Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife to revoke or suspend Appellant's hunting license for three years and his guide license for one year, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the Commissioner’s interpretation of the statute mandating revocation of Appellant's hunting license for one year was correct, and her action revoking Appellant's hunting license for one year was supported by substantial evidence; (2) Appellant did not overcome the presumption of constitutionality to demonstrate that the statute governing hunting license revocation and suspension was constitutionally vague; and (3) the Legislature acted within constitutional bounds in delegating authority to the Commissioner to establish standards of competency for licensed guides. View "Wood v. Dep't of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the writ of mandamus sought by Stephen Harris to order the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision denying Harris's request for scheduled-loss compensation for the permanent partial loss of sight of both eyes, holding that there were no grounds for the writ.After the Commission denied Harris's request for scheduled-loss compensation a district hearing officer determined that the medical evidence failed to establish that Harris had sustained any loss of vision in either eye as a result of the industrial injury. Harris filed a mandamus action requesting an order directing the Commission to reverse its decision. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some evidence existed to support the Commission's decision. View "State ex rel. Harris v. Industrial Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus brought under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, by Harry Barr, an inmate at the Grafton Correctional Institution (GCII), seeking to compel the warden's assistant at GCI to produce the job description for, and the certification or license held by, Jennifer Whitten, a GCI employee, holding that Barr was not entitled to the writ.In addition to the writ of mandamus, Barr sought statutory damages and also filed a complaint for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction and other motions. The Supreme Court dismissed Barr's complaint for a TRO and a preliminary injunction, granted Barr's motion to amend the evidence and deemed the record supplemented, granted his motion to withdraw his motion for an order pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R.4.01(A), and denied the writ of mandamus and his request for statutory damages, holding that Barr was entitled to some relief. View "State ex rel. Barr v. Wesson" on Justia Law

A group of Doctors sued the FDA and the Department of Health and Human Services (together, the “Agencies”), claiming an FDA ad intended to deter people from off-label use of ivermectin to treat COVID-19. Each Doctor says that FDA’s messaging interfered with their own individual medical practice.The Doctors argue that FDA’s ad and similar public statements violated FDA’s enabling act (“Act”) and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The district court held that sovereign immunity protects the Agencies and the Officials, and it dismissed the suit. The Fifth Circuit reversed.The Fifth Circuit held that the Doctors can use the APA to bypass sovereign immunity and assert their ultra vires claims against the Agencies and the Officials. The ad was plausibly agency action, because it publicly announced the general principle that consumers should not use ivermectin to treat the coronavirus, and the Doctors fall within the Act’s zone of interests.The Doctors’ pure APA claim cannot go forward because the ad does not determine legal rights and thus lacks the finality. However, the Fifth Circuit held that the Doctors’ first theory was enough to allow this suit to proceed. View "Apter v. Dept of Health & Human Svc" on Justia Law

In this zoning dispute involving the interplay between the public's interest in the future of a private airport in Prince George's County and the financial interests of its owner, the Supreme Court held that the amended zoning ordinance allowing the airport to develop higher-density housing did not violate Maryland's uniformity requirement, Md. Code Ann., Land Use 22-201(b)(2)(i).When the airport's owners began experiencing financial difficulties they sought to redevelop the site, which had been limited by the zoning ordnance to low-density, single-family detached housing, for non-airport use. The County Council amended the zoning ordinance to allow for higher-density housing to incentivize the airport's redevelopment. Plaintiffs brought suit. The circuit court concluded that the ordinance did not violate uniformity, but the appellate court reversed, finding that the ordinance violated uniformity because it was tailored so narrowly as to afford favorable development opportunities to only the airport property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was adopted to further a valid public purpose and did not discriminate against similarly situated properties, thus surviving the uniformity challenge. View "Prince George's County v. Concerned Citizens" on Justia Law

A nine-year-old girl took her own life after a classmate repeatedly delivered racist insults to her. The girl's mother and grandmother sought to hold the school system and several school officials accountable for her death. The family filed a lawsuit asserting claims arising under federal and state law against the school system and the school officials. The district court granted summary judgment to the school system and its officials, concluding that the family failed to satisfy various elements of their federal statutory claims and that qualified immunity barred at least one of the claims. The court concluded that the state law claims failed on immunity grounds. The family appealed.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Although the response of the school system and its officials was "truly discouraging," the standard for relief in cases of student-on-student harassment was not met. The court explained that a reasonable jury could not find that DCS acted with deliberate indifference, that it intentionally discriminated against the girl, or that Defendants' actions were arbitrary or conscience-shocking. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the family's Title IX, Title VI, equal protection, and substantive due process claims. View "Jasmine Adams, et al v. Demopolis City Schools, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a practicing attorney, sued a municipal court judge, a prosecutor, and the City of St. Helens, Oregon, in state court. After Defendants removed the case to federal court, Plaintiff moved to remand to state court, claiming that, although his complaint referenced federal law, it was poorly drafted, and he did not intend to bring federal claims. The district court severed and remanded the state-only claims and dismissed the retained claims with prejudice. On appeal, Plaintiff filed an informal pro se brief and argued that he should have been granted leave to amend his complaint to exclude any mention of a federal claim and to seek a remand to state court.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that, although there is a good reason for awarding leeway to pro se parties who presumably are unskilled in the law and more prone to make pleading errors, that logic does not apply to practicing attorneys. The panel determined that his attempt to backtrack seemed aimed at robbing the government of its removal option and ensuring another bite at the apple in state court. The panel held that a sophisticated attorney like Plaintiff should not be allowed to jettison his own complaint when it is beneficial yet avoid the consequences of that renunciation. The panel held that because Plaintiff facially alleged a violation of his federal rights, the district court had federal question jurisdiction. In view of the immunity of the government defendants, the complaint could not be saved by amendment, and therefore the district court’s dismissal without leave to amend was proper. View "JAMES HUFFMAN V. AMY LINDGREN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Q Link Wireless LLC (Q Link) petitioned the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (Commission) for designation as an eligible telecommunications carrier (ETC). The designation would have made Q Link eligible to access certain federal funds for providing telecommunications services to underserved communities in New Mexico. Following lengthy and protracted proceedings before the Commission’s hearing examiner, Q Link filed a motion to withdraw its petition. The hearing examiner filed an Order Recommending Dismissal of Proceeding with Prejudice (Recommended Decision). The recommendation was to dismiss the petition and to ban Q Link from ever again filing a petition to obtain an ETC designation. The Commission adopted the Recommended Decision in full. Q Link appealed, and the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Commission lacked express or implied statutory authority to ban Q Link from ever again seeking an ETC designation. View "Q Link Wireless LLC v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Center for Biological Diversity, Sierra Club, and Grand Canyon Wildlands Council (collectively, “CBD”) contend that the United States Forest Service (“USFS”) is liable under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), for “contributing to the past or present . . . disposal” of lead ammunition in the Kaibab National Forest. The district court concluded that USFS is not liable as a contributor under RCRA and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that (a) the Forest Service’s choice not to regulate despite having the authority to do so does not manifest the type of actual, active control contemplated by RCRA; (b) although the Forest Service has the authority to further regulate Special Use permits, it has not done so, and RCRA does not impose a duty on the Forest Service to do so; and (c) mere ownership is insufficient to establish contributor liability under RCRA. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying CBD’s motion to amend its complaint to add RCRA claims against Arizona officials because CBD’s proposed amendment did not add any new claims or allegations against the Forest Service, and its claims against Arizona officials were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Finally, the panel denied as moot CBD’s request that this case be reassigned to a different district judge. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, ET AL V. USFS, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) from the Office of Administrative Hearings affirming the decision of the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Water Resources (Division) to issue a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit to Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.The permit at issue allowed Martin Marietta to discharge twelve million gallons of mining wastewater per day from Vanceboro Quarry into Blounts Creek tributaries. The ALJ affirmed the issuance of the permit. The superior court reversed, concluding that the Division failed to ensure "reasonable compliance with the biological integrity standard." The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the permit was properly and validly issued in accordance with the applicable regulations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ properly made findings of fact and properly applied those facts to a correct interpretation of the regulatory plain language. View "Sound Rivers, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law