Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) and certain legislators regarding the appointment of a new administrator for WEC. The legislators argued that the term of the current administrator, Meagan Wolfe, expired on July 1, 2023, and that WEC is required to appoint a new administrator. WEC contended that Wolfe could continue to hold over in her position until a new administrator is appointed and confirmed by the Senate.The Dane County Circuit Court granted WEC's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied the legislators' motion. The court concluded that WEC does not have a duty to appoint a new administrator simply because the current administrator's term has expired. Instead, WEC is only required to appoint a new administrator if there is a vacancy in the position. The court also issued a permanent injunction preventing the legislators from taking any action contrary to its declarations.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case on bypass. The court affirmed the circuit court's decision in part and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that Wisconsin Statute § 15.61(1)(b)1. specifies that WEC must appoint an administrator by a majority vote of its members and with the Senate's confirmation. However, the statute imposes a duty on WEC to appoint a new administrator only if a vacancy occurs in the position. Since no vacancy existed, WEC did not have a duty to appoint a new administrator to replace Wolfe simply because her term had ended. View "Wisconsin Elections Commission v. LeMahieu" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant, alleging that he made and retained an unauthorized copy of her computer hard drive, which contained private and confidential data. The complaint included a claim for violation of Penal Code section 502, which prohibits unauthorized use of any computer system for an improper purpose. The plaintiff sought damages and attorney fees.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a civil jury trial was held, and the jury found in favor of the defendant on all of the plaintiff's causes of action. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for attorney fees and costs under section 502, subdivision (e). The trial court granted the defendant's costs but denied his request for attorney fees, concluding that section 502 does not permit an award of fees to prevailing defendants and that, even if it did, it would be unreasonable to award fees in this case because there was no evidence that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous or abusive.The defendant appealed the order to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California. The appellate court agreed with the defendant that section 502 allows the award of attorney fees to prevailing defendants. However, the court concluded that section 502 defendants may only recover attorney fees where the plaintiff's claim was objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. The appellate court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that the plaintiff's claim was not frivolous or abusive and affirmed the order denying attorney fees. View "Hay v. Marinkovich" on Justia Law

Tim Daniels, a commercial fisherman in Florida, challenged the constitutionality of regulations by Florida’s Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) that restrict where and how Florida-registered vessels can harvest Florida pompano in federal waters. Daniels argued that federal law preempts state regulations affecting fishing in federal waters and that Florida’s regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause by only restricting Florida-registered vessels.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment for the FWC, concluding that Florida’s regulations do not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause. The court also determined that Daniels lacked standing to sue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Daniels has standing to sue because he faces a credible threat of prosecution under Florida’s regulations, which affects his commercial fishing activities. The court found that Daniels’s injury is directly traceable to Florida’s regulations and can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.On the merits, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act does not preempt Florida’s regulations. The court reasoned that the Act allows states to regulate fishing vessels registered under their laws in federal waters when there is no federal fishery management plan or regulations in place. The court also held that Florida’s regulations do not violate the Equal Protection Clause because they are rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of conserving and managing pompano stock, and the regulations only apply to Florida-registered vessels, which are within the state’s jurisdiction.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, upholding Florida’s pompano regulations. View "Daniels v. Executive Director of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission" on Justia Law

GBSB Holding, LLC (GBSB) is the developer of Baker 80, a proposed subdivision adjacent to Whitefish Hills Village (WHV) in Flathead County. GBSB sought to use WHV roads as the primary access to Baker 80, which was opposed by Flathead County, Whitefish Village, LLC, and the WHV Homeowners Association. GBSB also challenged the abandonment of a portion of Brady Way, a county road within WHV, by Flathead County.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court prohibited GBSB from using WHV roads as the primary access to Baker 80. The court concluded that the public access easements on WHV roads did not include primary access for Baker 80 residents. Additionally, the court found that Flathead County did not exceed its jurisdiction in abandoning a portion of Brady Way.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the public access easements on WHV roads were easements in gross, benefiting the public at large and not specifically Baker 80 residents. The court determined that the scope of the public access easements did not extend to primary access for Baker 80. The court also upheld the District Court's conclusion that Flathead County did not exceed its jurisdiction in abandoning a portion of Brady Way, as the abandonment process complied with statutory requirements and substantial evidence supported the Board's decision. View "GBSB Holding v. Flathead County" on Justia Law

Three states challenged an executive order issued by President Joseph R. Biden, which mandated that federal contractors pay their workers a minimum hourly wage of $15. The states argued that the President exceeded his authority under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (FPASA) and that the order violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the nondelegation doctrine. The district court for the Southern District of Texas agreed with the states, finding that the FPASA did not grant the President broad authority to set minimum wages for federal contractors and that the executive order was a major question beyond the President's authority. The court permanently enjoined the executive order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court examined whether the executive order was a permissible exercise of the President's authority under the FPASA. The court found that the FPASA's language was clear and unambiguous, granting the President broad authority to prescribe policies necessary to carry out the Act's provisions, as long as those policies were consistent with the Act. The court determined that the executive order met these requirements, as it aimed to promote economy and efficiency in federal procurement by ensuring contractors paid their workers adequately.The Fifth Circuit also addressed the application of the major questions doctrine, concluding that it did not apply in this case because the FPASA's text was clear and unambiguous. The court noted that the President's exercise of proprietary authority in managing federal contracts did not raise a major question requiring clear congressional authorization. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's permanent injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State of Texas v. Trump" on Justia Law

The Providence Retired Police and Firefighter’s Association (the Association) sought a declaratory judgment against the City of Providence (the city) regarding entitlement to occupational cancer disability benefits under Rhode Island General Laws chapter 19.1 of title 45, “Cancer Benefits for Fire Fighters.” The Association argued that its retired members were entitled to these benefits under the state law, while the city contended that benefits should be processed under a local ordinance.The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Association, concluding that the state law applied to all firefighters, including those retired from the Providence Fire Department, regardless of the city's participation in the Municipal Employees Retirement System (MERS). The court relied on the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in City of East Providence v. International Association of Firefighters Local 850, which interpreted the state law to apply broadly to all firefighters.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the Superior Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Providence System, a comprehensive retirement benefits program established by a special legislative act, supersedes the general state statute. The court referenced its prior decision in Betz v. Paolino, which established that special legislative provisions for the Providence System prevail over state statutes of general application. Consequently, the court determined that the city is not required to process applications for occupational cancer benefits under the state law but should follow the local ordinance. The case was remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to enter judgment for the city. View "The Providence Retired Police and Firefighter's Association v. The City of Providence" on Justia Law

The case involves the surviving relatives of Quinn Lucas Schansman, a passenger on Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17), which was shot down over eastern Ukraine by a missile launched from territory controlled by the Russian Federation-backed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR). The plaintiffs allege that Sberbank of Russia PJSC (Sberbank) provided material support to the DPR by facilitating money transfers from donors to the DPR via correspondent accounts in the United States, which they claim proximately caused the downing of MH17.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Sberbank’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint on foreign sovereign immunity grounds. Sberbank argued that it was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) after the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation acquired a majority share in Sberbank. The district court found that Sberbank was presumptively immune under the FSIA but that the commercial activity exception applied, as the claims were based on commercial activities carried out in the United States.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that Sberbank is presumptively immune under the FSIA due to its majority ownership by the Russian Ministry of Finance. However, the court also held that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception applies to Sberbank’s conduct, as the alleged claims are based on commercial activities—facilitating money transfers—carried out in the United States. Additionally, the court held that the ATA’s immunity provisions apply to instrumentalities of foreign states and that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception applies equally to actions brought under the ATA. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schansman v. Sberbank" on Justia Law

The City of East Lansing entered into an agreement with the Lansing Board of Water and Light (LBWL) in 2016, which included a franchise fee to be charged to LBWL consumers residing within the City. The fee was collected by LBWL and remitted to the City. Plaintiff James Heos, representing a class of LBWL consumers, filed a complaint against the City, alleging that the franchise fee was an illegal tax under the Michigan Constitution's Headlee Amendment and other state laws.The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the plaintiff on most counts, ruling that the franchise fee was an illegal tax. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed this decision, directing the trial court to grant summary disposition in favor of the City, concluding that the plaintiff was not a taxpayer and thus his claim was time-barred.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the franchise fee was indeed a tax because it was used for general revenue-raising purposes, was not proportionate to any costs incurred by the City, and was not voluntary. The Court further held that the plaintiff was a taxpayer because the legal incidence of the fee fell on the LBWL consumers, not LBWL itself. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiff to pursue his Headlee Amendment claim. View "Heos v. City Of East Lansing" on Justia Law

William A., a dyslexic student, graduated from high school with a 3.4 GPA but was unable to read. His parents filed a complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), claiming the school failed to provide him with a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The school had developed an individualized education plan (IEP) for William, which included language therapy and one-on-one instruction, but he made no progress in reading fluency throughout middle and high school. His parents eventually arranged for private tutoring, which helped him make some progress.An administrative law judge (ALJ) held a due-process hearing and found that the school had violated William's right to a FAPE under the IDEA. The ALJ ordered the school to provide 888 hours of dyslexia tutoring. William's parents then sought an order in federal court for the tutoring to be provided by a specific tutor, Dr. McAfee. The school counterclaimed, seeking reversal of the ALJ's order. The district court, applying a "modified de novo" standard of review, affirmed the ALJ's findings and ordered the same relief but denied the request for Dr. McAfee specifically.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the school had not provided William with a FAPE, as his IEPs focused on fluency rather than foundational reading skills necessary for him to learn to read. The court noted that William's accommodations masked his inability to read rather than addressing it. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the school failed to provide an education tailored to William's unique needs, as required by the IDEA. View "William A. v. Clarksville-Montgomery County School System" on Justia Law

Rhonda Fleming, an inmate at Federal Correctional Institution Tallahassee (FCIT), filed a pro se lawsuit against Warden Erica Strong and the United States, alleging Eighth Amendment violations due to her exposure to mold, asbestos, and COVID-19, which she claimed caused severe health issues. Fleming sought injunctive relief and damages under Bivens and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). She alleged that despite her complaints, the prison officials, including Warden Strong, failed to address the hazardous conditions, leading to her contracting COVID-19 twice and requiring hospitalization.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida partially granted and partially denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing most of Fleming's claims, including all claims against Strong, citing that Bivens did not provide a remedy for her Eighth Amendment claim. However, the district court disagreed, finding that Fleming's Eighth Amendment claim was similar to a previously recognized Bivens claim and allowed it to proceed. The district court did not address the issue of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court had to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from the district court's order recognizing a Bivens cause of action. The Eleventh Circuit joined four other circuits in holding that the collateral-order doctrine does not extend to Bivens-extension orders that do not address qualified immunity. The court emphasized that qualified immunity adequately protects government officials from the burdens of litigation and that separation-of-powers concerns with Bivens extensions do not justify immediate appeal. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fleming v. FCI Tallahassee Warden" on Justia Law