Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima (Lima) and Rutas de Lima S.A.C. (Rutas) entered into a Concession Contract for the construction and operation of urban roads in Lima, Peru. Rutas agreed to finance and manage the project in exchange for toll revenue, while Lima was responsible for preliminary infrastructure activities. Subsequent agreements transferred these preliminary responsibilities to Rutas in exchange for toll rate increases. Social protests erupted in response to these increases, leading Lima to close a toll unit and refuse further rate hikes. Rutas initiated two international arbitrations, claiming Lima breached the contract. Lima argued the contract was void due to bribery by Rutas’s parent company, Odebrecht S.A.The District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case after two arbitration tribunals ruled in favor of Rutas, finding insufficient evidence of corruption linked to the Concession Contract. Lima sought to vacate the arbitration awards, citing violations of U.S. public policy against corruption, fraud by Rutas in discovery, and misconduct by the second tribunal in excluding evidence. The District Court denied Lima’s petitions and confirmed the awards, concluding that Lima failed to prove the contract was obtained through bribery and that any alleged discovery misconduct did not prejudice Lima’s case.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The court held that the arbitration tribunals’ findings were supported by the record and that there was no sufficient evidence linking Odebrecht’s bribes to the Concession Contract. The court also found no merit in Lima’s claims of discovery fraud and tribunal misconduct, noting that Lima suffered no prejudice from the exclusion of evidence. The court concluded that enforcing the arbitration awards did not violate U.S. public policy. View "Metropolitan Municipality of Lima v. Rutas De Lima S.A.C." on Justia Law

The case involves the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and its application of the Spills Law, which mandates that parties responsible for hazardous substance discharges must notify the DNR and take necessary actions to mitigate environmental harm. The central issue is whether the DNR must promulgate rules identifying specific substances, including PFAS, as hazardous before enforcing the Spills Law.The Waukesha County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc. (WMC) and Leather Rich, Inc., holding that the DNR's policies on emerging contaminants like PFAS were invalid unpromulgated rules. The court of appeals affirmed this decision.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the DNR's statements regarding PFAS and other emerging contaminants as hazardous substances were guidance documents, not rules, and thus did not require rulemaking. The Court also determined that the DNR's interim decision to offer only partial liability exemptions in the Voluntary Party Remediation and Exemption from Liability program was a guidance document. Additionally, the Court found that the DNR's communications did not impose a reporting threshold for PFAS discharges.The Supreme Court concluded that the DNR has broad but explicit authority under the Spills Law to enforce reporting thresholds for hazardous substances without promulgating specific rules. Therefore, the DNR's actions were within its statutory authority, and the decision of the court of appeals was reversed, with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the DNR. View "Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

A local housing authority, authorized by state statute and activated by city government, faced a personal injury lawsuit. The plaintiff alleged that the authority negligently failed to ensure the safety of the apartment complex where she was shot. The authority claimed sovereign immunity, arguing it was an instrumentality of the state, a municipal corporation, and an instrumentality of the municipality.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the housing authority, concluding it was protected by sovereign immunity under all three claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing on the authority's status as an instrumentality of the municipality. The appellate court relied on case law regarding state instrumentalities and concluded that the authority was entitled to sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the Court of Appeals had incorrectly applied state instrumentality case law to determine municipal instrumentality immunity. The Supreme Court noted that the Georgia Constitution does not explicitly extend sovereign immunity to municipalities or their instrumentalities, and any such immunity must be derived from common law as of 1776. The Court found that neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals had conducted the necessary common law analysis to determine if the housing authority was entitled to sovereign immunity as an instrumentality of the municipality.The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further consideration under the proper analytical approach, specifically examining the common law scope and nature of sovereign immunity as it applied to municipal instrumentalities. View "GUY v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF AUGUSTA" on Justia Law

Chris Kelly was pulled over in August 2020 for minor traffic infractions, leading to the suspension of his driver's license. Despite efforts by a prosecutor to correct the record, Kelly was pulled over again in January 2021 for driving on a suspended license. He continued to face issues with his suspended license, which he claimed caused him to lose a job opportunity and incur over $1,000 in expenses. Kelly alleged that despite acknowledging the error, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) failed to correct his driving record.Kelly sued the BMV in January 2023 for negligently failing to correct his driving record, seeking costs, damages, and interest. The BMV moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that the statutes did not create a private right of action. The Marion Superior Court granted the BMV's motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Kelly had sufficiently alleged a common-law negligence claim and that the relevant statute conferred a private right of action. The BMV petitioned for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's dismissal. The court held that the Legislature did not intend to create a private right of action under the relevant statutes, as the material error review process and the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA) provided independent enforcement mechanisms. Additionally, the court found that the BMV's duty to maintain driving records primarily served public safety rather than individual drivers. The court also concluded that Kelly failed to establish a common-law duty for the BMV to maintain accurate records. View "Kelly v. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Lisa Sánchez, a member of the Boise City Council, moved her residence outside of the district she represented. She was informed by the mayor and city council that she had automatically vacated her seat due to this move. The mayor subsequently appointed a new council member to fill her seat. Sánchez sued the City of Boise, claiming improper removal and seeking reinstatement, along with damages for lost salary and benefits. The City moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted, dismissing her case with prejudice. Sánchez appealed, questioning whether a city council member automatically vacates their seat under Idaho Code section 59-901(1)(e) when they unintentionally move out of their district.The district court concluded that Idaho Code section 59-901(1)(e) applies to city council members and that Sánchez's intent to remain a resident of her district was irrelevant. The court held that the statute's plain language indicated an automatic vacancy upon moving out of the district, regardless of intent. The court also found that Sánchez received all due process required under the statute.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Idaho Code section 59-901(1)(e) applies to city council members and that the statute's plain language does not require an inquiry into the official's intent. The court also concluded that no additional due process was required because any potential property interest in Sánchez’s elected position was forfeited when she moved out of her district. Thus, the district court's judgment on the pleadings in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Sanchez v. City of Boise" on Justia Law

Miller Plastic Products Inc. fired Ronald Vincer in March 2020, during the early weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic. Vincer had expressed concerns about the company's pandemic protocols and its operating status, believing it was not an essential business. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) determined that Vincer’s termination violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because it was motivated, at least in part, by his protected concerted activity.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Vincer’s conduct was protected under the NLRA and that his termination was motivated by his protected activity. The ALJ also disallowed testimony regarding after-acquired evidence at the liability stage of the proceeding. Miller Plastic petitioned for review of the Board’s order, and the Board cross-applied for enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that Vincer’s conduct was protected under the NLRA and was a motivating factor for his termination. The court also agreed with the ALJ’s decision to disallow testimony regarding after-acquired evidence at the liability stage, noting that such evidence is typically considered during compliance proceedings.However, the court found that the NLRB failed to adequately address certain evidence related to Miller Plastic’s affirmative defense that it would have fired Vincer even absent his protected conduct. The court remanded the case to the Board to address the significance of that evidence. The court denied Miller Plastic’s petition for review in part and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement in part, affirming the finding that Vincer was terminated because of his concerted activity. View "Miller Plastic Products Inc v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved California regulations under the Clean Air Act that require automakers to produce more electric vehicles and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles to reduce emissions. Several fuel producers, including those of gasoline and ethanol, sued the EPA, arguing that the EPA lacked the authority to approve these regulations as they target global climate change rather than local air quality issues. The fuel producers claimed that the regulations would significantly reduce the demand for liquid fuels, causing them monetary injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the fuel producers lacked Article III standing. The court found that the fuel producers failed to demonstrate that automakers would likely respond to the invalidation of the regulations by producing fewer electric vehicles and more gasoline-powered vehicles, thus failing to establish redressability.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge the EPA’s approval of the California regulations. The Court found that the fuel producers demonstrated injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The Court reasoned that the regulations likely cause monetary injury to the fuel producers by reducing the demand for gasoline and other liquid fuels. The Court also found that invalidating the regulations would likely redress the injury by increasing the sales of gasoline-powered vehicles and, consequently, the demand for liquid fuels. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) mandates that manufacturers must obtain approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before marketing any new tobacco product. In 2016, the FDA classified e-cigarettes as new tobacco products under the TCA. R. J. Reynolds Vapor Co. (RJR Vapor) applied for FDA approval to market its Vuse Alto e-cigarettes, but the FDA denied the application, stating that RJR Vapor failed to prove that marketing the products would protect public health. RJR Vapor, along with a Texas-based retailer and a Mississippi-based trade association, challenged the FDA's denial in the Fifth Circuit.The FDA requested the Fifth Circuit to dismiss or transfer the petition, arguing that only the applicant (RJR Vapor) was "adversely affected" by the denial and thus eligible to seek judicial review. The Fifth Circuit, however, ruled that the venue was proper and denied the FDA's motion.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that retailers who would sell a new tobacco product if not for the FDA’s denial order are "adversely affected" and may seek judicial review under the TCA. The Court interpreted "adversely affected" broadly, consistent with its use in other statutes, and concluded that the retailers' interests were within the zone of interests protected by the TCA. The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Food and Drug Administration v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co." on Justia Law

A public benefit corporation, Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admissions (LFRA), challenged local rules of federal district courts in the Ninth Circuit. These rules require attorneys seeking general admission to be members in good standing of the bar of the state where the district court is located. LFRA argued that these rules prevent its members, who are barred in states outside the Ninth Circuit and do not wish to join another state bar, from seeking general admission to these federal district courts.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed LFRA’s amended complaint with prejudice. The court found that LFRA had standing to bring claims on behalf of its members, except for the Sixth Amendment claim, which lacked standing. The court dismissed the remaining claims for failure to state a claim, concluding that the Admission Rules did not violate constitutional, statutory, or procedural grounds as alleged by LFRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice. The Ninth Circuit held that the Admission Rules are constitutional and do not violate separation of powers, federalism principles, the Privileges and Immunities Clauses, the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, the Full Faith and Credit Act, the Rules Enabling Act, or procedural due process. The court also found that Rules 1 and 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create a private right of action. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the amended complaint without leave to amend, as the complaint could not be saved by amendment. The court also upheld the denial of LFRA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as procedurally premature. View "Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admissions v. United States" on Justia Law

The case involves the Center for Biological Diversity and other petitioners challenging the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) Program for the years 2023, 2024, and 2025. The petitioners include environmental organizations, refiners, a renewable fuel producer, and a biofuel trade association. They argue that the EPA's rule, known as the Set Rule, fails to adequately address the environmental impacts, particularly greenhouse gas emissions and effects on endangered species.The lower court, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reviewed the EPA's RFS Program standards for 2020-2022 in a previous case, Sinclair Wyo. Refin. Co. LLC v. EPA. In that case, the court upheld the EPA's standards. In the current case, the petitioners argue that the EPA did not adequately explain its reliance on outdated data for greenhouse gas emissions and failed to properly consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) regarding the impact on endangered species.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the EPA's use of outdated data for greenhouse gas emissions was arbitrary and capricious. The court also found that the FWS's concurrence with the EPA's determination that the Set Rule would have "no effect" on endangered species was not adequately explained. The court remanded the Set Rule to the EPA and FWS for further consideration and explanation without vacating the rule. The court denied the petitions of Neste and the Refiner Petitioners and dismissed SABR's petition for untimeliness and lack of standing. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law