Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Patricia Burnette Chastain was appointed as the clerk of superior court in Franklin County in May 2013 and was subsequently elected to the position in November 2013 and reelected in 2017. In July 2020, an attorney named Jeffrey Thompson filed an affidavit requesting an inquiry into Ms. Chastain's conduct, alleging various instances of misconduct, including distributing gift certificates to jurors, allowing a judicial candidate to address a jury, and acting unprofessionally with correctional officers, among other allegations.Judge John M. Dunlow initially suspended Ms. Chastain and set a hearing date. However, due to a conflict of interest, Judge Dunlow and another judge were recused, and Judge Thomas H. Lock was appointed to preside over the removal inquiry. After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Lock issued an order in October 2020 permanently removing Ms. Chastain from her position based on findings of willful misconduct. Ms. Chastain appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated the order, holding that Judge Lock lacked authority under Article IV of the North Carolina Constitution to remove her and remanded the case for reconsideration under Article VI.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that Judge Lock had the authority to preside over the removal proceeding as a replacement for the recused senior regular resident superior court judge. The court also held that procedural due process requires that removal be based only on conduct identified in the initiating affidavit. Furthermore, the court clarified that the standard for removal under Article IV is "misconduct," not "willful misconduct." The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for reconsideration of removal under the proper standards. The court also noted that discretionary review was improvidently allowed regarding the procedure for disqualification under Article VI. View "In re Chastain" on Justia Law

A police officer in Buffalo, Texas, was terminated by the City Council after engaging in a high-speed chase with a civilian in his patrol vehicle, resulting in an accident. The officer, Gregory Moliere, received a written reprimand from the Chief of Police, which he accepted. Subsequently, the City Council voted to terminate his employment. Moliere sued, claiming the City Council lacked the authority to fire him and that his due process rights were violated.The trial court dismissed Moliere's suit, finding that the City Council had the authority to terminate him. Moliere appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that there was a fact issue regarding the City Council's authority to terminate Moliere. The appellate court noted ambiguities in the City's employee manual and the police department's policy-and-procedure manual and remanded the case for further proceedings without addressing Moliere's due process claim.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the City Council had the authority to terminate Moliere under Texas Local Government Code Section 341.001, which allows the governing body of a Type A general-law municipality to establish and regulate a municipal police force. The court held that the City Council's authority to regulate the police force included the power to terminate officers for cause. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment dismissing Moliere's claims based on the alleged lack of authority to fire him.However, the Supreme Court of Texas remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address Moliere's due process claim, which had not been considered previously. View "City of Buffalo v. Moliere" on Justia Law

Donald Blazer was involved in a vehicle accident and voluntarily submitted to a preliminary breath test (PBT), which showed a blood alcohol content of .102 percent. However, he refused to submit to a blood draw. The South Dakota Department of Public Safety (Department) notified Blazer of its intent to disqualify his commercial driver’s license (CDL) for life, citing this refusal as a second violation of SDCL 32-12A-36, with the first being a 2014 DUI conviction. Blazer requested an administrative hearing, and the Department affirmed the disqualification of his CDL for life.Blazer appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the Department’s decision. The circuit court concluded that Blazer’s voluntary submission to the breath test constituted a submission to a chemical analysis, meaning his refusal to submit to the blood draw could not result in the disqualification of his CDL. The Department then appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The Court held that under SDCL 32-23-1.2, a preliminary breath test (PBT) is permitted and may be required in addition to a chemical test. The Court determined that Blazer’s refusal to submit to the blood draw constituted a refusal to submit to a chemical analysis as required by SDCL 32-12A-46. This refusal was a second violation under SDCL 32-12A-36, justifying the disqualification of Blazer’s CDL for life under SDCL 32-12A-37. The Court emphasized that a PBT is a preliminary test and does not fulfill the requirement for a chemical analysis under the implied consent laws. View "Blazer v. Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

In 1995, Grady McGowan was convicted of residential burglary. In 2020, he pleaded guilty to residential burglary again and was sentenced to nine years in prison with an additional eleven-year suspended sentence. His sentencing order noted that he might be ineligible for parole due to a prior felony conviction. The Arkansas Division of Correction initially determined McGowan was eligible for parole and provided him a parole hearing, but later rescinded this decision based on a 2022 opinion from the Arkansas Attorney General, which led to a recalculation of his parole-eligibility date.McGowan filed a petition in the Pulaski County Circuit Court seeking declaratory judgment on his parole eligibility under Act 683 of 2023. The circuit court granted declaratory relief in favor of McGowan, finding that the sentencing order did not expressly designate his ineligibility for parole as required by the statute. The court ordered the appellants to modify his parole-eligibility date but denied further relief, stating that McGowan's release was an issue for the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that McGowan's sentencing order did not contain the express designation required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-609(b)(2)(B) to render him ineligible for parole. The court also declined to remand the case for the sentencing order to be amended nunc pro tunc. The decision was consistent with the court's reasoning in a companion case, Rodgers v. Arkansas Parole Board. View "Post-Prison Transfer Board v. McGowan" on Justia Law

A former police officer, the petitioner, sought to annul the Comptroller's decision denying him accidental disability retirement (ADR) benefits. The petitioner was injured while on desk duty when his rolling chair tipped due to a rut in the floor, causing him to grab his desk and injure his shoulder and neck. He applied for ADR benefits, claiming the injury was accidental.The Comptroller denied the application, concluding that the petitioner could have reasonably anticipated the hazard. The petitioner testified that he was aware of the ruts in the floor and had been working desk duty for months. Photographs documented the floor's condition. The Comptroller determined that the injury was not the result of an "accident" as defined for ADR benefits.The petitioner challenged this decision through a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The Appellate Division confirmed the Comptroller's determination and dismissed the proceeding, stating that an event is not an accident if it could have been reasonably anticipated. One Justice dissented, arguing that the "reasonably anticipated" standard was inconsistent with precedent and that the chair tipping was a sudden, unexpected event.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment. The court held that a precipitating event that could or should have been reasonably anticipated by a person in the claimant's circumstances is not an "accident" for ADR benefits. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Comptroller's determination that the petitioner could have reasonably anticipated the near-fall from his desk chair, given his familiarity with the ruts in the floor and the documented condition of the precinct floor. The judgment was affirmed with costs. View "Bodenmiller v. DiNapoli" on Justia Law

Wisconsin Central Ltd. and Soo Line Railroad Company are in dispute over the location for exchanging rail traffic in the Chicago area. Wisconsin Central prefers the Belt Railway yard near Chicago, while Soo Line prefers the Spaulding yard near Bartlett, 35 miles away. The Surface Transportation Board initially ruled against Wisconsin Central, stating that it could not use Belt Railway's yard because it did not own it outright, despite having a contractual right to use it. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case, clarifying that a railroad could have the power to designate facilities by contract as well as by ownership.Upon remand, the Surface Transportation Board held that the Belt Railway yard was not a reasonable location for the exchange. The Board found that both locations could cause congestion but concluded that it was unreasonable for Wisconsin Central to insist that Soo Line bear the costs of moving cars to Chicago and the fees charged by Belt Railway. Additionally, the Board emphasized the importance of negotiation and agreement in selecting exchange locations, rather than allowing one party to unilaterally change the location.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the Board's decision. The court held that the Board's interpretation of "reasonable" was within its discretion and that considering costs as part of reasonableness was appropriate. The court also noted that Wisconsin Central did not preserve its argument regarding substantial evidence for review. Consequently, the court found that the Board's decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious and did not embody a legal error. The petition for review was denied. View "Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. Surface Transportation Board" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are retail pet stores, a dog broker, and a dog breeder who want to sell dogs through physical retail stores in Maryland. However, a Maryland law restricts their ability to do so. The plaintiffs sued, alleging that the Maryland statute is preempted by the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, concluding that they failed to state plausible claims. The plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the AWA does not preempt the Maryland statute because the AWA expressly contemplates state and local regulation on the same subject. The court also found that the Maryland statute does not pose an impermissible obstacle to achieving the purposes and objectives of the AWA.Regarding the Commerce Clause claims, the court held that the Maryland statute does not discriminate against interstate commerce in purpose or effect. The statute applies equally to in-state and out-of-state breeders and brokers, and it does not prohibit the flow of interstate goods or place added costs upon them. The court also found that the statute does not violate the Pike balancing test because the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the statute imposes a substantial burden on interstate commerce that is clearly excessive in relation to its putative local benefits.In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, holding that the Maryland statute is not preempted by the AWA and does not violate the Commerce Clause. View "Just Puppies, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Aleksia Lindsay filed an amended class action complaint against Patenaude & Felix, APC, and Transworld Systems Inc., alleging unfair debt collection practices. Lindsay had defaulted on $60,000 in student loans, and after receiving incomplete and inaccurate information from Transworld, Patenaude initiated two debt collection lawsuits against her. Lindsay later discovered that both entities had a history of unethical collection practices, leading to actions by various regulatory bodies. After the lawsuits against her were dismissed, Lindsay received another demand for payment and subsequently filed the class action complaint.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County struck Lindsay's complaint, relying on the anti-SLAPP law, and ruled that the public interest exception did not apply. Lindsay argued that the trial court erred in this decision. The trial court concluded that although the three conditions of the public interest exception were met, the action was not brought solely in the public interest because Lindsay sought damages.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that the action was brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public, as the relief sought by Lindsay was identical to that sought for the plaintiff class. The court also found that seeking damages did not preclude the application of the public interest exception. The court concluded that the action met all three conditions of the public interest exception: it did not seek greater or different relief, it would enforce an important right affecting the public interest and confer a significant benefit, and private enforcement was necessary and placed a disproportionate financial burden on Lindsay.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order, exempting Lindsay's action from the anti-SLAPP law and entitling her to costs on appeal. View "Lindsay v. Patenaude & Felix" on Justia Law

A four-year-old child, Noah C., was repeatedly removed from and returned to his abusive parents' custody by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Tragically, Noah died in July 2019 due to abuse by his parents. His great-grandmother, Evangelina Hernandez, acting personally and on behalf of Noah's estate and his siblings, sued the County of Los Angeles and Hathaway-Sycamores Child and Family Services for negligence. The case at issue concerns the second cause of action for negligence against the County, alleging that DCFS failed to notify Hernandez about a removal warrant for Noah that was obtained but not executed.The trial court overruled the County's demurrer to the negligence claim, holding that the County had a mandatory duty under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.3 to notify Hernandez about the removal warrant. The County then filed a petition for writ of mandate to overturn this ruling. The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ directing the trial court to either vacate its order and sustain the demurrer or show cause why a peremptory writ should not issue. The trial court declined to vacate its order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that section 361.3 does not impose a mandatory duty on the County to notify a relative about an application for a protective custody warrant or a court order granting such a warrant before the minor's removal from parental custody. The court also concluded that other provisions cited by Hernandez, including the California Department of Social Services Manual of Policies and Procedures, Civil Code section 1714, and the special relationship doctrine, do not establish such a duty. Consequently, the court granted the petition in part, vacated the trial court's order overruling the demurrer, and directed the trial court to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer to the second cause of action without leave to amend. View "County of Los Angeles v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

A group of 53 California hospitals challenged the Secretary of Health and Human Services' (HHS) 2020 low-wage-index policy, which adjusted Medicare payment rates by inflating the rates for the lowest quartile of hospitals and reducing payments to all hospitals by a small percentage. The hospitals argued that the policy violated statutory provisions, was arbitrary and capricious, resulted from a faulty administrative procedure, and was unsupported by evidence.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied HHS's motion for summary judgment, granted the hospitals' motion for summary judgment, and remanded the matter to the Secretary without vacating the policy. The court held that HHS lacked authority to implement the low-wage-index policy under either the Wage Index Provision or the Exceptions and Adjustments Provision and found procedural defects in the policy's implementation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the Secretary exceeded his statutory authority in establishing the 2020 wage index. The court held that the low-wage-index policy did not "reflect" area differences in hospital wage levels as required by the statute and that the Exceptions and Adjustments Provision could not independently authorize the policy. The court also vacated the district court's decision to remand the case without vacating the policy, stating that when an agency cannot issue the challenged policy in another way, the only appropriate remedy is vacatur. Judge Nguyen dissented, arguing that the low-wage-index policy was consistent with the statutory text and that the majority's decision would have negative repercussions for vulnerable communities. View "Kaweah Delta Health Care District v. Becerra" on Justia Law