Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

United Water Conservation District (United) filed a lawsuit against the United States, seeking just compensation for an alleged taking under the Fifth Amendment. United claimed that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) required it to increase the amount of water bypassing its diversion dam to protect an endangered species of trout, resulting in a loss of water that United could otherwise use for beneficial purposes.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed United's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, determining that the claim should be evaluated as a regulatory taking. The court reasoned that United had not yet exhausted its administrative remedies by applying for and being denied an incidental-take permit under the Endangered Species Act, making the claim not ripe for adjudication.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court agreed that United's claim was regulatory in nature, as the NMFS's actions did not constitute a physical appropriation of water already diverted by United. Instead, the actions required more water to remain in the river, representing a regulatory restriction on United's use of the water. The court held that United's claim was not ripe because it had not yet obtained a final agency action by applying for and being denied an incidental-take permit. Therefore, the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was appropriate. View "UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT v. US " on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Board of Trustees of the California State University (CSU) mandated remote instruction. Patrick Krug, a biology professor at California State University Los Angeles, incurred expenses for necessary equipment to comply with this directive, which CSU refused to reimburse. Krug filed a lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated faculty, claiming that Labor Code section 2802 required CSU to reimburse these work-related expenses. CSU argued that as a state department, it was exempt from such Labor Code provisions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained CSU’s demurrer without leave to amend, leading to a judgment of dismissal. The court reasoned that CSU, as a governmental agency, was exempt from section 2802 because the section did not explicitly apply to public employers. Krug appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that Labor Code section 2802 did not obligate CSU to reimburse employees for work-related expenses. The court found no express language or positive indicia in the statute or its legislative history indicating that it applied to public employers. The court also noted that applying section 2802 to CSU would infringe on its sovereign powers, as CSU has broad discretion under the Education Code to set its own equipment reimbursement policies.The California Supreme Court granted review and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Stone v. Alameda Health System. Upon reconsideration, the appellate court again affirmed the judgment, maintaining that section 2802 does not apply to public employers like CSU. View "Krug v. Board of Trustees of the California State University" on Justia Law

Great Oaks Water Company, a private water retailer, sued the Santa Clara Valley Water District, alleging that the district’s groundwater pumping charges were unlawful taxes levied without voter approval, violating Proposition 26. Great Oaks argued that the charges exceeded the reasonable costs of the governmental activity and were unfairly allocated, benefiting other water users to which Great Oaks had no access. Additionally, Great Oaks contended that the district’s use of ad valorem property taxes to subsidize agricultural groundwater pumping charges was unconstitutional.The trial court ruled in favor of the water district, finding that the groundwater charges did not exceed the costs of the district’s overall water management program. The court held that it was reasonable to use these charges to pay for the program because non-agricultural groundwater pumpers, like Great Oaks, received significant benefits from it. The charges were deemed reasonably allocated on a volumetric basis, and the agricultural discount was found constitutionally valid as it was funded by ad valorem property taxes, not by non-agricultural pumpers.The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that the groundwater charges were not “taxes” under Proposition 26 because they fell under exceptions for specific benefits conferred or government services provided directly to the payor. The court found that the water district proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the charges were no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the governmental activity and that the costs were fairly allocated to Great Oaks. The court also upheld the use of ad valorem taxes to fund the agricultural discount, finding no violation of the California Constitution or the Water Code. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

Basecamp Teton WY SPV LLC (Basecamp) received a permit from the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to construct and operate a septic system for its glamping operation in Teton County, Wyoming. Protect Our Water Jackson Hole (POWJH), a nonprofit organization, sought a declaratory judgment claiming that DEQ lacked the authority to issue the permit due to a delegation agreement transferring permitting authority to Teton County. POWJH also requested an injunction to stay the permit during the litigation. The district court dismissed the complaint, citing several arguments from DEQ and Basecamp, including POWJH's lack of standing.The district court found that POWJH did not establish that a favorable decision would remedy any injury it suffered, as it was unclear whether Teton County would have denied the permit if Basecamp had applied there instead of to DEQ. The court also noted that POWJH was not a party to the delegation agreement and thus could not enforce it. POWJH's motion for reconsideration or to amend the complaint was denied, and the district court's dismissal was based on POWJH's lack of standing among other reasons.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision, focusing on POWJH's lack of standing. The court held that POWJH did not demonstrate a tangible interest that was harmed by DEQ's issuance of the permit. POWJH's allegations about its expenditures on water quality initiatives were deemed too vague and conclusory to establish a specific injury. Additionally, POWJH failed to show how the septic permit would directly harm its efforts or distinguish its interests from those of the general public. As a result, the court concluded that POWJH lacked standing to pursue the declaratory judgment action. View "Protect Our Water Jackson Hole v. Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

George Roseberry, a U.S. Army veteran, sustained a lower back injury during his service from 1977 to 1989. In March 1994, he filed a claim for service connection related to degenerative disc disease, which was denied three months later. Between 1998 and 2005, he made several unsuccessful attempts to reopen his claim. On July 20, 2021, the Veterans Court remanded his case to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, concluding his appeal on October 12, 2021. On November 13, 2021, Roseberry filed an application for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which was one day late.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed Roseberry’s EAJA application as untimely. The court found that the application was due on November 12, 2021, 30 days after the effective date of the mandate, October 12, 2021. Roseberry’s counsel had mistakenly relied on the date the mandate was entered on the docket, October 15, 2021, leading to the late filing. The court determined that equitable tolling was not warranted as there were no “extraordinary circumstances” to justify the delay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit agreed that the correct standard for equitable tolling is “extraordinary circumstances,” as established by precedent. Roseberry’s late filing was due to ordinary neglect, which does not meet the threshold for equitable tolling. Consequently, the Federal Circuit upheld the dismissal of Roseberry’s EAJA application as untimely. View "ROSEBERRY v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Dr. Jeffery D. Milner, a physician, brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Baptist Health Montgomery, Prattville Baptist, and Team Health. Milner alleged that while working at a hospital owned by the defendants, he discovered that they were overprescribing opioids and fraudulently billing the government for them. He claimed that he was terminated in retaliation for whistleblowing after reporting the overprescription practices to his superiors.Previously, Milner filed an FCA retaliation lawsuit against the same defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, which was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court found that Milner did not sufficiently allege that he engaged in protected conduct under the FCA or that his termination was due to such conduct. Following this dismissal, Milner filed the current qui tam action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The district court dismissed this action as barred by res judicata, relying on the Eleventh Circuit's decisions in Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc. and Shurick v. Boeing Co.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that Milner's qui tam action was barred by res judicata because it involved the same parties and the same cause of action as his earlier retaliation lawsuit. The court found that both lawsuits arose from a common nucleus of operative fact: the defendants' alleged illegal conduct and Milner's discovery of that conduct leading to his discharge. The court also noted that the United States, which did not intervene in the qui tam action, was not barred from pursuing its own action in the future. View "Milner v. Baptist Health Montgomery" on Justia Law

Relators Tiffany Montcrief and others filed a False Claims Act suit against Peripheral Vascular Associates, P.A. (PVA), alleging that PVA billed Medicare for vascular ultrasound services that were not completed. The claims were categorized into "Testing Only" and "Double Billing" claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Relators, concluding that PVA submitted knowingly false claims. A jury found these claims material and awarded approximately $28.7 million in damages against PVA.The district court granted partial summary judgment to Relators on the issues of falsity and knowledge of falsity. The jury found that the claims were material and caused the Government to pay out money. The district court entered judgment against PVA, including statutory penalties and treble damages. PVA appealed, challenging the district court's grant of partial summary judgment and certain rulings during and after the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment on the Testing Only claims but remanded for a new trial on damages. The court reversed the partial summary judgment ruling on the Double Billing claims, vacated the final judgment, and remanded for a new trial consistent with its opinion. The court concluded that the district court erred in interpreting the CPT–4 Manual and in concluding that the Manual required PVA to create separate, written reports for vascular ultrasounds before billing Medicare. The court also found that the district court abused its discretion in relying on Relators' post-trial expert declaration to calculate damages. View "Montcrief v. Peripheral Vascular" on Justia Law

Fathiree Ali, a Muslim inmate, requested the Michigan Department of Corrections to provide him with a halal diet, which is required by his religion. The prison chaplain directed him to apply for the vegan meal option, but another official rejected his application after discovering that Ali had purchased over one hundred non-halal items from the prison commissary. Ali then sued the chaplain, the special activities coordinator, the warden, and the Michigan Department of Corrections under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Free Exercise Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed Ali’s claims against the Department of Corrections and granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. Ali appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed Ali’s appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the rest of the district court’s decision. The court held that RLUIPA does not authorize money-damages claims against officials sued in their official or individual capacities. The court also found that Ali’s claims for injunctive relief against the chaplain and warden were moot because they no longer had the power to adjust his meal plan after his transfer to a different prison. Additionally, the court held that Ali’s claim for injunctive relief against the special activities coordinator was moot because the coordinator no longer worked for the Department of Corrections.The court concluded that Ali did not have a cognizable claim for injunctive or declaratory relief under RLUIPA because he had alternatives to access halal meat and could reapply for the vegan meal plan. The court also found that Ali failed to state a claim against the Michigan Department of Corrections as he did not identify a policy that violated RLUIPA. Finally, the court held that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity on Ali’s Free Exercise Clause claims under § 1983. View "Ali v. Adamson" on Justia Law

In 2015, bipartisan legislation repealed the U.S. ban on crude oil exports, leading to expanded efforts to export U.S. crude oil. This case involves an administrative challenge to a construction permit issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for expanding operations at the Moda Ingleside Crude Export Terminal in Texas. The expansion includes constructing new docks and a turning basin, requiring dredging and discharging material into U.S. waters. The Corps conducted an Environmental Assessment (EA) and approved the permit. Plaintiffs, including Native American tribes and an environmental association, sued to invalidate the permit, claiming violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied summary judgment for the plaintiffs and granted summary judgment for the Corps, concluding that the Corps had adequately studied the environmental impacts of the proposed expansion. The court found that plaintiffs had associational standing but had waived certain claims by not raising them in summary judgment briefing. The court also found that plaintiffs forfeited claims related to increased vessel traffic by not raising them during the notice-and-comment period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fifth Circuit held that the Corps did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its environmental impacts analysis, including its assessment of cumulative impacts and climate change. The court found that the Corps's EA was sufficient and that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was not required. The court also agreed that plaintiffs had forfeited arguments related to increased vessel traffic. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Indigenous Peoples v. U.S. Army" on Justia Law

Casey Hoff applied for a building permit from the City of Burlington to add an addition to his home, which is located within the city's floodplain. Hoff, an experienced contractor, provided appraisals and plans to the city officials, who approved the permit based on the information provided. However, after Hoff began construction, it was later determined that the remodel constituted a "substantial improvement" under the city's floodplain ordinances, requiring additional compliance measures. The city subsequently refused to issue a certificate of occupancy, leading Hoff to sue the city.The District Court of Ward County held a bench trial and denied Hoff's claims for a writ of mandamus, declaratory judgment, injunction, and inverse condemnation. The court found that Hoff did not comply with the city's floodplain ordinances and that the remodel was a substantial improvement. The court also granted summary judgment dismissing Hoff's negligence claim, concluding that the city was immune under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Hoff did not establish a clear legal right to a certificate of occupancy, as he did not comply with the city's ordinances. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying Hoff's declaratory judgment and injunction claims. Additionally, the court concluded that Hoff failed to establish a "special relationship" with the city, which is necessary to overcome the city's immunity from negligence claims. The court also rejected Hoff's inverse condemnation claim, finding no total regulatory taking occurred. View "Hoff v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law