Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A nonprofit organization sought to provide free legal advice to low-income New Yorkers facing debt-collection lawsuits by training nonlawyer “Justice Advocates” to help individuals complete a state-issued check-the-box answer form. The organization and a prospective Justice Advocate argued that many defendants in such cases default due to lack of understanding, leading to severe consequences. However, New York law prohibits nonlawyers from providing individualized legal advice, and all parties agreed that the proposed activities would violate the state’s unauthorized practice of law (UPL) statutes.The plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement challenge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that applying the UPL statutes to their activities would violate their First Amendment rights. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits, holding that the UPL statutes, as applied, were a content-based regulation of speech that could not survive strict scrutiny. The court granted a preliminary injunction, barring the Attorney General from enforcing the UPL statutes against the plaintiffs and participants in their program.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the UPL statutes, as applied, regulate speech. However, the Second Circuit held that the regulation is content neutral, not content based, and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. Because the district court applied the wrong standard, the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. The court did not reach a final decision on whether the statutes, as applied, ultimately violate the First Amendment, leaving that determination for the district court on remand. View "Upsolve, Inc. v. James" on Justia Law

Two former officers and directors of a Texas community bank faced regulatory action after the bank failed in 2013 following significant losses during the 2008 financial crisis. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) alleged that the individuals engaged in unsafe and unsound banking practices, breached fiduciary duties, and filed materially inaccurate reports. The OCC’s claims centered on three main strategies: the bank’s practice of making loans to finance purchases of its holding company’s stock (which were then counted as capital), aggressive and risky sales of real estate owned by the bank, and improper accounting for nonaccrual loans. These actions allegedly overstated the bank’s capital and masked its true financial condition, ultimately resulting in substantial losses.After the OCC initiated an enforcement action in 2017, the matter was reassigned to a new Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. SEC. The new ALJ ratified prior rulings, conducted a hearing, and issued a recommendation. The Comptroller adopted most of the ALJ’s findings but imposed industry bans and civil penalties on both petitioners, concluding that their conduct warranted prohibition from banking and monetary sanctions. The petitioners then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the OCC’s enforcement action fell within the public rights doctrine, so the petitioners were not entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. The court also found that the ALJ’s appointment was constitutionally valid, the enforcement action was timely under the applicable statute of limitations, and the agency’s evidentiary and procedural rulings were supported by substantial evidence. The court further upheld the Comptroller’s decision to impose prohibition orders and civil penalties, finding the preponderance of the evidence standard appropriate for such administrative proceedings. View "Ortega v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency" on Justia Law

After the 2025 Presidential Inauguration, the federal government initiated mass terminations of thousands of probationary employees across numerous federal agencies. These employees, who were subject to one- or two-year probationary periods, were dismissed without the advance notice typically required for reductions in force (RIFs). The affected states alleged that the lack of notice hindered their ability to provide rapid response services to the terminated employees, resulting in increased unemployment claims and diversion of state resources.Nineteen states and the District of Columbia filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, arguing that the terminations violated statutory RIF procedures, including the requirement to provide 60 days’ notice to state governments. The district court granted a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction, ordering the federal government to reinstate the terminated employees and prohibiting further terminations without compliance with all applicable laws and notice requirements. The injunction was later stayed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the plaintiff states lacked Article III standing to bring the suit. The court found that the states did not suffer a cognizable and redressable injury, as the direct harm was to the terminated employees, not the states. The court also determined that the relief sought by the states—indefinite reinstatement and broad injunctive relief—was not tailored to their alleged informational injury and primarily served to vindicate the rights of non-party employees. As a result, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the action. View "State of Maryland v. USDA" on Justia Law

Catherine Baker was employed by San Mateo County as a Social Worker III but went on medical leave in 2009 due to back pain. In 2015, she returned to work in a different position as a screener trainee, which involved different duties but was compensated at the same pay rate as her original position. Her last paycheck was issued in January 2016. In 2017, Baker applied for a service-connected disability retirement, and the San Mateo County Employees Retirement Association (SamCERA) determined that the effective date for her retirement benefits should be January 22, 2016, the day after her last receipt of “regular compensation.”After SamCERA’s Board approved her application and set the effective date, Baker sought administrative review, arguing that her compensation as a screener trainee did not qualify as “regular compensation” under Government Code section 31724 because she had not returned to her original job. An administrative law judge recommended denial of her request to change the effective date, and the Board adopted this recommendation. Baker then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the Superior Court of San Mateo County, which denied the petition and confirmed the January 22, 2016 effective date.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether “regular compensation” under section 31724 included Baker’s pay as a screener trainee. Exercising independent judgment on statutory interpretation, the court held that “regular compensation” refers to regular salary or full wages, regardless of whether the position is the employee’s original job. Because Baker’s screener trainee pay matched her original position’s rate, it qualified as “regular compensation.” The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, upholding the effective date set by SamCERA. View "Baker v. San Mateo County Employees Retirement Assn." on Justia Law

A company had been diverting large amounts of water from streams in East Maui for over twenty years under a series of annually renewed, so-called “temporary” permits issued by the state’s Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR). Each year, the company applied to renew these permits, which allowed it to use state land and divert millions of gallons of water daily. In 2020, before BLNR voted to renew the permits for 2021, an environmental group timely requested a contested case hearing, arguing that new evidence and changed circumstances warranted further scrutiny. BLNR denied this request and proceeded to renew the permits, adding some new conditions.The environmental group appealed to the Environmental Court of the First Circuit, challenging both the denial of a contested case hearing and the permit renewals. The Environmental Court found that the group had a constitutionally protected right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by state law, and that due process required a contested case hearing before the permits were renewed. The court vacated the permits but stayed its order to avoid disruption, temporarily modifying the permits to reduce the allowable water diversion. The court also awarded attorney fees and costs to the group.On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) held that the group’s protected interest was defined by some, but not all, relevant environmental laws, and that due process did not require a contested case hearing in this instance. The ICA further found that the Environmental Court lacked jurisdiction over the permit renewals and erred in modifying the permits and awarding attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reversed the ICA in relevant part. It held that the group’s constitutional right was defined by all cited environmental laws, including those governing coastal zone management. The court concluded that due process required a contested case hearing before the permits were renewed, and that the Environmental Court had jurisdiction to review both the denial of the hearing and the permit renewals. The Supreme Court also affirmed the Environmental Court’s authority to temporarily modify the permits and to award attorney fees and costs to the environmental group. View "Sierra Club v. Board of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

A business was investigated by the Consumer Protection Unit (CPU) of the Alaska Attorney General’s Office after the CPU received an anonymous letter alleging that the business, a local car dealership, was charging documentation fees on top of advertised prices, potentially violating Alaska law. The letter included an email exchange confirming the practice. Following approval from the Department of Law, the CPU monitored the business’s website and conducted an undercover visit, during which employees confirmed the additional fees. In December, the CPU issued a subpoena requesting documents related to vehicle sales, including contracts and advertisements, to further its investigation.After the business missed the deadline to produce documents, it petitioned the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, to quash the subpoena. The business argued that the CPU lacked “cause to believe” a violation had occurred, as required by statute, and challenged the reliability of the anonymous complaint and the legitimacy of the undercover investigation. The CPU responded that the subpoena was an administrative subpoena, subject to a low threshold for issuance, and that the letter and email provided a sufficient basis for investigation.The Superior Court denied the petition to quash, finding that the subpoena was authorized under AS 45.50.495(b), was part of a good-faith investigation, and adequately specified the documents to be produced. The court held that the “cause to believe” standard did not apply to the subpoena power in subsection (b), but that even if it did, the evidence met the low bar required. The business appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s order, holding that the CPU had sufficient basis to issue the subpoena under AS 45.50.495(b), regardless of whether the “cause to believe” standard applied. The court found no abuse of discretion in the superior court’s decision. View "Business Doe, LLC v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to a 2024 rule issued by the Department of Energy (DOE) that revised the method for calculating the “petroleum equivalency factor” (PEF), which is used to determine the fuel economy values of electric vehicles for regulatory purposes. The DOE had previously used a “fuel content factor” of 1/0.15, which significantly inflated the fuel economy ratings of electric vehicles. In its 2023 proposal, DOE suggested eliminating this factor, but in the final rule, it opted to phase it out gradually over several model years. The final rule also introduced a new method for calculating the PEF, using a “cumulative gasoline-equivalent fuel economy of electricity” based on the projected useful life of an electric vehicle fleet—a method not included in the proposed rule.Several states and the American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. They argued that the DOE exceeded its statutory authority by retaining the fuel content factor and violated notice-and-comment requirements by adopting a new calculation method not previously proposed. The petitioners asserted standing based on increased costs to maintain public roads due to heavier electric vehicles and environmental harms from increased greenhouse gas emissions.The Eighth Circuit found that the petitioners had standing and that the case was not moot, even in light of new EPA emissions standards. The court held that DOE exceeded its statutory authority by retaining the fuel content factor, as the relevant statute did not authorize such an approach. Additionally, the court determined that DOE violated notice-and-comment procedures by failing to provide adequate notice of the new cumulative calculation method. The court concluded that these deficiencies were not severable from the rest of the rule.Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the 2024 final rule, and remanded the matter to DOE. View "State of Iowa v. Wright" on Justia Law

A property owner along the shore of Priest Lake in Idaho sought a permit from the Idaho Department of Lands (IDL) for a submerged log structure, which he claimed had existed since the early 1960s. The structure, known as a log crib, was intended to prevent erosion and create a sandy beach. After initially applying for a permit to cover modifications made to the structure, including the addition of cobblestones and sandbags, the owner was denied due to lack of public benefit and evidence of modification. He then submitted a second application under Idaho Code section 58-1312, which allows permits for pre-1975 encroachments if the applicant provides documentation of the structure’s age and proof that it has not been modified since 1974.IDL denied the second application, finding insufficient evidence that the structure had not been modified since 1974, particularly since the owner admitted to adding and later removing materials. The owner appealed, and after a public hearing, the IDL Director issued a Final Order denying the permit, agreeing that while the structure predated 1974, it had been modified. The owner then sought judicial review in the District Court of the First Judicial District, Bonner County, arguing that IDL’s procedures violated his due process rights and that the agency erred in its interpretation of the law. The district court affirmed IDL’s decision, finding substantial evidence supported the denial and that due process was not violated.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court held that IDL properly denied the permit because the applicant failed to show the structure had not been modified since 1974, and that the agency was not required to follow procedures for new encroachments. The Court also found no due process violation and awarded attorney fees and costs to IDL. View "Wilson v. Idaho State Board of Land Commissioners" on Justia Law

An 11-year-old child with significant disabilities, including autism and other disorders, attended a public elementary school where staff were aware of his special needs and history of leaving school grounds when unsupervised. Despite this knowledge, the child was left alone multiple times, and on May 17, 2021, he walked out of the school unattended and was never seen again. His mother, acting as his legal guardian, alleged that the school district and staff negligently supervised her son, leading to his disappearance and likely death or serious harm. She also claimed severe emotional distress resulting from the incident.The mother filed suit in the District Court for Sarpy County under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), naming the school district and three staff members as defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were barred by sovereign immunity under the PSTCA’s due care and discretionary function exemptions, and that the complaint failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted the motion, finding both exemptions applied and that the emotional distress claim was either barred or insufficiently pled. The court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that, based solely on the complaint’s allegations and reasonable inferences, it could not determine whether the PSTCA exemptions applied, as a more developed factual record was needed. The court also found the complaint alleged sufficient facts to state plausible claims for negligent supervision and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Larsen v. Sarpy Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 77-0027" on Justia Law

A Florida minister and licensed clinical Christian psychologist, who had provided court-mandated batterers’ intervention program (BIP) services for decades, sought certification from the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF) to continue offering these services to individuals ordered by courts to attend BIPs following domestic violence convictions. The DCF denied his application because his curriculum incorporated a faith-based approach and addressed issues such as substance abuse and anger management, which conflicted with state regulations prohibiting faith-based ideology and requiring a specific psychoeducational model. The provider had previously operated without proper certification and had been denied certification in the past for similar reasons.After the DCF’s 2022 denial, the provider filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, alleging that the regulation violated his rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of DCF, holding that court-ordered BIPs constitute government speech, and thus the state could set their content without implicating the First Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the curriculum and presentation of court-ordered BIPs are government speech. The court found that the state has historically used BIPs to communicate its own message, that participants would reasonably associate the program’s content with the government, and that the state exercises substantial control over the content. Because the programs are government speech, the provider’s Free Speech and Free Exercise claims could not proceed. The court also rejected the facial challenge to the regulation and affirmed the District Court’s judgment. View "Nussbaumer v. Secretary, Florida Dept of Children and Families" on Justia Law