Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the court is whether Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated in Gatesville, Texas, has a right to be heard before the prison decides whether to approve or deny her request to transfer money from her inmate trust account to an outside bank account. The district court answered no and granted summary judgment to the Appellees.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and reversed. The court wrote that Plaintiff provided evidence that her procedural due process rights were violated, which precludes summary judgment. The court explained that Plaintiff’s property interests were undoubtedly at stake, and, considering the evidence that was before the district court, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the procedures were adequate, there were alternative safeguards, or that the administrative burden would be too great. It is up to a factfinder to determine whether Plaintiff can prove her case. Accordingly, the court held that the district court erred in not vacating the judgment and granting Plaintiff leave to amend her pleadings. View "Calhoun v. Collier" on Justia Law

In early 2020, following the outbreak of COVID-19, Los Angeles County passed the “Resolution of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles Further Amending and Restating the Executive Order for an Eviction Moratorium During Existence of a Local Health Emergency Regarding Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19)” (the “Moratorium”). The Moratorium imposed temporary restrictions on certain residential and commercial tenant evictions. It provided tenants with new affirmative defenses to eviction based on nonpayment of rent, prohibited landlords from charging late fees and interest, and imposed civil and criminal penalties to landlords who violate the Moratorium. Id. Section V (July 14, 2021). Plaintiff, a commercial landlord, sued the County, arguing that the Moratorium impaired his lease, in violation of the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court found that Plaintiff had not alleged an injury in fact and dismissed his complaint for lack of standing.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that Plaintiff had standing to bring his Contracts Clause claim. Plaintiff’s injury for Article III purposes did not depend on whether Plaintiff’s tenant provided notice or was otherwise excused from doing so. Those questions went to the merits of the claim rather than Plaintiff’s standing to bring suit. Plaintiff alleged that the moratorium impaired his contract with his tenant because it altered the remedies the parties had agreed to at the time they entered into the lease. The panel held that these allegations were sufficient to plead an injury in fact and to state a claim under the Contracts Clause, and remanded to the district court. View "HOWARD ITEN V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

The City of Belle Plaine, Minnesota, designated Veterans Memorial Park as a limited public forum and granted permits to two groups to place monuments there. Before the Satanic Temple could place its monument, the City closed the Park as a limited public forum and terminated both permits. The Satanic Temple sued the City. The district court dismissed its claims, except for promissory estoppel. When the Satanic Temple moved to amend its complaint, a Magistrate Judg2denied its motion. The Satanic Temple filed a second suit, reasserting the dismissed claims and adding new ones. The district court held that res judicata bars the second suit and granted summary judgment to the City on the promissory estoppel claim from the first suit.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Satanic Temple failed to plausibly allege that closing the Park as a limited public forum was unreasonable or viewpoint discriminatory. The court further explained that the Satanic Temple asserted that the City violated its free exercise rights. The court explained that although the Enacting and Recession Resolutions were facially neutral, facial neutrality is not a safe harbor if the City’s actions targeted the Satanic Temple’s religious conduct. However, the Satanic Temple failed to plausibly claim that its display was targeted. Moreover, the Satanic Temple has not plausibly alleged that it and the Veterans Club were similarly situated or that it was treated differently. The City gave a permit to both groups, had no control over the fact that the Veterans Club placed its statue first, and closed the Park as a limited public forum to everyone. View "The Satanic Temple v. City of Belle Plaine" on Justia Law

Daufuskie Island Utility Company (DIUC) again appealed decisions by the Public Service Commission (PSC) regarding DIUC's 2015 application for ratemaking. In the PSC's first two decisions, it granted only part of the 109% rate increase requested by DIUC. DIUC appealed both decisions, and both times, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the PSC for further consideration. On the final remand, the parties entered a settlement agreement allowing DIUC to recover rates equivalent to the 109% rate increase it initially requested in 2015. However, the parties continued to disagree over the propriety of DIUC's additional request to retroactively recover the 109% rate increase from the date of the PSC's first order, rather than from the date of the PSC's acceptance of the settlement agreement. The PSC rejected DIUC's request for the "reparations surcharge," finding it would amount to impermissible retroactive ratemaking. The propriety of the reparations surcharge was the only matter at issue in this appeal. The Supreme Court found the General Assembly did not authorize the PSC to grant utilities relief via a reparations surcharge, and the PSC therefore correctly rejected DIUC's request. The Court found DIUC chose not to avail itself of South Carolina Code section 58-5-240(D)'s statutory remedy prior to this final appeal. Accordingly, the PSC's decision was affirmed and the Court "end[ed] this lengthy ratemaking process." View "Daufuskie v. SC Office of Regulatory Staff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Jacob Bennett was not barred from serving on the Harford County Council because of his employment as a schoolteacher by the Harford County Board of Education, thus reversing the contrary order and declaratory judgment of the circuit court.After Bennett was elected to the Council in the November 2022 general election a dispute arose between Bennett and Harford County concerning whether he was precluded from serving simultaneously as a member of the Council and as an employee of the Board by either section 207 of the Harford County Charter or the common law doctrine of incompatible positions. The circuit court ruled in favor of the County on the basis that the Board should be treated as a County for purposes of Charter 207. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither Charter 207 nor the doctrine of incompatible positions barred Bennett from simultaneously serving as a member of the Council and an employee of the Board. View "Bennett v. Harford County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declined to issue a writ of prohibition sought by Youngstown Civil Service Commission, the City of Youngstown and Youngstown Mayor Jamael Tito Brown (collectively, Youngstown) to prevent Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas Judge Maureen Sweeney from exercising jurisdiction over an administrative appeal commenced by Michael Cox and to require her to vacate all orders issued in the appeal, holding that Youngstown was not entitled to the writ.Youngstown commenced this action seeking a writ of prohibition prohibiting Judge Sweeney from exercising any judicial authority over the underlying action and vacating all orders and journal entires issued in that case. As grounds for the writ, Youngstown argued that Judge Sweeney patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over it because the pending underlying action was an untimely administrative appeal. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Judge Sweeney did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the matter at issue. View "State ex rel. Youngstown Civil Service Commission v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

When the Covid pandemic struck, the California State University (CSU) directed that instruction be provided remotely. To provide such instruction, Plaintiff, a biology professor at CSU-Los Angeles, incurred expenses that CSU refused to reimburse for a computer and other equipment. Plaintiff sued CSU’s board of trustees on behalf of himself and similarly situated faculty, alleging Labor Code section 2802 obligated CSU to reimburse employees for necessary work-related expenses. CSU demurred, arguing that as a department of the state, it enjoys broad exemption from Labor Code provisions that infringe on its sovereign powers. Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained CSU’s demurrer without leave to amend.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that absent express words or positive indicia to the contrary, a governmental agency is not within the general words of a statute. The court further wrote that although this exemption is limited to cases where the application of the statute would impair the entity’s sovereignty, subjecting CSU to Labor Code section 2802, in this case, would do so because it would infringe on the broad discretion CSU enjoys under the Education Code to set its own equipment reimbursement policies. Further, the court noted that because CSU did not violate section 2802, Plaintiff is not an aggrieved employee for purposes of PAGA. His PAGA claim therefore fails with his section 2802 claim. View "Krug v. Board of Trustees of the Cal. State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Brian Carr appealed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Newport Beach (the City) an action arising from injuries plaintiff sustained after diving headfirst into shallow harbor waters. The court concluded the City was immune from liability pursuant to Government Code section 831.7, which concerned hazardous recreational activities. It also found no triable issue of fact as to plaintiff’s claim alleging a dangerous condition of public property. Plaintiff contended the decision was error because there are triable issues of fact regarding the City’s claimed immunities and his dangerous condition claim. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding record evidenced otherwise. "As a matter of law, the hazardous recreational activity immunity insulates the City from the alleged liability, so thus affirm the judgment." View "Carr v. City of Newport Beach" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court ordering the disclosure of a redacted version of a police report created by the police department at the Whiting Forensic Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital documenting the police department's investigation into the death of a Whiting patient after a medical event, holding that the report, with minimal redaction, must be disclosed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 1-200 et seq.After the trial court ordered the disclosure of a redacted version of the police report the Freedom of Information Commission appealed, arguing that the report should be released in its entirety under FOIA because it was not exempt for disclosure by the psychiatrist-patient communications privilege set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-146d(2) and 52-146e(a), as well as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. 1320d et seq., as implemented by the Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. 160.101 et seq. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the police report was not a communication or record exempt from disclosure under FOIA; and (2) because the report included identifiable patient information, the report should be redacted in the manner described in this opinion. View "Comm'r of Mental Health & Addiction Services v. Freedom of Information Comm'n" on Justia Law

The City and County of San Francisco (the City) owns and operates San Francisco International Airport (SFO or the Airport). Airlines for America (A4A) represents airlines that contract with the City to use SFO. In 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the City enacted the Healthy Airport Ordinance (HAO), requiring the airlines that use SFO to provide employees with certain health insurance benefits. A4A filed this action in the Northern District of California, alleging that the City, in enacting the HAO, acted as a government regulator and not a market participant, and therefore the HAO is preempted by multiple federal statutes. The district court agreed to the parties’ suggestion to bifurcate the case to first address the City’s market participation defense. The district court held that the City was a market participant and granted its motion for summary judgment. A4A appealed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court concluded that two civil penalty provisions of the HAO carry the force of law and thus render the City a regulator rather than a market participant. The court wrote that because these civil penalty provisions result in the City acting as a regulator, it need not determine whether the City otherwise would be a regulator under the Cardinal Towing two-part test set forth in LAX, 873 F.3d at 1080 View "AIRLINES FOR AMERICA V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO" on Justia Law