, the trial court, using precedent set by the case In re Borden, denied his petition, stating that the ten-year period must be completed in North Carolina. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.Upon review, the Supreme Court also affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court determined that the term "county" in the relevant statutes refers to a county in North Carolina, not any state. The court also noted that the purpose of the Sex Offender Protection Registration Programs was to protect North Carolina communities, and this protection could not be ensured if sex offenders could avoid registering in North Carolina due to time spent on another state's registry. Therefore, the court held that the term "initial county registration" in section 14-208.12A requires ten years of registration in North Carolina, not simply ten years of registration in any state. View "State v. Fritsche" on Justia Law

The case involves ParkerVision, Inc. appealing a decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) that invalidated one of its patents, U.S. Patent No. 7,110,444 ('444 patent), owned by ParkerVision, Inc., which relates to wireless local area networks (WLANs) that use frequency translation technology. The Board determined that claim 3 of the patent is unpatentable as obvious in light of prior art. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision. The court found that the Board correctly construed the term “storage element” and did not procedurally err in how it treated certain arguments raised by the parties. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the Board's finding that the patent claim was obvious in light of prior art. The court found no violation of ParkerVision's procedural rights under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and no abuse of the Board's discretion in excluding parts of ParkerVision’s sur-reply. View "PARKERVISION, INC. v. VIDAL " on Justia Law

In this case, an unincorporated association, Saline Parents, and six individuals sued the Attorney General of the United States, Merrick Garland, alleging that the Department of Justice (DOJ) was unlawfully attempting to silence them and others who opposed progressive curricula and policies in public schools. This lawsuit was in response to a memorandum issued by the Attorney General, expressing concern over the increase in reported incidents of harassment, intimidation, and threats of violence against school administrators, board members, teachers, and staff. The memorandum instructed the DOJ staff to investigate the issue and discuss strategies to address it. The plaintiffs argued that their protest activities, which included constitutionally protected conduct and did not involve threats of criminal violence, had been unfairly targeted by the DOJ.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the dismissal of the case by the District Court on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue this action. The court agreed with the government's argument that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was not ripe for adjudication, indicating that the plaintiffs' claims were based on hypothetical future events that may not occur. The court also found that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the government had in any way threatened imminent enforcement action against them or had labeled them in a way that impugned their reputations. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claim was based on contingencies and speculation, making the dispute premature for judicial resolution. View "Saline Parents v. Garland" on Justia Law

In Texas, the District Attorney for the 38th Judicial District, Christina Mitchell Busbee, objected to the sale of a property that was purchased with the District's forfeiture funds and was legally owned by Medina County. The District Attorney argued that the County could not sell the property without her consent and that she was entitled to the sale proceeds. The trial court and the court of appeals ruled that the District Attorney did not have standing to make these claims because the relevant statute, Chapter 59, authorizes only the Attorney General to enforce its terms. The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed, holding that the question of whether the District Attorney was authorized to sue under Chapter 59 did not pertain to her constitutional standing to sue, but rather to the merits of her claims. The Court concluded that the District Attorney did have constitutional standing to sue because she had alleged a concrete injury traceable to the County's conduct and redressable by court order. The case was remanded back to the trial court to consider the County's additional jurisdictional challenges. View "BUSBEE v. COUNTY OF MEDINA, TEXAS" on Justia Law

In this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision, finding that the Middle Republican Natural Resources District (NRD) violated the due process rights of two landowners, Merlin Brown and Uhrich & Brown Limited Partnership, by having the same attorneys act as both prosecutors and participants in the adjudicatory process of the case. The court held that such a combination of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in the same individuals posed an intolerably high risk of actual bias, thus, infringing on the landowners' right to a fair trial by an impartial tribunal. In this case, the NRD had accused the landowners of violating certain ground water management rules. The case was initially heard by the Board of Directors of the NRD, whose decision to impose penalties on the landowners was informed by the same attorneys who had prosecuted the case on behalf of the NRD. The landowners appealed the Board's decision under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), leading to the district court's reversal. The NRD then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, which upheld the lower court's ruling. View "Uhrich & Brown Ltd. Part. v. Middle Republican NRD" on Justia Law

The case before the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware concerned an appeal by Carrah LeBoon Odell against an order from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. The order affirmed a decision made by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (UIAB) that upheld decisions by an appeals referee concluding that Odell was liable to repay overpaid unemployment benefits totaling $7,139.Odell had originally filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits after her employer, Allied Universal, reduced her hours. She later obtained a second job at Rater Labs and reported income from both employers to the Department of Labor. She received traditional unemployment benefits and Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation under the CARES Act for a period. It was later determined that Odell’s total income during the period was too high to qualify for unemployment benefits, and the benefits she received were therefore an overpayment subject to recoupment by the Department.Odell appealed the overpayment determinations, admitting that she was ineligible for traditional unemployment benefits during the period in question because her income was too high. She requested a waiver of the obligation to repay the benefits, arguing that she met the conditions for a repayment waiver established by the US Department of Labor’s instructions to states regarding processing overpayment waivers under the CARES Act.The UIAB affirmed the appeals referee’s decision. Odell then appealed to the Superior Court, which also affirmed the Board’s decision.Odell appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, which concluded that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. The Supreme Court ruled that Odell was liable for repayment, regardless of the cause of the overpayment. Her arguments concerning the Department’s computer system and discovery relating to that system did not establish reversible error. Furthermore, her argument that her repayment obligation should have been waived did not establish reversible error as repayment waivers were not available at the time of the proceedings below.Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Odell v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the plaintiff, a civilly committed sexually dangerous person, petitioned the Department of Correction (DOC) for medical parole due to his deteriorating health conditions. The DOC denied his petition based on their policy that civilly committed individuals are ineligible for medical parole under G. L. c. 127, § 119A. The plaintiff sought review of this denial, arguing that his due process rights had been violated. A Superior Court judge allowed his motion for judgment on the pleadings and ordered the DOC to conduct a hearing on the plaintiff's medical parole petition.However, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the judge's order. The court held that the medical parole statute applies only to committed offenders serving a criminal sentence, not to civilly committed sexually dangerous persons. It further held that sexually dangerous persons may seek release due to terminal illness or physical or mental incapacity under G. L. c. 123A, § 9, and denying them an additional avenue for relief by means of the medical parole statute does not offend substantive due process. The Court concluded that the plaintiff's due process rights were not violated by the DOC's policy that precludes civilly committed sexually dangerous persons from eligibility for medical parole. View "Murphy v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law