Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Sacramento Television Stations Inc. (Sac TV) sought additional audio and video recordings from the City of Roseville (City) under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) related to an incident on April 6, 2023, where Roseville Police Department (Roseville PD) officers discharged firearms at a suspect, Eric J. Abril. The City provided limited footage, arguing that further disclosure would interfere with an active investigation. Sac TV filed a petition for writ of mandate to compel the City to release more recordings.The Superior Court of Placer County denied Sac TV's petition, finding that the City had shown by clear and convincing evidence that further disclosure would substantially interfere with an active investigation, specifically Abril's ongoing criminal case. The court acknowledged that more footage was required under CPRA but did not determine the extent due to the active investigation exemption.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the Superior Court's finding of an active investigation was not supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that a pending criminal prosecution alone does not constitute an active investigation under CPRA. The court also found that the City’s interpretation of the required disclosure was too narrow and that more context was needed to understand the incident involving the discharge of a firearm.The Court of Appeal vacated the Superior Court's ruling and directed it to hold further proceedings, including an in camera review of the City’s recordings, to determine the extent of additional disclosure required. The court emphasized the importance of providing sufficient context to fully understand the events captured in the recordings. The petition for rehearing was denied, and the judgment remained unchanged. View "Sacramento Television Stations Inc. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

In 2018, South Carolina excluded Planned Parenthood from its Medicaid program, citing state law prohibiting public funds for abortion. Planned Parenthood and patient Julie Edwards sued, claiming the exclusion violated the Medicaid any-qualified-provider provision, which allows Medicaid beneficiaries to obtain services from any qualified provider. Edwards preferred Planned Parenthood for gynecological care but needed Medicaid coverage. They filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 to enforce rights under the federal Medicaid statutes.The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and enjoined the exclusion. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded the case in light of Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion Cty. v. Talevski, which addressed whether another spending-power statute created §1983-enforceable rights. On remand, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its decision.The Supreme Court of the United States held that Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under §1983. The Court emphasized that spending-power statutes rarely create enforceable rights and that the any-qualified-provider provision lacks the clear rights-creating language necessary to support a §1983 action. The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic" on Justia Law

The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), a federal agency responsible for marketing power generated at federal hydroelectric facilities in the Columbia River Basin, holds financial reserves to maintain stable rates. When these reserves exceed a certain threshold, BPA is required to spend the excess. In fiscal years 2022 and 2023, BPA decided to allocate only about 10 percent of its excess reserves to fish and wildlife mitigation efforts, prompting environmental groups led by the Idaho Conservation League (ICL) to challenge this decision.The environmental groups argued that BPA's decision violated its obligations under section 4(h)(11)(A) of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (NWPA), which requires BPA to provide equitable treatment for fish and wildlife and to consider the Council's environmental mitigation program to the fullest extent practicable. BPA contended that section 4(h)(11)(A) did not apply to its financial decisions regarding the allocation of excess reserves.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the petitions for review were timely filed within 90 days of BPA's final allocation decisions. The court also determined that the cases were not moot, as the issues raised were capable of repetition while evading review.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit concluded that BPA's allocation of its excess financial reserves was not subject to the requirements of section 4(h)(11)(A) of the NWPA. Instead, the court found that section 4(h)(10)(A) specifically addresses BPA's use of the excess financial reserve fund for fish and wildlife and does not require the same level of prioritization as section 4(h)(11)(A). Consequently, the court denied the petitions for review. View "IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION" on Justia Law

Matthew Mungai, a Black man of Kenyan origin, sued the University of Minnesota, alleging racial discrimination and harassment while he was a student. He claimed violations under Title VI, Title IX, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), the Fourteenth Amendment, and negligence. Mungai detailed several incidents of racial harassment by students and staff over three years, including derogatory comments and threats. He reported some incidents to university staff and the Student Conflict Resolution Center (SCRC).The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Mungai's claims, finding that his amended complaint failed to state a claim. Mungai appealed, focusing on his Title VI claim and challenging the dismissal with prejudice of his Title VI, MHRA, Fourteenth Amendment, and § 1983 claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court adopted the deliberate indifference standard for third-party harassment claims under Title VI, similar to Title IX. To establish liability, Mungai needed to show that the University was deliberately indifferent to known acts of harassment by individuals under its control. The court found that Mungai's allegations did not plausibly show that he reported the incidents to an appropriate person with authority to take corrective action. Additionally, the court found that Mungai did not provide sufficient facts to establish that the University acted with deliberate indifference.The court also upheld the district court's dismissal with prejudice of Mungai's MHRA, Fourteenth Amendment, and § 1983 claims. The MHRA claim was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Fourteenth Amendment claim could not be brought directly, and the University was not a "person" under § 1983.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Mungai v. University of Minnesota" on Justia Law

The case involves the Citizen Action Defense Fund (Fund) requesting the initial offers for collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) from the Washington State Office of Financial Management (OFM) under the Public Records Act (PRA). The key issue is whether the deliberative process exemption under RCW 42.56.280 applies to these initial offers after the tentative CBAs have been signed by the parties and submitted to the OFM director but before they are signed by the governor or funded by the legislature.The Thurston County Superior Court found that OFM violated the PRA by withholding the records, ruling that the deliberative process exemption did not apply once the CBAs were signed by the state’s negotiation representative and the union. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the records were still exempt because the CBAs had not been presented to the governor for approval or funded by the legislature, and thus were not yet final.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the deliberative process exemption continues to apply until the legislature has funded the CBAs. The court reasoned that the collective bargaining process is not complete until the final step in the statutorily required implementation process, which is the approval of funding by the legislature. Therefore, the deliberative process exemption protects the documents related to collective bargaining until the CBAs are funded by the legislature. View "Citizen Action Def. Fund v. Off. of Fin. Mgmt." on Justia Law

Following Hurricane Ida in 2021, Terrebonne Parish requested assistance from Lafayette Utilities Systems (LUS) to help restore power in Houma, Louisiana. LUS, in turn, requested help from the City of Wilson, North Carolina. Agreements were signed to facilitate emergency assistance, and the City of Wilson dispatched employees to Louisiana. Due to a shortage of hotels in Houma, the employees stayed in Lafayette and commuted daily. Kevin Worrell, a City of Wilson employee, was involved in a vehicle collision while driving from Houma to Lafayette, resulting in injuries to Edward and Linda Breaux and Jessie and Vickie Blanchard.The plaintiffs filed separate negligence lawsuits in Louisiana state court, which were removed to the federal district court in the Western District of Louisiana. The cases were consolidated, and the defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act. The district court granted summary judgment, finding statutory immunity, and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the district court's interpretation of the Act's immunity provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted the need to interpret the Louisiana emergency preparedness law and expressed doubt about its ability to make a reliable Erie guess. Consequently, the court certified two questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court: (1) whether an employee of a city from another state working under an emergency assistance agreement is a "representative" of Louisiana or its political subdivisions, and (2) whether an individual providing emergency assistance is "engaging in emergency preparedness and recovery activities" while commuting from the recovery site to lodging. The Fifth Circuit will resolve the case based on the Louisiana Supreme Court's guidance. View "Breaux v. Worrell" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Michigan's newborn screening program, which collects blood samples from newborns to test for diseases. The plaintiffs, consisting of parents and their children, argue that the program's retention and use of these blood samples without consent violate their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs claim that the state's actions constitute a coercive, non-consensual taking and keeping of baby blood for the state's profit.Initially, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. However, a prior panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded several claims, allowing the plaintiffs to pursue their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. On remand, the district court granted judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on nearly all their remaining claims and ordered the defendants to return or destroy the stored blood spots and data.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the defendants' actions of storing and using the blood spots and data did not violate the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process rights, as these actions did not constitute medical care or intrude on the parents' right to direct their children's medical care. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove a possessory interest in the blood spots and data, which is necessary to establish a Fourth Amendment seizure claim. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the injunction requiring the defendants to destroy the stored data. View "Kanuszewski v. Michigan Dep't of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought to validate a portion of West Fork Pine Creek Road in Shoshone County, Idaho, which runs across private property and into public land managed by the Bureau of Land Management. The road is used by recreationalists to access an area known as "the Roller Coaster." Following disputes between local landowners and recreationalists, a petition was filed with the Shoshone County Board of Commissioners to validate the road. The Board denied the petition, citing concerns about environmental impacts, safety, and costs to taxpayers.The petitioners then sought judicial review in the District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho, arguing that the Board erred in its decision. The district court affirmed the Board's decision, concluding that the Board's findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, arguing that the district court erred in affirming the Board's conclusions.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and determined that the Board erred in concluding that the 1909 meeting minutes did not establish the road as a public highway. However, the Court found no error in the Board's determination that validating the road was not in the public interest. The Court noted that the Board had considered various factors, including the availability of alternative access routes, the costs of surveying and maintaining the road, and the concerns of private property owners.Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision, holding that while the road was established as a public highway in 1909, the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that validation was not in the public interest. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal. View "Jutila v. County of Shoshone" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the Wisconsin State Legislature and the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI) regarding the governor's partial veto power and the allocation of funds for literacy programs. The legislature argued that the governor exceeded his constitutional authority by partially vetoing a bill that was not an appropriation bill. DPI and the governor contended that the legislature's Joint Committee on Finance (JCF) improperly withheld funds appropriated for DPI's literacy programs.The Dane County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in part for each party. The court concluded that the governor did not exceed his constitutional boundaries in partially vetoing the bill and that JCF did not improperly withhold funds from DPI. The court reasoned that the bill in question was an appropriation bill and that the governor's partial veto was valid. However, the court also held that DPI was not entitled to the funds appropriated to JCF.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the governor breached his constitutional boundaries because the bill he partially vetoed was not an appropriation bill. The court reaffirmed the "four corners rule," which requires that an appropriation bill must set aside public funds for a public purpose within its text. The court concluded that the bill in question did not meet this requirement and, therefore, was not subject to the governor's partial veto authority. The court also held that JCF did not improperly withhold funds from DPI, as the funds were lawfully appropriated to JCF. Consequently, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court's summary judgment order. View "Wisconsin State Legislature v. Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction" on Justia Law

Petitioners, including various agricultural and trade organizations, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over a rule that set an equation for calculating vehicle fuel economy, specifically the "Ra factor." They argued that the Ra factor was set arbitrarily low, which effectively increased federal fuel economy standards and decreased demand for gasoline, harming their businesses.The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The petitioners contended that the EPA's rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by ignoring significant comments and data that flagged flaws in the determination of the Ra factor. They pointed out that the EPA's test program used too few and outdated vehicles, included data from a malfunctioning vehicle, and excluded data from a properly functioning one. Additionally, they argued that the EPA failed to consider alternative data sources, such as manufacturer certification data, which showed a higher Ra factor.The Fifth Circuit found that the EPA's rule was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the EPA did not adequately respond to significant comments that raised substantial issues with the test program's sample size, the representativeness of the vehicles tested, and the inclusion and exclusion of certain test data. The court also found that the EPA failed to justify its rejection of alternative data sources. As a result, the court held that the EPA did not demonstrate that its decision was the product of reasoned decision-making.The court granted the petition for review and vacated the portion of the EPA's rule that set and implemented the Ra factor of 0.81. The court concluded that there was no serious possibility that the EPA could substantiate its decision on remand, and thus, vacatur was the appropriate remedy. View "Texas Corn Producers v. EPA" on Justia Law