Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association, Inc. (MALA) challenging a final rule issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) that seasonally bans vertical buoy lines used in lobster and Jonah crab trap fishing in certain federal waters off Massachusetts from February 1 to April 30 each year. The NMFS issued this rule to protect the endangered North Atlantic right whales from entanglement in these buoy lines during their foraging period.Previously, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled in favor of MALA, holding that the final rule conflicted with a temporary statutory authorization for lobster and Jonah crab fishing contained in a rider to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023. The district court found that the final rule did not fall within the exception provided in the rider, which allowed for actions to extend or make final an emergency rule that was in place on the date of the rider's enactment, December 29, 2022. The court concluded that the 2022 emergency rule was not "in place" on that date because it was not actively preventing fishing in the Wedge area at that time.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the 2022 emergency rule was indeed "in place" on December 29, 2022, for the purposes of the rider's exception. The court reasoned that the emergency rule's findings and authority were still relevant and could serve as a basis for future regulatory actions, such as the final rule. Therefore, the final rule was lawful and enforceable under the exception provided in the rider. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Mass. Lobstermen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv." on Justia Law

Christopher Hamilton was convicted of federal felony possession of child pornography. After a federal district court terminated his federal sex offender registration requirement, the California Attorney General notified him of his lifetime obligation to register under California law, pursuant to Penal Code section 290.005(a). The Attorney General determined that the state law equivalent of Hamilton’s federal offense required lifetime registration, placing him in the highest tier of California’s three-tier scheme.Hamilton petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to terminate his state registration requirement. The Superior Court denied his petition and a subsequent amended motion. Hamilton appealed the denials, arguing violations of equal protection and due process.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the Attorney General’s classification of Hamilton’s offense as a felony with a lifetime registration requirement did not violate equal protection. The court reasoned that the federal offense’s classification as a felony, based on custodial exposure, justified the equivalent state offense’s classification as a felony. Additionally, the court found that the federal offense’s requirement of interstate or foreign commerce provided a rational basis for the different treatment.The court also rejected Hamilton’s due process challenge, concluding that he received notice and had opportunities to contest his tier designation through his petition and amended motion. Lastly, the court dismissed Hamilton’s vagueness challenge, finding that the term “equivalent” in section 290.005(a) was sufficiently clear when considered in context with other statutory provisions.The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court’s orders denying Hamilton’s petition and amended motion. View "People v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Dr. Jabeen N. Abutalib, a physician with the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), sought corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) for alleged retaliatory personnel actions following her Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint. Dr. Abutalib claimed that her EEO complaint, which was settled in January 2020, led to adverse actions including a reduction in pay and reassignment. She filed a whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and subsequently appealed to the MSPB.The MSPB dismissed Dr. Abutalib’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that she failed to make a nonfrivolous showing of whistleblowing or other protected activity. The administrative judge noted that as a VHA physician, Dr. Abutalib could not appeal adverse agency actions under chapter 75 of title 5. Additionally, the judge found that her claims of retaliation for filing an EEO complaint did not constitute whistleblowing under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or protected activity under § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the MSPB’s decision. The court held that Dr. Abutalib did not present her argument regarding the settlement agreement as evidence of whistleblowing to the administrative judge, and thus could not raise it for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the court found that the matters addressed in the settlement agreement were not the subjects of her OSC complaint, indicating a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that Dr. Abutalib did not make a nonfrivolous showing of a qualifying whistleblowing disclosure and upheld the MSPB’s dismissal of her appeal. View "ABUTALIB v. MSPB " on Justia Law

Bonnie Campbell, a federal employee, and Michael Campbell, her ex-husband, entered into a divorce property settlement agreement in which Mr. Campbell waived his rights to Ms. Campbell's Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account. Despite this agreement, Ms. Campbell did not remove Mr. Campbell as the beneficiary of her TSP account before her death. After her death, Mr. Campbell received the balance of the TSP account. The estate of Ms. Campbell (the Estate) sued Mr. Campbell for breach of contract to enforce the terms of the divorce settlement agreement.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted summary judgment in favor of the Estate on its breach of contract claim, awarding money damages. The court rejected Mr. Campbell's argument that the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986 (FERSA) preempted the Estate's claim. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, holding that FERSA preempted the Estate's breach of contract claim.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that FERSA does not preempt the Estate’s post-distribution breach of contract action. The court found that FERSA’s purposes, which include establishing a federal employee retirement plan and ensuring it is fully funded and financially sound, do not concern plan beneficiaries. The court also noted that FERSA’s provisions elevate the requirements of a qualifying state property settlement agreement over a deceased participant’s designated beneficiary, provided notice is given before payment. The court concluded that a post-distribution suit to enforce contractual obligations in a divorce property settlement agreement does not hinder any governmental interest in administrative convenience or avoiding double payment. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed, and the Circuit Court's judgment was affirmed. View "In re Isely" on Justia Law

Curtis Temple, a cattle rancher and member of the Oglala Sioux Indian Tribe (OST), had his grazing permits on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation expire on October 31, 2012. He reapplied for new permits, but another OST member, Donald Buffington, also applied. The OST allocation committee found Temple had over 1,600 cattle, exceeding the 300 animal unit limit, making Buffington the eligible applicant. Temple's permits were awarded to Buffington, and Temple's appeals to the OST executive committee and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) were unsuccessful. Temple continued to graze his cattle on the land allocated to Buffington, leading to multiple trespass notices and eventual impoundment of his cattle by the BIA.Temple filed a lawsuit in the District of South Dakota in August 2015, seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and contesting the permit allocation. The district court denied the TRO and dismissed Temple's permit allocation claims, requiring him to exhaust administrative remedies. Temple's due process claims regarding the impoundment of his cattle proceeded, but the district court found that the written notices of trespass provided to Temple were sufficient and did not violate his due process rights. Temple's motion to continue the trial was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Temple was provided due process through the written notices of trespass and had ample opportunity to contest the trespass determinations. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Temple's permit allocation claims for failure to exhaust tribal remedies, as he did not appeal the tribal court's decision. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Temple's motion to continue the trial. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Curtis Temple v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The Unkechaug Indian Nation and its Chief, Harry B. Wallace, challenged the enforcement of New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) regulations prohibiting the harvesting of American glass eels. They argued that the Andros Order, a 1676 agreement between the Royal Governor of New York and the Nation, allowed them to fish freely and preempted the DEC’s regulations. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the DEC from enforcing these regulations against the Nation’s members in their customary fishing waters.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the Andros Order is not federal law preempting New York’s fishing regulations. The court also found that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Commissioner Basil Seggos in his official capacity under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims against Commissioner Seggos under the Ex parte Young exception. The court also found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to resolve Daubert motions or privilege disputes before ruling on the summary judgment motions. Finally, the court held that the Andros Order is not federal law binding on the United States because it was entered before the Confederal period, on behalf of the British Crown, and has not been ratified by the United States. Therefore, the Andros Order does not preempt New York’s fishing regulations, and the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Unkechaug Indian Nation v. Seggos" on Justia Law

In 2019, Nestle Purina Petcare Company sought to switch its electric supplier for its facility in Hartwell, Georgia, from Georgia Power Company to Walton Electric Membership Corporation. Georgia Power objected, citing the Territorial Electric Service Act, arguing that the premises were not new and did not meet the requirements to switch suppliers. Georgia Power contended that the premises had long been a manufacturing and warehousing facility and that the changes made by Nestle did not amount to the premises being "destroyed or dismantled" as required by the Act.The Georgia Public Service Commission (the "Commission") ruled in favor of Nestle, concluding that the premises were "destroyed or dismantled" and not "reconstructed in substantial kind," allowing Nestle to switch to Walton EMC. The superior court reversed this decision, finding that the premises were not "destroyed or dismantled" and that the modifications did not meet the statutory requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's decision.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the appropriate standard of review was abuse of discretion. The Court determined that the Commission's decision should have been upheld. The Court held that "destroyed or dismantled" does not require complete destruction but can include substantial dismantling or stripping away of significant components. The Court also found that the premises were not "reconstructed in substantial kind" due to the significant differences in structure and function between the old and new facilities. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, allowing Nestle to switch its electric supplier to Walton EMC. View "WALTON ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY" on Justia Law

In 2022, the Georgia General Assembly enacted House Bill 839 (HB 839), which incorporated the City of Mableton within unincorporated Cobb County and provided for the creation of one or more community improvement districts (CIDs) within Mableton. Deidre White and other residents of Cobb County challenged the constitutionality of HB 839, arguing that it violated the "Single Subject Rule" of the Georgia Constitution by creating more than one unit of government, specifically Mableton and the CIDs.The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court found that HB 839 did not violate the Single Subject Rule, as the creation of CIDs within Mableton was germane to the overall objective of incorporating the city. The Appellants then appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's dismissal. The court held that HB 839 did not violate the Single Subject Rule because the creation of CIDs within Mableton had a logical and natural connection to the incorporation of the city. The court also rejected the argument that the ballot question for HB 839 contravened the precedent set in Rea v. City of LaFayette, as the creation of CIDs was related to the single objective of establishing Mableton. Thus, the court concluded that HB 839 was constitutional and upheld the trial court's decision. View "WHITE v. CITY OF MABLETON" on Justia Law

The National Automobile Dealers Association and the Texas Automobile Dealers Association challenged the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) Combating Auto Retail Scams Trade Regulation Rule (CARS Rule). They argued that the FTC violated its own regulations by not issuing an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), failed to provide a reasoned basis for the rule, and conducted an arbitrary and capricious cost-benefit analysis. Alternatively, they requested a remand for additional evidence consideration.The FTC published the CARS Rule without an ANPRM, which led to the petitioners seeking judicial review. The rule aimed to address deceptive practices in the auto sales industry, including misrepresentations, mandatory disclosures, prohibitions on valueless add-ons, and requirements for consumer consent. The FTC received over 27,000 comments during the rulemaking process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the FTC violated its own regulations by not issuing an ANPRM, which is required under subpart B procedures for rules promulgated under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the FTC Act. The court determined that the Dodd-Frank Act did not grant the FTC independent substantive authority to bypass the ANPRM requirement. The court also rejected the FTC's argument for deference under Auer v. Robbins and Kisor v. Wilkie, finding no relevant ambiguity in the regulations.The court concluded that the FTC's failure to issue an ANPRM was not harmless error, as it deprived the petitioners of a procedural benefit that could have influenced the final rule. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the CARS Rule, without addressing the petitioners' remaining substantive challenges. View "National Automobile Assoc v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves the Insurance Marketing Coalition Limited (IMC) challenging a decision by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding the interpretation of "prior express consent" under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The TCPA requires that robocalls must have the called party's "prior express consent." The FCC's 2012 regulation defined this as "prior express written consent" for telemarketing or advertising calls. In 2023, the FCC issued a new rule further interpreting "prior express consent" to include two additional restrictions: (1) consent must be given to only one entity at a time, and (2) the subject matter of the calls must be logically and topically associated with the interaction that prompted the consent.The FCC's 2023 Order was challenged by IMC, which argued that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority under the TCPA. IMC contended that the new restrictions conflicted with the ordinary statutory meaning of "prior express consent." The FCC defended its rule, claiming it was consistent with the common understanding of the phrase and within its authority to implement the TCPA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the FCC's additional restrictions on "prior express consent" were inconsistent with the ordinary statutory meaning of the phrase. The court held that under common law principles, "prior express consent" means a willingness for certain conduct to occur, clearly and unmistakably stated before the conduct. The court concluded that the FCC's one-to-one-consent and logically-and-topically-related restrictions impermissibly altered this meaning.The Eleventh Circuit granted IMC's petition for review, vacated Part III.D of the FCC's 2023 Order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court determined that the FCC had exceeded its statutory authority by imposing additional restrictions that were not supported by the TCPA's text. View "Insurance Marketing Coalition Limited v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law