Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Janet Cote owns a property that was previously a gas station site. After discovering significant petroleum contamination in the soil, she applied for and received reimbursement from the Petroleum Cleanup Fund (PCF). The Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) later denied further reimbursement for costs associated with a licensed engineer and additional items on Cote’s property. The Environmental Division affirmed the ANR’s decision in part and reversed in part. Cote appealed the denied reimbursements.The Environmental Division held a two-day hearing and concluded that the ANR must reimburse Cote for electrical work, concrete work, and wastewater work, as these were pre-approved and the ANR’s subsequent denial was unreasonable. However, the court upheld the ANR’s denial of costs for a licensed engineer and other punch list items, finding the ANR’s decision reasonable and consistent with the law.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the ANR’s denial of reimbursement for the licensed engineer and punch list items was reasonable. The court found the Environmental Division’s analysis lacking, as it did not adequately explain why the ANR’s denial was reasonable or provide sufficient findings of fact. The court noted that the Environmental Division merely restated the ANR’s conclusory arguments without proper analysis.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, instructing the Environmental Division to make adequate factual findings and any additional conclusions necessary on the disputed reimbursement claims. The court emphasized the need for clear reasoning and analysis to support the decision. View "In re Cote/Maquam Shore Market" on Justia Law

In early 2019, G.K. and K.K. purchased a homeowners insurance policy from Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company for their residence. The policy included an anti-assignment clause prohibiting assignment without the insurer's consent. In May 2020, after the policy expired, the Policyholders reported roof damage from a 2019 storm and hired Featherfall Restoration, LLC to repair it. Travelers denied the claim, citing wear and tear. The Policyholders then assigned their claim to Featherfall, which Travelers refused to recognize due to the anti-assignment clause.Featherfall filed a complaint with the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA), asserting its right to act in place of the Policyholders. The MIA upheld Travelers' denial, stating the anti-assignment clause invalidated the assignment. Featherfall requested a hearing, arguing the clause should not apply to post-loss assignments. The MIA Commissioner granted summary decision in favor of Travelers, finding the assignment invalid and Featherfall not entitled to a hearing.Featherfall sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which affirmed the MIA's decision and denied declaratory relief. The Appellate Court of Maryland also affirmed, holding that anti-assignment clauses apply to post-loss assignments and that Featherfall lacked standing.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the anti-assignment clause did not prohibit the assignment of a post-loss claim. The court distinguished between the policy itself and a claim arising under it, noting that a claim is a chose in action and thus assignable. The court reversed the lower courts' decisions and remanded the case to the MIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Petition of Featherfall Restoration" on Justia Law

Kevin Rowe filed a lawsuit against his ex-wife, Dione Rowe, alleging tortious interference with a business relationship. Dione, with the help of her daughters, sent a letter to the Tribal Land Enterprise (TLE) making disparaging allegations against Kevin, who leased Tribal-owned land from the TLE. The letter requested the TLE to cancel Kevin’s leases and lease the land to her daughters instead. The TLE rescinded Kevin’s leases at their next board meeting, leading Kevin to file the lawsuit.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Tripp County, South Dakota, denied Dione’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that her letter was an absolutely privileged communication under SDCL 20-11-5(2). The court concluded that the TLE meeting was a quasi-judicial proceeding but held that the privilege did not apply because the TLE did not follow its own procedures, including providing notice to Kevin.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the absolute privilege under SDCL 20-11-5(2) applies to claims of tortious interference with a business relationship. The court found that the TLE board meeting was an official proceeding authorized by law and that Dione’s letter had a logical relation to the TLE’s proceedings. The court also determined that the lack of notice to Kevin did not negate the privilege. Additionally, the court concluded that Dione did not waive the privilege by failing to plead it in her answer, as the issue was tried by implied consent during the summary judgment proceedings. The Supreme Court directed the lower court to enter summary judgment in favor of Dione. View "Rowe v. Rowe" on Justia Law

The Northwestern Illinois Area Agency on Aging (NIAAA) filed lawsuits against Paula Basta, the former Director of the Illinois Department on Aging (IDA), alleging that Basta unlawfully refused to hold hearings on three administrative petitions filed by NIAAA. These petitions concerned grievances about withheld funding and rejected service provider designations. NIAAA claimed that these actions violated their rights under the Older Americans Act (OAA) and Illinois state law.The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of Basta, determining that NIAAA did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in the funding or service provider designations. Subsequently, the federal district court dismissed NIAAA’s suit, finding it time-barred and failing to state a claim. NIAAA then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that NIAAA’s claims related to the denials of the Initial Petition and APS Petition were barred by the statute of limitations, as they accrued by September 2019 and were not tolled by NIAAA’s state court litigation. The court also agreed with the district court that NIAAA failed to plausibly allege a due process violation, as the Illinois Supreme Court had determined that NIAAA did not have a property interest in the funding or service provider designations.Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit found that the OAA provisions at issue did not create individual rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court concluded that the OAA’s language and context did not unambiguously confer individual rights upon NIAAA, and thus, NIAAA could not enforce these provisions through § 1983. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Basta. View "Northwestern Illinois Area Agency on Aging v. Basta" on Justia Law

A group of television and radio broadcasters challenged the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) 2023 Order, which retained all existing media ownership rules and tightened one of them following the 2018 Quadrennial Review. The broadcasters argued that the FCC erred by defining the relevant video and audio markets too narrowly, retaining all parts of the radio and television ownership rules, and tightening Note 11 of the television ownership rule.The FCC's 2023 Order was issued after the 2018 Quadrennial Review, which included a notice of proposed rulemaking and a public comment period. The FCC retained the Local Radio Ownership Rule and the Local Television Ownership Rule, defining the markets narrowly to exclude non-broadcast sources. The FCC justified its decision by emphasizing the unique aspects of broadcast sources and the need to prevent excessive consolidation. The FCC also modified Note 11 to prevent circumvention of the Top-Four Prohibition by including low-power TV stations and multicast streams.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in retaining the Top-Four Prohibition part of the television ownership rule and improperly tightened Note 11. The court vacated and remanded the Top-Four Prohibition and the amendment to Note 11 but withheld the issuance of the mandate for 90 days to allow the FCC an opportunity to provide adequate justification. The court denied the remainder of the petition, upholding the FCC's market definitions and retention of the Local Radio Ownership Rule and the Two-Station Limit. View "Zimmer Radio of Mid-Missouri, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

In this case, the Attorney General of New Jersey decided to supersede control of the Paterson Police Department following a fatal police shooting. The Attorney General appointed Isa M. Abbassi, a veteran NYPD officer, as the Officer in Charge (OIC) and reassigned the Paterson Police Chief, Engelbert Ribeiro, to the Police Training Commission in Trenton. Plaintiffs, including Paterson officials, challenged the Attorney General's authority to supersede the police department without local consent.The case was first brought to the Law Division, which transferred it to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division consolidated the actions and ultimately reversed the Attorney General's decision, ruling that the Attorney General exceeded his statutory powers. The appellate court directed the defendants to reassign Ribeiro to Paterson, relinquish control of the department to city officials, and provide a report summarizing their actions and expenditures during the supersession.The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the case and found evidence that the Legislature intended to authorize the supersession in two statutes: Chapter 94, which facilitated the OIC's leadership, and the appropriations bill for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2024, which funded the Attorney General's operation of the department. The Court did not base its holding on other statutes or authorities cited by the defendants. The Court reversed the Appellate Division's judgment, finding that the Attorney General's supersession of the Paterson Police Department was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and had fair support in the record. The Court did not address whether the Attorney General has general authority to supersede municipal police departments in other circumstances. View "Bulur v. The New Jersey Office of the Attorney General" on Justia Law

Employees of Veolia Water Contract Operations USA, Inc. filed a lawsuit in Massachusetts state court, claiming they were entitled to prevailing wages under the Massachusetts Prevailing Wage Act (PWA) for work performed. They argued that their work fell within the scope of the PWA. Veolia removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Veolia. The court concluded that the Special Act of 1997, which pertains to the Springfield Water and Sewer Commission, exempted Veolia from the obligation to pay prevailing wages under the PWA. The employees appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The central issue was whether the Special Act required Veolia to pay prevailing wages. The court noted that the outcome depended on unresolved questions of Massachusetts law and significant policy concerns. Consequently, the First Circuit decided to certify the dispositive state law questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for clarification.The First Circuit certified two questions: the meaning of "construction and design of improvements" in the Special Act and whether the Special Act is incompatible with the PWA under the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc. The First Circuit retained jurisdiction over the appeal pending the resolution of these certified questions. View "Nicholls v. Veolia Water Contract Operations USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Robust Missouri Dispensary 3, LLC, operates a dispensary in Florissant, an incorporated city in St. Louis County. After Missouri voters approved a constitutional amendment legalizing non-medical marijuana and allowing local governments to impose a 3 percent sales tax, both Florissant and St. Louis County enacted such a tax. Robust collected and remitted the tax to Florissant but not to St. Louis County. The Missouri Department of Revenue notified Robust that it must also remit the tax to St. Louis County. Robust sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the constitutional amendment only allows a village, town, or city in an incorporated area to impose the tax, not a county.The Circuit Court of St. Louis County granted summary judgment in favor of St. Louis and St. Charles Counties, finding that the definition of "local government" includes a county in an incorporated area. The court reasoned that excluding counties from the definition would frustrate the amendment's purpose of protecting public health. Robust appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case de novo and found that the plain language of the constitutional amendment distinguishes between incorporated and unincorporated areas. The court held that in an incorporated area, only a village, town, or city can impose the 3 percent sales tax, while in an unincorporated area, only a county can impose the tax. The court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case to enter judgment in favor of Robust, ruling that St. Louis County cannot impose the tax on sales within Florissant. View "Robust Missouri Dispensary 3, LLC v. St. Louis County" on Justia Law

Katrina Robertson, an independent contractor working as a polygraph examiner for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), was involved in an automobile accident while exiting the DIA campus. She sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that a DIA employee's negligence caused the accident. The government moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that it had not waived its sovereign immunity under the FTCA because a private employer in similar circumstances would be immune from suit under Virginia law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the government's motion to dismiss. The court found that the DIA was a "statutory employer" under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act (VWCA) and that Robertson's injury occurred during the course of her work. Therefore, the VWCA provided the exclusive remedy, and the government was immune from the suit. The district court also denied Robertson's motion to certify a question to the Supreme Court of Virginia as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that under the FTCA, the United States is liable only to the extent that a private party would be liable in similar circumstances. Since a private employer in Virginia would be immune from a negligence suit under the VWCA if it were a statutory employer, the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Robertson v. United States" on Justia Law

CPI Security Systems, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Vivint Smart Home, Inc., alleging that Vivint engaged in deceptive practices to lure away CPI’s customers. Vivint sales representatives falsely claimed that Vivint had acquired CPI, that CPI was going out of business, or that Vivint needed to upgrade CPI’s equipment. These tactics led many CPI customers to switch to Vivint, causing significant losses for CPI. A jury found Vivint liable for violating the Lanham Act, the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), and for committing the common-law torts of unfair competition and tortious interference with contracts. The jury awarded CPI $49.7 million in compensatory damages and $140 million in punitive damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina upheld the jury’s verdict. Vivint appealed, raising several issues, including the requirement of CPI’s reliance on false statements for the UDTPA claim, the sufficiency of evidence supporting the damages award, the application of North Carolina’s cap on punitive damages, and the admission of prejudicial evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found no reversible error. The court held that CPI was not required to prove its own reliance on Vivint’s false statements to establish a UDTPA claim, as the claim was based on unfair competition rather than fraud. The court also found that the evidence presented by CPI was sufficient to support the jury’s damages award. Additionally, the court ruled that the district court correctly applied North Carolina’s cap on punitive damages by considering the total compensatory damages awarded. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Vivint’s motion to bifurcate the trial or in its evidentiary rulings. The reassignment of the trial judge post-trial did not warrant a new trial. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "CPI Security Systems, Inc. v. Vivint Smart Home, Inc." on Justia Law