Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the families of Michael Jackson, Carl Wiley, Jr., and Rashad Henderson, who were killed during high-speed police chases in Houston, Texas, sued the City of Houston. They alleged that the Houston Police Department (HPD) has a policy of racial profiling that leads to more high-speed chases in predominantly black neighborhoods, resulting in the deaths of their loved ones. The plaintiffs brought several federal municipal liability claims, including violations of equal protection, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, and substantive due process, as well as state tort claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted in part and denied in part Houston's motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for judgment on the pleadings. The court dismissed all claims except the equal protection claims and Jackson’s state law claims. Houston then filed an interlocutory appeal, raising issues regarding standing, failure to state federal claims, capacity to sue, and governmental immunity for Jackson’s state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review non-final district court orders except under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The court found that it could only review whether the plaintiffs had standing to assert their equal protection claims. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their injuries did not stem from unequal treatment based on race. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s order regarding standing for the equal protection claims and vacated the district court’s decision on governmental immunity for Jackson’s negligence claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Axalta Coating Systems LLC ("Axalta") provided a can of flammable paint to FedEx for air shipment. The paint spilled during transit due to a loose lid. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) filed an administrative complaint alleging Axalta failed to package the paint according to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Axalta in violation and imposed a $1,900 penalty, which the FAA Administrator affirmed. Axalta petitioned for review, arguing the administrative adjudication violated the Seventh Amendment's jury trial guarantee, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Jarkesy.The ALJ denied Axalta's motion to dismiss the complaint and a motion to disqualify the ALJ. After a hearing, the ALJ concluded Axalta violated 49 C.F.R. § 171.2(e) and 49 C.F.R. § 173.24(b)(1), assessing a $1,900 penalty. Axalta appealed, and the FAA cross-appealed for a higher penalty. The Administrator affirmed the ALJ's decision. Axalta then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for review.The Third Circuit held that the administrative adjudication did not violate the Seventh Amendment. The court distinguished the case from Jarkesy, noting that the HMR's technical standards were not derived from common law, unlike the securities fraud provisions in Jarkesy. The court concluded that the FAA's enforcement action was a public right that could be adjudicated administratively without a jury. The court also rejected Axalta's additional arguments, including claims of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, improper ALJ appointment, statute of limitations issues, and due process violations. The petition for review was denied. View "Axalta Coating Systems LLC v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law

Snakeroot Solar, LLC, sought a good-cause exemption from the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to extend the deadline for its photovoltaic generating facility in Pittsfield to reach commercial operation and participate in Maine’s net energy billing (NEB) program. The facility needed to be operational by December 31, 2024, but delays in the interconnection process and the time required for grid upgrades made this deadline unachievable. Snakeroot argued that these delays were outside its control and warranted an exemption.The PUC denied Snakeroot’s petition, finding that the delays were inherent to the interconnection process and not external. The PUC noted that the cluster study process, which took slightly longer than average, and the time required for grid upgrades were typical and did not constitute external delays. Snakeroot appealed, arguing that the PUC misinterpreted the statute and that the delays were indeed external and beyond its control.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and upheld the PUC’s decision. The Court found that the PUC’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable and aligned with the legislative intent to limit the number of projects eligible for the NEB program to control electricity rates. The Court also determined that the PUC’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, including the typical duration of cluster studies and the standard lead times for equipment procurement. The Court concluded that the PUC did not abuse its discretion in denying the exemption, as the delays experienced by Snakeroot were part of the normal interconnection process and not extraordinary. View "Snakeroot Solar, LLC v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Two Mauritian mining companies, Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. and Amari Nickel Holdings Zimbabwe Ltd., filed a lawsuit against the Republic of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), and Zimbabwe’s Chief Mining Commissioner. The plaintiffs sought to recognize and enforce a judgment from the High Court of Zambia, which confirmed an arbitral award issued in Zambia. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants waived their immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) through the arbitration exception and the implied waiver exception.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled on the scope of the FSIA exceptions. The court determined that the arbitration exception did not apply because it covers actions to confirm arbitral awards, not actions to recognize and enforce foreign court judgments. However, the district court held that the implied waiver exception applied, reasoning that by signing the New York Convention and agreeing to arbitrate in Zambia, the defendants waived their immunity from the action to recognize a foreign court judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that the arbitration exception did not apply, as the exception covers only actions to confirm arbitral awards, not actions to recognize foreign court judgments. The court also concluded that the implied waiver exception did not apply, as signing the New York Convention and agreeing to arbitrate in a signatory state did not demonstrate an intent to waive immunity from judgment recognition actions. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction, vacated the remaining orders, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. v. Zimbabwe Mining Development Corp." on Justia Law

Tobias Jones, a self-described citizen journalist, was filming a Secret Service building in Washington, D.C. when two officers ordered him to stop. When he refused, they detained, handcuffed, and searched him. A third officer later informed Jones that he had the right to film, and he was released. Jones sued the officers for damages, claiming violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights, and sought prospective relief against the Secret Service.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Jones' case. The court held that Jones did not have a valid cause of action for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Jones' Fourth Amendment claims presented a new context under Bivens, as the Secret Service officers were performing protective duties, which differ from the law enforcement activities in Bivens. The court found that extending Bivens to this new context was inappropriate due to the potential for judicial intrusion into executive functions and the availability of alternative remedies through the Department of Homeland Security. The court also declined to extend Bivens to Jones' First Amendment claim, noting that the Supreme Court has never done so and has foreclosed Bivens remedies for First Amendment retaliation claims.Regarding prospective relief, the court held that Jones lacked standing because he did not plausibly allege a substantial risk of future harm. The court noted that Jones' allegations of potential future encounters with Secret Service officers were speculative and insufficient to establish standing.The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Jones' case. View "Jones v. Secret Service" on Justia Law

Gary Sebastian Brown, III filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the FBI for witness accounts related to the 2015 terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California. Brown argued that the FBI's search was inadequate and that it improperly withheld information. The FBI initially provided 19 pages of previously released documents and, after Brown's dissatisfaction, conducted a new search, locating 411 pages. The FBI withheld some records under FOIA Exemption 7(A) due to a pending investigation. After the investigation concluded, the FBI released 406 pages, redacting some information under various FOIA exemptions.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the FBI, finding that the FBI's search was adequate and that its redactions were consistent with FOIA. Brown appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the FBI's search was reasonable and that it properly construed Brown's request for "witness accounts, narratives, or statements" as seeking formal witness interviews. The court also found that the FBI's invocation of FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(D) to withhold personal information and information provided by confidential sources was justified. The court noted that the FBI adequately explained the foreseeable harms from disclosure and that the redactions were not overbroad.The court also upheld the district court's decision to deny in camera review of the redactions, finding no evidence of bad faith or contradictions in the FBI's declaration. Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the FBI's actions complied with FOIA requirements. View "Brown v. FBI" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) manages wild horse herds in southern Wyoming under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. This Act mandates the protection and management of wild horses on public lands. The land in question is a checkerboard pattern of alternating public and private ownership. Since 1979, BLM managed these herds with the consent of private landowners. However, in 2010, private landowners revoked their consent, making it difficult for BLM to maintain the herds. In 2022, BLM amended its Regional Management Plan (RMP) to change two Herd Management Areas (HMAs) to Herd Areas (HAs), reducing the wild horse population goal to zero in two areas and significantly reducing it in another.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming reviewed the case and ruled in favor of BLM, finding that the agency had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in amending the RMP. The court held that any challenge to BLM’s decision to remove horses was unripe and that BLM had complied with the relevant statutes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and found that BLM failed to consider whether its decision would achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance, as required by the Wild Horse Act. The court held that BLM’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not base its decision on this statutory requirement. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case to determine the appropriate remedy, considering the practical consequences of vacatur and the potential for BLM to substantiate its decision on remand. View "American Wild Horse Campaign v. Raby" on Justia Law

An inmate, Thomas Clark, filed a mandamus action against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) seeking copies of electronic kites he sent to prison staff while incarcerated at the North Central Correctional Complex (NCCC) and the Lebanon Correctional Institution (LCI). He also requested a copy of the chow-hall menu from LCI. Clark claimed that his requests were not fulfilled and sought $2,000 in statutory damages and court costs.The lower court proceedings involved Clark sending public-records requests to LCI staff. The LCI staff forwarded his request for NCCC kites to the appropriate person at NCCC, but Clark did not receive a response. For the chow-hall menu request, LCI staff directed Clark to obtain the menu from his unit manager, which Clark did not do. Clark then filed this mandamus action.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that Clark was entitled to a writ of mandamus for his request for the NCCC kites because LCI staff had forwarded his request to NCCC, and NCCC did not respond. The court held that DRC must provide Clark with the requested NCCC kites. However, the court denied the writ for the chow-hall menu request, as LCI staff had properly directed Clark to the appropriate person to obtain the menu. The court awarded Clark $1,000 in statutory damages for the NCCC kites request but denied his request for court costs. The court also denied Clark's motion for leave to file rebuttal evidence. View "State ex rel. Clark v. Department of Rehabilitation and Correction" on Justia Law

Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC plans to build an interstate pipeline through Iowa, passing through Shelby and Story Counties. Both counties enacted ordinances regulating pipelines, including setback, emergency response plan, and local permit requirements. Summit challenged these ordinances, claiming they were preempted by the federal Pipeline Safety Act (PSA) and Iowa law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Summit, permanently enjoining the ordinances.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa reviewed the case and ruled in favor of Summit, finding that the PSA preempted the counties' ordinances. The court held that the ordinances imposed safety standards, which are under the exclusive regulatory authority of the federal government. The court also found that the ordinances were inconsistent with Iowa state law, which grants the Iowa Utilities Commission (IUC) the authority to regulate pipeline routes and safety standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the PSA preempts the Shelby and Story ordinances' setback, emergency response, and abandonment provisions. The court found that the ordinances' primary motivation was safety, which falls under the exclusive regulatory authority of the federal government. The court also held that the ordinances were inconsistent with Iowa state law, as they imposed additional requirements that could prohibit pipeline construction even if the IUC had granted a permit.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in both cases, but vacated and remanded the judgment in the Story County case to the extent it addressed a repealed ordinance. View "McNair v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Rachael Gorecki applied for disability benefits and received a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) whose appointment was ratified by Nancy Berryhill during her second tenure as Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. The ALJ denied Gorecki's benefits application, and the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council denied review, making the decision final. Gorecki then sued, arguing that the ALJ had no constitutional authority to issue a decision because Berryhill's second stint as Acting Commissioner violated the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama rejected Gorecki's argument, aligning with other appellate courts that had ruled on similar issues. The district court found that Berryhill's second tenure as Acting Commissioner was lawful under the FVRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and joined five other circuits in holding that the FVRA authorized Berryhill's second stint as Acting Commissioner. The court found that the plain text of the FVRA allowed Berryhill to serve again as Acting Commissioner once a nomination for the office was submitted to the Senate, regardless of whether the nomination occurred during the initial 210-day period. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Berryhill's ratification of the ALJ's appointment was valid and that the ALJ had the authority to deny Gorecki's benefits application. The Eleventh Circuit thus affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Gorecki v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration" on Justia Law