Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Aquarion Water Company of Connecticut (Aquarion) filed a rate application with the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) in August 2022, seeking to increase its rates to cover approximately $700 million in capital improvements made since 2013. Aquarion also sought to recover $3 million in deferred water conservation expenses and $2.2 million for its employee incentive compensation program. PURA reviewed the application and allowed Aquarion to include $650 million in plant additions completed before August 31, 2022, in its rate base but excluded $48 million in post-application plant additions. PURA also denied Aquarion’s request for the full amount of deferred conservation expenses and employee incentive compensation, reducing the approved revenue requirement to $195 million and the return on equity (ROE) to 8.7%.The trial court dismissed Aquarion’s appeal, finding substantial evidence supporting PURA’s decisions. Aquarion then appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, arguing that PURA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its prudence determinations and that the rate order was confiscatory.The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld PURA’s exclusion of the $42 million in post-application plant additions, finding a discernible difference in the quality of evidence submitted for pre- and post-application additions. The court also upheld the denial of $2.2 million for the employee incentive compensation program, agreeing that PURA did not use hindsight but rather assessed the program’s future efficacy based on historical data.However, the court found that PURA improperly used hindsight to evaluate the prudence of $1.5 million in deferred conservation expenses, focusing on after-the-fact economic savings rather than the prudence of the decision at the time the expenses were incurred. The court reversed this part of the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.The court also rejected Aquarion’s claim that the rate order was confiscatory, affirming that the approved ROE of 8.7% was not effectively reduced by the disallowance of certain costs and was sufficient to maintain Aquarion’s financial integrity and ability to attract capital. View "Aquarion Water Co. of Connecticut v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

Jordan Watkins, while in federal custody, underwent hernia repair surgery and subsequently experienced severe pain and swelling in his groin. Medical staff at the correctional facility dismissed his symptoms as routine side effects and refused to schedule a follow-up appointment before his transfer to another facility. Watkins filed Bivens claims against the medical and correctional staff for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the United States for negligent medical treatment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed all of Watkins' claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the Supreme Court's framework for evaluating Bivens claims barred Watkins' claims and that his FTCA claim was filed too late.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Watkins' Bivens claims could proceed under the precedent set by Carlson v. Green, which allows federal prisoners to sue for damages resulting from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. The court found that Watkins' claims fit within the context recognized by Carlson and were not meaningfully different. The court also held that the district court's dismissal of Watkins' FTCA claim was premature. Watkins may be able to establish the requirements for equitable tolling due to extraordinary circumstances, such as disruptions caused by COVID-19, which prevented him from filing his suit on time. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Watkins v. Mohan" on Justia Law

A group of hospitals in New Jersey, which serve a high number of low-income patients, challenged the state's charity care program. This program mandates that hospitals cannot refuse patients based on their inability to pay and prohibits billing qualified patients. The hospitals argued that this program constitutes an unlawful taking of private property without just compensation, violating both federal and state constitutional protections.The trial court dismissed some of the hospitals' claims for not exhausting administrative remedies and granted summary judgment to the state on the remaining claims, finding no per se or regulatory takings. The Appellate Division affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that the charity care program does not effect a taking.The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the charity care program does not constitute an unconstitutional per se physical taking. The program does not grant an affirmative right of access to hospital property, does not physically set aside hospital property for the government or third parties, and does not deprive hospitals of all economically beneficial use of their property. Additionally, the court found that the program does not amount to a regulatory taking due to the highly regulated nature of the hospital industry and the significant public interest served by the charity care program.The court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment, as modified, and noted that hospitals can challenge their subsidy allocations through administrative channels and lobby the Legislature for policy changes. The court emphasized that the charity care program does not violate the Takings Clause. View "Englewood Hospital & Medical Center v. State" on Justia Law

Seville Industries, LLC, a business providing services to the oil and gas sector, applied for a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan during the COVID-19 pandemic. The company included payments to independent contractors in its payroll costs calculation, resulting in a loan amount of $2,578,351. The Small Business Administration (SBA) later reviewed Seville's loan and determined that the inclusion of independent contractor payments was incorrect, leading to a partial forgiveness of the loan amount.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana reviewed Seville's appeal against the SBA's decision. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the SBA, upholding the decision to deny full loan forgiveness based on the inclusion of independent contractor payments in the payroll costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the CARES Act's definition of "payroll costs" does not include payments made to independent contractors by businesses. The court emphasized that the statutory text and structure clearly distinguish between payroll costs for employees and income for independent contractors or sole proprietors. The court also rejected Seville's claims that the SBA's interim final rule changed the meaning of "payroll costs" and that the SBA should be equitably estopped from denying full forgiveness. The court concluded that Seville was not entitled to include payments to independent contractors in its payroll costs calculation for PPP loan forgiveness. View "Seville Industries v. SBA" on Justia Law

In this case, the families of Michael Jackson, Carl Wiley, Jr., and Rashad Henderson, who were killed during high-speed police chases in Houston, Texas, sued the City of Houston. They alleged that the Houston Police Department (HPD) has a policy of racial profiling that leads to more high-speed chases in predominantly black neighborhoods, resulting in the deaths of their loved ones. The plaintiffs brought several federal municipal liability claims, including violations of equal protection, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, and substantive due process, as well as state tort claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted in part and denied in part Houston's motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for judgment on the pleadings. The court dismissed all claims except the equal protection claims and Jackson’s state law claims. Houston then filed an interlocutory appeal, raising issues regarding standing, failure to state federal claims, capacity to sue, and governmental immunity for Jackson’s state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review non-final district court orders except under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The court found that it could only review whether the plaintiffs had standing to assert their equal protection claims. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their injuries did not stem from unequal treatment based on race. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s order regarding standing for the equal protection claims and vacated the district court’s decision on governmental immunity for Jackson’s negligence claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Axalta Coating Systems LLC ("Axalta") provided a can of flammable paint to FedEx for air shipment. The paint spilled during transit due to a loose lid. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) filed an administrative complaint alleging Axalta failed to package the paint according to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Axalta in violation and imposed a $1,900 penalty, which the FAA Administrator affirmed. Axalta petitioned for review, arguing the administrative adjudication violated the Seventh Amendment's jury trial guarantee, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Jarkesy.The ALJ denied Axalta's motion to dismiss the complaint and a motion to disqualify the ALJ. After a hearing, the ALJ concluded Axalta violated 49 C.F.R. § 171.2(e) and 49 C.F.R. § 173.24(b)(1), assessing a $1,900 penalty. Axalta appealed, and the FAA cross-appealed for a higher penalty. The Administrator affirmed the ALJ's decision. Axalta then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for review.The Third Circuit held that the administrative adjudication did not violate the Seventh Amendment. The court distinguished the case from Jarkesy, noting that the HMR's technical standards were not derived from common law, unlike the securities fraud provisions in Jarkesy. The court concluded that the FAA's enforcement action was a public right that could be adjudicated administratively without a jury. The court also rejected Axalta's additional arguments, including claims of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, improper ALJ appointment, statute of limitations issues, and due process violations. The petition for review was denied. View "Axalta Coating Systems LLC v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law

Snakeroot Solar, LLC, sought a good-cause exemption from the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to extend the deadline for its photovoltaic generating facility in Pittsfield to reach commercial operation and participate in Maine’s net energy billing (NEB) program. The facility needed to be operational by December 31, 2024, but delays in the interconnection process and the time required for grid upgrades made this deadline unachievable. Snakeroot argued that these delays were outside its control and warranted an exemption.The PUC denied Snakeroot’s petition, finding that the delays were inherent to the interconnection process and not external. The PUC noted that the cluster study process, which took slightly longer than average, and the time required for grid upgrades were typical and did not constitute external delays. Snakeroot appealed, arguing that the PUC misinterpreted the statute and that the delays were indeed external and beyond its control.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and upheld the PUC’s decision. The Court found that the PUC’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable and aligned with the legislative intent to limit the number of projects eligible for the NEB program to control electricity rates. The Court also determined that the PUC’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, including the typical duration of cluster studies and the standard lead times for equipment procurement. The Court concluded that the PUC did not abuse its discretion in denying the exemption, as the delays experienced by Snakeroot were part of the normal interconnection process and not extraordinary. View "Snakeroot Solar, LLC v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Two Mauritian mining companies, Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. and Amari Nickel Holdings Zimbabwe Ltd., filed a lawsuit against the Republic of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), and Zimbabwe’s Chief Mining Commissioner. The plaintiffs sought to recognize and enforce a judgment from the High Court of Zambia, which confirmed an arbitral award issued in Zambia. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants waived their immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) through the arbitration exception and the implied waiver exception.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled on the scope of the FSIA exceptions. The court determined that the arbitration exception did not apply because it covers actions to confirm arbitral awards, not actions to recognize and enforce foreign court judgments. However, the district court held that the implied waiver exception applied, reasoning that by signing the New York Convention and agreeing to arbitrate in Zambia, the defendants waived their immunity from the action to recognize a foreign court judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that the arbitration exception did not apply, as the exception covers only actions to confirm arbitral awards, not actions to recognize foreign court judgments. The court also concluded that the implied waiver exception did not apply, as signing the New York Convention and agreeing to arbitrate in a signatory state did not demonstrate an intent to waive immunity from judgment recognition actions. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction, vacated the remaining orders, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. v. Zimbabwe Mining Development Corp." on Justia Law

Tobias Jones, a self-described citizen journalist, was filming a Secret Service building in Washington, D.C. when two officers ordered him to stop. When he refused, they detained, handcuffed, and searched him. A third officer later informed Jones that he had the right to film, and he was released. Jones sued the officers for damages, claiming violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights, and sought prospective relief against the Secret Service.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Jones' case. The court held that Jones did not have a valid cause of action for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Jones' Fourth Amendment claims presented a new context under Bivens, as the Secret Service officers were performing protective duties, which differ from the law enforcement activities in Bivens. The court found that extending Bivens to this new context was inappropriate due to the potential for judicial intrusion into executive functions and the availability of alternative remedies through the Department of Homeland Security. The court also declined to extend Bivens to Jones' First Amendment claim, noting that the Supreme Court has never done so and has foreclosed Bivens remedies for First Amendment retaliation claims.Regarding prospective relief, the court held that Jones lacked standing because he did not plausibly allege a substantial risk of future harm. The court noted that Jones' allegations of potential future encounters with Secret Service officers were speculative and insufficient to establish standing.The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Jones' case. View "Jones v. Secret Service" on Justia Law

Gary Sebastian Brown, III filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the FBI for witness accounts related to the 2015 terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California. Brown argued that the FBI's search was inadequate and that it improperly withheld information. The FBI initially provided 19 pages of previously released documents and, after Brown's dissatisfaction, conducted a new search, locating 411 pages. The FBI withheld some records under FOIA Exemption 7(A) due to a pending investigation. After the investigation concluded, the FBI released 406 pages, redacting some information under various FOIA exemptions.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the FBI, finding that the FBI's search was adequate and that its redactions were consistent with FOIA. Brown appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the FBI's search was reasonable and that it properly construed Brown's request for "witness accounts, narratives, or statements" as seeking formal witness interviews. The court also found that the FBI's invocation of FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(D) to withhold personal information and information provided by confidential sources was justified. The court noted that the FBI adequately explained the foreseeable harms from disclosure and that the redactions were not overbroad.The court also upheld the district court's decision to deny in camera review of the redactions, finding no evidence of bad faith or contradictions in the FBI's declaration. Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the FBI's actions complied with FOIA requirements. View "Brown v. FBI" on Justia Law