Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Prince George’s County Council, sitting as the District Council, engaged in a 2009 comprehensive rezoning process known as a sectional map amendment for subregions 5 and 6. Several property owners, including Christmas Farm and MCQ Auto Servicenter, were affected by this rezoning. Christmas Farm sought a more intensive zoning classification but failed to file the required ethics affidavit. MCQ’s property was downzoned, but MCQ successfully petitioned for a revisory petition, resulting in the restoration of its original zoning classification.The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and the Appellate Court of Maryland reviewed the zoning decisions multiple times, resulting in several remands to the District Council. The courts found that the District Council failed to comply with procedural requirements, including the failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard. The most recent remand occurred in 2019, where the District Council adopted sectional map amendments without holding a public hearing or notifying the affected property owners.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed whether a 2021 countywide rezoning constituted a substantive change in the law that rendered moot the property owners' assertions of error from the 2019 proceeding. The Court also examined whether the District Council erred in failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard and whether it complied with the Appellate Court’s prior remand order.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the 2021 countywide rezoning was not a comprehensive rezoning or a substantive change in the law that rendered the property owners' assertions moot. The rezoning was a technical mapping exercise intended to align zoning classifications with the new zoning ordinance. The Court also held that the District Council failed to comply with state and local laws requiring notice and a public hearing and did not follow the Appellate Court’s remand instructions. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "County Council of Prince George's County. v. Robin Dale Land LLC" on Justia Law

Karen Jean Anderson, a licensed advanced practice registered nurse (APRN), was accused by the Utah Division of Professional Licensing (DOPL) of unlawfully practicing medicine and exceeding her APRN license by performing tumescent liposuction and fat grafting procedures. These procedures are classified as ablative cosmetic medical procedures under Utah law. DOPL barred Anderson from performing these procedures and imposed a fine. Anderson sought agency review with the Department of Commerce, which reduced the fine but upheld DOPL’s order. Anderson then sought judicial review.The Utah Board of Nursing initially found that Anderson did not unlawfully practice medicine or exceed her APRN license, reasoning that the Nurse Practice Act (NPA) allows APRNs broad authority, including the ability to perform procedures like tumescent liposuction and fat grafting. However, DOPL rejected this recommendation, stating that the legislature had granted exclusive authority to perform non-exempt ablative cosmetic medical procedures to medical and osteopathic doctors. The Department of Commerce affirmed DOPL’s decision, leading Anderson to file a petition for judicial review with the Utah Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Utah Supreme Court.The Utah Supreme Court held that the Utah Code bars APRNs from independently performing ablative cosmetic medical procedures. The court found that the statutory scheme limits such procedures to those licensed to practice medicine or those whose scope of practice includes the authority to operate or perform surgery. Since the scope of practice for APRNs does not include such authorization, Anderson unlawfully practiced medicine and exceeded her APRN license. The court affirmed the Department’s order, maintaining the restrictions and fine imposed on Anderson. View "Anderson v. Department of Commerce" on Justia Law

Brian Beck was driving on Interstate 70 when a Geary County sheriff's deputy noticed that a frame around Beck's license plate partially obstructed the state name. The deputy executed a traffic stop, during which Beck appeared nervous and provided an odd explanation for his travel route. The deputy called for canine support, and the dog alerted to the presence of drugs. Beck consented to a search, and deputies found methamphetamine in his car. Beck was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possessing a controlled substance without a drug tax stamp, and interference with law enforcement.The Geary District Court denied Beck's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, ruling that the partial obstruction of the state name on the license plate justified the traffic stop. Beck was found guilty on all counts by a jury. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the partial obstruction of the state name constituted a violation of Kansas law, thus justifying the stop.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Kansas law does not require the state name on a license plate to be clearly legible, only the alphanumeric display and registration decal. Therefore, the partial obstruction of the state name did not provide reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. The court reversed Beck's convictions based on the evidence obtained during the search and remanded the case to the district court for a new hearing to determine if there were other valid grounds for the stop and seizure. View "State v. Beck " on Justia Law

Equinor Energy LP operated oil and gas wells in North Dakota and contracted with its affiliate for saltwater gathering services. Versa Energy, LLC, a non-operating working interest owner in these wells, alleged that Equinor overcharged for these services. Versa petitioned the North Dakota Industrial Commission to determine the proper costs, claiming Equinor violated state law by charging more than the "reasonable actual cost" of operation.The North Dakota Industrial Commission concluded it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute and determined that Equinor's costs were improper. The Commission set the proper cost for saltwater gathering services at $0.35 per barrel. Equinor appealed to the District Court of McKenzie County, which affirmed the Commission's order.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. The court held that the Commission's regulatory authority under N.D.C.C. § 38-08-04 does not extend to adjudicating private contractual disputes. Additionally, the court determined that saltwater gathering costs are post-production costs, which fall outside the scope of "operation of a well" under N.D.C.C. § 38-08-08(2). Therefore, the Commission did not have jurisdiction under this statute to determine the proper costs for saltwater gathering.The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court's order and vacated the Commission's order. View "Equinor Energy v. NDIC" on Justia Law

Marjorie Johnson, the owner of farmland, was denied a permit by the Village of Polk to drill a new well for irrigating her farmland. She sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance requiring a permit for new wells in the village’s wellhead protection area was invalid, arguing it was preempted by the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act (NGWMPA) and violated state law by interfering with her existing farming operations.The district court for Polk County denied her request for declaratory judgment and her petition in error. The court found that the ordinance was not preempted by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature intended for both local natural resources districts (NRDs) and municipalities to have control over water sources. The court also found that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the land was previously irrigated through an agreement with a neighbor, and it was the dispute with the neighbor, not the ordinance, that resulted in the land being dryland.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the ordinance was enacted under the necessary statutory grant of power to the municipality, as the Wellhead Protection Area Act and other statutes granted villages the authority to adopt controls to protect public water supplies. The court also found no field or conflict preemption by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature did not intend to deprive municipalities of their statutory authority to require permits for wells within wellhead protection areas. Finally, the court agreed that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the existing farming at the time of the permit request was dryland farming, and it was the neighbor’s actions, not the ordinance, that prevented irrigation. View "Johnson v. Village of Polk" on Justia Law

A real estate developer, HK Baugh Ranch, LLC, petitioned the Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) to release its undeveloped land, River Bend Ranch, from the certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) issued to Crystal Clear Special Utility District (Crystal Clear). Crystal Clear, a federally indebted utility district, sued the PUC’s Chair and Commissioners in federal court, alleging that Texas Water Code § 13.2541, which allows for decertification, was preempted by 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b). This federal statute protects certain federally indebted utilities from curtailment of their service areas while their loans are outstanding.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction preventing the PUC from decertifying River Bend Ranch. The district court applied the “physical ability” test from Green Valley Special Utility District v. City of Schertz, determining that Crystal Clear likely made its service available to HK Baugh and was thus entitled to the protections of § 1926(b). The court concluded that § 1926(b) likely expressly preempts Texas Water Code § 13.2541, resolving the remaining preliminary injunction factors in favor of Crystal Clear.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that Crystal Clear would likely satisfy the “physical ability” test. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred in holding that § 1926(b) expressly preempts Texas Water Code § 13.2541. The appellate court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether § 1926(b) otherwise preempts Texas Water Code § 13.2541 and to address all preliminary injunction factors as necessary. The preliminary injunction remains in place pending further proceedings. View "Crystal Clear v. HK Baugh Ranch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Mollie Marie Flinton applied for Social Security disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits in August 2015, citing mental health disabilities. Her application was initially denied, and she requested an administrative hearing. ALJ Mark Solomon, who was not properly appointed at the time, conducted the hearing and denied her benefits in March 2018. Flinton appealed, and the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York remanded the case for a new hearing in 2020. Despite the remand, Flinton appeared again before ALJ Solomon in August 2021, whose appointment had been ratified by then.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, presided over by Magistrate Judge Gary R. Jones, granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security in September 2023. The court found that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and that remanding the case to a new ALJ was unnecessary, despite acknowledging the Appointments Clause challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that, pursuant to Lucia v. SEC, Flinton was entitled to a new hearing before a different, properly appointed ALJ. The court found that ALJ Solomon’s initial decision was invalid due to his improper appointment and that the subsequent hearing before the same ALJ did not cure the constitutional violation. The court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case to the Commissioner for a de novo hearing before a different, validly appointed ALJ. View "Flinton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which held that the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to abortion, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that Wisconsin Statute § 940.04(1), which criminalizes the intentional destruction of an unborn child, does not ban abortion. The plaintiffs included the Attorney General, the Department of Safety and Professional Services, the Medical Examining Board, and three physicians. They argued that the statute either does not apply to abortion or has been impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation.The Dane County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief could be granted because § 940.04 does not prohibit consensual medical abortions. The court later issued a declaratory judgment that the statute does not prohibit abortions.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The central question was whether § 940.04(1) bans abortion. The court concluded that comprehensive legislation enacted over the last 50 years, which regulates various aspects of abortion, impliedly repealed the 19th-century near-total ban on abortion. The court held that the legislature's detailed regulation of abortion was meant as a substitute for the earlier statute, and therefore, § 940.04(1) does not ban abortion in Wisconsin.The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment and order, holding that the comprehensive legislative framework governing abortion impliedly repealed the near-total ban on abortion in § 940.04(1). View "Kaul v. Urmanski" on Justia Law

The case involves the Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund (MIIF) seeking cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) payment reimbursements from the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund (trust fund). MIIF, a nonprofit entity created by statute, administers and pays certain claims against insolvent insurers. Between 1989 and 2013, MIIF paid workers' compensation benefits, including COLA payments, on behalf of several insolvent insurers. MIIF filed claims with the trust fund for reimbursement of these payments, but the trust fund denied the claims, arguing that MIIF is not an "insurer" under the relevant statutes and does not participate in the trust fund.The Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA) administrative judge denied MIIF's claims, and the Industrial Accident Reviewing Board (board) affirmed the decision. The board relied on the Appeals Court's decision in Home Ins. Co. v. Workers' Compensation Trust Fund, concluding that MIIF, like the insolvent insurers, does not collect and transmit assessments to the trust fund and is therefore not entitled to reimbursement.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that MIIF is eligible for COLA-payment reimbursements. The court determined that MIIF, when taking on an insolvent insurer's covered claims, is "deemed the insurer" and has "all rights, duties, and obligations" of the insolvent insurer under G. L. c. 175D, § 5 (1) (b). The court also found that the plain language of the relevant statutes does not exclude MIIF from reimbursement eligibility and that the trust fund's funding mechanism, which is paid for by employers, supports MIIF's entitlement to reimbursement.The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the board's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund v. Workers' Compensation Trust Fund" on Justia Law

Upper Missouri Waterkeeper and seven Broadwater County residents challenged the approval of a subdivision by 71 Ranch, LP, arguing it did not meet the "exempt well" exception for a water rights permit. They sought attorney fees under the Montana Water Use Act, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), and the Private Attorney General Doctrine. The District Court denied their request for fees under all three claims.The First Judicial District Court found that the subdivision's environmental assessment was inadequate and that the County abused its discretion in approving the subdivision. The court ruled in favor of Upper Missouri on most claims but denied their request for attorney fees. The plaintiffs appealed the denial of fees.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court that the Water Use Act did not authorize fees. However, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of fees under the UDJA, finding that the District Court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court held that the equities supported an award of attorney fees and that the declaratory relief sought by Upper Missouri was necessary to change the status quo. The case was remanded to the District Court to determine a reasonable amount of fees and their apportionment. The Supreme Court did not address the private attorney general claim. View "Upper Missouri v. Department of Natural Resources and Conservation" on Justia Law