Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Lisa Wheeler, a physician assistant and former Assistant Medical Director at Acadia Healthcare Company’s Asheville, North Carolina clinic, filed a complaint alleging that Acadia falsified medical records to claim payments from government healthcare programs. Wheeler claimed that Acadia, which provided methadone-assisted treatment for opioid use disorder, failed to provide required therapy and counseling services, instead fabricating therapy notes to submit fraudulent claims to Medicare, Medicaid, and other government programs.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina dismissed Wheeler’s amended complaint, concluding that she failed to adequately plead that Acadia’s false claims were material or submitted to the government. The court found that Wheeler did not sufficiently allege that Acadia’s failure to provide therapy was material to the government’s payment decisions or that false claims were actually submitted to the government.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Wheeler adequately pled her claims of presentment, false statement, false certification, and fraudulent inducement under the False Claims Act. The court found that Wheeler’s allegations of falsified therapy notes and non-compliance with federal opioid treatment standards were material to the government’s payment decisions. The court also concluded that Wheeler sufficiently alleged that Acadia submitted false claims to government healthcare programs and that the fraudulent conduct was central to the government’s decision to pay.Additionally, the Fourth Circuit held that Wheeler adequately pled her reverse false claim, finding that the stipulated penalties in Acadia’s Corporate Integrity Agreement with the government constituted an obligation under the False Claims Act. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a proposed charter amendment in Baltimore City, known as the Baby Bonus Amendment, which would mandate a one-time payment of at least $1,000 to every eligible city resident upon the birth or adoption of a child. The Maryland Child Alliance, Inc. sponsored the petition for this amendment, which was certified by the Baltimore City Board of Elections for inclusion on the ballot for the November 2024 Presidential General Election.The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, along with other city officials, filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the Baltimore City Board of Elections and the State Board of Elections, seeking judicial review, a writ of mandamus, declaratory judgment, and an injunction to prevent the Baby Bonus Amendment from being placed on the ballot. The circuit court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, declaring the Baby Bonus Amendment unconstitutional as it violated Article XI-A, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution by removing meaningful discretion from the City over an area within its legislative purview and being legislative in nature rather than proper charter material.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The Court held that the Baby Bonus Amendment did not concern the form or structure of government and encroached upon the City’s police or general welfare powers, thus violating Article XI-A, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution. The Court also declined to sever the mandatory payment provision from the amendment, concluding that the dominant purpose of the amendment would not be achieved without the $1,000 payment provision, which abrogated the City’s law-making authority in violation of the Constitution of Maryland. View "Baltimore City Board of Elections v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

Kristie Williams, a former employee of the University of Alabama at Birmingham, requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to care for her daughter, who was allegedly sexually assaulted while serving in the Marine Corps. The University approved her leave, but Williams claimed she continued to receive work-related communications and criticism from her supervisors during her leave. This led to her resignation, and she subsequently sued the University, alleging interference with her FMLA rights and retaliation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied the University’s motion to dismiss, which argued that the suit was barred by state sovereign immunity. The court reasoned that Williams might have been seeking family-care leave under the FMLA, for which the Supreme Court had previously held that Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Williams’s suit could proceed regardless of whether she sought family-care leave, active-duty leave, or servicemember-family leave. For family-care leave, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hibbs confirmed that Congress had abrogated state sovereign immunity. For active-duty and servicemember-family leave, the court concluded that Alabama waived its sovereign immunity under the plan-of-the-Convention doctrine when it joined the Union, as these provisions were enacted pursuant to Congress’s constitutional authority to raise and support the military. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the University’s motion to dismiss and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Board of Trustees of The University of Alabama" on Justia Law

D.G. sued the Orange County Social Services Agency and the County of Orange for negligence, alleging that he was sexually abused by his foster father from the mid-1970s until he was a teenager. D.G. claimed he informed his social worker that "bad people are hurting me," but no action was taken. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing there was insufficient evidence that it was aware of any abuse or risk of abuse while D.G. was in the foster home. The trial court agreed, finding the information reported was insufficient to make the abuse foreseeable and that discretionary immunity applied.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that there was no duty to protect D.G. from the unforeseeable criminal conduct of his foster father and that the social worker was immune under Government Code section 820.2 for discretionary acts. D.G. appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the County failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that a duty of care did not exist and that discretionary act immunity did not apply. The court held that the failure to investigate potential abuse when indicators were present made the harm foreseeable, thus imposing a duty of care. Additionally, the court found no evidence that the social worker made a considered decision regarding the potential abuse. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "D.G. v. Orange County Social Services Agency" on Justia Law

Environmental groups challenged the issuance of a permit by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the development of the Cainhoy Plantation in South Carolina. The plaintiffs argued that the permit violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). They claimed the permit improperly used a habitat surrogate to set the level of anticipated take of an endangered species and was issued after an Environmental Assessment (EA) rather than a more comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that they did not have a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court concluded that the Corps' decision to issue the permit based on an EA was reasonable and that the use of a habitat surrogate was justified under the circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the Corps had taken the required "hard look" at the environmental consequences of the project as mandated by NEPA and that the use of a habitat surrogate was appropriate given the impracticality of monitoring the take of individual bats. The court found that the Corps' decision to rely on an EA instead of preparing an EIS was entitled to deference and that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court also noted that the surrogate used by the Service was enforceable and set a clear standard for determining when the level of anticipated take had been exceeded. View "South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The case involves the Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association, Inc. (MALA) challenging a final rule issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) that seasonally bans vertical buoy lines used in lobster and Jonah crab trap fishing in certain federal waters off Massachusetts from February 1 to April 30 each year. The NMFS issued this rule to protect the endangered North Atlantic right whales from entanglement in these buoy lines during their foraging period.Previously, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled in favor of MALA, holding that the final rule conflicted with a temporary statutory authorization for lobster and Jonah crab fishing contained in a rider to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023. The district court found that the final rule did not fall within the exception provided in the rider, which allowed for actions to extend or make final an emergency rule that was in place on the date of the rider's enactment, December 29, 2022. The court concluded that the 2022 emergency rule was not "in place" on that date because it was not actively preventing fishing in the Wedge area at that time.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the 2022 emergency rule was indeed "in place" on December 29, 2022, for the purposes of the rider's exception. The court reasoned that the emergency rule's findings and authority were still relevant and could serve as a basis for future regulatory actions, such as the final rule. Therefore, the final rule was lawful and enforceable under the exception provided in the rider. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Mass. Lobstermen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv." on Justia Law

Christopher Hamilton was convicted of federal felony possession of child pornography. After a federal district court terminated his federal sex offender registration requirement, the California Attorney General notified him of his lifetime obligation to register under California law, pursuant to Penal Code section 290.005(a). The Attorney General determined that the state law equivalent of Hamilton’s federal offense required lifetime registration, placing him in the highest tier of California’s three-tier scheme.Hamilton petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to terminate his state registration requirement. The Superior Court denied his petition and a subsequent amended motion. Hamilton appealed the denials, arguing violations of equal protection and due process.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the Attorney General’s classification of Hamilton’s offense as a felony with a lifetime registration requirement did not violate equal protection. The court reasoned that the federal offense’s classification as a felony, based on custodial exposure, justified the equivalent state offense’s classification as a felony. Additionally, the court found that the federal offense’s requirement of interstate or foreign commerce provided a rational basis for the different treatment.The court also rejected Hamilton’s due process challenge, concluding that he received notice and had opportunities to contest his tier designation through his petition and amended motion. Lastly, the court dismissed Hamilton’s vagueness challenge, finding that the term “equivalent” in section 290.005(a) was sufficiently clear when considered in context with other statutory provisions.The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court’s orders denying Hamilton’s petition and amended motion. View "People v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Dr. Jabeen N. Abutalib, a physician with the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), sought corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) for alleged retaliatory personnel actions following her Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint. Dr. Abutalib claimed that her EEO complaint, which was settled in January 2020, led to adverse actions including a reduction in pay and reassignment. She filed a whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and subsequently appealed to the MSPB.The MSPB dismissed Dr. Abutalib’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that she failed to make a nonfrivolous showing of whistleblowing or other protected activity. The administrative judge noted that as a VHA physician, Dr. Abutalib could not appeal adverse agency actions under chapter 75 of title 5. Additionally, the judge found that her claims of retaliation for filing an EEO complaint did not constitute whistleblowing under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or protected activity under § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the MSPB’s decision. The court held that Dr. Abutalib did not present her argument regarding the settlement agreement as evidence of whistleblowing to the administrative judge, and thus could not raise it for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the court found that the matters addressed in the settlement agreement were not the subjects of her OSC complaint, indicating a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that Dr. Abutalib did not make a nonfrivolous showing of a qualifying whistleblowing disclosure and upheld the MSPB’s dismissal of her appeal. View "ABUTALIB v. MSPB " on Justia Law

Bonnie Campbell, a federal employee, and Michael Campbell, her ex-husband, entered into a divorce property settlement agreement in which Mr. Campbell waived his rights to Ms. Campbell's Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account. Despite this agreement, Ms. Campbell did not remove Mr. Campbell as the beneficiary of her TSP account before her death. After her death, Mr. Campbell received the balance of the TSP account. The estate of Ms. Campbell (the Estate) sued Mr. Campbell for breach of contract to enforce the terms of the divorce settlement agreement.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted summary judgment in favor of the Estate on its breach of contract claim, awarding money damages. The court rejected Mr. Campbell's argument that the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986 (FERSA) preempted the Estate's claim. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, holding that FERSA preempted the Estate's breach of contract claim.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that FERSA does not preempt the Estate’s post-distribution breach of contract action. The court found that FERSA’s purposes, which include establishing a federal employee retirement plan and ensuring it is fully funded and financially sound, do not concern plan beneficiaries. The court also noted that FERSA’s provisions elevate the requirements of a qualifying state property settlement agreement over a deceased participant’s designated beneficiary, provided notice is given before payment. The court concluded that a post-distribution suit to enforce contractual obligations in a divorce property settlement agreement does not hinder any governmental interest in administrative convenience or avoiding double payment. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed, and the Circuit Court's judgment was affirmed. View "In re Isely" on Justia Law

Curtis Temple, a cattle rancher and member of the Oglala Sioux Indian Tribe (OST), had his grazing permits on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation expire on October 31, 2012. He reapplied for new permits, but another OST member, Donald Buffington, also applied. The OST allocation committee found Temple had over 1,600 cattle, exceeding the 300 animal unit limit, making Buffington the eligible applicant. Temple's permits were awarded to Buffington, and Temple's appeals to the OST executive committee and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) were unsuccessful. Temple continued to graze his cattle on the land allocated to Buffington, leading to multiple trespass notices and eventual impoundment of his cattle by the BIA.Temple filed a lawsuit in the District of South Dakota in August 2015, seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and contesting the permit allocation. The district court denied the TRO and dismissed Temple's permit allocation claims, requiring him to exhaust administrative remedies. Temple's due process claims regarding the impoundment of his cattle proceeded, but the district court found that the written notices of trespass provided to Temple were sufficient and did not violate his due process rights. Temple's motion to continue the trial was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Temple was provided due process through the written notices of trespass and had ample opportunity to contest the trespass determinations. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Temple's permit allocation claims for failure to exhaust tribal remedies, as he did not appeal the tribal court's decision. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Temple's motion to continue the trial. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Curtis Temple v. Roberts" on Justia Law