Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After an adult son sent text messages threatening a mass shooting at a local high school and referenced access to thousands of rounds of ammunition, the city police investigated the home he shared with his father. The father owned multiple firearms and large quantities of ammunition. Evidence showed the son had a history of mental health crises, including involuntary holds, and was subject to a lifetime ban from possessing firearms. Despite this prohibition, the son had access to firearms through his father, participated in shooting competitions, and had knowledge of how to access gun safes in the home. The father failed to turn in all firearms and ammunition as required by a temporary restraining order, and some safes were not adequately secured.The Superior Court of Orange County held an evidentiary hearing, where both the father and a police investigator testified. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father’s failure to adequately secure his firearms and ammunition, combined with his son’s mental health history and credible threat of mass violence, posed a significant danger to others. The court concluded the father’s conduct enabled his son’s access to firearms and found no adequate, less restrictive alternatives to a Gun Violence Restraining Order (GVRO). A three-year GVRO was issued against the father.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings and that the GVRO statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The court concluded the trial court reasonably interpreted statutory causation and properly considered alternatives. The father’s Second Amendment and hearsay objections were deemed forfeited for not being raised below. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the GVRO. View "Anaheim Police Dept. v. Crockett" on Justia Law

Lucid Group USA, Inc., a company that sells new electric vehicles directly to consumers in other states, sought to open a retail location in Georgia. To do so, it applied for a dealer license from the Georgia Department of Revenue, which is required to sell new motor vehicles in the state. The Department denied Lucid’s application, citing Georgia’s Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act provisions that generally prohibit manufacturers and their affiliates from selling new motor vehicles directly to consumers or owning dealerships, thereby requiring sales to go through independent franchised dealers.Following the denial, Lucid filed suit against the State of Georgia, arguing that as applied to Lucid, these statutory provisions violate several sections of the Georgia Constitution, including the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and Article III, Section VI, Paragraph IV. Lucid also sought an injunction against enforcement of the law. The Superior Court permitted the Georgia Automobile Dealers Association to intervene and dismissed Lucid’s complaint. The court found Lucid’s due process and equal protection claims barred by Article III, Section VI, Paragraph II(c), which authorizes the legislature to regulate the motor vehicle industry “notwithstanding” those constitutional protections. The trial court also concluded Lucid had not stated a valid claim under Paragraph IV, reasoning the law was a general law with uniform operation.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that Paragraph II(c) does not bar all due process and equal protection challenges, but only those regulations enacted for the purpose of preventing frauds, unfair business practices, unfair methods of competition, impositions, or other abuses upon Georgia’s citizens. The Court vacated the trial court’s dismissal of Lucid’s due process and equal protection claims and remanded for further consideration. The Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the dismissal of Lucid’s Paragraph IV claims, specifically remanding for further proceedings regarding Lucid’s challenge to the 2015 statutory amendment. View "LUCID GROUP USA, INC. v. STATE OF GEORGIA" on Justia Law

A Louisiana pharmacy owned by a licensed pharmacist was investigated by the Drug Enforcement Administration after allegations arose that the pharmacy was filling prescriptions for itself and for patients with “red flags” indicating possible misuse or diversion of controlled substances. The DEA’s investigation focused on several prescriptions, including combinations of opioids and benzodiazepines for various patients, out-of-pocket payments for controlled substances, and a prescription filled by the pharmacist herself written by her physician father, which violated state law prohibiting physicians from prescribing controlled substances to immediate family.Following an agency hearing before an administrative law judge, the DEA’s Administrator adopted the ALJ’s recommendation and revoked the pharmacy’s federal registration to dispense controlled substances. The Administrator concluded that the pharmacy had violated federal regulations and Louisiana law by filling prescriptions without adequately resolving red flags and by filling a prescription written in violation of state law. The pharmacy petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit found that the DEA misinterpreted and misapplied its own regulations and state law. The court held that 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) requires a pharmacist to “knowingly” fill an invalid prescription, which the DEA had not shown, and that a violation of the state-law standard of care is not, by itself, a violation of federal regulations. The court also held that the Louisiana law at issue did not apply to pharmacies. Because the DEA’s order rested on erroneous interpretations of governing regulations and state law, the Fifth Circuit vacated the deregistration order and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Neumann's Pharmacy v. Drug Enforcement Administration" on Justia Law

This case concerns a challenge to new regulations issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) regarding the importation of dogs into the United States. The CDC, responding to incidents in which rabid dogs entered the country using fraudulent paperwork, amended its regulations to require that all imported dogs have a microchip, be at least six months old, and that importers submit a Dog Importation Form. These measures were intended to ensure the identity of the dogs, their vaccination status, and prevent the introduction of rabies, which remains a risk in other countries.Plaintiffs, consisting of a U.S. hunter, a Canadian dog breeder, and a hunting organization, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. They argued that the age and microchip requirements exceeded the CDC's statutory authority and were arbitrary and capricious. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of these requirements, particularly as applied to dogs from rabies-free and low-risk countries. The magistrate judge recommended, and the district court agreed, that the plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, and denied the injunction. Plaintiffs then appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court held that the age and microchip requirements were likely within the CDC’s statutory authority under 42 U.S.C. § 264, as they constitute inspections or other necessary measures to prevent the introduction of communicable diseases. The court also determined that the rulemaking was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. View "U.S. Sportsmen's Alliance Found. v. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention" on Justia Law

At a psychiatric hospital, employees were exposed to violent behavior from disturbed patients. Following a tip, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigated and cited the hospital for failing to implement measures that could have protected staff from workplace violence. These measures included reconfiguring nurses’ stations, providing communication devices, fully implementing existing safety programs, maintaining adequate staffing, securing patient belongings, hiring specialized security staff, and investigating each incident of workplace violence. The hospital did not contest the necessity of some measures but challenged the citation overall.An administrative law judge with the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission conducted a hearing, upheld the citation, and imposed a fine. The judge’s decision became the final decision of the Review Commission when it declined further review. The hospital then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit for judicial review, arguing that another federal agency, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, had exclusive authority over hospital safety, that the Secretary of Labor should have deferred to other regulatory bodies, and that the Secretary’s methods and notice were insufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Secretary of Labor had the authority to enforce the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause in this context, as the cited agency did not actually regulate employee safety regarding workplace violence. The court found that the Secretary provided fair notice, acted within statutory authority, and permissibly used adjudication rather than rulemaking. The court also concluded that the abatement measures were feasible, supported by substantial evidence, and that the imposed sanctions for failure to preserve video evidence were appropriate. The Tenth Circuit denied the hospital’s petition for review, upholding the citation and penalty. View "Cedar Springs Hospital v. Occupational Health and Safety" on Justia Law

In 2014, Russia invaded and subsequently asserted control over Crimea, an area internationally recognized as part of Ukraine. Ukrainian businesses operating in Crimea—including an electricity distributor and a group of petrol station owners—had their assets seized and operations transferred to Russian-controlled entities without compensation. These businesses, having made investments under Ukrainian law and while the 1998 Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the Encouragement and Mutual Protection of Investments (“Investment Treaty”) was in effect, pursued arbitration against Russia for expropriation and treaty violations.The Ukrainian companies initiated separate arbitrations under the Investment Treaty’s arbitration clause. The arbitral tribunals found Russia liable for breaches and awarded significant damages to the companies. Russia challenged the arbitral jurisdiction and the awards in foreign courts, but those efforts were unsuccessful. The companies then filed petitions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce the awards under the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act. Russia moved to dismiss, arguing the courts lacked subject-matter and personal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The District Court rejected Russia’s arguments, finding jurisdiction appropriate under the FSIA’s arbitration exception and personal jurisdiction proper upon valid service.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the District Court correctly exercised jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the FSIA’s arbitration exception applied because the companies established the existence of an arbitration agreement, a qualifying arbitral award, and a treaty potentially governing enforcement. The court further held that foreign states are not entitled to the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections against personal jurisdiction. The judgments of the District Court were affirmed. View "Stabil LLC v. Russian Federation" on Justia Law

A Jordanian business entity entered into an agreement with the Republic of Iraq in 1995 to settle Iraq’s unpaid debt for delivered goods by providing specified quantities of sulfur and urea, valued at $53 million. The agreement contemplated delivery at the Iraq-Jordan border, and although the supplier anticipated reselling these materials in the United States, this downstream transaction was not included in the written agreement. Iraq did not fulfill its obligations under the agreement, leading the supplier to pursue payment through interactions with Iraqi officials, who orally acknowledged the debt and suggested legal action might facilitate payment.After Iraq failed to deliver the goods, the supplier obtained a judgment in its favor from a Jordanian court in 2015 for the full amount. The Jordanian Court of Cassation affirmed the judgment. However, when the supplier sought to enforce the judgment in Jordan, the Jordanian Court of Appeal held that Iraq had not waived its sovereign immunity in the enforcement proceeding, preventing collection. Iraq has not satisfied any part of the judgment.The supplier then initiated an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking recognition of the Jordanian judgment. Iraq moved to dismiss, invoking sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court found that no FSIA exception applied and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding that Iraq had not made an explicit waiver of immunity and that Iraq’s conduct did not cause a direct effect in the United States as required by the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. Thus, the supplier’s claim is barred by Iraq’s sovereign immunity. View "Mohammad Hilmi Nassif & Partners v. Republic of Iraq" on Justia Law

ARcare, Inc., a nonprofit community health center receiving federal funding, suffered a data breach in early 2022 when an unauthorized third party accessed confidential patient information, including names, social security numbers, and medical treatment details. After ARcare notified affected individuals, several patients filed lawsuits alleging that ARcare failed to adequately safeguard their information as required under federal law. Plaintiffs reported fraudulent invoices and that their information was found for sale on the dark web.The actions were removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, where six class actions were consolidated. ARcare sought to invoke absolute immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) of the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (FSHCAA), which provides immunity for damages resulting from the performance of “medical, surgical, dental, or related functions.” ARcare moved to substitute the United States as defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act, arguing the data breach arose from a “related function.” The district court denied the motion, finding that protecting patient information from cyberattacks was not sufficiently linked to the provision of health care to qualify as a “related function” under the statute.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the statutory immunity issue de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of immunity, holding that the FSHCAA’s language does not extend statutory immunity to claims arising from a health center’s data security practices. The court reasoned that “related functions” must be activities closely connected to the provision of health care, and data security is not such a function. Therefore, ARcare is not entitled to substitute the United States as defendant, and the denial of statutory immunity was affirmed. View "Hale v. ARcare, Inc" on Justia Law

A five-month-old child died from an anoxic brain injury after being found with her face against a blanket while in the care of Amanda Cooke, a state-registered childcare provider. Cooke had placed the child for a nap in the basement, an area not approved for sleeping, without a baby monitor or the ability to observe the child by sight or sound. Contrary to safe sleep regulations, a blanket was left in the sleeping area. After the incident, the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) found that Cooke denied the child critical care by failing to provide proper supervision and issued a founded child abuse assessment, which resulted in her placement on the central child abuse registry and revocation of her childcare registration.An administrative law judge initially reversed the agency’s determination regarding denial of critical care, reasoning that Cooke’s conduct should be measured against a generic reasonable and prudent person, not a childcare provider with specialized training. The Director of HHS rejected this and affirmed the agency’s original finding, concluding that the “facts and circumstances” of Cooke being a trained, state-registered provider must be considered. The Iowa District Court for Polk County reversed the agency’s decision, holding that the standard for proper supervision was an objective one and should not account for Cooke’s training or professional status, and remanded the case for reconsideration.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the proper legal standard for adequate supervision under Iowa Code section 232.68(2)(a)(4)(b) includes consideration of the objective circumstances, such as Cooke’s status as a state-registered childcare provider and her duty to follow safe sleep regulations. The Court found that Cooke failed to provide the supervision that a reasonable and prudent person would exercise under similar facts and circumstances, reversed the district court’s order, and reinstated the founded child abuse assessment. View "Cooke v. Iowa Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Several technology companies challenged instructions issued by the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that guided the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) in deciding whether to institute inter partes review (IPR) proceedings. These instructions, known collectively as the NHK-Fintiv instructions, outlined factors for the Board to consider when parallel patent litigation was occurring in district court. The challengers argued that these instructions resulted in too many denials of IPR petitions and were contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and issued without the required notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California initially found all challenges to the PTO’s instructions to be judicially unreviewable. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that while the challenges based on statutory and arbitrary-and-capricious grounds were unreviewable, the claim regarding the lack of notice-and-comment rulemaking could proceed. On remand, the district court determined that the instructions were exempt from notice-and-comment requirements because they were “general statements of policy,” not substantive or legislative rules.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court agreed that the Director’s instructions were general statements of policy exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). It emphasized that there is no statutory right to IPR institution, that the instructions do not bind the Director, and that the Director retains unreviewable discretion to institute or deny IPR. The court found that none of the legal standards or precedents cited by the challengers required a different result, and it affirmed the district court’s judgment rejecting the APA-based challenge. View "APPLE INC. v. SQUIRES " on Justia Law