Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A provider of energy efficient resources (EERs), which are projects that reduce electrical consumption, challenged a decision by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approving a change to PJM Interconnection LLC’s tariff. PJM manages the electrical grid in parts of thirteen states and the District of Columbia, and it operates capacity auctions to ensure reliable electricity supply. Historically, EERs were allowed to bid in these auctions for up to four consecutive years to compensate for a lag in PJM’s statistical model (load forecast), which previously did not account for new EERs’ impact on energy consumption. In 2016, PJM updated its model to capture these effects in real time, removing the need for EERs to participate in the auctions.In 2024, PJM proposed a tariff amendment to exclude EERs from future capacity auctions, citing the improved accuracy of its load forecast and the unnecessary costs imposed on consumers by double-counting EERs’ effects. FERC approved this amendment, finding it would lower costs for consumers without compromising grid reliability. Affirmed Energy LLC, an EER aggregator, protested, arguing that the amendment was unlawfully retroactive and arbitrary and capricious, as it would disrupt settled expectations and reliance interests, particularly for projects that had already cleared prior auctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that FERC’s orders were not retroactive because they only applied to future auctions and did not strip EER providers of entitlements to past payments or auction results. The court also found that FERC had reasonably evaluated PJM’s updated forecast, weighed the reliance interests at stake, and explained why the amendment was justified. The petition for review was denied. View "Affirmed Energy, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

Several pharmaceutical manufacturers and a trade association challenged a Louisiana statute, Act 358, which restricts drug manufacturers from interfering with the delivery of federally discounted drugs through contract pharmacies. The statute was passed in response to manufacturers’ efforts to limit the distribution of discounted drugs under the federal 340B Program, particularly through arrangements with contract pharmacies serving vulnerable populations. The plaintiffs argued that the Louisiana law was preempted by federal law and violated several constitutional provisions, including the Takings Clause, the Contracts Clause, and the Due Process Clause’s prohibition on vagueness.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana considered three related cases together. It denied the manufacturers’ motions for summary judgment and instead granted summary judgment for the State of Louisiana and the Louisiana Primary Care Association (LPCA) on all claims. The district court also allowed LPCA to intervene in each case, over the objection of one plaintiff.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Act 358 is not preempted by federal law. It found that the federal 340B statute does not occupy the field of pharmacy regulation and does not conflict with or frustrate federal objectives, as it is silent on the use of contract pharmacies and leaves room for state regulation. The court also concluded that Act 358 does not effect a physical or regulatory taking, does not substantially impair contract rights under the Contracts Clause, and is not unconstitutionally vague. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s order permitting LPCA to intervene in AbbVie’s case, finding that LPCA’s interests were adequately represented by the State and it did not show it would present a distinct defense. The court affirmed summary judgment for Louisiana on all claims. View "AstraZeneca v. Murrill" on Justia Law

After President Donald J. Trump began his second term, he issued two executive orders requiring federal agencies to end “diversity, equity, and inclusion” (DEI) programs in their grant and contracting processes. These directives included provisions for agencies to terminate DEI-related offices, positions, and funding (“Termination Provision”); to require federal grantees and contractors to certify compliance with anti-discrimination laws and the absence of DEI programs that violate those laws (“Certification Provision”); and to prepare a report on steps to deter illegal DEI programs (“Enforcement Threat Provision”). The plaintiffs—a city government and two organizations involved in higher education and academic advocacy—alleged that these provisions violated their constitutional rights and sought a preliminary injunction to halt their enforcement.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland found the plaintiffs likely to succeed on their constitutional claims and issued a nationwide preliminary injunction against most of the challenged provisions, except for the preparation of the enforcement report. The defendants appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted a stay of the injunction pending appeal. The plaintiffs later sought to have the injunction vacated so they could amend their complaint, but the district court denied this request.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Enforcement Threat Provision because their alleged injuries were too speculative and intertwined with intra-governmental processes. However, the court found the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Termination and Certification Provisions because these provisions resulted in concrete and imminent injuries, such as loss of funding or compelled changes in organizational activities.On the merits, the Fourth Circuit concluded the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their facial constitutional challenges. The court ruled that the Termination Provision was not unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment, and that the Certification Provision did not violate the First Amendment on its face. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Natl. Assoc. of Diversity Officers in Higher Edu. v. Trump" on Justia Law

Several organizations and individuals petitioned to prevent the Idaho State Tax Commission from implementing a newly enacted parental choice tax credit. This tax credit, established in 2025, provides refundable credits to parents, guardians, and foster parents for certain private educational expenses, including private school tuition and related services, for dependent students not enrolled in public schools. The law caps total annual credits and includes prioritization based on income and previous participation. The petitioners, including advocacy groups, a school district, and parents, argued that the statute creates a separate, non-public education system funded by public resources, allegedly violating the Idaho Constitution’s mandate for a single, general, uniform, and thorough system of public schools. They also claimed the statute failed the “public purpose doctrine,” asserting it primarily benefits private rather than public interests.Before the Idaho Supreme Court, the petitioners sought a writ of prohibition, which would prevent the Tax Commission from carrying out the law. The respondents, including the State and the Idaho Legislature, contested the petitioners’ standing and the merits of the constitutional claims. The Supreme Court determined that the petitioners lacked traditional standing but, given the urgency and importance of the constitutional question and the absence of another suitable challenger, relaxed standing requirements to address the merits.The Supreme Court of Idaho denied the petition. It held that Article IX, section 1 of the Idaho Constitution does not restrict the legislature from enacting educational measures beyond the required public school system, so long as the public system remains intact and constitutionally sufficient. The Court also found that the tax credit serves a legitimate public purpose—supporting parental choice in education—even if private entities benefit. The petition was dismissed, and the Tax Commission was awarded attorney fees and costs. View "Committee to Protect and Preserve v. State" on Justia Law

Several trusts owned by the Garaas family hold mineral interests in McKenzie County, North Dakota. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. operates a well on these lands, which are subject to two distinct spacing units created by orders of the North Dakota Industrial Commission (NDIC): a base unit and an overlapping unit. NDIC issued an order allocating production from the well in the overlapping unit to Section 20, which is part of the base unit but not wholly contained within the overlapping unit. This allocation reduced the Trusts’ royalty interests, prompting them to seek declaratory relief and damages.The Trusts first brought their claims in the District Court of McKenzie County, but the court dismissed the case. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Trusts were required to exhaust administrative remedies before the NDIC. Subsequently, Petro-Hunt applied to NDIC for clarification on production allocation, and NDIC issued Order No. 33453, allocating production from the overlapping unit to the base unit. The Trusts appealed NDIC’s order to the district court, which affirmed NDIC’s order. The Trusts then appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that NDIC had legal authority under statute to allocate oil and gas production among spacing units. However, the court concluded that NDIC did not regularly pursue its authority because it failed to follow proper procedures, including providing notice and opportunity to participate to all affected interest owners. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and vacated NDIC Order No. 33453. The request for attorney’s fees by the Trusts was denied, as the record did not show NDIC acted without substantial justification. View "Garaas v. NDIC" on Justia Law

Several health care facilities and their affiliates faced administrative complaints from the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in 2012 for alleged unfair labor practices. The proceedings were assigned to Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Kenneth Chu, who developed the factual record over multiple hearings. During this period, the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning invalidated certain NLRB Board appointments, calling into question ALJ Chu’s own appointment. The Board later “ratified” prior actions, including Chu’s appointment, after regaining a lawful quorum. Administrative proceedings were delayed for several years due to interlocutory appeals and COVID-19, and ultimately resumed in 2023. Shortly before resumption, the plaintiffs sought to halt the proceedings, arguing the ALJ was unlawfully appointed and protected from removal in a manner unconstitutional under the separation of powers.The plaintiffs initially sought relief in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which denied a temporary restraining order and transferred the case to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. There, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, again raising constitutional arguments regarding the ALJ’s appointment and removal protections. The District of Connecticut denied the injunction, finding the plaintiffs had not shown a clear likelihood of success on the merits. Proceedings before ALJ Chu concluded in May 2024, after which Chu retired and the NLRB Board assumed de novo review of the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the appeal. It assumed jurisdiction but declined to address the likelihood of success on the merits, instead affirming the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction on the ground that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate irreparable harm. The court held that, because all proceedings before the challenged ALJ had concluded and the Board (now lawfully constituted) would conduct de novo review, there was no risk of irreparable injury warranting injunctive relief. The order was affirmed. View "Care One, LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

A.B., a 42-year-old individual with a longstanding diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, had been receiving mental health services in San Francisco since 2008, including numerous psychiatric hospitalizations and crisis interventions. He was previously under conservatorship, which ensured compliance with medication, but historically disengaged from treatment and decompensated when conservatorship ended. In October 2023, following a psychiatric incident at home involving paranoia and disruptive behavior, A.B. was hospitalized. His mother, who provided housing, testified to his history of aggression and repeated decompensation when not medicated, stating she would not allow him to live with her absent a conservatorship and mandatory medication order.The San Francisco County Superior Court initially appointed the public conservator and imposed an involuntary medication order. After a mistrial in April 2023, the parties resolved the matter by conservatorship without a medication order, but following further decompensation, the conservator sought renewal with an involuntary medication order. At the 2025 court trial, testimony from A.B.’s mother and treating psychiatrist indicated that A.B. lacked insight into his illness, would not reliably take medication without a legal mandate, and was unable to maintain shelter independently. Although A.B. testified that he now recognized his diagnosis and would comply with medication, the court credited the testimony of his mother and psychiatrist over his own.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings that A.B. was presently gravely disabled due to his mental disorder and unable to provide for his own shelter without medication, which he would not take absent a court order. The appellate court also affirmed the finding that A.B. was incompetent to give or withhold informed consent for psychotropic medication. The orders renewing the conservatorship and involuntary medication were affirmed. View "Conservatorship of A.B." on Justia Law

Over three hundred restaurants and businesses applied for grants from the Restaurant Revitalization Fund (RRF), a program established by Congress in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and administered by the Small Business Administration (SBA). The plaintiffs submitted their applications on the first day the portal opened, but did not receive grants before the RRF funds were exhausted. They alleged that the SBA improperly awarded grants to later applicants instead of following the statutory requirement to award grants in the order applications were received.The United States Court of Federal Claims considered the plaintiffs’ complaint seeking damages equivalent to the unpaid grants. The Government moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act and for failure to state a claim, arguing that the RRF statute did not mandate payment and that Congress imposed a cap on liability. The Court of Federal Claims denied the motion, holding that the RRF statute’s language was money-mandating, thus conferring jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, and that there was no clear statutory cap limiting the Government’s liability for the grants. The court certified its decision for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that the RRF statute was money-mandating due to its mandatory “shall award” language and the retrospective nature of the grant calculation. The court further determined that the statutory appropriation language was ambiguous and did not impose a clear cap limiting the Government’s liability. As a result, the plaintiffs’ claims fell within Tucker Act jurisdiction, and they had sufficiently stated a claim for relief. The decision of the Court of Federal Claims was affirmed. View "112 GENESEE STREET, LLC v. US " on Justia Law

Three children attending a government-owned daycare center at Robins Air Force Base in Georgia suffered physical and emotional abuse at the hands of two childcare workers. The children’s parents, who had entrusted them to the Center and paid for their care, alleged that the government had provided assurances of safety and had adopted formal criteria to prevent and respond to child abuse. The parents claimed that the Center’s director failed to report the abuse to authorities and that the government breached its duty to protect the children.The parents brought suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, alleging negligence in failing to protect the children. The government moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by the FTCA’s intentional tort exception, which preserves sovereign immunity for claims arising out of certain intentional torts, including assault and battery. The district court agreed, finding that the parents’ claims were dependent on the employment status of the abusers and thus fell within the exception. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied the parents’ motion to amend, reasoning that amendment would be futile.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the FTCA’s intentional tort exception did not apply because the government’s duty to care for and protect the children was independent of the employment status of the abusers. The court vacated the district court’s dismissal and denial of leave to amend, and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to consider whether the parents had stated a claim for relief. View "John Doe, 1 v. USA" on Justia Law

Two children were placed in the temporary custody of the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) by the Family Court in 2018. The Family Court determined that Newport and Cumberland were responsible municipalities for the children’s education, as they were the residences of the custodial parents. DCYF placed the children in residential treatment facilities where they received general education services, but not special education services.DCYF requested orders from the Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education that Newport and Cumberland reimburse DCYF for education costs at the per-pupil special-education rate. The commissioner agreed and ordered the municipalities to pay at that rate. Both municipalities appealed to the Council on Elementary and Secondary Education, which denied their appeals. The municipalities then appealed to the Rhode Island Superior Court under the Administrative Procedures Act. The Superior Court consolidated the cases and found that the statute required the municipalities to pay their share of educational costs, but not at the special-education rate unless special education services were provided. The trial justice also held that, even after statutory amendments removed references to general education, the municipalities were still responsible for the per-pupil general-education rate for children not receiving special education.On review, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island considered whether the municipalities were obligated to pay the general-education rate after the statutory reference to general education was removed. The Court held that the plain language of the statute only requires reimbursement for special education costs and does not obligate municipalities to pay for general education where no special education services are provided. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Superior Court. View "Newport School Committee v. Rhode Island Department of Education" on Justia Law