Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Johnson was the councilman in Cleveland’s Buckeye-Shaker neighborhood for 41 years. Jamison was his executive assistant. For years, Johnson used his position to fraudulently claim federal reimbursements for payments he never made. He also secured employment for his children in federally funded programs, although they were not legally eligible to work in such positions. Johnson deposited their earnings into his own account. In addition, Johnson fraudulently claimed a series of tax deductions. He encouraged and assisted his son Elijah in submitting falsified records for Elijah’s grand-jury testimony. Jamison assisted Johnson in these crimes. Johnson and Jamison were convicted on 15 charges, including federal program theft under 18 U.S.C. 371, 666(a)(1)(A) and (2); tax fraud, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2); and obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b) and 1519. Johnson was sentenced to 72 months in prison. Jamison was sentenced to 60 months.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the district court’s loss calculations and to sentencing enhancements for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants, for using a minor, and for obstructing justice. The district court properly admitted “other acts” evidence of prior misuse of campaign funds. Any other errors in evidentiary rulings were harmless. View "United States v. Jamison" on Justia Law

The County of San Luis Obispo granted a permit to move an easement on a property in the coastal zone. However, the California Coastal Commission denied the permit. The trial court found in the Commission's favor.The County appealed under the California Coastal Act of 1976( Coastal Act). The CoastalAct establishes a “coastal zone,” defined by an official map and generally extending from the mean high tide line landward 1000 yards. Every city or county with jurisdiction over lands within the coastal zone is required to create a “local coastal program” to implement the provisions and policies of the Coastal Act.The Commission has de novo review authority over the County’s grant of the permit. Here, because the Commission denied the McCarthys’ permit on appeal, the development was not authorized pursuant to the Coastal Act. Thus the Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's order. View "Cave Landing, LLC v. Cal. Coastal Com." on Justia Law

Petitioner Angel Aguayo filed a motion to terminate his removal proceedings, contending his state detention and transfer to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody was unlawful. Aguayo was a native and citizen of Mexico. In 1992, he entered the United States unlawfully. For over twenty-five years, Aguayo and his wife lived in Utah and raised four children. In March 2018, Aguayo’s daughter - a United States citizen - filed a visa petition on her father’s behalf. After U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) approved the visa petition, Aguayo lawfully remained in Utah and applied to become a legal permanent resident. In 2019, state law enforcement officers arrested Aguayo in Springville, Utah. He was later charged with two counts of possession of a forged document, use or possession of drug paraphernalia, and having an open container in a vehicle. At the time of his arrest, Aguayo also had pending misdemeanor state charges for issuing a bad check, shoplifting, possession or use of a controlled substance, and use or possession of drug paraphernalia. Aguayo was detained at the Utah County Jail. The day after his arrest, agents from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) encountered Aguayo during a routine jail check. DHS then issued an immigration detainer (an “ICE hold”) for Aguayo. He remained at the Utah County Jail for about five months. In June 2019, Aguayo pled guilty to some of the pending state charges. He was sentenced to thirty days in the county jail. He would be later sentenced to 364 days’ imprisonment on the forgery convictions, and an indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed five years on the bad check conviction. DHS initiated removal proceedings; Aguayo contested his removability. The Tenth Circuit denied Aguayo's petition: he did not show he was prejudiced—under any applicable standard—by the denial of his motion to terminate removal proceedings. View "Aguayo v. Garland" on Justia Law

Noncitizens can qualify for employment-based U.S. visas by investing in designated commercial enterprises that create jobs in the United States. After making a qualifying investment, a noncitizen must petition the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for the visa. In these two consolidated appeals, investors who have waited several years for USCIS to approve their petitions sue the agency for what they see as unreasonably delayed action in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The district courts in both cases granted USCIS’s motions to dismiss, holding that the investors’ allegations do not show USCIS’s delay to be unreasonable under the circumstances.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs do not state a claim of unreasonable delay. The availability-screened queue is a rule of reason, and the complaints do not allege that USCIS follows a process other than its officially stated policy. Ruling in favor of Plaintiffs would require USCIS to process Plaintiffs’ petitions ahead of those of other petitioners who have been waiting as long or longer for their EB-5 petitions to be adjudicated. Congress did not set a deadline for agency action, Plaintiffs allege primarily financial harm, and the allegations do not point to government impropriety. View "Adrian Da Costa v. Immigration Investor Program Office" on Justia Law

The consolidated petitions in this case concern an order of the Surface Transportation Board (“the Board”) authorizing the construction and operation of a new rail line in the Uinta Basin in Utah (“Railway”). The Board exercised its authority to exempt the Railway from the Board’s more extensive application requirements in a two-part process. The first addressed the “transportation benefits” of the Railway, and the second concerned the project’s environmental impacts. As part of its environmental process, the Board created an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) outlining the various environmental impacts associated with the Railway’s construction and operation. The EIS was informed by the Board’s consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service (“Service”), which led to the development of a Biological Opinion (“BiOp”) concerning the Railway’s potential impacts on endangered species and critical habitats.Petitioners include various environmental organizations and a Colorado county that alleges it will be impacted by the Railway even though it is located “downline” of the proposed rail line’s construction area.The D.C. Circuit granted the petitions in part, denied them in part, vacated the underlying order as well as the EIS and the BiOp in part, and remand to the Board for further proceedings. View "Eagle County, Colorado v. STB" on Justia Law

Appellant Watkins Law & Advocacy, PLLC, submitted requests under the Freedom of Information Act to various federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Watkins sought records concerning the process by which the names of certain veterans and other VA beneficiaries are added to a background check system that identifies persons barred from possessing firearms for having been adjudicated as “mental defective[s].” Watkins initiated this FOIA action in the district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the agencies on almost all claims (and to Watkins on the remaining claims, none of which are at issue here). Watkins appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the FBI and DOJ on the adequacy of their searches and to the VA on its withholding of documents based on the deliberative process and attorney-client privileges.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the FBI and DOJ. But we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the VA and remand for further proceedings. The VA did not satisfy its burden to show that the withheld documents are exempt from disclosure. The court concluded that the VA failed to adequately set out its basis for asserting the deliberative process and attorney-client privileges as to the withheld documents. The court wrote that because the VA offers no arguments about specific documents other than the eight that Watkins highlighted as illustrations, a blanket remand is appropriate. View "Watkins Law & Advocacy, PLLC v. DOJ" on Justia Law

The City of Nashua (the City) appealed a superior court order granting the petition of Laurie Ortolano compelling the City to conduct a reasonable search of its back-up tapes for records in response to Ortolano’s Right-to-Know Law request. The request asked for all emails sent and received by the following current and former City employees: Louise Brown, between November 1, 2020 and her last day of work, December 25, 2020; Amanda Mazerolle, between November 1, 2020 and March 7, 2021; and Karina Ochoa, between November 1, 2020 and March 7, 2021. The City replied on June 23, 2021 informing Ortolano that Mazerolle and Ochoa would both conduct reasonable searches for records matching Ortolano’s descriptions and that Ortolano would receive an update or response by July 16, 2021. The City stated that it no longer had “reasonable access to Ms. Brown’s emails from the time of her employment.” the City “claim[ed] that it met its requirement under RSA 91-A by looking for emails in Ms. Brown’s Outlook application and her personal U-drive and it was not required under RSA 91-A:4, III(b) to search the City’s backup tapes because such tapes are not ‘readily accessible’ as defined by the statute.” The trial court found that “it is undisputed that the City’s backup tape system exists, can be searched, and that files such as those requested by the petitioner are retrievable from the backup tapes.” After review of the superior court record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in finding that the requested emails on the back-up tapes were “readily accessible” to the City. View "Ortolano v. City of Nashua" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding Mother sole legal and physical custody of the parties' minor child and making some of Mother's requested findings to support an application to obtain special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status for the child under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, holding that there was no abuse of discretion.Mother and Father were married in Mexico and had one child, Max. The parties later moved to Nebraska, where they separated. Mother filed a complaint for dissolution, requesting sole legal and physical custody of Max. The district court dissolved the marriage and awarded Mother custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by refusing to make all the SIJ findings that Mother requested; and (2) Mother's second assignment of error was without merit. View "Hernandez v. Dorantes" on Justia Law

The statute at issue in this appeal, 19 Del. C. § 2322F, provided a mechanism for employers and their workers’ compensation carriers to challenge proposed or provided health care services relating to compensable work injuries. An employer sought review of a superior court opinion reversing a decision by the Industrial Accident Board (the “IAB” or “Board”) regarding the reasonableness of a prescribed course of treatment. The IAB initially dismissed this case as moot, but the superior court reversed and remanded that decision in 2019. On remand, the IAB held that the claimant-employee’s ongoing narcotics treatment after June 2017 was unreasonable, unnecessary, and therefore not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The superior court then reversed the IAB again, holding there was no justiciable issue before the Board because the claimant employee had not submitted any medical claims to his employer for ongoing treatment. The employer argued the superior court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the IAB could not consider the compensability of an employee’s ongoing narcotics treatment until the employee submitted invoices for payment to the employer and the employer disputed those invoices in the statutory review process. Because the superior court incorrectly interpreted 19 Del. C. § 2322F with respect to the justiciability of the employer’s petition, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision, vacated the attorneys’ fees award, and reinstated the IAB’s determination. View "This and That Services Co. Inc. v. Nieves" on Justia Law

In 2016, Salansky, the Great Smoky Mountains National Park’s Fire Management Officer, discovered a slow-moving fire covering less than an acre. Due to the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday, most of the Park’s staff were away. Eight days later (November 24), Salansky observed that building a fire line would be impossible. Salansky opted to let the fire burn, using the natural terrain for containment. On November 27, Salansky requested additional firefighting resources. A National Guard helicopter dropped water onto the fire. By evening, the fire had spread to 35-40 acres within Park boundaries. Salansky did not monitor the fire overnight. At 4:05 a.m., the National Weather Service issued a high-wind warning. By 7:30 a.m., Salansky estimated that the fire had grown to 250-500 acres. Burning embers created smaller fires a mile away. People in Gatlinburg observed heavy smoke and ash. A 10:58 a.m. call was the first communication between Park staff and any local official about the fire. Around 5:45 p.m., the Gatlinburg Fire Department received reports of fires within the city. Winds gusted to 87 mph and the fire grew to 5,000 acres. Total evacuation of the Gatlinburg area was ordered. Evacuation efforts were hampered by infrastructure damage. Ultimately, 14 people died, 191 were injured, 2,500 structures were damaged or destroyed, and more than 17,000 acres burned.The Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal of “failure to warn” suits under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA). Before filing suit under the FTCA, a claimant must “present” that claim to the agency, 28 U.S.C. 2675(a); the plaintiffs’ forms sufficiently enabled the Department of the Interior to investigate. On remand, to determine whether the claims are barred by the FTCA's discretionary-function exception, the district court should address whether certain publications constitute mandatory directives. View "Abbott v. United States" on Justia Law