Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose between a regional fishermen’s association and the federal government concerning changes to catch limits for several fish species in the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan. The association, representing commercial fishermen allegedly harmed by reduced catch limits, challenged the legality of the Framework Adjustment 65 Final Rule and its implementing regulations. At the core of the association’s argument was the claim that the involvement of the New England Fishery Management Council in the development of these rules violated the U.S. Constitution’s Appointments Clause. The association argued that the Council exercised significant authority in the regulatory process but its members were not properly appointed as federal officers.The United States District Court for the District of Maine reviewed the case. It concluded that the association had standing due to the economic injury suffered by its members. The district court rejected the primary constitutional claim, holding that the Council’s role was advisory and final binding authority rested solely with the Secretary of Commerce, who promulgated the regulations. The court did, however, agree with the association in part, finding certain unrelated statutory provisions unconstitutional, but determined that this did not entitle the association to its requested relief. The district court severed those statutory provisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit heard the appeal. After reviewing the statutory framework and the specific facts, the court held that the Council’s role was advisory and did not amount to the exercise of significant federal authority under the Appointments Clause. The harm to the association’s members derived from the Secretary’s independent decision to promulgate the binding regulations, not from the Council’s recommendations. The First Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive and declaratory relief and reversed the district court’s severance of the unrelated statutory provisions. View "New England Fishermen's Stewardship Association v. Lutnick" on Justia Law

A municipality enacted an ordinance imposing a “stormwater charge” on owners of developed properties within its jurisdiction. The amount of this charge was based on the impervious surface area of each property, justified as covering the cost of constructing, operating, and maintaining the municipal stormwater system, as well as ensuring compliance with federal and state environmental mandates. The funds collected were deposited into a dedicated account for stormwater management purposes. The university system, which owns several properties within the municipality, refused to pay the charge, arguing that it constituted a tax from which it was immune under Pennsylvania law.The municipality initiated litigation in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, seeking a declaration that the stormwater charge was a fee for service rather than a tax, and therefore enforceable against the university system. The university system responded with a preliminary objection and later an application for summary relief, maintaining the charge was a tax or, alternatively, a special assessment, both of which would render it immune from payment. The Commonwealth Court, after reviewing cross-motions for summary relief, ruled in favor of the university system. It concluded the stormwater charge was a tax because it funded projects that delivered general public benefits rather than discrete, individualized services for payors, and there was no voluntary, contractual relationship between the parties. The court also found the charge was not a special assessment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s judgment. It held that the stormwater charge is a tax because the municipality provided stormwater management services as a public duty, for the general benefit of the community, and not within a voluntary or contractual fee-for-service framework. The court emphasized that, absent a quasiprivate relationship or proportional fee for individualized service, such charges are properly characterized as taxes, from which the university system is immune. View "The Boro of W. Chester v. PASSHE" on Justia Law

An environmental organization sought judicial review of the Department of Pesticide Regulation’s decisions to renew and not reevaluate registrations for several rodenticides, contending the Department violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and its own regulations. The organization argued these pesticides posed significant risks to wildlife. Trade associations representing pesticide manufacturers and distributors intervened in the case, stating both representational and direct economic interests in defending the Department’s actions, as their members produced and sold the challenged products.The Superior Court of Alameda County initially ruled in favor of the Department, denying the environmental group’s petition. The organization appealed, and the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reversed and remanded, instructing the Department to reconsider its decision regarding reevaluation of diphacinone, a rodenticide, focusing on its unique environmental impacts. Following remand, the Department agreed to reevaluate diphacinone, and the Legislature enacted a moratorium on its use during the reevaluation process. The environmental organization then sought attorney fees under the private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5).The Superior Court found the organization was a successful party, having achieved its litigation objectives and conferred a significant public benefit. The court awarded attorney fees and costs of about $857,000, holding the Department, real parties in interest, and intervening trade associations jointly and severally liable. The trade associations appealed, arguing they were not “opposing parties” under the statute and lacked the requisite direct interest. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that intervenors with a direct pecuniary interest and active participation in the litigation qualify as “opposing parties” for purposes of fee liability under section 1021.5, even if they were not responsible for enacting or enforcing the challenged government actions. View "Raptors Are the Solution v. Croplife America" on Justia Law

In 2007, the plaintiff was convicted by a jury of first degree murder, robbery, and burglary after he drove accomplices to a location where a planned marijuana theft resulted in the victim’s death. The evidence showed he participated in planning and facilitating the crime, and the jury found him guilty under both aiding and abetting and conspiracy theories. The conviction and sentence of 26 years to life were affirmed by the California Court of Appeal. Later, in an uncontested habeas proceeding, the murder conviction was reduced to second degree and the sentence reduced accordingly.Following legislative changes in 2018 that redefined murder under Senate Bill No. 1437 and created a process for retroactive relief, the trial court vacated the plaintiff’s murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6 and resentenced him on the remaining charges. Having served more time than the revised sentence required, he was released. The plaintiff then applied to the California Victim Compensation Board, seeking compensation under Penal Code section 4900 for time served beyond his new sentence, arguing he was “innocent” under the current definition of murder.The Board denied his application, finding he did not allege innocence under the law as it stood at the time of his conviction and that his claim did not state a cognizable basis for relief. The Board also relied on a regulation allowing dismissal of such claims without a hearing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied his writ petition challenging both the Board’s decision and the validity of the regulation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed. It held that compensation under section 4900 requires an “erroneous conviction,” and a conviction valid when rendered does not become erroneous due to subsequent legislative changes. The court also upheld the Board’s regulation as consistent with its statutory authority. View "Gardner v. Cal. Victim Comp. Bd." on Justia Law

Metro Treatment of New Hampshire, L.P. operates outpatient opioid treatment clinics licensed by the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). AmeriHealth Caritas New Hampshire is a Medicaid Managed Care Organization (MCO) responsible for arranging healthcare services for Medicaid-eligible patients, including some treated by Metro. The parties’ relationship was governed by an ancillary services agreement. Following an audit of Metro’s patient records, AmeriHealth determined that Metro had violated certain state administrative rules and sought to recoup $36,722.27 in alleged Medicaid overpayments. After Metro appealed through the contractual process, AmeriHealth reduced the recoupment amount and advised Metro it could seek further review through a State Fair Hearing as provided by statute.Metro then filed an appeal with the Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU) of DHHS, but argued that the AAU lacked jurisdiction over payment disputes between MCOs and providers. The AAU issued a written decision concluding that it has subject matter jurisdiction under RSA 126-A:5, VIII to hear appeals arising from determinations that Medicaid payments were inappropriately made and should be recouped. The AAU denied Metro’s motion for reconsideration and stayed further proceedings pending Metro’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the AAU has jurisdiction in this dispute. The court held that the AAU does possess jurisdiction under RSA 126-A:5, VIII because Metro is a provider licensed by DHHS and the statute provides for appeals by such providers. The court rejected Metro’s argument that the statute or administrative rules limited jurisdiction only to disputes involving direct departmental actions. The decision of the AAU was affirmed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Petition of Metro Treatment of N.H." on Justia Law

A private company specializing in the disposal of wastewater from oil and gas fracking leased land in an urban area and constructed two saltwater-injection wells. After two earthquakes were recorded near the wells, the State of Ohio determined the company’s activities caused the seismic events and temporarily suspended operations at both wells. One well was later permitted to resume limited operations, but the suspension of the second well remained until 2021. The company had been aware of seismicity risks before acquiring its leasehold and warned investors of possible regulatory shutdowns.After the suspension, the company pursued administrative and judicial challenges, including an appeal to the Ohio Oil and Gas Commission and the Tenth District Court of Appeals, both of which upheld the State’s actions. The company then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, claiming a regulatory taking of its property. The Eleventh District initially denied relief, but following multiple remands from the Supreme Court of Ohio, it ultimately found no total taking but did find a compensable partial regulatory taking under the Penn Central analysis, ordering the State to initiate eminent-domain proceedings.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether the suspension order constituted a total or partial regulatory taking. The court held that the company failed to prove it was deprived of all economically beneficial use, rejecting the total taking claim. The court further held that, under a proper balancing of the Penn Central factors, the State’s actions did not amount to a compensable partial taking. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Eleventh District’s denial of the total takings claim, reversed its partial takings finding, and denied the writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. AWMS Water Solutions, L.L.C. v. Mertz" on Justia Law

A public utility company implemented a power-purchase-agreement rider connected to its contractual share in two coal-fired plants operated by a regional power corporation. This rider could result in either surcharges or credits to retail customers, depending on whether the market revenues from selling the plants’ output exceeded their costs. For the years 2018 and 2019, an independent auditor was hired to review the prudency of all costs and sales associated with this rider and to determine if the company’s actions served the best interests of retail ratepayers. The audit found that while the plants cost customers more than the market price for energy, the company's processes were generally consistent with good utility practice. The audit noted that the “must-run” strategy for plant operation might not always be optimal but considered other factors, such as employment and fuel diversity.The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio previously authorized the rider and allowed cost recovery, subject to annual prudency audits. After the independent audit, the Commission held hearings at which parties, including consumer advocacy groups, challenged the prudency of the must-run strategy and raised concerns about the independence of the audit process. They argued that commission staff improperly influenced the auditor and sought to subpoena a staff member for testimony. The Commission denied the subpoena, finding that testimony from other witnesses covered the relevant issues and that the auditor’s independence was not compromised.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Commission’s findings and procedures. The Court held that the Commission did not commit reversible error in crediting evidence supporting the must-run strategy’s prudency, nor did it violate due process or its own rules by denying the subpoena, since the parties had ample opportunity to cross-examine other key witnesses. The Court also found the Commission was not required to apply an appearance-of-impropriety standard to assess the auditor’s independence. The Commission’s orders were affirmed. View "In re Rev. of the Power-Purchase-Agreement Rider of Ohio Power Co. for 2018 and 2019" on Justia Law

After a motor vehicle accident in Norfolk, Connecticut, downed electrical wires from a utility pole owned by an electric supplier trapped the vehicle’s occupants. First responders waited about an hour before the utility’s specialist confirmed the wires were de-energized, delaying rescue. The Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) investigated the supplier’s response, conducted a hearing in which the supplier participated, and ultimately found the response imprudent. PURA ordered the supplier to adopt a thirty-minute target response time for certain life-threatening situations, among other directives.The electric supplier appealed PURA’s decision to the Superior Court, arguing that the investigation and hearing constituted a “contested case” under Connecticut’s Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, which would entitle it to judicial review. The Superior Court rejected this argument, finding that the statutes and regulations cited by the supplier did not require PURA to hold a hearing in these circumstances, and therefore the proceeding did not qualify as a contested case. The court dismissed the supplier’s administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.On further appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the proceeding was not a contested case because no state statute or regulation required PURA to determine the supplier’s legal rights, duties, or privileges after an opportunity for a hearing in this context. The Court explained that references to statutes requiring hearings in other circumstances did not convert the proceeding into a contested case when the relevant factual predicates were absent. The holding also clarified that PURA’s decision to hold a hearing voluntarily, or to follow contested case procedures, did not create contested case status where no such hearing was legally mandated. Thus, PURA’s determinations and orders in this investigation were not subject to judicial review under the contested case provisions. View "Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

In this case, Montgomery County, Maryland, enacted amendments to its County Code in 2021 and 2022 regulating firearms. The amendments expanded the definition of “place of public assembly,” prohibited the possession of firearms (including “ghost guns”) in or within 100 yards of such places, and removed exceptions for state-issued handgun permit holders. The amendments also imposed new restrictions concerning minors’ access to firearms and regulated ghost guns and their components. The petitioners, two businesses and eight individuals, claimed these provisions were preempted by state law, not a valid local law, and amounted to an unconstitutional taking.After removal to federal court and a partial remand, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County ruled in favor of the challengers, finding the county’s provisions preempted by state law, not a local law, and an unconstitutional taking, and issued declaratory and injunctive relief. The Appellate Court of Maryland remanded for further analysis of preemption and takings issues, particularly concerning the expansion of “place of public assembly.”The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case, holding that new issues may only be properly added by amending the complaint, not through summary judgment motions. The Court determined that Criminal Law § 4-209(b)(1) authorizes charter counties to regulate firearms in limited contexts (with respect to minors, law enforcement, and within 100 yards of certain public places), and that this authority was not abrogated by other state preemption statutes. The Court found Montgomery County’s regulation valid for parks, places of worship, schools, libraries, courthouses, legislative assemblies, recreational and multipurpose exhibition facilities, and polling places, but invalid for hospitals, health centers, long-term care, childcare facilities, government buildings as broadly defined, and generalized gatherings. The Court also clarified the scope of local regulation regarding minors and found no unconstitutional taking occurred. The judgment of the Appellate Court was vacated and remanded with instructions for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Engage Armament v. Montgomery Cnty." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between an Arizona municipal corporation and a water conservation district, both of which are public entities. In 2002, the two parties entered into a long-term agreement for the sale and delivery of water, with specific provisions regarding termination. In 2018, the water district notified the city that it considered the agreement terminated and ceased performance, while the city maintained that the contract remained valid and that the district’s actions constituted breach and anticipatory breach. Over the subsequent years, the city repeatedly requested water delivery under the agreement, and the district consistently refused, reiterating its position that the agreement was no longer in effect. In 2022, after further unsuccessful attempts to enforce the contract, the city formally notified the district of a breach and then initiated legal action seeking specific performance and declaratory relief.The Superior Court in Maricopa County denied the district’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The court found the city’s claims were subject to the one-year limitation period under A.R.S. § 12-821 but concluded the claims were timely because each refusal to deliver water constituted a new breach. The court also declared the agreement valid and enforceable. The district appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute of limitations in § 12-821 applied to the city’s claims and thus barred them.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the effect of § 12-821 on the common law nullum tempus doctrine, which exempts the state from statutes of limitation when acting as plaintiff. The Court held that § 12-821 does not expressly abrogate the nullum tempus doctrine for lawsuits between public entities and that the one-year limitation does not apply in such cases. Accordingly, the Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the superior court’s judgment as to timeliness, and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment for the city, declaring the agreement valid and enforceable. View "CHANDLER v. ROOSEVELT" on Justia Law