Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Inflation Reduction Act (“IRA”) requires the federal government to hold a specific oil-and-gas lease sale (“Lease Sale 261”), covering territory in the northwest and north-central Gulf of Mexico, by September 30, 2023, in accordance with a particular administrative record of decision. A month before that deadline, however, the bureau in the Department of the Interior charged with conducting the sale—the Bureau of Ocean Energy and Management (“BOEM”)—abruptly changed the sale terms, removing six million acres from the lease and imposing new limits on vessels that pass through the to-be-leased area. Plaintiffs—the State of Louisiana, the American Petroleum Institute, Chevron USA, Inc., and Shell Offshore, Inc.—sued BOEM and other federal entities and officials, arguing that BOEM’s implementation of the new terms was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The merits panel stayed the preliminary injunction pending its decision on the merits. On appeal, BOEM does not challenge the injunction, instead asking only for enough time to comply with it. Only the four environmental organizations that intervened below (“Intervenors”) challenge the preliminary injunction on appeal.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the intervenors’ appeal and amended the preliminary injunction to require that the lease sale at issue be conducted within thirty-seven days. The court explained that here, the causal chain of events necessary to support Intervenors’ theory of standing is so attenuated that the alleged harm is not “certainly impending.” Namely, for the complained-of conduct to result in the alleged injury, the following chain of events needs to occur. View "State of Louisiana v. Haaland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Michael Cathey and Vonderosa Properties, LLC (collectively "Vonderosa") filed suit seeking declaratory relief against Defendant-Appellee Board of County Commissioners for McCurtain County (Board) and moved for a temporary injunction to restrain and enjoin the Board from enforcing and collecting a lodging tax increase passed at a special election held in McCurtain County on November 8, 2022, in conjunction with the general election. The district court denied Vonderosa's request for a temporary injunction and Vonderosa appealed, seeking emergency relief from the Oklahoma Supreme Court. On March 28, 2023, the Supreme Court entered an Order temporarily enjoining enforcement of the 2% increase to the lodging tax until the special election was fully and finally litigated. The Court expressed no opinion concerning the validity of the special election in its emergency Order. While Appellee's petition for rehearing was still pending before the Supreme Court and before the mandate issued, the district court granted Appellee-Intervenor's Motion for Summary Judgment and held the special election was valid. The Supreme Court held that under the facts of this specific case the district court was without jurisdiction to enter summary judgment for Appellee while the appeal was pending before the Supreme Court and before mandate had issued. The District Court's Order of June 20, 2023 was void for lack of jurisdiction and the Order was vacated. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions. View "Cathey v. McCurtain County Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Fitschen was diagnosed with advanced cancer and stopped working. In 2000 the Social Security Administration (SSA) found Fitschen eligible for disability benefits. Fitschen returned to work in 2001 but continued to receive benefits for a nine-month “trial work period,” 42 U.S.C. 422(c)(4). After that period, he could continue to work and receive benefits for another 36-month period if his wages did not exceed the level at which a person is deemed to be capable of engaging in substantial work activity. The SSA's 2003 review determined that Fitschen had engaged in substantial work and should not have received benefits for much of 2002-2003. The SSA notified him of his overpayment liability but his benefits continued because he had again ceased substantial work. Fitschen again returned to work in 2004 but did not report the change. The SSA initiated another review in 2007 and suspended his benefits. The SSA may waive recovery of overpayments if the recipient was without fault.In 2019 the Commissioner of Social Security found Fitschen liable for an overpayment of $50,289.70 and declined to waive recovery. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the SSA was procedurally barred from recovering the overpayment because it failed to comply with its “reopening” regulation; the overpayment assessment did not “reopen” Fitschen’s initial eligibility determination or any later determination concerning the continuation or recomputation of his benefits. Substantial evidence supports the finding that Fitschen was at fault. View "Fitschen v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Cajun Industries LLC (“Cajun”) claimed tax credits for the 2013 tax year pursuant to § 41 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Section 41. First, the Code provision at issue in this case, Section 41 offers a tax credit for “qualified research expenses” including wages and expenditures incurred in pursuit of qualified research.1 The Internal Revenue Code provides a tax credit for qualified research activities, as defined by the Code. Appellants appealed the district court’s judgment which ejected research and development tax credits claimed by Cajun Industries LLC and upheld the resulting tax deficiency.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellants’ argument that all contracts “for the product or result” are not funded improperly conflates “amounts payable under any agreement that are contingent on the success of the research” with contracts for products or services. This argument ignores the operative portion of the sentence: “amounts payable under any agreement that are contingent on the success of the research.” Structurally, the phrase “and thus considered to be paid for the product or result of the research” merely describes or modifies “amounts payable . . . contingent on the success of the research.” It does not, as Appellants urge, stand on its own to establish an additional type of contract “not treated as funding.” Further, the court explained that Appellants are not entitled to the research credit merely because SWBNO could not claim the credit. The Regulations do not require that a tax credit be allocated in every contract. View "USA v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

A dispute arose under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA; Water Code 10720) regarding which local groundwater sustainability agency is authorized to manage the groundwater in a portion of the 180/400 Foot Aquifer Subbasin of the Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin called the CEMEX area. The City of Marina challenged the groundwater sustainability plan of the Salinas Valley Basin Groundwater Sustainability Agency (SVBGSA) as adopted by Monterey County and posted by the Department of Water Resources as the operative groundwater sustainability plan for most of the Subbasin. The County sought a declaration that the formation of the City’s groundwater sustainability agency was void.The court of appeal affirmed the trial court, agreeing with the Department that under section 10724 the County could step in as the presumptive groundwater management agency for the CEMEX area when the City and SVBGSA failed to reach an agreement to allow prompt designation of a groundwater sustainability agency; the Department properly posted the County’s notice of the formation of a groundwater sustainability agency for the CEMEX area on its website and properly identified the County’s groundwater sustainability agency as the exclusive groundwater sustainability agency for the area. View "City of Marina v. County of Monterey" on Justia Law

The California Construction and Industrial Materials Association and the Ventura County Coalition of Labor, Agriculture and Business (Project Opponents) separately petitioned for writs of mandate to require the County of Ventura (County) to vacate an ordinance (the Project) creating overlay zones to protect wildlife migration corridors in rural portions of the County. The Project Opponents claim the Project violates the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1975 (SMARA) and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The trial court denied the petitions.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the Project Opponents claim that the Project’s location distinguishes it from other projects in its exempt class. They point out that the Project overlays 10,000 acres of classified mineral resources. However they cite no evidence that other projects in Classes 7 and 8 do not overlay similar resources. Neither mining nor ordinances that attempt to preserve wildlife are unique to the County. The Project Opponents compare the Project to the Class 33 exemption. That exemption is for projects not to exceed five acres to assure the maintenance, restoration, enhancement, or protection of habitat for fish, plants, or wildlife. But the County is not relying on the Class 33 exemption. It is relying on the Classes 7 and 8 exemptions. They are separate exemptions and not comparable. View "Cal. Construction & Industrial Mat. Assn. v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

In 2018, Presidential Proclamation 9693 imposed duties on imports of solar panels, starting at 30% and scheduled to decrease each year to 25%, 20%, and in the final year, 15%. Importers of bifacial solar modules, consisting of cells that convert sunlight into electricity on both the front and back of the cells, petitioned the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), asking that bifacial solar panels not be subjected to the duties. Ultimately, bifacial solar panels were excluded from the duties. In October 2020, Presidential Proclamation 10101, “modified” Proclamation 9693 to withdraw the exclusion of bifacial solar panels from the scheduled duties, and to increase the fourth-year duty rate to 18%. IImporters of bifacial solar panels sued, alleging that the statute authorizing the President to “modify” Proclamation 9693 only allowed him to make previously adopted safeguard measures more trade-liberalizing while eliminating the exclusion of bifacial panels and raising the fourth-year duty were trade-restrictive. They further argued that even if the President had the authority to “modify” safeguards in a trade-restrictive direction, he failed to follow appropriate procedures.The Trade Court agreed that the authority to “modify” a safeguard is limited to trade-liberalizing changes but rejected the procedural challenges under the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. 2251. The Federal Circuit reversed. The President’s interpretation of the statute, which allows him to “modify” an existing safeguard in a trade-restricting direction, is not unreasonable. In adopting Proclamation 10101, the President committed no significant procedural violation. View "Solar Energy Industries Association v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenge the Louisiana Legislature’s 2022 redistricting map for electing the state’s six members of the United States House of Representatives. The district court preliminarily enjoined use of that map for the 2022 congressional elections. The United States Supreme Court stayed that injunction, pending resolution of a case involving Alabama’s congressional redistricting plan. About a year later, the Supreme Court resolved the Alabama case.In review of the Louisiana Legislature's 2022 redistricting plan, the Fifth Circuit held that district court did not clearly err in its necessary fact-findings nor commit legal error in its conclusions that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in proving a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. However, the court found the injunction is no longer necessary. View "Robinson v. Ardoin" on Justia Law

The Galveston County Commissioners Court is composed of four county commissioners, elected from single-member precincts, and one county judge, elected by the entire county. From 1991 to 2021, one of the four commissioner precincts had a majority-minority population, with blacks and Hispanics together accounting for 58 percent of the precinct’s total population as of 2020. In 2021, the Galveston County Commissioners Court enacted a new districting plan for county commissioner elections. The enacted plan does not contain a majority-minority precinct. Following a bench trial, the district court found that the enacted plan dilutes the voting power of the county’s black and Hispanic voters in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.Galveston County appealed. The panel held that, under existing precedent, distinct minority groups like blacks and Hispanics may be aggregated for purposes of vote dilution claims under Section 2. However, disagreeing with the underlying legal analysis, the panel believed that such precedent should be overturned. Thus, the panel requested a poll for en banc hearing. View "Petteway v. Galveston County" on Justia Law

In April of 2022,the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,and Explosives (“ATF”)issued a Final Rule in which the terms “firearm” and “frame or receiver,” among others, were given “an updated, more comprehensive definition. The Final Rule was almost immediately the subject of litigation claiming that ATF had exceeded its statutory authority, including this case.The Plaintiffs claimed that portions of the Final Rule, which redefine “frame or receiver” and “firearm,” exceeded ATF’s congressionally mandated authority. The plaintiffs requested that the court hold unlawful and set aside the Final Rule, and that the court preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Government from enforcing or implementing the Final Rule. The district issued, and then expanded upon, a preliminary injunction before granting Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, vacating the Final Rule.The Fifth Circuit held that the two challenged portions of the Final Rule exceeded ATF's authority.At this point, all that remained before the court was whether the appeal of the district court’s final judgment vacating the Final Rule in its entirety. In reviewing the district court's vacatur of the entire Final Rule, the court vacated the vactur order, remanding for further consideration of the remedy, considering the court’s holding on the merits. View "VanDerStok v. Garland" on Justia Law