Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A United States citizen, formerly known as Paul Anderson and now Saadiq Long, was placed on the federal government’s Terrorist Screening Dataset (commonly called the Terrorist Watchlist) and, at one point, on its No Fly List subset. After experiencing travel restrictions, employment issues, and other alleged harms, Long challenged his placement on these lists, asserting constitutional and statutory violations. He claimed that his inclusion was based on impermissible factors such as race, religion, and protected activities, and that the government’s information-sharing practices and redress procedures were unlawful. While the litigation was ongoing, Long was removed from the No Fly List, but remained on the broader Watchlist. He also alleged that his Watchlist status led to the denial of credentials necessary for his work as a truck driver.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially transferred some of Long’s claims to the Fourth Circuit and stayed others. After Long’s removal from the No Fly List, a prior Fourth Circuit panel found his No Fly List claims moot and remanded for the district court to determine which claims remained justiciable. On remand, the district court dismissed all of Long’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that his removal from the No Fly List mooted those claims and that he lacked standing for his Watchlist-related claims, as his alleged injuries were either resolved or not sufficiently imminent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal. The Fourth Circuit held that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in FBI v. Fikre, Long’s removal from the No Fly List did not necessarily moot his claims, as the government had not shown it could not repeat the challenged conduct. The court also found that Long had standing to challenge his Watchlist status based on the denial of transportation credentials, and remanded for the district court to consider the merits of his claims. View "Long v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A childcare provider operating two centers in Vermont participated in the federal Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), which reimburses centers for meals provided to children if certain regulatory requirements are met. The provider had previously been cited for noncompliance in 2019, but the matter was resolved after corrective action. In 2022, the Vermont Agency of Education (AOE) again found serious deficiencies, including inadequate recordkeeping, improper meal claims, and failure to monitor facilities. The provider submitted a corrective-action plan, and AOE initially determined the deficiencies were fully and permanently corrected. However, a subsequent unannounced review in 2023 revealed recurring deficiencies, such as missing enrollment forms, incorrect eligibility determinations, and incomplete documentation.Following these findings, AOE issued a notice proposing to terminate the provider’s participation in CACFP and to disqualify the provider and two employees from future participation. The provider requested an administrative review. At the hearing, the provider acknowledged some paperwork was not in compliance but argued the errors were minor and unintentional. Due to time constraints, the hearing officer allowed both parties to submit post-hearing written arguments and documentation, to which the provider did not initially object but later challenged as a violation of due process and agency procedures.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case after the hearing officer affirmed AOE’s decision to terminate and disqualify the provider. The Court held that the hearing officer applied the correct legal standard and that the record supported the findings of persistent serious deficiencies. The Court also determined that the provider had not properly preserved its objection to post-hearing submissions and, regardless, was not prejudiced by the procedure. The Court affirmed the termination and disqualification from the CACFP. View "In re Butterfly Kisses Child Care Center, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns a petitioner who was substantiated by the Vermont Department for Children and Families (DCF) for placing a child, L.M., at risk of sexual harm. The petitioner had a prior substantiation in 2006 for sexually abusing a minor and a 2019 conviction for open and gross lewdness involving an adult. In 2020, the petitioner and his husband, who had previously been substantiated as a minor, began babysitting L.M., an eight-year-old transgender boy. L.M. would sometimes stay overnight at their apartment, where another adult friend was also present. The petitioner did not inform his probation officer about this arrangement, despite probation conditions restricting his contact with minors. DCF received a report and, after investigation, substantiated the petitioner for risk of sexual harm to L.M.After the substantiation, the petitioner requested review. The Commissioner’s Registry Review Unit upheld the substantiation, and the petitioner appealed to the Human Services Board. A hearing officer recommended reversing the substantiation, but the Board adopted the hearing officer’s factual findings and nonetheless affirmed the substantiation, reasoning that the petitioner’s access to L.M., his prior record, lack of sex-offender treatment, and dishonesty during the investigation supported a finding of risk. The Board found that the petitioner had regular and ongoing access to L.M., including overnight stays, and that the presence of other adults did not amount to constant supervision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Board’s decision for abuse of discretion. The Court held that the Board reasonably inferred risk of harm based on the petitioner’s access to L.M., prior substantiation, and other factors. The Court rejected arguments that DCF was required to relitigate the 2006 substantiation or that DCF’s policies were inconsistent with statutory requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s decision upholding the substantiation. View "In re Appeal of S.C.-M." on Justia Law

A hospital submitted its proposed budget for the upcoming fiscal year, requesting a 6.1% increase in net patient revenue (NPR) and a 2.8% increase in commercial negotiated rates. The hospital justified its request by citing increased patient volume and efforts to reduce wait times. The Green Mountain Care Board, which regulates hospital budgets in Vermont, had previously issued guidance setting a 3.5% benchmark for NPR growth and a 3.4% benchmark for commercial rate increases, requiring hospitals to justify any requests above these benchmarks.After reviewing the hospital’s proposal, the Green Mountain Care Board approved a 5.0% NPR increase—higher than the benchmark but lower than requested—citing the hospital’s strong financial health and the need to balance access to care with cost containment. The Board also approved the requested 2.8% commercial rate increase but included a footnote reducing this increase to 1.2% due to a prior budget overage, referencing a separate budget-enforcement order. The hospital appealed the Board’s decision to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that the Board’s NPR decision was arbitrary and that the reduction in the commercial rate increase violated procedural requirements under the Vermont Administrative Procedure Act (VAPA).The Vermont Supreme Court held that the Board had adequately explained its decision to approve a 5.0% NPR increase and acted within its discretion, given the statutory mandate to balance cost control and access to care. However, the Court struck the footnote reducing the commercial rate increase to 1.2%, because the underlying budget-enforcement order had been reversed by the Vermont Superior Court for failure to follow VAPA procedures and was no longer valid. The Supreme Court otherwise affirmed the Board’s decision. View "In re Rutland Regional Medical Center Fiscal Year 2025" on Justia Law

Baker Ranches, Inc., a Nevada corporation, holds decreed water rights in Baker and Lehman Creeks, which flow through Great Basin National Park. In 2015, the National Park Service (NPS) received a permit for a nonconsumptive instream flow in Baker Creek, requiring that the water not be removed and the full natural flow exit the park undiverted. Baker Ranches alleged that, since 2016, the NPS denied it permission to remove obstructions and allowed rock dams to be constructed, diverting water into caves and interfering with its water rights. While related federal litigation was ongoing, Baker Ranches requested the State Engineer to investigate these alleged violations.The State Engineer, after site visits and correspondence, decided in 2021 to hold the investigation in abeyance pending the outcome of the federal litigation. Baker Ranches then petitioned the Seventh Judicial District Court in White Pine County for judicial review or a writ of mandamus. The district court denied the writ but granted judicial review, finding the State Engineer’s decision to suspend the investigation arbitrary and capricious, and ordered the State Engineer to complete the investigation and render a final decision.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered whether the State Engineer had the authority to hold the investigation in abeyance and whether such a decision was subject to judicial review. The court held that the State Engineer possesses discretionary powers, including the implied authority to pause investigations pending related litigation. The court further determined that the State Engineer’s decision to suspend the investigation was interlocutory, not a final order, and therefore not subject to judicial review. As a result, the Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the district court’s order granting Baker Ranches’ petition for judicial review. View "SULLIVAN, P.E. VS. BAKER RANCHES, INC." on Justia Law

In 1997, an individual applied to the Utah Division of Water Rights to divert water from a surface source in the Weber Basin for irrigation and livestock purposes. The application was met with protests from the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, among others. After a hearing in 1998 and sporadic communications over the next two decades, the Utah State Engineer ultimately denied the application in 2018. The applicant sought judicial review in the Second District Court, arguing that the denial was improper because the water source contained unappropriated water, the application would not interfere with existing rights, and the application’s 1997 filing date should give it priority.While the case was pending in the Second District Court, the applicant died. His counsel moved to substitute the estate’s personal representative as the plaintiff under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1). The district court denied the motion, holding that the claim did not survive the applicant’s death because he had no perfected property right and any inchoate right was not mentioned in his will. The court also found that Utah’s general survival statute did not apply, and dismissed the case. The estate appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed whether the district court erred in denying substitution and dismissing the claim. The court held that the burden was on the movant to show the claim survived death. It found that neither common law nor statute provided for the survival of a claim for judicial review of an administrative denial of a water appropriation application. The court concluded that the claim abated upon the applicant’s death and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Marriott v. Wilhelmsen" on Justia Law

Green Theory LLC applied for a license to operate a medical cannabis dispensary at a location in Washington, D.C. While the application was pending, a group of local residents, including parents and school administrators, collectively known as the Wolverton Group, filed a protest with the District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board. They argued that the proposed dispensary was within 1,000 feet of several schools, raising concerns about the impact on the community and potential violations of federal law. The local Advisory Neighborhood Commission (ANC) did not oppose the application.The Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board dismissed the Wolverton Group’s protest, reasoning that under the Medical Cannabis Amendment Act of 2022, only affected ANCs had standing to protest such license applications. The Board then approved Green Theory’s license. The Wolverton Group and other petitioners sought reconsideration and a stay, both of which were denied. They then filed a petition for review with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, arguing that the Board’s interpretation of the statute was incorrect and unconstitutional, and that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to consider the petition. The court determined that its jurisdiction is limited to “contested cases,” which require a trial-type hearing mandated by statute, regulation, or constitutional right. The court found that the relevant statute only required such a hearing if an ANC filed a protest, which did not occur. The court also rejected arguments that a hearing was required by regulation or constitutional right. Concluding that this was not a contested case, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition for review. View "1000 Feet DC Inc. v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage and Cannabis Board" on Justia Law

Several individuals who allegedly owed debts to Kentucky public institutions—either for medical services at the University of Kentucky or for educational services at the University of Kentucky, Morehead State University, or the Kentucky Community & Technical College System—challenged the referral of their debts to the Kentucky Department of Revenue for collection. The plaintiffs argued that the statutes used to justify these referrals did not apply to their debts and that the Department unlawfully collected the debts, sometimes without prior court judgments or adequate notice. The Department used its tax collection powers, including garnishments and liens, to recover these debts, and in some cases, added interest and collection fees.In the Franklin Circuit Court, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and monetary relief, including refunds of funds collected. The Circuit Court ruled that the Department was not authorized by statute to collect these debts and held that sovereign immunity did not protect the defendants from the plaintiffs’ claims. The court also certified the medical debt case as a class action. The Court of Appeals reviewed these interlocutory appeals and held that while sovereign immunity did not bar claims for purely declaratory relief, it did bar all claims for monetary relief, including those disguised as declaratory relief.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the consolidated appeals. It held that sovereign immunity does not bar claims for purely declaratory relief or for a refund of funds that were never due to the state, nor does it bar constitutional takings claims. However, the court held that sovereign immunity does bar claims for a refund of funds that were actually due to the state, even if those funds were unlawfully or improperly collected. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings to determine which funds, if any, were never due to the state and thus subject to refund. The court also found that statutory changes rendered prospective declaratory relief in the medical debt case moot, but not retrospective relief. View "LONG V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A man named Donald Prater, Jr. was found partially nude and behaving erratically after leaving a hospital, having previously told a deputy he had used methamphetamine and was hallucinating. Law enforcement officers from the City of Paintsville and Johnson County, along with emergency medical personnel, responded to reports of his behavior. When officers attempted to arrest Prater on a public street, he resisted and force was used, including a taser, pepper spray, and baton strikes. After being handcuffed, Prater stopped breathing and, despite immediate lifesaving efforts, died. The medical examiner found no lethal trauma and attributed the death to excited delirium syndrome, with other health factors possibly contributing.The personal representative of Prater’s estate filed a wrongful death suit in Johnson Circuit Court against various city and county entities and their employees, alleging excessive force, negligence, and wrongful death. The circuit court granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding the officers and emergency personnel were entitled to qualified official immunity, that the force used was reasonable, and that there was no evidence their actions caused Prater’s death. The court also dismissed claims against the city and county entities, including those for negligent hiring and supervision, on the basis that no underlying tort had been established.On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that some claims against the city and police department for negligent hiring and supervision could proceed, and that the officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity required further factual findings. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that all defendants were properly dismissed. The Court concluded that the officers’ actions were discretionary, performed in good faith, and within the scope of their authority, entitling them to qualified official immunity. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for any necessary proceedings. View "CITY OF PAINTSVILLE V. HANEY" on Justia Law

A healthcare provider participated in Kentucky’s Medicaid program, offering in-home services to recipients in rural areas under the Home and Community Based (HCB) Waiver program. The Department for Medicaid Services had, for several years, reimbursed the provider at enhanced rates for “case management” services, even though the relevant administrative regulation did not list “case management” as a reimbursable “revenue code service.” In 2016, the Department determined that these payments were made in error and sought to recoup over $1 million from the provider for services rendered between 2011 and 2013.After the Department initiated recoupment, the provider contested the action through the Cabinet’s administrative process, arguing that the omission of “case management” from the regulation was a drafting error and that the Department should be estopped from recouping the funds due to its prior representations and delay. The administrative hearing officer rejected these arguments, finding the regulation’s text unambiguous and concluding that neither equitable estoppel nor laches applied. The Secretary of the Cabinet adopted this decision. The provider then sought judicial review in the Franklin Circuit Court, which affirmed the agency’s decision. The Kentucky Court of Appeals also affirmed.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the Department’s regulation unambiguously excluded “case management” from the list of services eligible for enhanced reimbursement, and the Department was within its authority to recoup the overpaid funds. The Court declined to read omitted language into the regulation, found no basis for equitable estoppel or laches against the Department, and rejected the provider’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of the Department’s audit. View "PROFESSIONAL HOME HEALTH CARE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES" on Justia Law