Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2020, seven victims of a 2016 terrorist bombing in Afghanistan obtained multi-million-dollar default judgments against the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani Network. Following the Taliban’s 2021 takeover of Afghanistan, the victims, suing as John Doe plaintiffs, sought to attach assets held by the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (commonly known as the “World Bank”). The plaintiffs argued that these assets belonged to the Afghan government or the central bank of Afghanistan, and that the Taliban had become the de facto Afghan government and the Afghan central bank its “instrumentality.”The district court granted the World Bank’s and Fund’s motions to quash the plaintiffs' writs of execution. The court found the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) inapplicable in this case. It expressed doubt that the funds the plaintiffs sought to recover belonged to Afghanistan, and it could not recognize an ownership claim by the Taliban to Afghan assets since the United States had not recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The plaintiffs failed to show that the assets at issue fell under the TRIA, and so they had not shown that an exception to the Fund and the World Bank’s immunity applied. On that basis, the district court found that it lacked jurisdiction in the case and granted the motions to quash.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the TRIA does not abrogate the World Bank’s and Fund’s jurisdictional immunity under the International Organizations Immunities Act and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The court concluded that the TRIA applies only to foreign states and international organizations once jurisdiction has been established over them. Because the TRIA leaves the World Bank’s and Fund’s jurisdictional immunity intact, the district court could not entertain the plaintiffs' garnishment action. View "John Does 1-7 v. Taliban" on Justia Law

In 1989, Andrew Johnson was convicted of aggravated burglary and sexual assault. In 2013, a Wyoming state court declared Johnson innocent based on DNA evidence and vacated his convictions. Johnson then filed a lawsuit against Officer Alan Spencer, the Estate of Detective George Stanford, and the City of Cheyenne, Wyoming, alleging that they fabricated evidence, failed to produce exculpatory evidence, and failed to maintain adequate policing policies. The district court dismissed Johnson's claims, and he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Johnson failed to plausibly allege a fabrication-of-evidence claim against Officer Spencer. Regarding Johnson's claim based on the alleged failure to produce exculpatory evidence, the court determined that Johnson failed to show that his constitutional rights were violated, and thus, Officer Spencer and Detective Stanford were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed the claims against the City of Cheyenne because Johnson did not demonstrate that any City of Cheyenne law enforcement officer violated his constitutional rights. View "Johnson v. City of Cheyenne" on Justia Law

In 2021, New York enacted the Affordable Broadband Act (ABA), which required internet service providers to offer broadband internet to qualifying households at reduced prices. A group of trade organizations representing internet service providers sued, arguing that the ABA was preempted by federal law. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and granted a preliminary injunction barring New York from enforcing the ABA. The parties later requested that the district court enter a stipulated final judgment and permanent injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the ABA was not field-preempted by the Communications Act of 1934 (as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996), because the Act does not establish a framework of rate regulation that is sufficiently comprehensive to imply that Congress intended to exclude the states from entering the field. The court also concluded that the ABA was not conflict-preempted by the Federal Communications Commission’s 2018 order classifying broadband as an information service. The court reasoned that the order stripped the agency of its authority to regulate the rates charged for broadband internet, and a federal agency cannot exclude states from regulating in an area where the agency itself lacks regulatory authority. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and vacated the permanent injunction. View "New York State Telecommunications Association, Inc. v. James" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the Kirkwood Institute's request for public records from the Office of the Auditor of State in Iowa. The Institute sought emails between the Auditor's office and two investigative reporters. The Auditor's office withheld ten email chains, citing Iowa Code § 11.42 and § 22.7(18), which protect certain types of information. Kirkwood sued, arguing that the Auditor's office failed to show that these exceptions applied to the withheld emails. Additionally, Kirkwood claimed that the Auditor's office failed to disclose an eleventh email chain that had been quoted in a reporter's blog.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Auditor's office, holding that the ten email chains were exempt from production and that no violation occurred with the late turnover of the eleventh email chain. Kirkwood appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. The court found that there was a factual issue as to whether the delay in producing the eleventh email was reasonable. It also found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Auditor's office's withholding of nine emails under § 11.42, as it was not immediately apparent that these emails were received in the course of an audit or examination. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision regarding the tenth email withheld under § 22.7(18), agreeing that it fell within the exception created in this statute. View "Kirkwood Institute, Inc. v. Sand" on Justia Law

The case involves Elliott Sterling, who was convicted for engaging in a fraudulent scheme to obtain loan and grant funds from the Department of Education’s Federal Student Aid Program. Sterling submitted fraudulent applications on behalf of students, both real and fictional, and also committed fraud in connection with his educational consulting business. He was indicted for multiple counts of wire fraud, financial aid fraud, and engaging in monetary transactions involving property derived from specified unlawful activity. Sterling chose to represent himself during the trial after his request for a new counsel was denied.The district court found Sterling competent to waive his right to counsel and allowed him to proceed pro se in his defense. After a 9-day jury trial, Sterling was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to 132 months of imprisonment, followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. Sterling appealed, raising several Sixth Amendment claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no merit in Sterling’s procedural or substantive challenges. It held that Sterling's waiver of counsel was clear, unequivocal, and voluntary, and that he was competent to represent himself at trial. The court also found that the district court did not err in allowing Sterling to represent himself at his own competency hearing, and that the district court's determination of Sterling's competence did not constitute an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Sterling" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the construction of an offshore wind project aimed at reducing reliance on fossil fuels. The project, proposed by Vineyard Wind 1, LLC, was expected to provide energy sufficient to power 400,000 Massachusetts homes. However, residents of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket opposed the project, arguing that federal agencies failed to properly assess the potential impact of the project on the endangered North Atlantic right whale.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts had granted summary judgment in favor of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and Vineyard Wind, rejecting the residents' challenge to a biological opinion issued by the NMFS and relied on by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management in permitting the construction of the wind power project.In the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the residents challenged the lower court's decision, arguing that the NMFS's determination that the incidental harassment of up to twenty right whales constituted a "small number" under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful. They also argued that NMFS's consideration of the "specified activity" and the "specific geographic region" within which that activity would occur for purposes of issuing the Incidental Harassment Authorization (IHA) to Vineyard Wind was impermissibly narrow in scope.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the NMFS's determination was not arbitrary or capricious and that it had properly delineated the "specific geographic region" for the purposes of the IHA. The court also found that the residents' concerns about the broader effect of the project on the right whale population were unwarranted, as the agency had considered the impact on the entire right whale population in its "negligible impact" analysis, its biological opinion, and in its participation in the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management's Environmental Impact Statement. View "Melone v. Coit" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs, led by Chris Calnan, who challenged a rule implemented by Maine Emergency Medical Services (Maine EMS) requiring emergency medical service (EMS) workers to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 and influenza. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Maine EMS lacked statutory authority to implement such a rule.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had named the correct defendants, that it had jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the rulemaking, and that the EMS Board acted within its authority in implementing the immunization rule. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as moot.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the EMS Board did not exceed its statutory authority in issuing the immunization rule. The court also concluded that the rule aligns with the purpose of the Maine Emergency Medical Services Act of 1982, which is to ensure optimum patient care and the safe handling and transportation of patients. Lastly, the court determined that the EMS Board followed the applicable rulemaking process for the promulgation of the immunization rule. View "Calnan v. Hurley" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of convicted sex offenders who were confined in the Fishkill Residential Treatment Facility (RTF) while on post-release supervision (PRS). The Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) used the Fishkill RTF to confine these offenders past their maximum sentence expiration dates because they were unable to find housing that complied with the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA). The plaintiffs initiated a proceeding in 2016, seeking injunctions, declaratory relief, and class certification, arguing that DOCCS's operation of the Fishkill RTF failed to comply with the statutes governing RTFs because it did not offer adequate programming or employment opportunities.The Supreme Court dismissed part of the proceeding and converted the remaining into an action seeking a declaration that DOCCS's operation of the Fishkill RTF was non-compliant with the statutes governing RTFs. The court denied class certification, reasoning that the converted declaratory judgment action would adequately protect the interests of similarly situated offenders. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment and a declaration in their favor. The Supreme Court granted defendants' motion in part, concluding that the internal programming was minimally adequate to satisfy DOCCS's statutory obligations. However, the court agreed with plaintiffs that DOCCS failed to provide adequate community-based opportunities.The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing the part that granted partial summary judgment to plaintiffs and granted defendants' motion in its entirety. The Court concluded that while the statute requires DOCCS to locate RTFs near a community with employment, training, and educational opportunities, there was no mandate that DOCCS offer such opportunities outside the facility.The Court of Appeals held that DOCCS's wholesale refusal to secure community-based opportunities for Fishkill RTF residents constitutes a violation of the statute. The Court concluded that DOCCS, at a minimum, must undertake reasonable efforts to secure community-based opportunities for those persons subject to its RTF programming. However, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the internal programming at the Fishkill RTF was at least minimally adequate. View "Alcantara v Annucci" on Justia Law

The case involves the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) and the City of Lancaster, Borough of Carlisle, and Borough of Columbia (collectively referred to as the Municipalities). The dispute centers around Section 59.18 of the PUC’s regulations, which gives natural gas distribution companies (NGDCs) the authority to determine the location of gas meters in historic districts. The Municipalities argued that this regulation violates Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which vests legislative power in the General Assembly, not in private entities like NGDCs.The Commonwealth Court agreed with the Municipalities, concluding that Section 59.18 unlawfully delegates legislative authority to NGDCs without providing adequate standards to guide their decisions. The court therefore declared Section 59.18 unenforceable.The PUC appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The PUC argued that Section 59.18 does not delegate legislative power to NGDCs, but rather is a regulatory act under the PUC’s administrative authority. The PUC also contended that the Commonwealth Court failed to consider the safety issues related to meter placement, which is the primary concern of the regulation.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the decision of the Commonwealth Court. The court found that the General Assembly never enacted a statute giving the PUC legislative authority to determine the location of gas meters in historic districts. Therefore, the PUC could not have unlawfully delegated this authority to NGDCs. The court concluded that the Municipalities' disagreement with the PUC's regulation does not amount to a constitutional violation. The case was remanded to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings. View "City of Lancaster v. PUC" on Justia Law

In September 2020, George Fluitt was indicted on three counts of fraud and offering kickbacks related to genetic testing services that his company, Specialty Drug Testing LLC, provided to Medicare beneficiaries. As part of a nationwide investigation into genetic testing fraud, the Government executed search warrants at laboratories referred to as the Hurricane Shoals Entities (“HSE”), allegedly operated by Khalid Satary. The Government copied several terabytes of data from HSE, some of which were later determined to be material to Fluitt’s defense.In the lower courts, the Government established a “Filter Team” to review materials seized in its investigation and identify any that might be privileged. The Filter Team’s review was governed in part by a Protocol Order, which established a multi-step process for notifying a third party that it might have a claim of privilege and then adjudicating that claim. HSE and Satary provided privilege logs to the Filter Team, asserting thousands of claims of privilege. Both Fluitt and the Filter Team found these privilege logs to be facially deficient as they made only threadbare assertions of privilege, without any accompanying explanation.In the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the appellants failed to establish their claims of privilege. The court also found that the appellants' argument that they are not bound by the Protocol Order was a red herring, as the magistrate judge evaluated the appellants’ privilege logs under the standards established by federal caselaw. The court also rejected the appellants' argument that Fluitt “has not shown a need for the documents” and has not “demonstrated any kind of relevancy.” The court found that the record suggests that Fluitt “has a need” for the potentially privileged documents, as the Government determined that the potentially privileged materials were material to preparing Fluitt’s defense. View "United States v. Fluitt" on Justia Law