Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Veltor Underground LLC, a construction business, applied for a $125,000 loan under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) during the COVID-19 pandemic, claiming it had six employees. However, the Small Business Administration (SBA) later discovered that these "employees" were actually independent contractors. Consequently, the SBA denied Veltor's request for loan forgiveness, as payments to independent contractors do not qualify as "payroll costs" under the CARES Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the SBA and associated individuals. The court found that Veltor's payments to independent contractors did not meet the statutory definition of "payroll costs," which is a requirement for loan forgiveness under the PPP.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the CARES Act's definition of "payroll costs" includes only payments to employees and not to independent contractors. The court reasoned that the Act distinguishes between businesses with employees and self-employed individuals, including sole proprietors and independent contractors, and that the term "payroll costs" does not encompass payments made to independent contractors by businesses. Therefore, Veltor was not entitled to loan forgiveness and must repay the loan. View "Veltor Underground, LLC v. SBA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, limited liability companies, filed class action lawsuits in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland seeking relief under the Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) provisions. These provisions make Medicare a secondary payer when a beneficiary has other insurance coverage. Plaintiffs obtained assignments from Medicare Advantage Organizations and other secondary payers to seek reimbursement from primary payers like the defendants, Government Employees Insurance Company and its affiliates (GEICO). Plaintiffs had no preexisting interest in the claims and were compensated on a contingency basis.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied GEICO's motion to dismiss the case, which argued that the assignments were void as against Maryland public policy based on the doctrines of maintenance, champerty, and barratry. The court found no clear statement of Maryland law on this issue and certified questions to the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that Plaintiffs did not violate Maryland’s barratry statute, which prohibits soliciting another person to sue for personal gain without an existing relationship or interest. Plaintiffs did not solicit secondary payers to file lawsuits but obtained the right to sue in their own names through assignments. The court also held that the common law doctrines of maintenance, champerty, and barratry, to the extent they still apply, do not invalidate Plaintiffs’ assignments. The court concluded that the assignments are not void as against public policy and did not address the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in the agreements. View "GEICO v. MAO-MSO Recovery II" on Justia Law

Energy Harbor, LLC, the owner and operator of the W.H. Sammis power plant, was assessed $12 million in penalties by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. for failing to comply with PJM’s Tariff during a major winter storm in December 2022. Energy Harbor contested these penalties, arguing that the penalties were inconsistent with the terms of the Tariff, particularly the exception for maintenance outages. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) denied Energy Harbor’s complaint, leading Energy Harbor to petition for judicial review.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviewed Energy Harbor’s complaint and found that PJM had correctly interpreted the Tariff and calculated the penalties. FERC concluded that the maintenance outage at the Sammis Plant was not the sole cause of the performance shortfall, as the plant had sufficient capacity to meet its commitments but failed due to forced outages. Energy Harbor’s request for rehearing was denied by operation of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld FERC’s decision. The court agreed with FERC’s interpretation of the Tariff, stating that PJM correctly evaluated whether the maintenance outage was the sole cause of the performance shortfall. The court found that the Sammis Plant had enough installed capacity to meet its expected performance during the emergency, and the forced outages were also causes of the shortfall. The court also rejected Energy Harbor’s argument that the penalty exception should be assessed for each generating unit, affirming that the entire Sammis Plant was the resource at issue. Consequently, the court denied Energy Harbor’s petition for review. View "Energy Harbor, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Department of Labor (DoL) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in 2019 to amend its 2010 regulations regarding the H-2A visa program. In January 2021, during the final days of the Trump Administration, the DoL announced a final rule and submitted it to the Office of the Federal Register (OFR) for publication. However, the rule was withdrawn by the DoL under the Biden Administration before it was made available for public inspection. In 2022, the DoL issued a new rule based on the 2019 NPRM.The National Council of Agricultural Employers (NCAE) challenged the withdrawal of the 2021 rule and the promulgation of the 2022 rule, arguing that the 2021 rule was unlawfully repealed. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that the NCAE lacked standing to challenge the withdrawal of the 2021 rule but had standing to challenge the 2022 rule. The court denied the NCAE's request for a preliminary injunction and later granted the DoL's cross-motion for summary judgment, determining that the 2021 rule had not become final because it was never made available for public inspection by the OFR.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the rulemaking process culminated in the 2022 rule. The court determined that a substantive rule is not final until the OFR makes it available for public inspection. Since the 2021 rule was withdrawn before it became final, the DoL did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing the 2022 rule without a new round of notice and comment. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "National Council of Agricultural Employers v. DOL" on Justia Law

A regional transmission organization, Southwest Power Pool, sought to integrate the City of Nixa's transmission assets into its Zone 10 infrastructure. This integration would spread the costs of the Nixa Assets across all Zone 10 customers. Several nearby cities and utilities objected, arguing that they would bear unjustified costs without receiving corresponding benefits. They took their objections to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).FERC initially found insufficient evidence to determine whether the cost shift was justified and remanded the case for further proceedings. After a second hearing, an administrative law judge concluded that the integration was just and reasonable, providing incremental benefits such as improved reliability and power support for all Zone 10 customers. FERC affirmed this decision, finding that the integration's benefits justified the cost shift and denied the non-Nixa parties' request for rehearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC's decision to analyze costs and benefits at the zonal level, rather than on a customer-by-customer basis, was reasonable. The court noted that requiring a hyper-granular approach would undermine the zonal system. The court also upheld FERC's consideration of unquantifiable systemwide benefits, such as improved integration and reliability, as sufficient to justify the cost shift. Finally, the court found that FERC's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including testimony and records indicating that the integration would benefit all Zone 10 customers.The court denied the petition for review, affirming FERC's decision to approve the integration and the associated cost allocation. View "Paragould Light & Water Commission v. FERC" on Justia Law

Dallas Fenton was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against a fourteen-year-old child, including eight counts of third-degree sexual offense, one count of sexual solicitation of a minor, and one count of indecent exposure. He was sentenced to ten years for one of the third-degree sexual offenses (Count 1) and another ten years for a different third-degree sexual offense (Count 8), to be served consecutively.The Division of Correction (DOC) informed Fenton that he would not receive diminution of confinement credits for the sentence on Count 8 because he had been previously convicted of a similar offense (Count 1). Fenton's grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office (IGO) was dismissed, and the Circuit Court for Washington County partially granted and partially denied his petition for judicial review, ruling that he was entitled to good conduct credits but not other types of diminution credits for Count 8.The Appellate Court of Maryland held that Fenton was not prohibited from accruing diminution credits for Count 8, as the statute only applied if the previous conviction occurred before the commission of the offense for which the sentence was being served. The court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for recalculation of Fenton's credits.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's decision, holding that under Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 3-702(c), diminution credits are precluded only if the offense was committed after a previous conviction for the same offense. The court concluded that Fenton was entitled to diminution credits for Count 8, as he had not been "previously convicted" at the time of the offense. View "Dept. of Pub. Saf. & Corr. Serv. v. Fenton" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Vermont’s Auditor of Accounts and the Attorney General. The Auditor sued the Attorney General, alleging non-compliance with the statutory obligation to provide legal advice. The Auditor sought a declaratory judgment affirming his right to retain counsel to sue the Attorney General and mandamus to compel the Attorney General to answer specific legal questions. The trial court dismissed the Auditor’s claims and denied his request for attorneys’ fees.The dispute arose from the Auditor’s audit of a Burlington tax increment financing (TIF) district. The Auditor encountered a perceived gap in TIF statutes and sought advice from the Attorney General, who answered one question but directed the Auditor to other entities for the remaining questions. The Auditor claimed this was a violation of the Attorney General’s duty under 3 V.S.A. § 159 and threatened to sue. The Attorney General responded, explaining her statutory obligations and asserting that the Auditor lacked authority to sue.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Auditor’s claims for mandamus and declaratory judgment related to the specific TIF questions, concluding that the Attorney General had provided legal advice as required by 3 V.S.A. § 159. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the broader declaratory judgment claim, finding no live controversy as the Attorney General had provided legal advice and there was no policy of refusing to do so.However, the court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the Auditor’s claim for declaratory judgment regarding his right to retain counsel and sue for mandamus. The court held that the Auditor has implied statutory authorization to seek mandamus to enforce the Attorney General’s duty under 3 V.S.A. § 159. The court also affirmed the denial of attorneys’ fees, finding Rule 54 inapplicable for the relief sought by the Auditor. View "Office of the Auditor of Accounts v. Office of the Attorney General" on Justia Law

A resident taxpayer of Omaha challenged the City of Omaha's contract for residential solid waste collection, alleging it was an illegal expenditure of public funds and violated the Integrated Solid Waste Management Act (ISWMA). The contract, awarded to FCC Environmental Services Nebraska, LLC (FCC-Nebraska), included a yard waste sticker program where residents could purchase stickers for additional yard waste disposal.The district court for Douglas County granted summary judgment in favor of the City and FCC-Nebraska, dismissing the taxpayer's claims. The court found that the City acted within its discretion in seeking a postopening bid clarification from FCC-Spain (the original bidder) to standardize the unit price for yard waste stickers, which did not materially alter the bid or give FCC an unfair advantage. The court also determined that the yard waste sticker fee charged by FCC did not require voter approval under § 13-2020(4) of the ISWMA, as the fee was charged by and paid to the contractor, not the City.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the City did not act in bad faith or with favoritism in seeking the bid clarification and that the clarification did not result in a material variance from FCC's original bid. The court also agreed that the voter approval requirement in § 13-2020(4) did not apply to the yard waste sticker fee, as it was governed by § 13-2020(5), which allows contractors to charge service rates without voter approval. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the taxpayer's motion to amend the complaint to add a new theory of invalidity based on the identity of the contracting party. View "Johnson v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

James King sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and individual government employees under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, alleging physical abuse by U.S. officials. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on both claims. King appealed only the Bivens claim, making the FTCA judgment final. The individual defendants argued that the FTCA's "judgment bar" precluded the Bivens claim. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the defendants, stating that the FTCA judgment barred the Bivens claim.King then filed a Rule 60(b) motion in the district court to reopen the FTCA judgment to withdraw his FTCA claim and avoid the judgment bar. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that attorney error or strategic miscalculation is not a valid basis for reopening under Rule 60. King appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, as attorney error or strategic miscalculation does not justify reopening a final judgment under Rule 60. The court emphasized the public policy favoring the finality of judgments and noted that Rule 60(b)(6) relief is only available in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, which were not present in this case. View "King v. United States" on Justia Law

Sunshine State Regional Center, Inc. (Sunshine State) is an EB-5 regional center that was designated in 2014. The EB-5 program allows immigrants to obtain visas by investing in job-creating enterprises in the U.S. The EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022 (the Act) introduced an annual fee for regional centers to fund the EB-5 Integrity Fund, aimed at preventing fraud. Sunshine State, which is not currently sponsoring new investment projects, argued that it should not be subject to this fee because it was designated before the Act was passed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Sunshine State’s motion for summary judgment and granted, in part, the motion to dismiss filed by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The district court found that the Act’s text did not exempt pre-Act regional centers from the Integrity Fund Fee and that the structure of the Act suggested the opposite.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Act’s language and structure indicate that all regional centers, regardless of when they were designated, are subject to the Integrity Fund Fee. The court reasoned that the term “designated under subparagraph (E)” includes both pre- and post-Act regional centers because the Act governs the entire EB-5 program, and any designation for that program must now operate under subparagraph (E). The court also rejected Sunshine State’s argument that imposing the fee would be retroactive, stating that the fee is prospective and applies to the ongoing status of being a designated regional center.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding the imposition of the Integrity Fund Fee on Sunshine State. View "Sunshine State Regional Center, Inc. v. Director, US Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law