Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) failed to comply with both the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in its decision to amend the registration of streptomycin for use on citrus crops. The case was brought by a group of environmental advocacy and public interest organizations against the EPA.The EPA had concluded that the registration of streptomycin for use on citrus would not cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment." However, the court disagreed, finding a lack of substantial evidence for some of the EPA’s conclusions. In particular, the court held that the EPA’s assessment of the risk to pollinators (bees) was incomplete or inadequately explained, and the agency failed to provide a sufficient explanation for the registration labels’ suggestion that streptomycin could be used to prevent citrus diseases.Furthermore, the court also found that the EPA failed to comply with the ESA. According to the ESA, the EPA should have determined whether the pesticide registration "may affect" any endangered species or critical habitat, which it failed to do.As a result, the court vacated the EPA’s amended registration of streptomycin for use on citrus crops and remanded the case back to the agency to address the errors in its FIFRA analysis and to conduct an ESA effects determination. View "MIGRANT CLINICIANS NETWORK V. USEPA" on Justia Law

In this appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, James Dow Vandivere challenged a district court decision denying his motion for release from civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Act. Vandivere, who had been convicted of multiple crimes involving the sexual exploitation of minors and sentenced to almost twenty years in prison, was nearing the end of his sentence when the government moved to civilly commit him. The government argued, and the district court agreed, that Vandivere remained sexually dangerous. Vandivere filed a motion for discharge and, following a hearing, the district court found he remained sexually dangerous and denied his motion. Vandivere appealed, arguing that he was wrongly forced to bear the burden of proof at the hearing and that the district court erred in determining that he remained sexually dangerous.The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found that under the Adam Walsh Act, the burden of proof at an Adam Walsh Act discharge hearing is on the detainee to show his recovery by a preponderance of the evidence. The court also found this allocation of burden does not violate the detainee’s due process rights. Further, the appellate court found no error in the district court's conclusion that Vandivere remained sexually dangerous, stating that the district court had appropriately considered Vandivere's behavior while in custody, his persistent cognitive distortions about sexual abuse, his refusal to participate in sex offender therapy, and his proposed release plan. View "US v. Vandivere" on Justia Law

In the State of Montana, a group of parents and the non-profit organization Stand Up Montana sued several school districts in Missoula County over the implementation of mask mandates in schools during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs argued that the mask mandates violated their substantive due process rights. The Fourth Judicial District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the school districts, finding the mask mandates did not violate the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court reiterated that the mask mandates did not implicate any fundamental rights under Article II of the Montana Constitution, and therefore, the rational basis test was the appropriate standard of review. Under the rational basis test, the court found that the mask mandates were rationally related to the legitimate government interest of stemming the spread of COVID-19, as the school districts had considered information and recommendations from reputable public and private health care providers and agencies, including the CDC, which all recommended universal masking. The court also affirmed the lower court's decision to grant a motion in limine to exclude testimony from the plaintiffs' hybrid witnesses, as the proffered testimony was not relevant to whether the mask policies were rationally related to stemming the spread of COVID-19. View "Stand Up Montana v. Msla Co. Schools" on Justia Law

In the case heard by the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Caryn Miske, the plaintiff and appellant, was appealing a district court decision that granted the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) summary judgment on all of her claims that arose from her termination by the DNRC from the Flathead Basin Commission.The primary facts of the case involve Miske's employment as the Executive Director of the Flathead Basin Commission, a body established by the 1983 Legislature to protect the environment of Flathead Lake and its tributaries. The Commission is administratively attached to the DNRC, a relationship that Miske argued allowed the Commission independent authority over staffing decisions. However, the DNRC contended that the Commission and DNRC share concurrent authority over staffing decisions.The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the DNRC on all of Miske's claims. It held that, based on the plain language and structure of the relevant statutes, the DNRC and the Commission have concurrent authority over staffing decisions, and therefore, Miske was a DNRC employee.The court also ruled that the DNRC didn't commit intentional interference with contractual relations as it wasn't a stranger to Miske's relationship with the Commission. Additionally, the court found that Miske's lobbying efforts on behalf of the Commission were made in her capacity as a DNRC employee and thus were not protected political speech. Lastly, the court held that the DNRC had good cause to terminate Miske due to her repeated failures to provide the DNRC with state-issued credit card statements, which constituted a legitimate business reason for her termination. View "Miske v. DNRC" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the petitioner, Jay Watson, filed a grievance against his employer, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (FWP or agency), claiming he was underpaid for six years due to an agency error in implementing a new pay system. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, ruled in favor of Watson and reversed the Final Agency Decision issued by the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA or Board). The court also awarded attorney fees to Watson. FWP appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not err in reversing BOPA’s decision. The court found that BOPA incorrectly applied the Montana Wage Payment Act (MWPA) to Watson's grievance, which was pursued under the agency's grievance process. The court found that the MWPA provides a process independent from the agency grievance process and its restrictions and benefits do not apply to Watson's claim. As such, the MWPA's three-year limitation does not apply to Watson’s claim, and the court affirmed the District Court’s reinstatement of the Hearing Officer’s pay determination.However, the Supreme Court held that the District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Watson. The court noted that Montana follows the “American Rule” regarding fee awards, which provides that “absent statutory or contractual authority, attorney’s fees will not be awarded to the prevailing party in a lawsuit.” There was no contractual or statutory authority providing for attorney fee awards for prevailing parties in this case, and the court found that this case was not frivolous litigation or litigated inappropriately by FWP. Therefore, an exception to the generally applicable American Rule was not established. The court reversed the attorney fee award and remanded for entry of an amended judgment. View "Watson v. FWP" on Justia Law

In 2018, a worker, Thomas Lazalee, filed a claim for benefits after suffering a right thumb injury and carpal tunnel syndrome, for which he underwent surgery. His employer, Wegman's Food Markets, Inc., did not challenge the claim and compensated Lazalee at the temporary total disability rate. In 2019, Lazalee was diagnosed with similar injuries to his left hand, and again, Wegman's compensated him at the temporary total disability rate. Lazalee then requested a hearing to amend the previous award to include these additional injuries.At the hearing, Wegman's accepted liability but sought to cross-examine Lazalee's doctor regarding the degree of impairment during Lazalee's most recent period out of work. The Workers' Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) denied this request, ruling that Lazalee's 11.2-week absence was not excessive. This decision was affirmed by the Workers' Compensation Board and the Appellate Division, with the latter finding that Wegman's request to cross-examine the doctor was disingenuous because it came after Wegman's had already paid Lazalee at the total disability rate until his return to work, and was based solely on the employer's counsel's interpretation of the medical reports without any credible medical evidence to the contrary.However, the New York Court of Appeals reversed these decisions, holding that under the rules of the Workers' Compensation Board, if an employer wishes to cross-examine an attending physician whose report is on file, the referee must grant an adjournment for such purpose. The court found that the WCLJ did not have the discretion to deny Wegman's request for cross-examination made at the hearing before the WCLJ had rendered a decision on the merits. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division with instructions to remand to the Workers' Compensation Board for further proceedings in accordance with the Court of Appeals' opinion. View "Matter of Lazalee v Wegman's Food Mkts., Inc." on Justia Law

In a dispute between the American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire (ACLU) and the New Hampshire Division of State Police (the Division), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed a lower court's decision permitting the ACLU's request for access to public records about a former state trooper under the Right-to-Know Law. The Division had argued that these records were exempt from disclosure under RSA 105:13-b and their release would constitute an invasion of privacy. The ACLU had requested reports, investigatory files, personnel, and disciplinary records related to adverse employment action against the former trooper.The Supreme Court ruled that the exemption cited by the Division, RSA 105:13-b, which pertains to the confidentiality of police personnel files, does not categorically prohibit disclosure of such records under the Right-to-Know Law. The court's interpretation of RSA 105:13-b is that it operates within the context of a specific criminal trial and does not prohibit disclosure in all instances or further regulate the information. Consequently, the Division's argument that the law establishes a scheme in which police personnel records may not be disclosed outside narrow exceptions was rejected.The court also found no absurdity in the coexistence of different statutory frameworks for seeking information in a police personnel file for different purposes. It ruled that the material disclosed under the Right-to-Know Law and RSA 105:13-b is tailored to the purposes of the respective laws, reflecting the different purposes served by each statutory scheme. View "American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire v. New Hampshire Division of State Police" on Justia Law

Kevin Cantwell worked for Flex-N-Gate for 28 years during which he sustained numerous work-related injuries. He was awarded permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits for these injuries under the law as it existed before February 1, 2014, referred to as Title 85. After this date, workers' compensation claims were governed by a new law, Title 85A, under the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act (AWCA). Cantwell sustained three more injuries after the enactment of AWCA and was again awarded PPD benefits. However, the Workers' Compensation Commission denied payment of these benefits based on their interpretation of Section 46(H) of the AWCA, which limited the total weeks of PPD benefits to 350.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, in this case, disagreed with the Commission's interpretation. The court determined that the 100% limitation on PPD benefits under Section 45(C)(1) of the AWCA controls over the number of weeks when awarding compensation for PPD. This is particularly applicable where a claimant has compensable awards for job-related injuries that occurred both before and after February 1, 2014. The court vacated the Commission's order in each case and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "CANTWELL v. FLEX-N-GATE" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard an appeal by Mark Jordan regarding his conviction for armed bank robbery and associated gun charges. The main issue was whether armed bank robbery can be considered a "crime of violence" under a federal gun statute. Jordan argued that armed bank robbery could be committed recklessly, and therefore should not count as a crime of violence.The court, however, found that the federal armed bank robbery statute is divisible into different crimes, and the specific crime that Jordan pleaded guilty to required purpose or knowledge, not recklessness. Therefore, using the modified categorical approach, the court held that armed bank robbery is a crime of violence. The court also held that whenever a federal crime is predicated on committing another crime, the elements of the predicate crime are considered elements of the first crime as well.In regards to the facts of the case, Jordan committed three bank robberies, during two of which he fired a gun. He was charged with three counts of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) and two gun charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He pleaded guilty to all five counts and was sentenced to 318 months in prison. He later challenged his sentence, arguing that § 2113(d) is not a "crime of violence" under § 924(c), which is what the court ultimately disagreed with. View "USA v. Jordan" on Justia Law

In this case heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiff, Daniella Easterbrook, appealed the denial of her application for disability benefits by the Social Security Administration. Easterbrook, who has suffered from persistent back pain since 2011, argued that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) failed to provide a "good reason," supported by substantial evidence, for not giving adequate weight to the opinions of her treating physician, Dr. John Kim.The court agreed with Easterbrook, stating that the ALJ erred in not applying the "treating source rule" to Dr. Kim's opinions and not providing a sufficient justification for giving his opinions less weight. The court noted that Dr. Kim's opinions were well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and were consistent with the substantial evidence in the record.The court also found that the ALJ's reasons for discounting Dr. Kim's opinions, such as Easterbrook's decision not to undergo certain treatments, were inappropriate and did not constitute "good reasons." The court stated that a patient's refusal to pursue a specific type of medical treatment does not automatically call into question the severity of her pain.As a result, the court reversed the Commissioner's decision and remanded the case for a determination consistent with its opinion. View "Easterbrook v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law