Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Two companies that operate app-based delivery platforms challenged a Seattle ordinance enacted in 2023, which aims to protect gig economy workers from unwarranted account deactivations. The law requires “network companies” to provide workers with written deactivation policies and mandates that these policies be “reasonably related” to the companies’ safe and efficient operations. The ordinance also delineates examples of impermissible deactivation grounds, such as those based solely on customer ratings or certain background checks. The companies did not contest the general bar on unwarranted deactivations but argued that the notice and deactivation policy requirements violate the First Amendment and that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, the companies sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the ordinance from taking effect. The district court denied their motion. It found that the ordinance regulates conduct (the act of deactivating accounts) rather than speech, and that any impact on expression is incidental. The court also concluded that the use of “reasonable” in the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague, pointing to statutory context and specific examples for guidance.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. The court held that the ordinance regulates nonexpressive conduct, not speech, and thus does not trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Alternatively, if the ordinance were seen as regulating speech, that speech would be commercial in nature, and the law would satisfy the lower level of scrutiny applicable to compelled factual commercial disclosures. The court further held that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague, as it provides adequate notice of what is prohibited. The disposition by the Ninth Circuit was to affirm the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. View "MAPLEBEAR INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

The case concerns injuries suffered by two individuals, one in New York and one in Pennsylvania, each struck by buses operated by New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit), a public transportation entity created by the New Jersey Legislature. NJ Transit operates as a “body corporate and politic” with significant powers such as suing and being sued, entering contracts, and raising funds. Its founding statute specifies that debts or liabilities of NJ Transit are not debts of the State of New Jersey, and all expenses must be paid from NJ Transit’s own funds. The State retains substantial control over NJ Transit through board appointments and removal powers, veto authority, and some legislative oversight, but the statute also stresses NJ Transit’s operational independence.After the incidents, the injured parties filed negligence lawsuits against NJ Transit in their home state courts. NJ Transit moved to dismiss both suits, arguing it was an arm of New Jersey and thus entitled to sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals of New York concluded that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey, allowing the New York suit to proceed. Conversely, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that NJ Transit is an arm of New Jersey and dismissed the Pennsylvania suit.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed both cases to resolve the conflict. It held that NJ Transit is not an arm of the State of New Jersey and therefore does not share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity. The Court emphasized that NJ Transit’s status as a legally separate corporation, responsible for its own debts and judgments, and the absence of formal state liability for its obligations, are decisive. The Court affirmed the New York decision, reversed the Pennsylvania decision, and remanded both cases for further proceedings. View "Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp." on Justia Law

A commercial air tour operator, who had previously conducted flights over Bandelier National Monument under interim authority, challenged a final order issued by the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Park Service. This order established an Air Tour Management Plan (ATMP) for Bandelier National Monument, prohibiting all commercial air tours over the site. The agencies’ process included public comment, environmental assessment, and extensive consultation with Native American tribes, who strongly objected to air tours due to cultural and privacy concerns. The operator argued that his flights were minimally intrusive, carefully routed, and brief, and that banning them would negatively impact safety and his business.The agencies initially considered various alternatives, including allowing limited air tours or maintaining previous operations, but ultimately concluded that any commercial air tour flights would create unacceptable impacts to Bandelier’s natural and cultural resources and visitor experience. The agencies’ environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) found no significant impacts for NEPA purposes, but their record of decision emphasized significant adverse impacts to tribal cultural resources under the National Parks Air Tour Management Act (NPATMA).Upon petition for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard and de novo for statutory interpretation, as required by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that NPATMA and NEPA use different significance standards, and that the agency’s path to finding significant adverse impacts under NPATMA was reasonably discernible in the record. The court also rejected the petitioner’s additional statutory and constitutional challenges, finding them either unexhausted or inadequately briefed. The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Adams v. FAA" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge brought by an environmental non-profit against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) relating to the agency’s 2016 national recommendations for allowable cadmium levels in water. The EPA, as required by the Clean Water Act (CWA), periodically issues nonbinding criteria for water pollutants, which states typically adopt as standards for their own waters. In 2016, the EPA updated its cadmium recommendations but did so without consulting the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service, as mandated under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) for actions that may affect protected species.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona found that the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) had standing to challenge the EPA’s failure to consult. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CBD, holding that the EPA’s issuance of the cadmium recommendations constituted “agency action” under the ESA that “may affect” listed species, thus triggering the consultation requirement. The court vacated the less stringent chronic freshwater cadmium recommendation and remanded all four 2016 cadmium recommendations to the EPA for proper consultation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that CBD had Article III standing, finding a concrete injury to its members’ interests in protected species, that the injury was fairly traceable to EPA’s recommendations due to predictable state adoption, and that the injury could be redressed by stricter recommendations resulting from consultation. On the merits, the court concluded that EPA’s publication of nationwide recommendations was “agency action” under the ESA and that such action “may affect” listed species, thus requiring prior consultation with the Services. The district court’s vacatur and remand were affirmed. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

Several cities in Idaho that hold junior ground water rights within the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (ESPA) challenged the methodology used by the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) to determine whether their groundwater pumping caused material injury to senior surface water right holders. The core factual dispute arose after the Director of IDWR issued a Fifth Amended Methodology Order in April 2023, updating the scientific models and data for evaluating material injury, followed by an order predicting a water shortfall for the senior rights holders. The cities requested a hearing, raising concerns about the methodology and specific factual determinations. After the hearing, the Director issued a Post-Hearing Order that modified and affirmed the Fifth Methodology Order and, simultaneously, a Sixth Methodology Order that expressly superseded all prior methodology orders.The cities then filed a petition for judicial review in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) district court, challenging the Director’s Post-Hearing Order. The district court allowed intervention by senior water right holders and, after review, affirmed the Director’s findings and conclusions regarding the methodology and its application. The court found the agency’s factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence and that the Director’s legal standards were proper. The court’s judgment affirmed only the Post-Hearing Order and did not address the subsequently issued Sixth Methodology Order.On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether it had jurisdiction to address the cities’ claims. The Supreme Court held that because the cities failed to petition for judicial review of the operative, currently effective Sixth Methodology Order in the district court, it lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. The court explained that under Idaho law, only the currently operative order may be challenged, and failure to timely appeal the correct order is jurisdictional. The appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and costs were awarded to IDWR and the intervenors. View "City of Idaho Falls v. Idaho Department of Water Resources" on Justia Law

Several individuals and organizations challenged a 2018 regulation issued by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) that classified rifles equipped with bump stocks as illegal machineguns. This rule departed from ATF’s previous position and was prompted by the 2017 Las Vegas shooting, where bump stocks were used to inflict mass casualties. The ATF’s rule gave owners 90 days to destroy or surrender such devices, threatening criminal penalties for noncompliance.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of the rule. The district court denied a preliminary injunction, finding the statutory definition of “machinegun” ambiguous and deferring to the ATF’s interpretation under Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. On appeal, a Sixth Circuit panel disagreed, finding Chevron inapplicable to statutes with criminal penalties and holding the statutory definition unambiguously excluded bump stocks. However, after en banc review, the Sixth Circuit split evenly, resulting in an affirmation of the district court’s denial. Meanwhile, other circuits reached conflicting outcomes, and the Supreme Court ultimately held in Garland v. Cargill that the statutory definition of “machinegun” does not cover bump stocks.Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the district court declared the ATF’s rule unlawful but denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, finding the government’s position “substantially justified” due to significant judicial disagreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed this denial and affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that, while the government’s position was ultimately rejected, it was “substantially justified” given the novel statutory question, the division among courts, and the existence of reasonable arguments supporting the ATF’s interpretation. Thus, attorney’s fees were not awarded. View "Gun Owners of America, Inc. v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) introduced new and revised air traffic procedures in the Southern California Metroplex as part of its Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) initiative in 2016, affecting airports including Los Angeles International Airport. These procedures, specifically the HUULL, IRNMN, and RYDRR routes, relied on satellite navigation and were subject to an environmental review, which concluded there would be no significant noise impacts. In 2018, the FAA amended these procedures, making minor changes to altitude and speed restrictions at certain waypoints, with no changes to flight paths, number of flights, or aircraft types. Only one amended waypoint affected Malibu, and none affected Culver City.Previously, Culver City and other parties challenged the FAA’s 2016 approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which upheld the FAA’s decision. After the 2018 amendments, the City of Los Angeles and Culver City (as intervenor) challenged the FAA’s actions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which found violations of environmental statutes but remanded for further review without vacating the procedures. The FAA then conducted additional environmental consultations and issued a Record of Decision, concluding the amendments qualified for a categorical exclusion from further environmental review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the petitions from Malibu and Culver City regarding the FAA’s 2018 amendments. The court held that only challenges to the 2018 amendments were timely, dismissing any challenge to the original 2016 procedures as untimely. The court determined that neither city demonstrated standing to challenge the 2018 amendments: Malibu’s evidence addressed only the 2016 procedures, and Culver City failed to provide evidence of injury. The petitions were dismissed for lack of standing. View "City of Culver City v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law

Gene Cleveland Battieste, a veteran, underwent surgery at a Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi in 2006. Although he had consented to surgery on certain cervical vertebrae, an additional procedure was performed on his C2 vertebra without his knowledge or consent. Following the surgery, Mr. Battieste experienced post-operative complications, including infection and increased pain. He applied for VA disability benefits in 2008, which were ultimately approved in 2020. The 2020 decision by the VA Board of Veterans’ Appeals was the first time Mr. Battieste or his family learned of the unauthorized surgery and the VA’s failure to provide proper informed consent or adequate post-operative care. Mr. Battieste died in 2022.In November 2022, the administrator of Mr. Battieste’s estate filed an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which the VA denied. In May 2024, a lawsuit for medical negligence was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The district court dismissed the case, finding that Mississippi’s medical malpractice statute barred any action brought more than seven years after the alleged negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-36(2)’s seven-year period is a statute of repose, not merely a statute of limitations. The court found that Mississippi’s intermediate appellate courts consistently interpret the seven-year provision as an absolute bar to claims, and the statute’s structure and language support this reading. Because the suit was filed more than seven years after the surgery, the court held the claim was time-barred and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Battieste v. United States" on Justia Law

The case centers on a challenge to a provision in the Los Angeles Administrative Code, section 8.33, which grants the mayor special powers upon declaring a “local housing and/or homelessness emergency.” In July 2023, the mayor declared such an emergency, and the city council subsequently renewed it. The emergency declaration was later lifted in November 2025. During the period the declaration was in place, Fix the City, Inc. contended that section 8.33 was invalid because it conflicted with the California Emergency Services Act (CESA) and another provision in the city’s code, arguing that the city had acted illegally during the emergency.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed Fix the City’s claims for writ and declaratory relief, which sought to vacate the emergency declaration and any resulting directives, as well as a declaration that section 8.33 was void for conflicting with CESA and local law. The city responded with a demurrer, asserting that section 8.33 was a proper exercise of municipal authority and did not conflict with CESA or the city’s own code. The superior court agreed, finding that CESA did not apply to charter cities unless there was a clear legislative directive, and that section 8.33 was not inconsistent with other city code provisions. The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and Fix the City appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that CESA does not preempt section 8.33 because the two do not conflict; section 8.33 is a valid exercise of the city’s home rule powers over municipal affairs. Additionally, section 8.33 did not violate other provisions of the city’s administrative code. The denial of leave to amend was also upheld. View "Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a magistrate in the domestic-relations division of a county court, declared her candidacy for a judicial seat alongside a fellow magistrate, who was also a court administrator. During her campaign, the plaintiff distributed literature that criticized her opponent’s work schedule and duties, suggesting that the opponent performed trivial administrative tasks and questioning her competence based on personal circumstances. These campaign materials were perceived by the administrative judge as undermining the integrity of the court and casting both the court and its staff in an unfavorable light. After the plaintiff lost the primary election, the administrative judge terminated her employment as a magistrate.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the plaintiff’s suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which alleged a violation of her First Amendment free-speech rights. The district court ruled that the court itself was not a legally cognizable entity subject to suit, that sovereign immunity barred claims for money damages against the administrative judge in her official capacity, and that the plaintiff failed to state a plausible free-speech claim against the administrative judge. The plaintiff appealed only the dismissal of her free-speech claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. It held that, because the plaintiff occupied a confidential or policymaking position and her campaign speech addressed matters related to court policy and politics in a manner that undermined the loyalty and efficient functioning required by her employer, her termination did not violate the First Amendment. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding that the balancing test usually applied to public employee speech was unnecessary under these circumstances. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s arguments regarding insubordination, the scope of judicial candidate speech protections, and the applicability of strict scrutiny. View "Gaines v. Cross" on Justia Law