Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability, Inc. filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests with six intelligence agencies seeking documents related to the upstreaming and unmasking of forty-eight named current and former members of congressional intelligence committees from January 1, 2008, to January 15, 2020. All six agencies issued Glomar responses, refusing to confirm or deny the existence of such records, citing multiple FOIA exemptions, including Exemption 1 for classified national security materials. The Project challenged these responses in court.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the agencies, concluding that the Glomar responses were proper under FOIA’s first exemption. The court found that the agencies were not required to search for responsive documents before issuing their Glomar responses and that the agencies' affidavits sufficiently supported their responses.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the agencies' Glomar responses were justified under Exemption 1, which allows withholding information that is classified under criteria established by an Executive order. The court found that the agencies' affidavits provided specific, logical, and plausible justifications for the Glomar responses, explaining that disclosing the existence or nonexistence of the requested records could harm national security by revealing intelligence sources, methods, and priorities. The court also rejected the Project's argument that the agencies were required to search for records before issuing Glomar responses, citing precedent that an agency need not search its records before invoking Glomar. View "Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability, Inc. v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Crowley Government Services, Inc. ("Crowley") entered into a contract with the Department of Defense United States Transportation Command ("USTRANSCOM") in 2016 to provide transportation coordination services, which involved hiring motor carriers to transport freight. The General Services Administration ("GSA"), not a party to the contract, began auditing Crowley's bills under a provision of the Transportation Act of 1940, claiming Crowley overbilled USTRANSCOM by millions of dollars. GSA sought to recover these overcharges by garnishing future payments to Crowley.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Crowley's Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") claims, holding that the claims were essentially contractual and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that Crowley's suit was not a contract claim and remanded the case. On remand, the District Court held that GSA could audit both carriers and non-carriers but agreed with Crowley that the USTRANSCOM Contracting Officer's interpretations governed any GSA audits. The court enjoined GSA from issuing Notices of Overcharge ("NOCs") contrary to the Contracting Officer's determinations.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that 31 U.S.C. § 3726(b) allows GSA to audit only bills presented by carriers and freight forwarders. The court found that Crowley is not a carrier because it does not physically transport freight nor is it contractually bound to help perform the movement of goods. Consequently, the court reversed the District Court's decision on the scope of § 3726(b) and remanded for further proceedings, permanently enjoining GSA from conducting postpayment audits of Crowley's bills. View "Crowley Government Services, Inc. v. General Services Administration" on Justia Law

A Puerto Rico-based poultry importer, Northwestern Selecta, Inc. (NWS), challenged a regulation by the Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture (PRDA) requiring a PRDA inspector to be present when shipping containers of poultry meat are opened and unloaded. NWS argued that this requirement is preempted by the federal Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), which regulates the inspection and distribution of poultry products. The PPIA includes a preemption clause that prohibits states from imposing additional or different requirements on official establishments beyond those established by the PPIA.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico agreed with NWS, finding that the PRDA's inspector requirement falls within the scope of the PPIA's preemption clause and is not exempted by the PPIA's savings clause. The district court granted declaratory relief to NWS and permanently enjoined the enforcement of the PRDA's regulation against NWS. The PRDA appealed the decision, arguing that the district court misinterpreted the scope of the PPIA's preemption clause and the application of the savings clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the PPIA's preemption clause broadly covers state regulations related to the operations of official establishments, which includes the opening and unloading of shipping containers at NWS's facility. The court found that the PRDA's inspector requirement directly impacts NWS's operations and is therefore preempted by the PPIA. Additionally, the court determined that the savings clause does not exempt the PRDA's regulation from preemption because it does not apply to poultry products outside of NWS's facility. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the permanent injunction against the enforcement of the PRDA's regulation. View "Northwestern Selecta, Inc. v. Gonzalez-Beiro" on Justia Law

Seven petitions were filed with the Lucas County Board of Elections to recall the mayor and six members of the Maumee city council under R.C. 705.92. The board found the petitions valid and certified the recall questions for a special primary election. The City of Maumee and a citizen, Glenn Rambo, protested, arguing that the city’s charter does not provide for recall, R.C. 705.92 does not apply to the city, and the petitions did not comply with the statute. The board denied the protests.The relators sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the board from placing the recall questions on the ballot and a writ of mandamus to order the board to grant their protests. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court found that Maumee’s charter allows for the removal of elected officials as provided by the Constitution or laws of Ohio, but R.C. 705.92 does not apply to Maumee because it was not adopted under R.C. 705.03. The court held that the board erred in deeming R.C. 705.92 applicable to Maumee.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted the writ of prohibition, preventing the board from placing the recall questions on the ballot, and denied the writ of mandamus as moot. The court concluded that the recall procedure in R.C. 705.92 is not generally applicable to municipalities and can only be adopted as part of a statutory plan of government under R.C. 705.03, which Maumee did not do. View "State ex rel. Maumee v. Lucas County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In this case, the father and mother of B.W. had a contentious relationship, and the father was involved in a criminal incident where he shot and killed a man. Following this incident, the father was advised by his criminal defense attorney not to contact the mother or B.W. to avoid jeopardizing his defense. The father was later charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy but was acquitted in December 2021. In March 2022, the father sought to establish his parental rights, and the mother filed for termination of his parental rights based on abandonment.The Superior Court in Maricopa County found that the father had abandoned B.W. by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship for over six months without just cause. The court rejected the father's argument that he had just cause for his inaction, noting that he did not take any legal steps to assert his parental rights. The court concluded that termination of the father's parental rights was in B.W.'s best interest. The father appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision, agreeing that the father did not demonstrate just cause for his failure to maintain a relationship with B.W. The court held that the father's reliance on his criminal defense attorney's advice did not excuse his inaction.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to clarify the meaning of "just cause" under A.R.S. § 8-531(1). The court held that "just cause" refers to a reasonable and justifiable reason for a parent's failure to maintain a normal parental relationship, based on good faith. The court reversed the juvenile court's termination order and remanded the case for reconsideration, instructing the lower court to apply the clarified definition of "just cause" in determining whether the father's actions were justified. The Court of Appeals' decision was vacated. View "In re Termination Parental Rights as to B.W." on Justia Law

Anthony Rojas, a student at the University of Florida, filed a class action lawsuit against the University of Florida Board of Trustees. Rojas claimed that the University breached its contract by suspending on-campus services and closing facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic, despite students being required to pay mandatory fees for these services. He also alleged that the University failed to refund these fees. The complaint included a spring 2020 tuition statement, a general statement of tuition and fee estimates for the 2019-2020 academic year, and the University’s financial liability agreement.The trial court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim but denied the University’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim, ruling that the complaint adequately pleaded the existence of an express contract. The University appealed, and the First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The First District concluded that the contract alleged by Rojas did not constitute an express written contract sufficient to overcome sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and quashed the First District’s decision. The Court held that the waiver-by-contract doctrine does not preclude claims based on the breach of implied covenants or conditions that do not conflict with express contract provisions. The Court found that the First District erred in requiring extraordinary specificity in government contracts and in failing to recognize permissible implied covenants. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Rojas v. University of Florida Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

The case involves the National Rifle Association of America (NRA) suing Maria T. Vullo, the former Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS), alleging that Vullo violated its First Amendment rights. The NRA claimed that Vullo engaged in coercive and retaliatory actions against the NRA by pressuring financial institutions and insurers to sever ties with the NRA, thereby infringing on its free speech and equal protection rights. Vullo argued that she was entitled to qualified immunity.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied Vullo's motion to dismiss the NRA's First Amendment claims, finding that the NRA had sufficiently stated a claim and that Vullo was not entitled to qualified immunity at that stage. Vullo appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit initially reversed the district court's decision, holding that the NRA failed to state a First Amendment claim and that Vullo was entitled to qualified immunity. The NRA then petitioned the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to address whether the NRA had stated a plausible First Amendment claim. The Supreme Court concluded that the NRA had plausibly alleged a First Amendment violation and remanded the case to the Second Circuit to reconsider the issue of qualified immunity.Upon reconsideration, the Second Circuit concluded that Vullo was entitled to qualified immunity. The court reasoned that, although the general principle that a government official cannot coerce a private party to suppress disfavored speech was well established, it was not clearly established that Vullo's conduct—regulatory actions directed at the nonexpressive conduct of third parties—constituted coercion or retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity and remanded the case for the district court to enter judgment dismissing the remaining claims against Vullo. View "Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Vullo" on Justia Law

In this case, 4022 Georgia Avenue, LLC (4022 LLC) acquired a townhouse in Washington, D.C., in April 2018, which it later sold in two units in 2020. In June 2021, the new owners reported significant structural issues, leading to an inspection by the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA). DCRA issued an order to correct (December OTC) to 4022 LLC in December 2021, directing it to address various building code violations. 4022 LLC appealed the order, arguing it could not comply without the cooperation of the new owners.The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) held a hearing in April 2024 and issued a final order in May 2024, affirming the December OTC. OAH found that 4022 LLC's appeal did not meet the criteria for appeals under the relevant regulations, as it did not specify which provisions of the building code were incorrectly interpreted or applied. OAH also found that 4022 LLC was responsible for the violations due to its warranty obligations under the Condominium Act.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that OAH did not err in its findings. The court concluded that 4022 LLC's failure to identify specific provisions of the building code in its appeal constituted a failure to comply with the criteria for appeals. The court also found that OAH's reliance on the Property Maintenance Code, instead of the Building Code, did not constitute reversible error, as the criteria for appeals were substantively similar. Finally, the court held that OAH did not err in finding 4022 LLC responsible for the violations, as substantial evidence supported this finding based on the LLC's warranty obligations.The court affirmed OAH's order, upholding the December OTC and the requirement for 4022 LLC to address the building code violations. View "4022 Georgia Avenue v. Department of Buildings" on Justia Law

A toll road operator in Loudoun County, Virginia, sought to increase toll rates, arguing that the State Corporation Commission (the Commission) misapplied statutory criteria and that denying the increase would constitute an uncompensated taking under the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions. The toll road, known as the Dulles Greenway, was built with private funds and has faced financial difficulties due to lower-than-expected traffic volumes. The operator, Toll Road Investors Partnership II, L.P. (TRIP II), has refinanced its debt multiple times and has previously received approval for toll increases.The Commission had previously approved several toll increases but denied TRIP II's latest application. The Commission's decision was based on the statutory criteria that toll rates must be reasonable to the user in relation to the benefit obtained, must not materially discourage use of the roadway, and must provide the operator no more than a reasonable return. The Commission found that TRIP II's proposed toll increase did not meet the "reasonable benefit to the user" or "material discouragement" criteria. The Commission also noted that TRIP II had significant cash reserves and had not made equity distributions since 2006 due to indenture restrictions.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Court held that the Commission's findings were supported by credible evidence and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The Court also rejected TRIP II's argument that the denial of the toll increase constituted an unconstitutional taking, noting that the Commission had acted within its authority and had considered the overall circumstances, including the public's interest and the financial condition of TRIP II. The Court concluded that the Commission's decision did not violate the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. View "Toll Road Investors Partnership II v. SCC" on Justia Law

Walmart, Inc. faced allegations from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for 11,103 violations of immigration-related recordkeeping requirements at 20 locations. These cases were assigned to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the Department of Justice’s Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO). Before the ALJ could rule on the merits, Walmart filed a lawsuit in federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the "good cause" removal procedure for ALJs under 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Walmart argued that this removal procedure infringed upon the President’s executive power under Article II of the Constitution.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia ruled in favor of Walmart, declaring § 7521(a) unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the Department and its Chief ALJ from adjudicating ICE’s complaints against Walmart. The district court refused to sever § 7521(a) from the rest of the statute.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The Eleventh Circuit held that the APA’s § 7521(a) is constitutional as applied to the Department’s ALJs in OCAHO. The court reasoned that the ALJs perform purely adjudicative functions, have limited duties, and lack policymaking or administrative authority. Additionally, the decisions of the ALJs are subject to plenary review by the Attorney General, who is removable at will by the President, ensuring sufficient executive control.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s permanent injunction and reversed its entry of summary judgment for Walmart. The court also noted that even if § 7521(a) were unconstitutional, the proper remedy would be to sever the "good cause" removal restriction, leaving the rest of the APA intact. View "Walmart, Inc. v. King" on Justia Law