Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Several small businesses and a coalition of states challenged a series of executive orders issued by the President that imposed new tariffs of unlimited duration on nearly all goods imported from most countries. These tariffs, referred to as the Trafficking Tariffs and Reciprocal Tariffs, were imposed in response to declared national emergencies related to drug trafficking and trade imbalances. The executive orders directed changes to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, resulting in significant increases in import duties on products from Canada, Mexico, China, and other major trading partners.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT), arguing that the President exceeded his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by imposing these tariffs. The CIT granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose the challenged tariffs and permanently enjoined their enforcement. The government appealed, and the Federal Circuit consolidated the cases, stayed the injunction pending appeal, and heard the matter en banc.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, holding that IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate” importation does not include the power to impose tariffs of the type and scope at issue. The court found that IEEPA does not mention tariffs, duties, or taxes, and contrasted it with other statutes where Congress has explicitly delegated tariff authority to the President with clear limitations. The court also concluded that the government’s interpretation would raise serious constitutional concerns under the major questions and non-delegation doctrines. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s declaratory judgment that the executive orders were invalid, but vacated the universal injunction and remanded for the CIT to reconsider the scope of injunctive relief in light of recent Supreme Court guidance. View "V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump" on Justia Law

Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan nationals living in the United States received Temporary Protected Status (TPS), which allowed them to work and protected them from deportation due to ongoing humanitarian crises in Venezuela. In January 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security extended TPS for Venezuelans through October 2026, consolidating two prior designations to streamline the process. Shortly after, a new Secretary, following a change in administration, attempted to vacate this extension and terminate TPS for one group of Venezuelan nationals, citing confusion and alleged improvements in Venezuela’s conditions. This abrupt reversal threatened TPS holders with imminent loss of status, employment, and the risk of deportation.The National TPS Alliance and several individual TPS holders filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking to restore the extension. The district court granted preliminary relief, postponing the effective dates of the vacatur and termination notices nationwide under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, would suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored postponement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the preliminary relief and that neither the TPS statute nor 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) barred judicial review of the Secretary’s authority. The court concluded that the Secretary lacked statutory authority to vacate a prior extension of TPS, as the statute provides specific procedures for designation, extension, and termination, but not for vacatur. The court also found that nationwide relief was necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs. The district court’s order postponing the vacatur and termination of Venezuelan TPS was affirmed. View "National TPS Alliance v. Noem" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to the United States Department of the Interior’s approval of the 2024–2029 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, which authorizes up to three lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico region. Environmental organizations argued that the Department failed to adequately assess the risks to vulnerable coastal communities, did not properly consider the endangered Rice’s whale in its environmental sensitivity analysis, overlooked potential conflicts with other ocean uses, and did not sufficiently balance the program’s projected benefits against its environmental costs. The Department, in coordination with the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, had developed the program through a multi-year process involving public comment and environmental review.After the Department finalized the program, the environmental groups and the American Petroleum Institute (API) each petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. API later withdrew its petition but remained as an intervenor. The environmental petitioners sought to have the program remanded for further consideration, arguing violations of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). The Department and API contested the petitioners’ standing and the merits of their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the environmental petitioners had associational standing to pursue their claims. On the merits, the court found that the Department of the Interior had satisfied OCSLA’s requirements by reasonably evaluating environmental justice concerns, the selection of representative species for environmental sensitivity analysis, and potential conflicts with other uses of the Gulf. The court concluded that the Department’s decision-making process was reasoned and not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review, leaving the 2024–2029 leasing program in effect. View "Healthy Gulf v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

After the Nebraska Legislature enacted L.B. 77, which allowed concealed carry without a permit and limited local regulation of weapons, the mayor of Lincoln issued an executive order prohibiting weapons in city-owned properties. This order was quickly amended but maintained similar restrictions, including criminal and civil penalties for violations. Several longstanding city ordinances also regulated firearms and other weapons, such as prohibiting weapons in parks, requiring reporting of firearm sales, and banning certain devices and knives. The Nebraska Firearms Owners Association (NFOA) and four individual plaintiffs, all regular concealed carriers, alleged that these local measures conflicted with state law and deterred them from activities they would otherwise pursue, such as carrying firearms in parks or purchasing certain items.The plaintiffs filed suit in the District Court for Lancaster County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The City moved to dismiss, arguing lack of standing. The district court dismissed the case entirely, finding that neither the NFOA nor the individuals had standing because none had been prosecuted or directly affected by enforcement of the challenged laws. The court relied on federal precedent, including Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, but concluded that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were too speculative or abstract.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the NFOA lacked associational standing because it failed to allege its authority to represent its members. However, the individual plaintiffs had standing to challenge the executive order and most ordinances, as they alleged a credible and imminent threat of prosecution sufficient for a preenforcement challenge. The court affirmed the dismissal as to the NFOA and the challenge to the vehicle storage ordinance, but reversed and remanded as to the individual plaintiffs’ challenges to the executive order and other ordinances. View "Nebraska Firearms Owners Assn. v. City of Lincoln" on Justia Law

Jessica De'Andrea, a patrol officer with the Montgomery Police Department, was involved in a motor vehicle collision while on duty. The driver of the other vehicle, Clint Walters, later sued De'Andrea individually for negligence, resulting in a $550,000 judgment against her after a jury trial. De'Andrea alleged that the City of Montgomery, which had procured liability insurance and acted as a self-insurer for its employees, failed to properly defend her, did not communicate settlement or appeal options, and refused to satisfy the judgment. She claimed these failures led to her bankruptcy and brought multiple claims against the City, including breach of contract, bad faith, fraudulent misrepresentation, and violations of the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act.The Montgomery Circuit Court denied the City's motions to dismiss, finding it was not apparent beyond doubt that De'Andrea could prove no set of circumstances entitling her to relief. The City then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus, seeking dismissal of all claims on the basis of statutory immunity and other defenses.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed only the City's immunity defense as to the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, because the City had not preserved immunity arguments for the other claims in the lower court. The Court held that municipal immunity under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, does not automatically bar all fraudulent misrepresentation claims, as such claims can be based on innocent or mistaken misrepresentations, not just intentional torts. The Court denied the City's petition for a writ of mandamus, allowing De'Andrea's claims to proceed. The City may raise its other defenses on appeal if necessary. View "De'Andrea v. City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

A property owner challenged an annual assessment levied by a city for the maintenance of landscaping and lighting improvements within a maintenance district. The assessment, originally set at $196.23 per residential lot in 1996, had increased to $300 per lot by the 2022–2023 tax year. The property owner argued that this increase violated Proposition 218, a constitutional amendment that restricts local governments’ ability to impose or increase taxes, assessments, and fees without voter approval. The city had not submitted the assessment to voters after Proposition 218’s passage, asserting that the assessment was exempt from Proposition 218’s requirements as a preexisting assessment for certain public services.The Superior Court of California, County of Solano, found in favor of the city. The court determined that the assessment was exempt from Proposition 218 and that the increase to $300 did not constitute an “increase” under the law because it did not exceed a range established before Proposition 218 took effect. Judgment was entered for the city, and the property owner appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the assessment had been “increased” within the meaning of Proposition 218 and the implementing statutes because the per-lot rate was higher than the rate in effect when Proposition 218 became law. The court rejected the city’s argument that a flat per-lot assessment does not involve a “rate” and found that the statutory definition of “rate” includes a per-parcel amount. The court also concluded that only ranges adopted in compliance with Proposition 218’s procedures could shield subsequent increases from voter approval requirements. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "Thacker v. City of Fairfield" on Justia Law

Lauren Richwine, through her business Death Done Differently, provides services as a “death doula,” assisting clients and their families with end-of-life planning, emotional support, and guidance on funeral arrangements. Richwine is not a licensed funeral director, and her website notes that her services are performed under the supervision of a licensed funeral director. In 2021, a complaint was filed with the Indiana Public Licensing Agency alleging that Richwine was practicing funeral services without a license. Following an investigation, the Indiana Attorney General sought a cease-and-desist order from the State Board of Funeral and Cemetery Service, which was approved. The order prohibited Richwine and her company from advertising or providing certain services related to funeral planning, community death care, and support with funeral homes.After the cease-and-desist order was issued, Richwine and Death Done Differently filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division, arguing that enforcement of the Indiana statute against them would violate their First Amendment rights. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining enforcement of the statute against the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed, arguing that the plaintiffs had waived their rights by signing the cease-and-desist agreement and that federal abstention doctrine barred the suit. The district court rejected these arguments, finding no clear and unmistakable waiver of federal rights and no ongoing state proceeding that would justify abstention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that the Indiana statute, as applied to Richwine and Death Done Differently, burdens substantially more speech than necessary to further the state’s interests in public health, safety, and consumer protection. The court found that the statute’s restrictions on the plaintiffs’ speech and advertising likely violate the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Richwine v. Matuszak" on Justia Law

West Central Agri Services operates a grain handling facility in Missouri, where employees load grain into railcars by accessing the tops of the cars, which are about fifteen feet above the ground. Employees open and close lids on the railcars to facilitate grain transfer, and a Trackmobile moves the railcars into position. An OSHA inspector, investigating an unrelated explosion, discovered that employees frequently worked atop railcars without wearing fall protection personal protective equipment (PPE), despite the facility having a fall protection system in place on one track and safety training instructing use of such equipment. Supervisors were aware of the lack of PPE use, and employees were not disciplined for noncompliance.Following the investigation, the Secretary of Labor cited West Central for a willful and serious violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(d)(1)(i), which requires employers to ensure employees use appropriate PPE for identified hazards. After a three-day evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission upheld the citation and imposed a penalty of $122,878.80, finding that West Central recognized the fall hazard and failed to enforce PPE use. The Commission denied discretionary review of the ALJ’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has exercised statutory authority over the working conditions on top of railcars, specifically through its 1978 policy statement asserting jurisdiction over walking-working surfaces and employee protection around railcars. As a result, the FRA’s authority preempts OSHA’s jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1). The court vacated the citation and reversed the ALJ’s order, concluding that OSHA cannot enforce its PPE regulation for employees working on top of railcars at this facility. View "MFA Enterprises, Inc. v. OSHRC" on Justia Law

A group of single-family residential (SFR) water customers challenged the City of San Diego’s tiered water rate structure, which imposed higher rates for increased water usage, arguing that these rates exceeded the proportional cost of service attributable to their parcels as required by California Constitution article XIII D, section 6(b)(3) (enacted by Proposition 218). The City’s water system serves a large population and divides customers into several classes, but only SFR customers were subject to tiered rates; other classes paid uniform rates. The City’s rates were based on cost-of-service studies using industry-standard methodologies, including “base-extra capacity” and “peaking factors,” but the plaintiffs contended these methods did not accurately reflect the actual cost of providing water at higher usage tiers.The Superior Court of San Diego County certified the case as a class action and held a bifurcated trial. In the first phase, the court found that the City failed to demonstrate, with substantial evidence, that its tiered rates for SFR customers complied with section 6(b)(3), concluding the rates were not based on the actual cost of service at each tier but rather on usage budgets and conservation goals. The court also found the City lacked sufficient data to justify its allocation of costs to higher tiers and that the rate structure discriminated against SFR customers compared to other classes. In the second phase, the court awarded the class a refund for overcharges, offset by undercharges, and ordered the City to implement new, compliant rates.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s judgment with directions. The appellate court held that the City bore the burden of proving its rates did not exceed the proportional cost of service and that the applicable standard was not mere reasonableness but actual cost proportionality, subject to independent judicial review. The court found substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings that the City’s tiered rates were not cost-based and thus violated section 6(b)(3). The court also upheld class certification and the method for calculating the refund, and directed the trial court to amend the judgment to comply with newly enacted Government Code section 53758.5, which affects the manner of refunding overcharges. View "Patz v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Tim Landholt was arrested in South Carolina after failing to pay child support, pursuant to a bench warrant issued by a family court judge. After Landholt appeared in court, paid a fine, and resolved the matter, the warrant was supposed to be recalled, but the clerk’s office failed to do so. Over five years later, Landholt was arrested again on the same, now-stale warrant and spent three days in jail. He then brought a negligence claim under South Carolina law against Jeanette McBride, in her official capacity as the Richland County Clerk of Court, alleging that the failure to recall the warrant caused his wrongful arrest and detention.Landholt initially filed suit in state court, asserting both federal and state-law claims. After procedural delays and amendments, the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. A magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment to McBride on the negligence claim, finding her immune under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, specifically S.C. Code § 15-78-60(2), which provides immunity for administrative actions or inactions of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature. The district court adopted this recommendation, holding that the immunity applied even to non-discretionary (ministerial) acts, and granted summary judgment to McBride.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that, under South Carolina precedent, immunity under S.C. Code § 15-78-60(2) applies only to discretionary, not ministerial, acts. Because the record did not establish that the failure to recall the warrant was a discretionary act, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to McBride on this ground and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Landholt v. Corley" on Justia Law