Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A Chinese manufacturer of electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS) sought authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market its refillable e-cigarette device in the United States. The device, sold without e-liquid, allows consumers to use a wide range of nicotine concentrations. The manufacturer submitted a premarket tobacco product application (PMTA) in August 2020, asserting that its product was appropriate for the protection of public health. After a preliminary assessment, the FDA identified deficiencies in the application and issued a deficiency letter in March 2023, requesting additional information. The manufacturer responded to some, but not all, of the deficiencies and requested an extension, which the FDA later denied. In January 2024, the FDA issued a final order denying the application, citing insufficient data to evaluate the product’s risks and benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case after the manufacturer and a retailer based in Texas, who was also affected by the denial, petitioned for review. The court determined that venue was proper because the retailer had its principal place of business in the circuit. The petitioners argued that the FDA’s denial was arbitrary and capricious, claiming the agency failed to weigh the public health benefits of the product and improperly limited applicants to a single deficiency letter.The Fifth Circuit held that the FDA’s decision was reasonable and reasonably explained. The court found that the FDA had considered the potential benefits and risks of the product, explained the deficiencies in the application, and did not impose new evidentiary requirements without notice. The court also concluded that the FDA’s policy of issuing only one deficiency letter was adequately justified and not arbitrary. The petition for review was denied. View "Shenzhen Youme v. FDA" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress established the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) to help eligible small businesses maintain payroll through government-mandated shutdowns. The program, administered by the Small Business Administration (SBA), provided for government-guaranteed loans to qualifying businesses, with the possibility of loan forgiveness if certain conditions were met. Bruckner Truck Sales received a $10 million PPP loan, but the SBA later determined that Bruckner was not eligible for the loan. Despite conceding its ineligibility, Bruckner refused to return the funds and instead claimed entitlement to loan forgiveness under the CARES Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed the case after Bruckner challenged the SBA’s denial of forgiveness. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, holding that the CARES Act does not entitle ineligible borrowers to loan forgiveness. The court also denied Bruckner’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, finding that the SBA’s interpretation of the statute was correct and that the agency’s actions were not arbitrary or capricious.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fifth Circuit held that the CARES Act limits loan forgiveness to borrowers who were eligible for the underlying PPP loan. The court rejected Bruckner’s arguments that the SBA’s rule was retroactive, that the agency violated the Chenery doctrine, and that the district court improperly deferred to the agency’s interpretation. The court concluded that neither the text nor the structure of the CARES Act supports forgiveness for ineligible borrowers, and affirmed the denial of loan forgiveness and the requirement to return the funds. View "Bruckner Truck Sales v. Guzman" on Justia Law

Rodney Owen Skurdal, who is not a licensed attorney, attempted to represent Ronald Trow during Trow’s initial appearance in a criminal case in Yellowstone County Justice Court. Judge Jeanne Walker, presiding over the case, ordered Skurdal to vacate the defendant’s table and did not permit him to represent Trow, as Skurdal was not a member of the bar. Trow subsequently entered a plea of not guilty, and a public defender was appointed. Skurdal then filed a lawsuit in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court for Yellowstone County against Judge Walker, later joined by Yellowstone County as a defendant, alleging violations of his and Trow’s rights and advancing various arguments, including those associated with the “Sovereign Citizen” movement.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court dismissed Skurdal’s complaint with prejudice, holding that Judge Walker and Yellowstone County were protected by absolute judicial immunity for actions taken in the course of judicial duties. The court also found that Skurdal, as a non-lawyer, had no statutory or constitutional right to represent another individual in a criminal proceeding in Montana. The court denied leave to amend the complaint, finding that any amendment would be futile due to the immunity defense.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that Montana law does not permit non-lawyers to represent others in criminal cases, and that Judge Walker’s actions were judicial acts performed within her jurisdiction, entitling her and Yellowstone County to absolute immunity from suit. The Court also concluded that the District Court did not err in denying leave to amend, as further amendment could not overcome the immunity bar. View "Skurdal v. Walker" on Justia Law

A married couple, both citizens of Mexico, have lived in the United States for over twenty years without legal status. They have two U.S.-born children, one of whom, I.L., has a learning disability, ADHD, and requires ongoing medical and educational support. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against the couple, who conceded inadmissibility but sought cancellation of removal, arguing that deportation would cause their son an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” due to his special needs and the alleged lack of adequate services in Mexico.An immigration judge found both parents credible and agreed they met the first three statutory requirements for cancellation of removal, but concluded they did not satisfy the hardship requirement. The judge acknowledged the difficulties I.L. would face but determined these did not rise to the high threshold set by the statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s decisions in separate, but materially identical, rulings, agreeing that the hardship standard was not met.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the Board’s application of the hardship standard under the substantial-evidence standard, as clarified by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, given the record showed that some medical and educational services were available in Mexico and that the Board applied the correct legal standard. The court denied the petitions for review, holding that the Board’s application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) is reviewable for substantial evidence, and that the Board’s decisions in these cases met that standard. View "Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

A group of individuals and organizations challenged a longstanding policy of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), codified as Rule 202.5(e), which requires defendants in civil enforcement actions to agree not to publicly deny the allegations against them as a condition of settlement. This “no-deny” provision has been in place since 1972 and is incorporated into settlement agreements, with the SEC’s remedy for a breach being the ability to ask the court to reopen the case. The petitioners argued that this rule violates the First Amendment and was improperly adopted under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).Previously, the New Civil Liberties Alliance (NCLA) petitioned the SEC to amend Rule 202.5(e) to remove the no-deny requirement, citing constitutional concerns. The SEC denied the petition, explaining that defendants can voluntarily waive constitutional rights in settlements and that the rule preserves the agency’s ability to litigate if a defendant later denies the allegations. After the denial, the petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, asserting both First Amendment and APA violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the SEC’s denial. Applying the Supreme Court’s framework from Town of Newton v. Rumery, the court held that voluntary waivers of constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights, are generally permissible if knowing and voluntary. The court concluded that Rule 202.5(e) is not facially invalid under the First Amendment, as it is a limited restriction tied to the settlement context and does not preclude all speech. The court also found that the SEC had statutory authority for the rule, was not required to use notice-and-comment rulemaking, and provided a rational explanation for its decision. The petition for review was denied, but the court left open the possibility of future as-applied challenges. View "POWELL V. UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION" on Justia Law

A four-year-old child drowned after wandering unattended from the home where she had been placed under temporary custody by order of the Probate Court. The child’s parents had previously lost guardianship, and the court had vested temporary custody in maternal relatives. To determine whether to grant a full transfer of guardianship, the Probate Court ordered the Department of Children and Families (DCF) to investigate the home and report its findings. DCF submitted its report, recommending the placement, but before the court could hold a hearing on permanent guardianship, the child died. The child’s estate, through her father as administrator, alleged that DCF’s negligence in investigating the placement and in making recommendations to the Probate Court was a proximate cause of the child’s death, and also claimed DCF failed to fulfill independent duties to protect the child from abuse and neglect.After the estate received permission from the Claims Commissioner to sue the state, DCF moved to dismiss the action in the Superior Court, arguing that it was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for actions integral to the judicial process, such as conducting court-ordered investigations and making recommendations. The Superior Court agreed, holding that DCF was protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity when acting as an arm of the Probate Court, and that the Claims Commissioner could not waive this immunity. The court dismissed the action, finding the complaint’s allegations insufficient to overcome DCF’s immunity.On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the Claims Commissioner’s waiver of sovereign immunity under the relevant statute does not preclude the state from asserting absolute quasi-judicial immunity. However, the Court reversed in part, concluding that some of the estate’s allegations may fall outside the scope of quasi-judicial immunity, particularly those involving DCF’s independent statutory duties. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine which claims, if any, are not barred by quasi-judicial immunity. View "Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Two students challenged the University of California’s policy that prohibits the employment of undocumented students who lack federal work authorization. The University’s longstanding practice allowed employment of undocumented students with Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, as they have federal work authorization, but excluded those without such authorization. After the federal government stopped accepting new DACA applications, the number of undocumented students without work authorization increased. The University considered changing its policy but ultimately decided against it, citing significant risks of federal enforcement under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and related regulations, and dissolved a working group tasked with exploring alternatives.The students filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, arguing that the University’s policy was an abuse of discretion and violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by discriminating based on immigration status. The court initially denied the petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back, instructing the appellate court to reconsider. The University argued that its policy was based on risk assessment rather than a definitive interpretation of IRCA, and that even if the policy was discriminatory, the risk of federal enforcement justified its continuation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, held that the University’s policy facially discriminates based on immigration status and that, under state law, such discrimination is only permissible if required by federal law, which the University did not establish. The court concluded that the University abused its discretion by relying solely on litigation risk as a justification for its policy. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the University to reconsider its policy using proper legal criteria. View "Munoz v. The Regents of the University of Cal." on Justia Law

The appellant, a Slovenian-born U.S. permanent resident, claimed to have discovered billions of dollars dispersed across Africa after the death of Muammar Gaddafi. He sought to repatriate these funds to the United States and enlisted the help of a Washington, D.C. lawyer. The appellant alleged that, during his efforts in Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire, he was unable to complete the repatriation due to issues with verifying the legitimacy of Treasury Department letters. He further claimed that, while detained in Côte d'Ivoire, the funds were stolen and replaced with counterfeit cash, and that he was later arrested for alleged money laundering and misrepresentation of U.S. documents. Upon returning to the United States, the lawyer withdrew representation due to the criminal allegations against the appellant.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the appellant’s fraud claims in two parts. First, it found that the complaint failed to allege any actionable misrepresentation by the lawyer, noting that the lawyer had provided legal services as agreed. Second, for the claims against three federal employees, the court allowed the United States to substitute itself as defendant under the Westfall Act, as the employees were acting within the scope of their employment. The court then dismissed the claim against the United States on the basis of sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the appellant’s complaint did not allege with particularity any fraudulent misrepresentation by the lawyer at the time of contract formation. Regarding the federal employees, the court found that the appellant failed to rebut the government’s certification that the employees acted within the scope of their employment, and thus sovereign immunity barred the claim. The court also denied the appellant’s request for leave to amend and for jurisdictional discovery. View "Plevnik v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Several companies incorporated in Cyprus and the Isle of Man, who were shareholders of OAO Yukos Oil Company, alleged that the Russian Federation unlawfully expropriated Yukos’s assets between 2003 and 2004. The shareholders initiated arbitration proceedings under the Energy Charter Treaty, which Russia had signed but not ratified, claiming that Russia’s actions violated the Treaty’s protections against expropriation. The arbitral tribunal in The Hague found in favor of the shareholders, awarding them over $50 billion in damages. Russia contested the tribunal’s jurisdiction, arguing that it was not bound to arbitrate under the Treaty because provisional application of the arbitration clause was inconsistent with Russian law, and that the shareholders were not proper investors under the Treaty.After the tribunal’s decision, Russia sought to set aside the awards in Dutch courts. The Dutch Supreme Court ultimately upheld the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the awards, finding that Russia was provisionally bound by the Treaty’s arbitration clause and that the shareholders qualified as investors. Meanwhile, the shareholders sought to enforce the arbitral awards in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Russia moved to dismiss, asserting sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and arguing that the arbitration exception did not apply because there was no valid arbitration agreement. The district court denied Russia’s motion, holding that it had jurisdiction under the FSIA’s arbitration exception, and deferred to the arbitral tribunal’s determination that an arbitration agreement existed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the existence of an arbitration agreement is a jurisdictional fact under the FSIA that must be independently determined by the district court, rather than deferred to the arbitral tribunal. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for independent consideration of whether the FSIA’s arbitration exception applies, including whether the Dutch courts’ judgments should have preclusive effect. View "Hulley Enterprises Ltd. v. Russian Federation" on Justia Law

A nonprofit substance abuse treatment facility in Kent, Connecticut, challenged the state’s approval of a competitor’s application to establish a similar facility in the same town. The competitor, Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC, applied for a certificate of need from the Department of Public Health. The plaintiff was granted intervenor status in the administrative proceedings, allowing it to participate in hearings and present evidence. After public hearings, a hearing officer recommended denying Birch Hill’s application, but the Department and Birch Hill later entered into a settlement agreement that approved the application with certain conditions.The plaintiff appealed the Department’s decision to the Superior Court, arguing that the approval was an abuse of discretion, especially given the hearing officer’s earlier recommendation. The defendants moved to dismiss the appeal, contending that the plaintiff was not aggrieved by the decision and thus lacked standing. The Superior Court initially dismissed the appeal on the ground that the settlement agreement was not a final decision. The Appellate Court affirmed this dismissal. However, the Connecticut Supreme Court later held that the settlement agreement was a final decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the Superior Court again dismissed the appeal, this time concluding that the plaintiff was not statutorily or classically aggrieved and therefore lacked standing.The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiff was neither statutorily nor classically aggrieved by the Department’s decision. The Court explained that mere economic competition resulting from governmental action does not confer standing in administrative appeals unless the relevant statute expressly protects competitors’ interests. The Court found that the applicable statute, General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 19a-639 (a), did not create such an exception. The plaintiff’s status as an intervenor and its participation in the administrative process did not, by themselves, establish a specific, personal, and legal interest sufficient for standing. View "High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health" on Justia Law