Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, including Mike Yoder and his company Drone Deer Recovery, LLC (DDR), along with hunter Jeremy Funke, challenged a Michigan law that bans the use of drones to hunt or collect downed game. DDR uses drones equipped with infrared cameras to locate downed game and provide hunters with GPS coordinates. Plaintiffs argued that the law prevents DDR from operating in Michigan, violating their First Amendment rights to create, disseminate, and receive information.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state a claim. The court found that the law did not prohibit the dissemination of location information but only the use of drones to locate game, which it deemed non-speech conduct. The court also concluded that the alleged injury was not redressable because the law would still prohibit drone use even if the requested injunction was granted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that Plaintiffs had standing but failed to state a claim. The court determined that Plaintiffs' intended conduct of using drones to create and share location information was arguably affected with a constitutional interest and that there was a credible threat of enforcement under the Michigan law. However, the court applied intermediate scrutiny, finding the law content-neutral and justified by substantial governmental interests in conservation and fair-chase hunting principles. The court concluded that the law was narrowly tailored to achieve these interests and did not violate the First Amendment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. View "Yoder v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Robert Sayers filed a complaint in 2021 seeking a declaration that Lippard Road is a public road and damages from Chouteau County for loss of access to his land. Chouteau County argued that the disputed portion of Lippard Road was abandoned in 1916. The disputed portion runs along the head of the Missouri River Breaks. The parties have a history of disputes over Lippard Road, but prior decisions do not impact the current case.The Twelfth Judicial District Court reviewed the case and concluded that the proper legal avenue was a writ of review, not a declaratory judgment. The court found that the Board of County Commissioners had abandoned the disputed portion of Lippard Road in 1916. The court noted that although the record did not show the appointment of viewers or a viewers' report, the curative statute in effect at the time addressed any procedural deficiencies. The court concluded that the Board's decision to abandon the road was supported by substantial evidence and did not materially affect the interests of the county or prejudice the substantial rights of property owners.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's ruling. The court held that the Board of County Commissioners had jurisdiction to consider the abandonment and that the record showed compliance with the statutory requirements for abandonment. The court also held that the curative statute applied, and any procedural deficiencies did not invalidate the abandonment. The court concluded that the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction or fail to regularly pursue its authority in abandoning the disputed portion of Lippard Road in 1916. View "Sayers v. Chouteau County" on Justia Law

A group of residents and business owners in Salt Lake City filed a lawsuit against the city, alleging that the city's failure to eliminate encampments of unsheltered people on public land interfered with their use and enjoyment of their properties. The residents claimed that the city, as a landowner, had a duty to maintain its properties free of nuisance. The city argued that the residents were attempting to use the court to force the city to exercise its enforcement powers in a specific way, and that under the public duty doctrine, the city had no duty to the residents regarding its failure to use those powers.The Third District Court in Salt Lake County dismissed the residents' complaint with prejudice, ruling that the public duty doctrine precluded their claims. The court found that the residents failed to allege that the city breached a duty owed specifically to them, rather than a duty owed to the public at large. The court concluded that the city owed no duty to the residents individually apart from its general duty to enforce laws and protect the public.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the public duty doctrine, which protects government actors from civil liability for failing to perform duties owed to the public, precluded the residents' claims of public and private nuisance. The court found that no special relationship existed between the residents and the city that would exempt the residents' claims from the public duty doctrine's preclusion. The court emphasized that the public duty doctrine applies to omissions by government actors performing public duties and that the residents did not demonstrate any unique duty owed to them by the city. View "Barrani v. Salt Lake City" on Justia Law

Liquid Hospitality, LLC, doing business as Windbreak Saloon, holds a liquor license from the City of Fargo. On August 18, 2023, Windbreak staff removed an intoxicated patron who later drove away and was involved in a single-vehicle accident. The patron had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.291 and was arrested for driving under the influence. The Fargo Police Department investigated and reviewed surveillance footage, which showed the patron being served multiple drinks and exhibiting signs of intoxication. The Windbreak was notified of a hearing before the Liquor Control Board for a possible violation of Fargo Municipal Code (F.M.C.) § 25-1509.2, which prohibits serving alcohol to intoxicated or impaired persons.The Liquor Control Board held a hearing on October 24, 2023, and determined that the Windbreak violated F.M.C. § 25-1509.2, recommending a $500 administrative penalty. The Windbreak appealed to the Board of City Commissioners of the City of Fargo, which upheld the Liquor Control Board's decision. The Windbreak then appealed to the district court.The district court requested additional briefing on the constitutionality of F.M.C. § 25-1509.2 and ultimately found the ordinance unconstitutionally vague, reversing the Commission's order. The court did not address whether the Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably, or whether their decision lacked substantial evidence. The Commission appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and concluded that F.M.C. § 25-1509.2 is not unconstitutionally vague. The court found that the ordinance provides adequate warning of prohibited conduct and creates minimum guidelines for enforcement. The court also determined that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The district court's judgment was reversed. View "Liquid Hospitality v. Bd. of City Commissioners of the City of Fargo" on Justia Law

A former Newark policeman, Keith Isaac, applied for special retirement in 2013, listing his estranged spouse, Roxanne, as his wife on the application. His retirement was approved in 2016, retroactive to August 1, 2014, resulting in $208,950.03 in unpaid benefits. Isaac passed away before receiving these benefits, and the Division of Pensions and Benefits distributed the unpaid benefits to Roxanne in March 2017. Isaac’s estate requested reconsideration, arguing that the benefits should be paid to the estate. The Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (PFRS) upheld the decision, stating that Isaac had designated Roxanne as his beneficiary.The estate appealed to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), which affirmed the Board’s decision, reasoning that listing Roxanne as his spouse on the retirement application constituted a beneficiary designation. The estate then appealed to the Appellate Division, which remanded the case to the OAL for a supplemental hearing to determine Isaac’s probable intent regarding the unpaid benefits.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12.2 mandates that unpaid benefits be distributed to the decedent’s estate unless a beneficiary is nominated by written designation. Since Isaac did not make such a designation, the Court ruled that the Board’s decision to distribute the benefits to Roxanne was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision to remand for further fact-finding and directed that the $208,950.03 in unpaid benefits be distributed to Isaac’s estate. View "Isaac v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants, owners of bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA), sued the United States, alleging a taking of their property under the Fifth Amendment due to the enactment of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). They claimed that the restructuring of COFINA's debts under PROMESA resulted in a significant loss of the principal and interest value of their bonds and their security interest.The United States Court of Federal Claims determined it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case but dismissed it for failure to state a claim. The court found that the enactment of PROMESA by Congress did not constitute sufficient federal government action to support a takings claim. The court reasoned that the actions of the Puerto Rico Oversight Board, which was created by PROMESA and acted autonomously, could not be attributed to the United States as coercive or as an agency relationship.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the Claims Court. The Federal Circuit held that PROMESA did not displace Tucker Act jurisdiction, as there was no clear congressional intent to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy. The court also agreed with the Claims Court that the United States did not exert coercive control over the Oversight Board's actions, which were necessary to establish a taking. The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not establish that the United States was liable for the alleged taking of their property. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the Claims Court's decision to deny the plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint. View "DINH v. US " on Justia Law

In 1996, California voters enacted Proposition 218, adding article XIII D to the California Constitution, which includes section 6(b)(3). This section mandates that governmental fees or charges imposed on property must not exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel. Plaintiffs, representing a class of single-family residential (SFR) customers of the City of San Diego, challenged the City's tiered water rates, claiming they violated section 6(b)(3) by exceeding the proportional cost of delivering water.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the City's tiered rates did not comply with section 6(b)(3). The court concluded that the City failed to show that its tiered rates were based on the actual cost of providing water at different usage levels. The court found that the City's tiered rates were designed to encourage conservation rather than reflect the cost of service, and that the City's use of peaking factors and other methodologies lacked supporting data.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the City did not meet its burden of proving that its tiered rates complied with section 6(b)(3). The appellate court found that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings that the City's tiered rates were not cost-proportional and that the City's methodologies were not adequately supported by data. The court also addressed the issue of class certification, finding that the class was properly certified and that the plaintiffs had a common interest in challenging the City's rate structure.The appellate court directed the trial court to amend the judgment to allow the City to satisfy the refund award pursuant to newly enacted Government Code section 53758.5, which requires agencies to credit refund awards against future increases in or impositions of the property-related charge. The court denied the plaintiffs' request for attorney fees on appeal without prejudice, allowing the trial court to determine the entitlement to such fees. View "Patz v. City of S.D." on Justia Law

Residents of the City of Page proposed an initiative to prevent the narrowing of a specific street within the city as part of a larger Streetscape Project aimed at economic development. The initiative sought to maintain the current size and number of lanes on Lake Powell Boulevard and prohibit the use of public or external funds to reduce its width. The City of Page rejected the initiative, deeming it non-legislative, and refused to place it on the ballot. Consequently, the Page Action Committee and individual plaintiffs filed a special action complaint in the superior court.The Superior Court in Coconino County found the initiative to be non-legislative in nature and ruled in favor of the City. The plaintiffs appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court applied a three-part test from Wennerstrom v. City of Mesa to determine whether the initiative was legislative or administrative. It concluded that the initiative was administrative because it only affected a specific portion of the road and sought to control the implementation of an already established policy.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the initiative was legislative in nature because it created a new public policy and provided the means for its implementation. The Court emphasized that the citizens' power to legislate is coextensive with that of their elected representatives and that the initiative proposed a law, not an administrative action. The decision of the Court of Appeals was vacated, and the case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter appropriate relief for the plaintiffs. View "ROUNDTREE v. PAGE" on Justia Law

The Center for Investigative Reporting and Will Evans requested several years of workforce composition reports from the U.S. Department of Labor under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). These reports, filed by federal contractors, detail the job categories and demographics of their employees. The Center intended to use this information to report on the diversity of these contractors' workforces. The Department of Labor withheld many of the requested reports, citing FOIA’s Exemption 4, which protects confidential commercial information.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California reviewed the case and ordered the Department to disclose the reports. The court found that the information in the reports did not qualify as "commercial" under Exemption 4 because it did not reveal commercially significant insights about the contractors' operations. The Department of Labor appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that the workforce-composition information in the reports did not constitute "commercial" information under Exemption 4. The court reasoned that the data on the number of employees in various job categories and their demographics did not directly describe the exchange of goods or services or the making of a profit. The court concluded that the Department of Labor failed to demonstrate that the information in the reports was commercial in nature, and therefore, the reports must be disclosed. The court did not address other elements of Exemption 4 or the FOIA Improvement Act, as the determination on the commercial nature of the information was sufficient to resolve the case. View "CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR" on Justia Law

A skilled nursing facility accepted a new resident who was receiving Medicaid benefits. The resident's husband was designated as her authorized representative. Nearly two years later, the Department of Human Services (DHS) terminated the resident's Medicaid benefits due to excess assets. Both the resident and her husband were incapacitated, and the resident's public guardian submitted a new Medicaid application, which was denied. The nursing facility continued to care for the resident without compensation until her death. The facility later sought an administrative hearing to challenge the eligibility decision, but the request was denied because the facility was not an authorized representative and the appeal was late.The circuit court and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the denial, holding that the nursing home lacked standing to challenge the eligibility determination under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 346-12, which limits appeals to the applicant or recipient. The courts concluded that the nursing home did not have a close relationship with the resident for third-party standing purposes.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts regarding standing. The court held that skilled nursing facilities have constitutionally protected property interests in compensation for medical services performed for residents based on DHS eligibility determinations. The court ruled that these facilities have due process rights under the Hawai'i Constitution, including notice and the opportunity to appeal Medicaid eligibility determinations when the beneficiary is incapacitated and no authorized representative is available or willing to appeal. The court vacated the ICA's judgment and the circuit court's order, remanding the case for a new administrative hearing on the merits of the resident's Medicaid eligibility. View "In re FT" on Justia Law