Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a challenge to a tariff adopted by the California Public Utilities Commission (Commission) that significantly reduced the compensation utilities pay to customers who generate electricity through rooftop solar panels and export excess energy to the grid. Petitioners, including environmental organizations, argued that the Commission’s tariff was inconsistent with Public Utilities Code section 2827.1, which requires the Commission to ensure that compensation for customer-generators reflects the costs and benefits of renewable generation and supports sustainable growth, particularly among disadvantaged communities.The First Appellate District, Division Three, of the California Court of Appeal granted a writ of review and affirmed the Commission’s decision. In doing so, the Court of Appeal applied a highly deferential standard of review derived from the California Supreme Court’s decision in Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com., asking only whether the Commission’s interpretation of the statute bore a reasonable relation to statutory purposes and language. The court concluded that the Commission’s approach satisfied this standard and declined to engage in a more searching review of the statutory interpretation.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine whether the deferential Greyhound standard remains appropriate following legislative amendments to the Public Utilities Code. The Supreme Court held that, for Commission decisions not pertaining solely to water corporations, the deferential Greyhound standard no longer applies. Instead, courts must independently review the Commission’s statutory interpretations under the standards set forth in Public Utilities Code sections 1757 and 1757.1, which parallel the review of other administrative agencies. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this less deferential standard. View "Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com." on Justia Law

Two pharmaceutical companies challenged a federal program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which directs the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to negotiate prices for certain high-expenditure prescription drugs lacking generic competition. Under this program, manufacturers of selected drugs must either negotiate a price with CMS or face steep excise taxes on all sales of those drugs, unless they withdraw all their products from specific Medicare and Medicaid programs. Both companies had drugs selected for negotiation and, while litigation was pending, agreed to participate and reached negotiated prices.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey resolved the cases on cross-motions for summary judgment, as the parties agreed there were no material factual disputes. The District Court ruled in favor of the government, holding that the program did not violate the Takings Clause, the First Amendment, or the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The companies appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit consolidated the appeals.The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s orders. It held that participation in Medicare and the negotiation program is voluntary, so there is no physical taking under the Fifth Amendment. The court found that economic incentives to participate do not amount to legal compulsion. It also held that the program’s requirements do not compel speech in violation of the First Amendment, as any speech involved is incidental to the regulation of conduct and participation is voluntary. Finally, the court concluded that the program does not impose unconstitutional conditions, as any compelled speech is limited to the contracts necessary to effectuate the program and does not restrict speech outside those contracts. The court affirmed summary judgment for the government. View "Bristol Myers Squibb Co v. Secretary United States Department of HHS" on Justia Law

A civilian employee of the Defense Logistics Agency in Hawaii, who had served in the National Guard and developed post-traumatic stress disorder, alleged that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. After a series of workplace incidents, the agency suspended him indefinitely, citing concerns about his access to sensitive information. The employee claimed that the agency failed to provide reasonable accommodations and improperly deemed him a direct threat.The employee filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint, which eventually led to a final agency decision (FAD) against him. The agency transmitted the FAD and related documents electronically using a secure system, but made several errors in providing the necessary passphrase to decrypt the document. As a result, the employee’s attorney was unable to access the FAD for several weeks, despite repeated requests for assistance and clarification. The attorney finally received an accessible, decrypted copy of the FAD by email on December 5, 2022. The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii 88 days later. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary of Defense, finding the complaint untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the initial electronic transmission, and denied equitable tolling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that the 90-day limitations period for filing suit under the Rehabilitation Act did not begin until the attorney received effective notice of the agency’s decision, which occurred when he received the decrypted FAD on December 5. Alternatively, the court held that equitable tolling was warranted because the attorney diligently sought access to the FAD and was prevented by extraordinary circumstances. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits. View "ASUNCION V. HEGSETH" on Justia Law

Several commercial air tour operators challenged federal regulations that banned all commercial air tours over Mount Rushmore National Memorial and Badlands National Park. The dispute arose after the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Park Service, in response to statutory requirements and litigation, issued air tour management plans (ATMPs) in 2023 that prohibited such tours, citing negative impacts on visitor experience, wildlife, and tribal cultural resources. The operators argued that the agencies’ actions were arbitrary and capricious, violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and failed to consider reasonable alternatives or aviation safety.Previously, the agencies had attempted to negotiate voluntary agreements with the tour operators, as permitted by the Air Tour Management Act. However, after one operator declined to participate, the agencies shifted to developing ATMPs. This change was influenced by a writ of mandamus issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in In re Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, which compelled the agencies to bring certain parks into compliance with the Act. The agencies then considered several alternatives before ultimately banning all commercial air tours in the final plans.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the petitions for review filed by the tour operators. The court held that the agencies’ decision to end voluntary agreement negotiations and proceed with ATMPs was not arbitrary or capricious. It further found that the agencies complied with NEPA’s procedural requirements, used reasonable data, considered an adequate range of alternatives, and sufficiently addressed aviation safety concerns. The court concluded that the agencies’ decisions were reasonable and reasonably explained, and therefore denied the petitions to vacate the air tour management plans. View "Badger Helicopters Inc. v. FAA" on Justia Law

A small business that imports and sells shea butter hired an individual in 2017 to provide communication, marketing, and sales support, particularly focusing on social media. The individual worked under a contract that labeled her as an independent contractor, but after the contract expired, she continued to perform a mix of social media, event, and administrative tasks. She stopped working regularly for the business in September 2018. A dispute arose over unpaid wages, with the individual claiming she was owed for work performed, and the business asserting that she was paid for all work under the terms of the contract.The Office of Wage-Hour (OWH) initially determined that the business owed the individual back wages, liquidated damages, and a statutory penalty. The business appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), arguing that the individual was an independent contractor. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the individual was an employee, not an independent contractor, and awarded damages. On the first petition for review, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the individual worked in both capacities—sometimes as an employee and sometimes as an independent contractor—and remanded for OAH to determine the hours worked in each capacity and adjust the damages accordingly. On remand, the ALJ used a percentage-based approach to allocate hours and payments between employee and independent contractor work, ultimately awarding the individual approximately $26,550 in unpaid wages and damages, plus a statutory penalty.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, reviewing the case again, affirmed the OAH’s amended final order. The court held that under the current D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law, employees may pursue claims for disputed wages even if the employer paid conceded wages. The court also held that, due to inadequate recordkeeping by the employer, the burden of proof shifted to the employer to disprove the employee’s evidence regarding hours worked and payments received. View "Shea Yeleen Health & Beauty, LLC v. Office of Wage-Hour" on Justia Law

A physician licensed in Florida worked at a weight management clinic, where he was responsible for maintaining a federal registration to dispense controlled substances. After a report of missing controlled substances at the clinic, local police and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) began investigating. The investigation revealed that the physician had issued numerous prescriptions for controlled substances without proper documentation of a doctor-patient relationship, failed to maintain required records, did not properly report or store controlled substances, and dispensed medication in violation of labeling requirements. The physician claimed that another clinic employee had forged his signature on some prescriptions and denied personal wrongdoing.The DEA issued an Order to Show Cause, notifying the physician of its intent to revoke his registration and deny pending applications, citing violations of federal and state law. The physician submitted a Corrective Action Plan but did not request a hearing. The DEA Administrator reviewed the evidence, including expert testimony and the physician’s admissions, and found that the physician’s continued registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. The Administrator revoked the registration and denied all pending applications, emphasizing the physician’s failure to accept responsibility and the inadequacy of his proposed corrective measures.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the DEA’s final order under an abuse of discretion standard, deferring to the agency’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. The court held that the physician received adequate procedural due process, as he was given notice and an opportunity for a hearing, which he declined. The court also rejected the argument that the DEA was required to find knowing or intentional misconduct under Ruan v. United States, holding that such a mens rea requirement does not apply to administrative revocation proceedings under 21 U.S.C. § 824. The petition for review was denied. View "Ashraf v. Drug Enforcement Administration" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the owners and operators of a tourist attraction, Bear World, and the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) over the closure of an intersection on Highway 20 in Madison County, Idaho. Bear Crest Limited LLC owns parcels of land leased to Yellowstone Bear World Inc., and Michael Ferguson is associated with both entities. In 1973, the original landowners (the Gideons) conveyed land to ITD’s predecessor for highway expansion, reserving “Access to the County Road Connection.” In 2016, as part of a highway upgrade to controlled-access status, ITD closed the intersection nearest Bear World, requiring visitors to use a more circuitous route, increasing travel distance by about five miles.After the intersection closure, the plaintiffs sued ITD for breach of contract and inverse condemnation, arguing that the closure violated the reserved access right in the Gideon deed and constituted a taking of property without just compensation. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Madison County, granted summary judgment to ITD, finding that the deed did not guarantee access to Highway 20, only to a county road, and that the closure did not amount to a compensable taking since alternative access remained.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reversed in part, vacated the district court’s judgment, and remanded. The Court held that Bear Crest Limited had standing and that the Gideon deed unambiguously reserved access to the specific Highway 20 connection, not merely to a county road. The Court found that ITD’s closure of the intersection breached the deed and substantially impaired Bear Crest’s access rights, constituting a taking under Idaho law. The Court directed entry of partial summary judgment for Bear Crest on both claims, reserving damages and other issues for further proceedings. View "Bear Crest Limited LLC v. State of idaho" on Justia Law

A group of business associations challenged a Minnesota law that prohibits employers from taking adverse action against employees who decline to attend meetings or receive communications about religious or political matters. The law also requires employers to post a notice of employee rights and directs the Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Industry to develop an educational poster about these rights. The plaintiffs sued the Minnesota Attorney General, the Commissioner, and the Governor, seeking to prevent enforcement of the law. The Attorney General and Commissioner both declared that they had not enforced, nor intended to enforce, the law. The Governor, who was added as a defendant after making public statements about the law, also had no direct enforcement role.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, which was based on state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The court found that the Governor’s public statements and removal power over the Commissioner, as well as the Commissioner’s duties under the law, were sufficient to allow the suit to proceed under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity. The court also found that the Attorney General’s statutory enforcement authority was enough to keep him in the case, despite his declaration of no present intent to enforce the law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. It held that the Governor’s administrative powers, such as appointing or removing the Commissioner, were too attenuated from enforcement to make him a proper defendant under Ex parte Young. The Commissioner’s role in developing an educational poster was deemed ministerial, not enforcement-related. As for the Attorney General, the court found that his sworn declaration of no present intent to enforce the law deprived the plaintiffs of standing. The court ordered dismissal with prejudice as to the Governor and Commissioner, and without prejudice as to the Attorney General. View "MN Chapter of Assoc. Builders v. Ellison" on Justia Law

Reginald Brown, who was serving as interim police chief in Monroe, Louisiana, was dismissed from the Monroe Police Department following his handling of an excessive force complaint against officers. The incident involved a body camera recording showing an officer kicking a suspect, Timothy Williams, during an arrest. Brown was informed of the complaint and took immediate steps, including placing officers on administrative leave and notifying city officials. However, questions arose regarding the timing of Brown’s decision to request the Louisiana State Police to conduct the criminal investigation, particularly whether the delay was influenced by an upcoming mayoral election. Subsequent internal reviews included an interrogation and a polygraph examination, which Brown was found to have failed, leading to allegations of dishonesty and improper delay for personal benefit.Brown appealed his termination to the Monroe Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board, which, after hearing testimony and reviewing evidence, found cause for discipline but determined that termination was excessive. The board reduced the penalty to a ninety-day suspension without pay. The City of Monroe appealed to the Fourth Judicial District Court, which reinstated Brown’s termination, finding his conduct egregious and the board’s reduction arbitrary. Brown then appealed to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, which reversed the district court and reinstated the board’s ninety-day suspension, holding that the district court lacked authority to modify the board’s disciplinary decision once it found the board acted in good faith for cause.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeal’s decision. The court clarified that judicial review of the board’s disciplinary decisions is limited to determining whether the board acted in good faith for cause, and courts may not modify the board’s chosen discipline if that standard is met. The Supreme Court held that the board’s decision to reduce Brown’s discipline was reasonably supported by the evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. View "MONROE MUNICIPAL FIRE AND POLICE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD VS. BROWN" on Justia Law

In 2018, the plaintiff was placed on an involuntary 72-hour psychiatric hold, resulting in the creation of a confidential record by the Orange County Sheriff’s Department. In 2021, during a legal dispute over their father’s estate, the plaintiff discovered that his sister’s attorney had obtained this confidential record and used it to threaten him in an attempt to force dismissal of his elder abuse lawsuit against his sister. The record had been released by an office specialist at the Sheriff’s Department, who admitted knowing the sister was not entitled to the record but disclosed it anyway, believing she was concerned for the plaintiff’s well-being.A jury in the Superior Court of Orange County found that the office specialist willfully and knowingly disclosed the confidential record, awarding the plaintiff $29,000 in economic damages and $40,000 in noneconomic damages. The jury also found the plaintiff’s sister and her attorney responsible for 25 percent of the damages. However, the trial court granted a motion for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding there was insufficient evidence of willfulness, declined to treble the damages, and apportioned both economic and noneconomic damages, entering judgment for 75 percent of the total damages against the office specialist and the County.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that “willfully and knowingly” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5330 means intentionally releasing confidential records to someone known to be unauthorized, regardless of intent to harm. The court found substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding of willfulness, requiring trebling of damages. The court also held that while noneconomic damages could be apportioned to other tortfeasors, economic damages could not. The case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for $177,000 against the County and the office specialist, jointly and severally. View "Doe v. County of Orange" on Justia Law