Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

George and Maria Dernis borrowed money from Premier Bank, which was involved in fraudulent lending practices. The loans were secured by mortgages on their personal real estate. After Premier Bank collapsed, the FDIC was appointed as receiver and sold some of the bank's loans, including the Dernises' loans, to Amos Financial in 2014. The Dernises claimed that the FDIC was aware of the fraudulent nature of the loans and failed to take remedial action. They filed a lawsuit against the FDIC, which was dismissed by the district court. They then filed an amended complaint against the United States under the FTCA, alleging various torts based on the FDIC's conduct.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the amended complaint, determining that most of the claims were not timely exhausted under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The court also found that the sole timely claim was barred by the FTCA’s intentional torts exception under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The court dismissed the action with prejudice and entered final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the Dernises failed to timely exhaust their administrative remedies for most of their claims. The court also held that the only timely claim was barred by the FTCA’s intentional torts exception, as it involved misrepresentation, deceit, and interference with contract rights. The court rejected the Dernises' argument that the FDIC’s "sue-and-be-sued" clause provided a broader waiver of sovereign immunity, noting that the United States was the sole defendant and the FTCA provided the exclusive remedy for tort claims against the United States. View "Dernis v United States" on Justia Law

Nick Feliciano, an air traffic controller with the Federal Aviation Administration and a Coast Guard reserve petty officer, was called to active duty in July 2012 under 10 U.S.C. §12301(d). He served until February 2017, primarily escorting vessels to and from harbor. Despite his active-duty service, Feliciano did not receive differential pay, which compensates federal civilian employees for the pay gap between their civilian and military salaries when called to active duty during a national emergency.Feliciano sought relief from the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming he was unlawfully denied differential pay. The Board rejected his claim, and Feliciano appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. He argued that under 5 U.S.C. §5538(a) and 10 U.S.C. §101(a)(13)(B), he was entitled to differential pay because he was called to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency. The Federal Circuit, referencing its decision in Adams v. Department of Homeland Security, held that Feliciano needed to show a substantive connection between his service and a particular national emergency, which he failed to do.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Federal Circuit's decision. The Court held that a federal civilian employee called to active duty under "any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency" is entitled to differential pay if the reservist's service coincides temporally with a declared national emergency. The Court determined that no substantive connection between the service and the national emergency is required. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Feliciano v. Department Of Transportation" on Justia Law

A solar energy company, Harvey Solar I, L.L.C., applied to the Ohio Power Siting Board for a certificate to construct a solar-powered electric-generation facility in Licking County, Ohio. The project faced opposition from a local citizens group, Save Hartford Twp., L.L.C., and 11 nearby residents, who raised concerns about the environmental and economic impacts of the project, including visual impacts, flooding, wildlife disruption, noise, water quality, and glare.The Ohio Power Siting Board reviewed the application and conducted an evidentiary hearing. The board staff investigated the potential impacts and recommended approval with conditions. The board ultimately granted the certificate, subject to 39 conditions, including requirements for visual screening, floodplain coordination, wildlife impact mitigation, noise control, and stormwater management.The residents appealed the board's decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, arguing that the board failed to properly evaluate the project's adverse impacts and that Harvey Solar did not provide sufficient information as required by the board's rules. They contended that the board's decision was unlawful and unreasonable.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that the board had acted within its statutory authority and had not violated any applicable laws or regulations. The court determined that the board had sufficient evidence to make the required determinations under R.C. 4906.10(A) and that the conditions imposed on the certificate were reasonable and appropriate. The court affirmed the board's order granting the certificate for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the solar facility. View "In re Application of Harvey Solar I, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Diana Penney, a pharmacy technician from 1980 to 2019, filed multiple work-related occupational disease claims due to repetitive activities at her job. She was diagnosed with low back issues, protruding disks in her neck and upper back, and carpal tunnel syndrome. Penney underwent surgeries and stopped working in August 2019 due to pain from these conditions. She sought permanent total disability (PTD) benefits from the Second Injury Fund (the Fund).An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Penney was permanently and totally disabled due to the combined effect of her occupational diseases and awarded her PTD benefits from the Fund. The Fund appealed to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, arguing that the ALJ improperly considered Penney’s preexisting occupational diseases under the relevant statutory category. The Commission disagreed and affirmed the ALJ’s award.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and held that preexisting occupational diseases do not qualify as preexisting disabilities under section 287.220.3(2)(a)a(ii)1, which requires the disability to be a “direct result of a compensable injury as defined in section 287.020.” The court noted that section 287.020 encompasses injuries by accident and explicitly excludes occupational diseases. The court emphasized that the legislature’s choice to reference only section 287.020 in the statute indicates an intent to limit qualifying preexisting disabilities to accidental injuries. Consequently, the court reversed the Commission’s decision, ruling that Penney’s preexisting occupational diseases could not be considered in determining her entitlement to PTD benefits from the Fund. View "Treasurer v. Penney" on Justia Law

A group of over 200 hospitals claimed that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) miscalculated their Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) adjustments, which provide additional funding to hospitals treating a high percentage of low-income patients. The dispute centered on the interpretation of the phrase "entitled to supplementary security income (SSI) benefits" under subchapter XVI. The hospitals argued that this phrase should include all patients enrolled in the SSI system at the time of hospitalization, even if they were not entitled to an SSI payment during that month. HHS, however, interpreted it to mean patients who were eligible to receive an SSI payment during the month of hospitalization.The Provider Reimbursement Review Board denied the hospitals' request for additional reimbursement on procedural grounds, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services denied relief on the merits. The District Court rejected the hospitals' claims and granted summary judgment to HHS. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, concluding that SSI benefits are about cash payments for needy individuals and that it makes little sense to say individuals are entitled to the benefit in months when they are not eligible for a payment.The Supreme Court of the United States held that an individual is "entitled to [SSI] benefits" for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligible to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitalization. The Court reasoned that SSI benefits are cash benefits determined on a monthly basis, and eligibility for such benefits is also determined monthly. The Court affirmed the judgment of the D.C. Circuit, respecting the specific formula that Congress prescribed for calculating the Medicare fraction. View "Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

In this case, Iran provided material support for a Taliban attack that killed thirty Americans, including Navy special forces operator Kraig Vickers. Vickers' family sued Iran under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which allows for such suits against state sponsors of terrorism. The district court awarded damages to most of Vickers' family but dismissed the claim of his daughter, K.E.F.V., who was born two months after his death.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held a three-day evidentiary hearing and concluded that Iran was a state sponsor of terrorism that had provided material support for the attack. The court then determined damages for twenty-three plaintiffs and appointed special masters to recommend damages for the remaining plaintiffs, including the Vickers family. The special master recommended solatium damages for each family member, but the district court dismissed K.E.F.V.'s claim, stating that she could not recover solatium because she was born after her father's death.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the FSIA does not preclude after-born plaintiffs from recovering solatium and that well-established state tort law, including wrongful death statutes, supports the recovery of damages by children born after a parent's death. The court concluded that K.E.F.V. is entitled to solatium for the loss of her father's comfort and society, regardless of her birth date relative to his death. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "K.E.F.V. v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law

The case involves the Board of Trustees of a multiemployer pension plan primarily benefitting unionized bakery drivers in New York City, which applied for Special Financial Assistance (SFA) in 2022. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) denied the application, citing the plan's termination in 2016 as a disqualifying factor. The Fund, asserting it was in "critical and declining status," sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the PBGC, agreeing that the plan's termination made it ineligible for SFA. The court also concluded that a terminated plan could not be restored under ERISA, thus affirming the PBGC's denial of the Fund's application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the SFA statute does not exclude plans based solely on a prior termination. The court found that the statute's reference to "critical and declining status" incorporates the definition from 29 U.S.C. § 1085(b)(6) without importing limitations from other sections. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment for the Fund, vacate the PBGC's denial of the SFA application, and remand to the PBGC for reconsideration. View "Bd. of Trs. of the Bakery Drivers Loc. 550 v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves four affiliated companies, collectively known as the Pangang Companies, which were indicted for economic espionage related to their alleged efforts to steal trade secrets from E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company (DuPont) concerning the production of titanium dioxide. The Pangang Companies argued that they were immune from criminal prosecution in the United States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) because they are owned and controlled by the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the Pangang Companies' motion to dismiss the indictment, holding that the FSIA did not apply to criminal cases and that even if it did, the commercial activity and implied waiver exceptions to the FSIA would apply. The Pangang Companies appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially held that the companies failed to make a prima facie showing that they were covered entities under the FSIA.Upon remand, the district court again denied the motion to dismiss, reiterating that the Pangang Companies did not qualify for immunity under the FSIA and also rejecting their claims to common-law immunity. The court found that the companies did not exercise functions comparable to those of an agency of the PRC and thus were not entitled to immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that under federal common law, the Pangang Companies did not make a prima facie showing that they exercised functions comparable to those of an agency of the PRC. Therefore, they were not eligible for foreign sovereign immunity from criminal prosecution. The court also noted that principles of deference to the political branches on matters touching on foreign relations reinforced this conclusion. View "USA V. PANGANG GROUP COMPANY, LTD." on Justia Law

The case involves the Center for Biological Diversity challenging the United States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) approval of Colorado's revised implementation plan for ambient air quality standards. Colorado revised its plan in 2019, changing the wording of a permit requirement for new emission sources and adding language to the definition of a key threshold for evaluating compliance. The Center argued that the revisions would prevent regulators from blocking construction of new sources that generate excessive emissions and allow regulators to disregard emissions during drilling, fracking, and well completion.The EPA approved Colorado's revisions, leading the Center to file a petition for review. The State of Colorado intervened to defend the revisions. The Center contended that the revised permit requirement and the new definition of "commencement of operation" would undermine air quality standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected the Center's first challenge, concluding that the Center had not shown an effect from the revised wording in the permit requirement. However, the court agreed with the Center on the second challenge, finding that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to address the potential emissions during drilling, fracking, and well completion. The court held that the EPA did not independently assess whether the revised definition created a substantive change and remanded the case to the EPA for further explanation without vacating the EPA's prior approval of the revised definition. The court denied the petition for review regarding the revised permit requirement but granted it concerning the revised definition of "commencement of operation." View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA" on Justia Law

Lathfield Investments, LLC, Lathfield Holdings, LLC, and Lathfield Partners, LLC (collectively, "Lathfield") own three commercial buildings in Lathrup Village, Michigan, rented to various commercial tenants. The City of Lathrup Village and its Downtown Development Authority (collectively, the "City") require landlords to obtain a rental license and list each tenant's name and principal business. Lathfield applied for a landlord rental license in July 2020 but did not list the required tenant information, leading to the denial of their application and their tenants' business license applications. Lathfield sued the City, alleging unlawful compulsion to apply for unnecessary licenses and make unnecessary property improvements, bringing eleven claims, nine against the City.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the City on all nine claims. Lathfield appealed, arguing that the City improperly required site plan approval, violated due process and equal protection rights, and engaged in inverse condemnation, among other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Lathfield's request for declaratory relief regarding site plan approval was moot since the site plan process was already completed. The court also found that Lathfield was required to obtain a general business license under the City Code and that the City Code's tenant registration requirement applied to Lathfield. The court rejected Lathfield's due process claims, noting that the City’s adoption of the Michigan Building Code was a legislative act not subject to procedural due process requirements. The court also dismissed Lathfield's equal protection claim due to a lack of evidence of differential treatment and found no basis for the Contracts Clause claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lastly, the court concluded that Lathfield failed to establish an inverse condemnation claim or a civil conspiracy. View "Lathfield Investments, LLC v. City of Lathrup Village, Mich." on Justia Law