Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Latoya Bray filed an action against sheriff’s lieutenant Stormie Watkins, in her official and individual capacities, for damages allegedly caused by her failure to activate a tornado warning system while working in a county emergency center. The trial court granted summary judgment to Watkins, concluding in part that the public duty doctrine negated any duty owed to Bray. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed: the majority opinion, the specially concurring opinion, and the dissenting opinion disagreed about whether the trial court erred by not considering whether sovereign immunity barred the official-capacity claim and whether the official capacity claim needed to be remanded for the trial court to resolve the sovereign immunity issue in the first instance. In her petition for certiorari to the Georgia Supreme Court, Bray contended: (1) the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the public duty doctrine foreclosed her lawsuit; and (2) the court’s discussion concerning sovereign immunity was “misplaced.” Because the applicability of the public duty doctrine was a merits question, the Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling on the official-capacity claims on the ground that the public duty doctrine barred all of Bray’s claims without considering the threshold jurisdictional question of whether sovereign immunity barred Bray’s claims against Watkins in her official capacity. The Court therefore granted the petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Bray, et al. v. Watkins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court judge dismissing the underlying declaratory judgment complaint in this declaratory judgment action regarding the scope of the Department of Housing and Community Development's (DHCD) authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 121B, 7A, holding that dismissal was warranted.Plaintiffs - location housing authorities (LHAs) of various cities and towns, current and former executive directors of LHAs and others - sought a judgment declaring that DHCD exceeded its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 121B, 7A by promulgating guidelines that govern contracts between an LHA and its executive director and making compliance with the guidelines a requirement to obtain contractual approval from DHCD. A superior court judge allowed DHCD's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that LHAs have authority to hire executive directors and "determine their qualifications, duties, and compensation, under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 121B, 7. View "Fairhaven Housing Authority v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 1970, Michigan voters approved Proposal C, amending Article VIII, section 2 of Michigan’s constitution: “No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public credit utilized, by the legislature or any other political subdivision or agency of the state directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, or secondary schools.” The plaintiffs allege that Proposal C was spurred by the legislature’s passage of 1970 PA 100, which “allowed the Department of Education to purchase educational services from nonpublic schools in secular subjects,” and authorized $22 million in spending during the 1970-71 school year. Plaintiffs allege that “nonpublic schools” meant “religious schools”; opposition to 1970 PA 100 resulted in Proposal C. In 2000, Michigan voters rejected a ballot initiative that would have amended the section to authorize “indirect” support of non-public school students and create a voucher program for students in underperforming public school districts to attend nonpublic schools.Plaintiffs brought unsuccessful free exercise claims, alleging they have funded Michigan Education Savings Program plans and wish to use those plans to pay for their children’s religious school tuition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their equal protection claim that section 2, while facially neutral, creates a political structure that unconstitutionally discriminates against religion because religious persons and schools cannot lobby their state representatives for governmental aid or tuition help without first amending the state constitution. View "Hile v. State of Michigan" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to the United States on Petitioner's claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and to the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department (SCSD) on Petitioner's claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act (RHA), 29 U.S.C. 794, and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to Petitioner's FTCA claims.Petitioner filed this action setting forth FTCA claims against the United States based on the treatment to which he was allegedly subjected while he was in immigration custody, as well as claims brought under the RHA and the ADA based on the alleged discrimination against him owing to his disability during his detention. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit vacated the judgment in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment to the United States as it pertained to Petitioner's FTCA claims; but (2) did not err in awarding summary judgment to SCSD on Petitioner's RHA and ADA claims. View "Thiersaint v. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court reversing the final order of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upholding Respondent's administrative driver's license revocation for a period of five years for driving under the influence, holding that the circuit court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the OAH and in using its determination as a basis for overturning the OAH's decision.After a hearing, the circuit court concluded that the OAH improperly weighed results of field sobriety tests against the negative findings of secondary chemical tests and that Respondent's expert's "unrebutted" testimony supported the negative findings of the secondary chemical test. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the OAH's factual determination that Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent had ingested controlled substances impairing his ability to operate a motor vehicle was entitled to substantial deference; and (2) the evidence in this case supported that factual determination. View "Frazier v. Ramadan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the final order of the circuit court reversing a decision of the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board and finding that Respondents, educational sign language interpreters who worked with students in high school classrooms, qualified for the pay increase provided by W. Va. Code 18A-4-2(e) as full-time special education teachers, holding that the circuit court erred.In reversing, the circuit court concluded that the Grievance Board's decision was clearly erroneous and that Respondents qualified as full-time special education teachers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Legislature intended the 2021 amendment of W. Va. Code 18A-4-2(e) to have retroactive effect; and (2) even in the absence of the 2021 amendment, Respondents were not "classroom teachers" under any version of W. Va. Code 18A-4-2(e), and therefore, they did not qualify for the salary increase provided therein. View "Kanawha County Bd. of Education v. Hall" on Justia Law

Stronghold and the city entered into a 2015 contract to renovate the Monterey Conference Center. Before filing a lawsuit asserting a claim for money or damages against a public entity, the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code 810) requires that a claim be presented to the entity. Without first presenting a claim to the city, Stronghold filed suit seeking declaratory relief regarding the interpretation of the contract, and asserting that the Act was inapplicable.Stronghold presented three claims to the city in 2017-2019, based on its refusal to approve change orders necessitated by purportedly excusable delays. Stronghold filed a fourth amended complaint, alleging breach of contract. The court granted the city summary judgment, reasoning that the declaratory relief cause of action in the initial complaint was, in essence, a claim for money or damages and that all claims in the operative complaint “lack merit” because Stronghold failed to timely present a claim to the city before filing suit.The court of appeal reversed. The notice requirement does not apply to an action seeking purely declaratory relief. A declaratory relief action seeking interpretation of a contract is not a claim for money or damages, even if the judicial interpretation sought may later be the basis for a separate claim for money or damages which would trigger the claim presentation requirement. View "Stronghold Engineering, Inc. v. City of Monterey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that an agreement entered into between Plaintiff Anthony Gattineri and Defendants Wynn MA, LLC and Wynn Resorts, Limited (collectively, Wynn) in San Diego California (the San Diego agreement) was unenforceable for reasons of public policy.Wynn entered into an option contract with FBT Everett Realty, LLC (FBT) to purchase a parcel of property. As Wynn's application for a casino license proceeded, the Massachusetts Gaming Commission discovered that there was a possibility of concealed ownership interests in FBT by a convicted felon with organized crime connections. In response, FBT lowered the purchase price for the parcel. The Commission approved the amended option agreement. Gattineri, a minority owner of FBT, opposed the price reduction and refused to sign the certificate required by the Commission. Gattineri alleged that at the San Diego meeting Wynn had agreed to pay Gattineri an additional $19 million in exchange for Gattineri signing the certificate. After the Commission awarded Wynn a casino license Gattineri brought suit claiming breach of the San Diego agreement because Wynn never paid Gattineri the promised $19 million. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the agreement was deliberately concealed from the Commission and inconsistent with the terms approved by the Commission; and (2) enforcement of such a secret agreement constituted a clear violation of public policy. View "Gattineri v. Wynn MA, LLC" on Justia Law

The parents in this case were brought to the attention of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare ("Department") regarding reports of neglect and physical abuse to their five children. The child protection case began in February 2023 as a protective supervision case. Nearly three months later, the magistrate court ordered that the children be removed from the home and placed in the legal custody of the Department. John Doe (Father) appealed the magistrate court’s order removing his five children from the parents’ custody and temporarily placing the children in the legal custody of the Department. Father argued the magistrate court’s order failed to contain detailed written findings as required by Idaho law, that the order was not supported by substantial and competent evidence, and that the magistrate court’s actions violated Father’s fundamental rights to the care and custody of his children. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court. View "IDHW v. John Doe" on Justia Law

Thrifty Payless, Inc., doing business as Rite Aid, seeks judicial review of the National Labor Relations Board’s decision that Rite Aid committed unfair labor practices. The Board has cross-applied for enforcement of its order. An Administrative Law Judge concluded that Rite Aid had committed unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act when it unilaterally implemented its proposal. The ALJ determined that Rite Aid violated its duty to bargain in good faith because it took unilateral action even though the parties had not yet reached an impasse. The main issue here is whether Rite Aid was entitled to implement its own proposal instead of continuing negotiations with the union.   The DC Circuit denied Rite Aid’s petition for review. The court denied the Board’s cross-application for enforcement and remanded the order. The court found that the record contains enough evidence to support the Board’s finding that the parties were not at an impasse. An impasse arises when neither side is open to compromise. Further, the court explained that any reasonable consideration of exigency must consider “an employer’s need to run its business” and the inherently uncertain task of making corporate decisions in the face of a potential crisis. Here, the Board acknowledged that it was “impossible” for Rite Aid “to predict what claims might come in and how that would impact the reserves.” Rite Aid asserts without contest that the reserves as of November 2019 could only cover a few weeks’ worth of healthcare coverage for Rite Aid employees. So Rite Aid’s concern that inaction could have had damaging consequences is understandable. View "Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law