Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

During the Second World War, Chevron’s corporate predecessor operated oil fields in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, producing crude oil that was refined into aviation gasoline (avgas) for the United States military under federal contracts. Decades later, following the enactment of Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978, which imposed permit requirements on certain uses of the coastal zone but exempted uses lawfully commenced before 1980, Plaquemines Parish and other parishes brought suit in state court. They alleged that Chevron and other oil companies had failed to obtain required permits and that some pre-1980 activities, including those during the war, were illegally commenced and not exempt.The parish’s expert report specifically challenged Chevron’s wartime crude-oil production methods, including its use of vertical drilling, canals, and earthen pits, as harmful to the environment and not in compliance with the Act. Chevron sought removal to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1), arguing that the suit was “for or relating to” acts under color of its duties as a federal contractor refining avgas. The United States District Court granted the parish’s motion to remand to state court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that although Chevron acted under a federal officer as a military contractor, the suit did not “relate to” those acts because the federal refining contract did not govern how Chevron obtained or produced crude oil.The Supreme Court of the United States held that Chevron plausibly alleged a close, not tenuous or remote, relationship between the challenged crude-oil production and its federal avgas refining duties. The Court concluded that the suit satisfied the “relating to” requirement for removal under §1442(a)(1), vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization representing manufactured home community owners and a mobilehome park owner challenged the City of Santa Rosa’s enforcement of California Penal Code section 396 during a multi-year wildfire state of emergency. Section 396 prohibits increasing the rental price of mobilehome spaces by more than 10 percent during a declared emergency. The plaintiffs argued that, under Santa Rosa’s rent control ordinance, park owners should be able to impose annual increases according to the ordinance’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) formula, even if those increases cumulatively exceeded the 10 percent cap in section 396. Alternatively, they sought to “reset” post-emergency rents as if the suppressed CPI increases during the emergency had been implemented.The Sonoma County Superior Court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment and granted the City’s, finding that section 396’s 10 percent cap was fixed at the rent authorized when the emergency began and that owners could not recoup lost increases after the emergency ended. The court reasoned that allowing such recoupment would defeat the statute’s purpose to protect consumers from excessive rent hikes during emergencies. The court entered judgment for the City after the plaintiffs’ third cause of action was dismissed by stipulation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that section 396’s cap applies to the rent authorized at the start of the emergency and lasts for its duration, regardless of local rent control provisions. The court further ruled that nothing in section 396 or the local ordinance entitles park owners to recoup suppressed rent increases once the emergency ends. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the City and awarded costs to the City. View "Western Manufactured Housing Cmty. Assn. v. City of Santa Rosa" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on how to calculate state tax credits for a municipal utility’s natural gas production. The Municipality of Anchorage owned a one-third interest in a Cook Inlet gas field and used most of its gas to generate electricity for its residents, selling only a small fraction to third parties. Alaska law taxes natural gas production but allows producers to claim tax credits based on production costs. A special statute for municipal producers required the Municipality to pay taxes only on the gas it sold to others, but also provided that it was eligible for tax credits “to the same extent as any other producer.” The Municipality sought tax credits by offsetting the costs of producing all its gas—including gas used for its own utility—against the relatively small amount of gas it actually paid taxes on, resulting in large credits.The Alaska Department of Revenue rejected this calculation, determining that tax credits should be based on the value of all gas produced, as defined by the general tax statutes, rather than only the gas actually taxed under the municipal exception. The Department awarded the Municipality much smaller tax credits. The Municipality challenged this decision. An administrative law judge and the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, affirmed the Department’s interpretation, finding it reasonable and not in conflict with applicable statutes or procedures.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that the legislature intended municipal gas producers’ tax credits to be calculated according to the value of all gas defined as taxable under the general statutes, not merely the gas actually taxed due to the municipal exception. The court also held that the Department was not required to adopt a formal regulation to implement this interpretation, as it was foreseeable and not a substantive change in policy. The superior court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Municipality of Anchorage, formerly v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

This case involves a challenge to the District of Columbia Public Service Commission’s approval of Potomac Electric Power Company’s (Pepco) 2024–2026 multi-year electric rate plan. The petitioners, the Office of the People’s Counsel and the Apartment and Office Building Association, objected to the Commission’s decision to approve a $123.4 million rate increase following a “legislative-style” hearing that did not permit the presentation or cross-examination of witnesses. The petitioners argued that the process failed to address significant factual disputes, particularly concerning the Effective Rate Adjustment (ERA) and Bill Stabilization Adjustment (BSA), mechanisms affecting rates for large commercial customers. They maintained that an evidentiary hearing was required to resolve these factual disagreements.The Public Service Commission, after receiving written testimony and briefs, denied requests for an evidentiary hearing and approved Pepco’s rate plan with modifications. It concluded that there were no material factual disputes necessitating cross-examination or oral testimony, and thus a legislative-style hearing was sufficient. The Commission also rejected applications for reconsideration, reiterating its view that the contested issues were either legal or policy-based rather than factual. However, there were substantial discrepancies between the parties’ calculations regarding the BSA deferral balances and concerns about the ERA’s impact on certain customer classes.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that this proceeding was a “contested case” under the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act and that the Commission was required to hold an evidentiary, trial-type hearing because there were genuine disputes over material facts. The court held that the Commission’s failure to provide such a hearing rendered its orders unsustainable. Accordingly, the court vacated the Commission’s orders and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the Commission to hold an evidentiary hearing. View "Office of the People's Counsel v. District of Columbia Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

The case concerns the termination of the General Counsel of the District of Columbia Retirement Board (DCRB), who had served in that role for nearly fourteen years. Following an internal investigation in 2021–2022, DCRB found that the General Counsel had failed to properly investigate and disclose conflict-of-interest allegations about a prior Executive Director. Based on these findings, DCRB initiated removal proceedings, ultimately deciding to terminate the General Counsel. The termination notice advised her of her right to appeal to the Office of Employee Appeals (OEA), where she argued, among other things, that her removal violated a regulatory “ninety-day rule.”Before OEA, the General Counsel claimed that she was a Career Service employee, which would entitle her to removal protections and OEA review. DCRB did not contest this characterization before OEA. OEA found in her favor and ordered her reinstatement, concluding that DCRB had violated the ninety-day rule. DCRB then petitioned the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for review, newly contending that the General Counsel was not in the Career Service but instead was a Senior Executive Attorney in the Legal Service—a category of at-will employees not entitled to OEA review or removal protections. The Superior Court found factual disputes regarding her employment status and remanded the case to OEA to determine its jurisdiction.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the statutory provisions governing DCRB and the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act unambiguously classified the General Counsel as a Senior Executive Attorney in the Legal Service, making her an at-will employee not entitled to OEA review. The court concluded that the Superior Court committed clear error by remanding for factual findings on this question. Accordingly, it reversed the Superior Court’s order and directed that Ms. Sampson’s OEA appeal be dismissed. View "District of Columbia Retirement Board v. Office of Employee Appeals" on Justia Law

A police officer employed by the Metropolitan Police Department experienced a data breach that exposed sensitive information of numerous employees. In response, the officer filed a putative class action in Superior Court for the District of Columbia, naming the District, certain government entities, and several private technology contractors as defendants. The complaint alleged that the defendants failed to safeguard employees’ data.During the proceedings, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed certain contractor defendants without prejudice, leaving the government defendants and a few contractors. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted the District’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the Metropolitan Police Department and the Office of the Chief Technology Officer could not be sued as unincorporated government bodies, and that sovereign immunity barred the claims against the District. The plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Subsequently, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed without prejudice the remaining private contractor defendants and asked the Superior Court to close the case. The Superior Court closed the case, prompting the plaintiff to appeal both the dismissal of her claims against the District and the denial of reconsideration.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that because the plaintiff dismissed her claims against the final contractor defendants without prejudice, the trial court’s order was not final as to all parties and claims. The court explained that dismissals without prejudice do not resolve the merits and thus do not confer appellate jurisdiction, except in rare circumstances. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the order below was not a final, appealable order. View "Moore v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Eighteen transgender women incarcerated in federal women’s prisons challenged a federal executive order that directed the Attorney General to ensure that “males”—defined by biological sex assigned at conception—are not detained in women’s facilities. These plaintiffs were a small group of transgender women whom the Bureau of Prisons had, after individualized assessments, placed in women’s facilities. Each had been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, received long-term hormone therapy, and some had undergone gender-affirming surgeries. The plaintiffs alleged that transferring them to men’s prisons would expose them to grave risks of violence, abuse, and psychological harm.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the plaintiffs preliminary injunctive relief, blocking their transfers and requiring the government to maintain their housing in women’s facilities. The district court found that transgender women are at a significantly higher risk of harm in men’s facilities and that the government was aware of these risks. The court also rejected government arguments that judicial review was barred or that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, holding instead that no effective administrative remedy was available.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that judicial review of constitutional claims was not barred by statute and that the government had not shown exhaustion of available administrative remedies. However, the court vacated the preliminary injunctions, finding that the district court’s broad, categorical reasoning was not defended by the plaintiffs on appeal, who instead advanced more individualized grounds. The record did not contain the necessary factual findings as to each plaintiff’s specific vulnerabilities. The case was remanded for further proceedings, and the expired injunctions were dismissed as moot. View "Doe v. Blanche" on Justia Law

KC Transport, an independent trucking company, provides hauling services for mining and other companies. It operates a maintenance facility for its haul trucks about a mile from one of its primary client’s active mines. During an inspection, a Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) inspector observed two KC Transport trucks at the facility undergoing maintenance in conditions that violated federal safety standards—specifically, the trucks were raised and unblocked, with one worker standing underneath. The inspector issued citations for these violations.In an administrative proceeding, KC Transport contested the citations, arguing that MSHA lacked jurisdiction over its facility and trucks since they were not located at an extraction site or on an appurtenant road. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that MSHA had jurisdiction, reasoning that the facility and trucks were “used in” mining-related activities and thus constituted a “mine” under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act. KC Transport appealed, and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission reversed the ALJ, holding that only facilities or equipment located at extraction sites or appurtenant roads qualify as “mines” under the Act and vacated the citations.The Secretary of Labor, acting through MSHA, petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review. After an intervening Supreme Court decision overruled Chevron deference, the D.C. Circuit independently interpreted the relevant statutory provisions. The court held that a “facility” constitutes a “mine” under the Mine Act when it is necessarily connected with the use and operation of extracting, milling, or processing minerals, even if not located directly at an extraction site or appurtenant road. Concluding that KC Transport’s facility met this definition, the court vacated the Commission’s decision and affirmed the Secretary’s citations. View "Secretary of Labor v. KC Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

A state environmental agency received a broad public records request from a nonprofit organization seeking documents related to a recent assessment on ethylene oxide. The agency responded the next day, asking the organization to clarify whether it wanted confidential information, which would require a formal opinion from the state attorney general and could delay production. The requester promptly confirmed it sought all responsive records, including any considered confidential but subject to disclosure under the public records law. The agency believed many documents were exempt under a deliberative-process exception and, within what it believed to be the deadline, sent a request to the attorney general for a ruling. The attorney general later determined that the agency had missed the ten-business-day deadline by two days, so the information was presumed public unless there was a compelling reason to withhold it.The agency then provided additional evidence that it was closed on July 5 due to the Independence Day holiday, that its request was timely mailed, and that it had sought clarification from the requester. Nonetheless, the Attorney General declined to reconsider. The agency filed a declaratory judgment action in district court, and the nonprofit intervened, seeking to compel disclosure. The Office of the Attorney General later conceded its original calculation was mistaken, but the district court granted summary judgment for the nonprofit, ordering disclosure of over 6,000 pages. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, holding the request for a ruling was untimely and rejecting the agency’s arguments about deadlines and clarifications.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the ten-business-day deadline for the agency’s request was reset by its timely, good-faith request for narrowing or clarification, and that the agency established timely submission of its request under the mailbox rule. It reversed the judgments below and remanded for further proceedings to determine if the deliberative-process privilege protects the records. View "TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY v. PAXTON" on Justia Law

This case arose after the City of Davenport settled three harassment claims with city employees for approximately $1.9 million. The settlements were publicly approved by the city council in December 2023, but there were allegations suggesting that the agreements were reached before the November 2023 city election and were intentionally announced afterward. The Iowa Auditor of State initiated a reaudit focusing on these settlements and issued a subpoena to the City requesting documents, including minutes and recordings of closed city council sessions. The City provided some documents but withheld others, citing attorney–client privilege and the attorney work-product privilege, and sought to modify the subpoena in Scott County District Court.The Iowa District Court for Scott County reviewed the matter and initially ordered the City to produce the closed-session materials for in camera review to determine if they constituted attorney work product. In a subsequent order, the court held that while the Auditor could not access attorney work product, Iowa law did permit access to attorney–client privileged communications, as the statutory exceptions did not explicitly include such privilege. The court planned an evidentiary hearing to clarify relevance but confirmed its intent to review the materials in camera, potentially granting the Auditor access to attorney–client privileged communications.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. The Court held that the attorney–client privilege is a longstanding protection under Iowa law and is not displaced by the statutory provisions governing the Auditor’s subpoena power, which do not expressly override the privilege. The Court concluded that the attorney–client privilege limits the Auditor’s access to materials, just as it does for other investigative bodies. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "City of Davenport v. Office of Auditor of State of Iowa" on Justia Law