Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

CoreCivic, Inc. has contracted with the federal government since 1996 to operate a private immigration detention center in Elizabeth, New Jersey. In 2023, CoreCivic planned to renew its contract, but New Jersey passed a law (AB 5207) prohibiting new, expanded, or renewed contracts for civil immigration detention. CoreCivic sued, arguing that the law violates the Supremacy Clause by infringing on intergovernmental immunity and being preempted by federal law. The United States supported CoreCivic, emphasizing the detention center's critical role in federal immigration enforcement.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary judgment in favor of CoreCivic. The court found that AB 5207 interferes with the federal government's discretion in detaining aliens, violating intergovernmental immunity and being preempted by federal law. New Jersey appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that AB 5207 directly regulates the federal government by effectively banning contracts for immigration detention, a core federal function. The court emphasized that the law's impact on federal operations is substantial, as it would cripple ICE's ability to detain and remove aliens efficiently. The court concluded that New Jersey's law violates intergovernmental immunity and is unconstitutional as applied to CoreCivic. View "CoreCivic, Inc. v. Governor of New Jersey" on Justia Law

Keith Huck, an elected member of the Perry County Common Council, was covered under the county's group health insurance plan. In 2023, the Perry County Board of Commissioners voted to exclude part-time employees from health insurance coverage, classifying elected officials, including Huck, as part-time employees. As a result, Huck and his spouse lost their health insurance coverage on January 1, 2024. Huck sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that as an elected official, he should be considered a full-time employee and thus eligible for health insurance coverage.The Perry Circuit Court granted Huck's request for a preliminary injunction, ordering the county to reinstate his insurance coverage. The County appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals determined that the county had the authority to classify elected officials as part-time employees and exclude them from health insurance coverage. Huck then sought transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, which vacated the appellate opinion and reviewed the case.The Indiana Supreme Court held that the county was within its rights to classify Huck as a part-time employee and exclude him from group health insurance coverage. The court found that Indiana law allows local governmental units to exclude part-time employees from group health insurance and that the county's classification of Huck as a part-time employee was permissible. The court reversed the trial court's ruling, vacated the preliminary injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Perry County v. Huck" on Justia Law

A healthcare provider, Neurological Surgery Practice of Long Island, PLLC, provides out-of-network medical services governed by the No Surprises Act. This Act requires out-of-network providers to seek compensation from the patient’s healthcare plan rather than billing patients directly. If a provider and a healthcare plan cannot agree on a compensation amount, an independent dispute resolution (IDR) process is used. Neurological Surgery alleges that a backlog of disputes has resulted in unpaid or delayed reimbursements due to the Departments of Health and Human Services, Treasury, and Labor failing to implement the Act properly, violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Neurological Surgery’s claims. The court concluded that the claims were moot due to the reopening of the IDR portal, Neurological Surgery lacked standing to compel the Departments to enforce the Act’s deadlines on third parties, and the claims regarding the Departments’ failure to certify a sufficient number of arbitrators and provide guidance on New York’s surprise billing law were foreclosed by the APA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, agreeing that the challenge to the pause of the IDR portal was moot since the portal was operational. The court also held that Neurological Surgery lacked standing to compel the Departments to enforce deadlines on healthcare plans and IDR entities, as the injury was caused by third parties, not the Departments. Additionally, the court found that the challenge to the Departments’ failure to certify a sufficient number of IDR entities was foreclosed by the APA, as the Act did not specify discrete actions required by the Departments. Lastly, the court held that the challenge to the Departments’ failure to issue guidance on New York’s surprise billing law failed to state a claim under the APA. View "Neurological Surgery v. Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

In June 2021, a deputy of the Maricopa County Sheriff rear-ended the plaintiffs while driving a vehicle owned by Maricopa County. The plaintiffs filed a notice of claim with the clerk of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors and subsequently sued the County, arguing it was vicariously liable for the deputy’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The County moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting it lacked the requisite control over the deputy to be held vicariously liable. The Superior Court in Maricopa County agreed and granted the County’s motion to dismiss.The plaintiffs appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, arguing that the deputy is an employee of the County and thus the County should be liable for his negligence. The Court of Appeals held that the County was not vicariously liable because it lacked the necessary control over deputy county sheriffs. The court also noted that county sheriffs qualify as public entities for notice of claim purposes under Arizona law.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether a county can be held vicariously liable for a deputy county sheriff’s negligence and whether the county is the proper public entity for notice of claim purposes. The Court held that a county does not control a deputy county sheriff when carrying out law enforcement duties and therefore cannot be vicariously liable for a deputy’s negligence. The Court further held that a sheriff in his official capacity is vicariously liable for any negligence or misconduct committed by a deputy engaged in law enforcement duties. Additionally, the Court clarified that a claimant may satisfy the notice of claim requirements by filing with the county sheriff’s office, which is responsible for the sheriff’s administrative functions. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of the case and vacated the opinion of the Court of Appeals. View "Sanchez v. Maricopa County" on Justia Law

The case involves the Trump administration's "Remain in Mexico" policy, also known as the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), which required asylum seekers arriving at the U.S. southern border to stay in Mexico while their claims were processed. The policy was first implemented in 2019, causing significant hardships for asylum seekers, including unsafe living conditions and limited access to legal representation. The Biden administration terminated the policy in 2021, but the second Trump administration sought to reimplement it in January 2025.The Central District of California reviewed the case and granted an emergency stay of the policy's reimplementation, citing violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and constitutional rights. The district court found that the policy severely impeded asylum seekers' access to legal representation and created dangerous conditions for them in Mexico. The government appealed the stay, arguing that it interfered with its discretionary authority to manage immigration and foreign policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal and partially granted the government's motion for a stay pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit limited the district court's stay to apply only to the current and future clients of the Immigrant Defenders Law Center (ImmDef), allowing the government to reimplement the policy for other asylum seekers. The court found that ImmDef had standing to challenge the policy and that the reimplementation likely violated the APA by infringing on asylum seekers' statutory rights to apply for asylum with the assistance of counsel. View "Immigrant Defenders Law Center v. Noem" on Justia Law

In early 2025, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) implemented a new policy prohibiting NIH from funding certain categories of scientific research grants. Two groups of plaintiffs, including private research organizations, individual researchers, and several states, sued, alleging that the new policy and the resulting grant terminations violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the U.S. Constitution. They argued that the policy was arbitrary and capricious, as the prohibited research categories were undefined and the rationale for discontinuing the research was circular.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held a trial on the merits and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding the agencies' actions to be "breathtakingly arbitrary and capricious." The court set aside the new policy and related grant terminations as illegal under the APA. The court found that the decisions were based on circular reasoning, lacked a rational connection to the facts, and ignored significant reliance interests. The government then moved for a stay of the district court's order pending appeal, which the district court denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to review the agency action under the APA and to grant declaratory relief. The court found that the district court's orders did not enforce a contractual obligation to pay money but rather provided declaratory relief that set aside agency actions as arbitrary and capricious. The court also determined that the grant terminations were reviewable under the APA and that the Department had failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court denied the Department's motion for a stay, concluding that the balance of equities and the public interest favored the plaintiffs. View "American Public Health Assn v. National Institutes of Health" on Justia Law

The Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability, Inc. filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests with six intelligence agencies seeking documents related to the upstreaming and unmasking of forty-eight named current and former members of congressional intelligence committees from January 1, 2008, to January 15, 2020. All six agencies issued Glomar responses, refusing to confirm or deny the existence of such records, citing multiple FOIA exemptions, including Exemption 1 for classified national security materials. The Project challenged these responses in court.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the agencies, concluding that the Glomar responses were proper under FOIA’s first exemption. The court found that the agencies were not required to search for responsive documents before issuing their Glomar responses and that the agencies' affidavits sufficiently supported their responses.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the agencies' Glomar responses were justified under Exemption 1, which allows withholding information that is classified under criteria established by an Executive order. The court found that the agencies' affidavits provided specific, logical, and plausible justifications for the Glomar responses, explaining that disclosing the existence or nonexistence of the requested records could harm national security by revealing intelligence sources, methods, and priorities. The court also rejected the Project's argument that the agencies were required to search for records before issuing Glomar responses, citing precedent that an agency need not search its records before invoking Glomar. View "Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability, Inc. v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Crowley Government Services, Inc. ("Crowley") entered into a contract with the Department of Defense United States Transportation Command ("USTRANSCOM") in 2016 to provide transportation coordination services, which involved hiring motor carriers to transport freight. The General Services Administration ("GSA"), not a party to the contract, began auditing Crowley's bills under a provision of the Transportation Act of 1940, claiming Crowley overbilled USTRANSCOM by millions of dollars. GSA sought to recover these overcharges by garnishing future payments to Crowley.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Crowley's Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") claims, holding that the claims were essentially contractual and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that Crowley's suit was not a contract claim and remanded the case. On remand, the District Court held that GSA could audit both carriers and non-carriers but agreed with Crowley that the USTRANSCOM Contracting Officer's interpretations governed any GSA audits. The court enjoined GSA from issuing Notices of Overcharge ("NOCs") contrary to the Contracting Officer's determinations.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that 31 U.S.C. § 3726(b) allows GSA to audit only bills presented by carriers and freight forwarders. The court found that Crowley is not a carrier because it does not physically transport freight nor is it contractually bound to help perform the movement of goods. Consequently, the court reversed the District Court's decision on the scope of § 3726(b) and remanded for further proceedings, permanently enjoining GSA from conducting postpayment audits of Crowley's bills. View "Crowley Government Services, Inc. v. General Services Administration" on Justia Law

A Puerto Rico-based poultry importer, Northwestern Selecta, Inc. (NWS), challenged a regulation by the Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture (PRDA) requiring a PRDA inspector to be present when shipping containers of poultry meat are opened and unloaded. NWS argued that this requirement is preempted by the federal Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), which regulates the inspection and distribution of poultry products. The PPIA includes a preemption clause that prohibits states from imposing additional or different requirements on official establishments beyond those established by the PPIA.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico agreed with NWS, finding that the PRDA's inspector requirement falls within the scope of the PPIA's preemption clause and is not exempted by the PPIA's savings clause. The district court granted declaratory relief to NWS and permanently enjoined the enforcement of the PRDA's regulation against NWS. The PRDA appealed the decision, arguing that the district court misinterpreted the scope of the PPIA's preemption clause and the application of the savings clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the PPIA's preemption clause broadly covers state regulations related to the operations of official establishments, which includes the opening and unloading of shipping containers at NWS's facility. The court found that the PRDA's inspector requirement directly impacts NWS's operations and is therefore preempted by the PPIA. Additionally, the court determined that the savings clause does not exempt the PRDA's regulation from preemption because it does not apply to poultry products outside of NWS's facility. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the permanent injunction against the enforcement of the PRDA's regulation. View "Northwestern Selecta, Inc. v. Gonzalez-Beiro" on Justia Law

Seven petitions were filed with the Lucas County Board of Elections to recall the mayor and six members of the Maumee city council under R.C. 705.92. The board found the petitions valid and certified the recall questions for a special primary election. The City of Maumee and a citizen, Glenn Rambo, protested, arguing that the city’s charter does not provide for recall, R.C. 705.92 does not apply to the city, and the petitions did not comply with the statute. The board denied the protests.The relators sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the board from placing the recall questions on the ballot and a writ of mandamus to order the board to grant their protests. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court found that Maumee’s charter allows for the removal of elected officials as provided by the Constitution or laws of Ohio, but R.C. 705.92 does not apply to Maumee because it was not adopted under R.C. 705.03. The court held that the board erred in deeming R.C. 705.92 applicable to Maumee.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted the writ of prohibition, preventing the board from placing the recall questions on the ballot, and denied the writ of mandamus as moot. The court concluded that the recall procedure in R.C. 705.92 is not generally applicable to municipalities and can only be adopted as part of a statutory plan of government under R.C. 705.03, which Maumee did not do. View "State ex rel. Maumee v. Lucas County Board of Elections" on Justia Law