Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Several companies that supply electricity generation services in Pennsylvania challenged a billing practice used by a regional electric distribution company (EDC), FirstEnergy. FirstEnergy, which is responsible for delivering electricity to customers, offered its own customers the option to pay for non-commodity goods and services—such as smart thermostats and surge protection—through their regular utility bills, a practice known as “on-bill billing.” However, FirstEnergy did not allow competing electric generation suppliers (EGSs) to use this billing method for their own non-commodity goods and services. The EGSs argued that this practice was unlawfully discriminatory under Section 1502 of the Public Utility Code and Section 2804(6) of the Electricity Generation Customer Choice and Competition Act, which prohibit unreasonable preferences or advantages in utility service.An administrative law judge initially found in favor of the EGSs, concluding that FirstEnergy’s practice gave it a significant competitive advantage and violated the anti-discrimination provisions. However, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) reversed this decision, reasoning that discrimination only occurs if the EDC provides the billing service to third parties but not to EGSs, which was not the case here. The PUC also determined that the relevant statutes did not require EDCs to offer on-bill billing for non-commodity goods and services to EGSs.The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the PUC’s decision, holding that the statutory provisions at issue did not obligate EDCs to provide on-bill billing for non-commodity goods and services to EGSs. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and agreed with the lower courts. The Court held that EDCs have no statutory duty to provide on-bill billing for non-commodity goods and services to EGSs, and that such billing does not constitute “service,” “electric services,” or “transmission and distribution service” under the relevant statutes. The Court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "Interstate Gas Supply, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission" on Justia Law

Entities approved to grow, process, or test medical marijuana in Pennsylvania challenged a regulation issued by the Pennsylvania Department of Health. The Department required that growers and processors use one independent laboratory to test marijuana at harvest and a different independent laboratory to test the product after processing, a rule known as the “two-lab requirement.” The challengers argued that this regulation exceeded the Department’s authority under the Medical Marijuana Act, which states that growers and processors must contract with “one or more independent laboratories” for testing.The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, sitting en banc, reviewed the challenge. It focused on the statutory language in Section 704 of the Act, interpreting the phrase “one or more independent laboratories” to mean that growers and processors could choose to use only one laboratory if they wished. The court concluded that the Department’s two-lab requirement conflicted with the Act and declared the regulation unenforceable. A dissenting opinion argued that the Department had broad regulatory authority under the Act, including the power to require multiple laboratories to ensure patient safety.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case on direct appeal. It held that the Medical Marijuana Act grants the Department of Health discretion to determine the number of laboratories required for testing, in order to fulfill the Act’s explicit goals, including patient safety and high-quality research. The Court found that the Commonwealth Court erred by interpreting Section 704 in isolation and failing to consider the broader context and policy objectives of the Act. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the remaining issues, including whether the two-lab requirement is reasonable. View "Green Analytics North, LLC v. Department of Health" on Justia Law

Yazam, Inc., operating as Empower, is a private vehicle-for-hire company that provides a digital app connecting drivers with passengers. Unlike other rideshare platforms, Empower sells monthly subscriptions to drivers, who then set their own fares and retain the full payment from riders. The District of Columbia Department of For-Hire Vehicles (DFHV) ordered Empower to cease operations in the District for failing to register as required by law. Empower requested an expedited hearing before the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), which upheld the cease-and-desist order.Previously, DFHV had issued a similar order in 2020, which OAH upheld, but the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, finding insufficient proof of immediate and irreparable harm to the public from Empower’s nonregistration. After that decision, DFHV issued a compliance order requiring Empower to register and provide documentation. When Empower did not respond, DFHV issued another cease-and-desist order, citing specific registration statutes and regulations. OAH found that Empower’s failure to register, along with other statutory violations, posed a substantial risk of immediate and irreparable harm, particularly through the impoundment of vehicles belonging to Empower drivers who were unaware of the risks.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the OAH decision, applying a standard that requires affirmance if OAH made findings of fact on each contested issue, those findings are supported by substantial evidence, and the conclusions flow rationally from the findings. The court held that OAH properly upheld the cease-and-desist order based on the immediate and irreparable harm caused by Empower’s nonregistration, specifically the risk of vehicle impoundments. The court also rejected Empower’s due process arguments regarding discovery, hearing scheduling, and the telephonic nature of the hearing, finding no abuse of discretion or reversible error. The order of OAH was affirmed. View "Yazam, Inc. d/b/a Empower v. D.C. Department of For-Hire Vehicles" on Justia Law

Three former employees of the District of Columbia Department of Forensic Sciences were terminated as part of a reduction in force. They appealed their terminations to the Office of Employee Appeals (OEA), which upheld the terminations in separate orders issued in August 2023. The OEA’s decisions became final in October 2023, and the employees were required to file petitions for judicial review in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia within thirty days. However, each employee filed their petition more than two months after the deadline, attributing the delay to their union counsel’s failure to file timely and seeking extensions based on excusable neglect.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed each petition. In Ms. Gilliam’s case, the court ruled that the thirty-day deadline was mandatory and could not be extended for excusable neglect. In Ms. Washington’s case, the court similarly found the deadline mandatory but also ruled, in the alternative, that she had not shown excusable neglect. In Ms. Ruiz-Reyes’s case, the court did not address whether the deadline was mandatory, instead finding that she had not established excusable neglect.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the thirty-day deadline for seeking Superior Court review of OEA decisions can be extended upon a showing of excusable neglect. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of Ms. Ruiz-Reyes’s petition, finding no abuse of discretion in the determination that she had not shown excusable neglect. However, the court vacated the dismissals of Ms. Gilliam’s and Ms. Washington’s petitions and remanded those cases for further proceedings, instructing the Superior Court to reconsider the excusable neglect issue without relying on an erroneous finding of prejudice to the agency. View "Gilliam v. D.C. Department of Forensic Sciences" on Justia Law

A licensed physician pled guilty to a misdemeanor violation of California’s Business and Professions Code section 650, which prohibits receiving compensation for patient referrals. As part of a plea agreement, he paid restitution and other fees, and additional charges were dismissed. Before completing his probation, he successfully moved to have the case dismissed under Penal Code section 1385, which allows for dismissal in the interest of justice.Following this, the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) suspended him from participating in California’s workers’ compensation system, citing Labor Code section 139.21. This statute mandates suspension of any provider convicted of certain crimes related to fraud or abuse of the workers’ compensation system. The physician challenged the suspension in an administrative hearing, arguing that the dismissal of his case meant he was no longer “convicted” under the statute. The administrative law judge rejected this argument and upheld the suspension. The physician then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, which denied the petition, finding that the statutory definition of “convicted” included a guilty plea accepted by a court, regardless of later dismissal.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the matter de novo. The court held that under the plain language of Labor Code section 139.21, a person is considered “convicted” if a guilty plea has been accepted by a court, with no exception for cases later dismissed under Penal Code section 1385. The court found that the physician’s suspension was required by law and affirmed the judgment of the superior court. The DIR was awarded costs on appeal. View "Ahn v. Parisotto" on Justia Law

Two licensed wrecker services in Connecticut were summoned by state police to remove a severely damaged tractor trailer from a highway accident. The wrecker services used specialized equipment, including a costly rotator truck, to recover and tow the vehicle, then transported it to their storage facility. They sent an itemized invoice to the vehicle owner’s insurer, which included charges for the use of special equipment and supervisory personnel. The insurer paid the invoice under protest and subsequently filed a complaint with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, arguing that the charges were excessive and not permitted under state regulations.A Department of Motor Vehicles hearing officer determined that the wrecker services had overcharged for their nonconsensual towing services by using their own rate schedule based on equipment rather than the hourly labor rate set by the commissioner. Most equipment-based charges were disallowed, and the wrecker services were ordered to pay restitution and a civil penalty. The Superior Court dismissed the wrecker services’ administrative appeal, finding the hearing officer’s conclusions supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the regulations required fees for exceptional services to be based solely on the hourly labor rate, excluding equipment costs.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the relevant regulation, § 14-63-36c (c), was ambiguous and could reasonably be interpreted to allow wrecker services to charge additional fees for exceptional services, including costs associated with special equipment, provided those fees are itemized and posted in accordance with regulatory requirements. The Court held that prohibiting such charges would prevent wrecker services from recouping necessary costs and could undermine the availability of exceptional towing services. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its interpretation. View "Modzelewski's Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

An employee at a hospital operated by the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA Health) photographed confidential patient information and posted it to his personal Instagram account, despite having received training and signing agreements to protect patient privacy. Although the employee redacted some information, personal details of ten patients remained visible. The hospital responded by placing the employee on administrative leave, ultimately terminating him, notifying affected patients, and reiterating privacy policies to staff. No patients reported adverse consequences from the disclosure.The California Department of Public Health investigated and imposed a $75,000 penalty on the hospital, finding a violation of Health and Safety Code section 1280.15, which requires health facilities to prevent unauthorized disclosure of patient medical information. An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the Department’s finding and penalty, interpreting section 1280.15 as imposing strict liability for any unauthorized disclosure, regardless of whether the hospital had implemented appropriate safeguards. The ALJ noted that the Department did not find a violation of section 1280.18, which requires reasonable safeguards, but still held the hospital responsible. The Department adopted the ALJ’s decision.The Regents of the University of California challenged the decision in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, seeking a writ of administrative mandate and declaratory relief. The trial court ruled in favor of the hospital, holding that a violation of section 1280.15 cannot occur without a concurrent violation of section 1280.18, thus importing a reasonableness standard into section 1280.15. The court ordered the Department to vacate its decision and remanded the matter.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that section 1280.15 is not a strict liability statute; liability requires a failure to implement reasonable safeguards as mandated by section 1280.18. The hospital was not liable absent proof of such a failure. View "Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. State Dept. of Public Health" on Justia Law

The case concerns a rule issued by the Federal Maritime Commission in 2024 to address concerns about demurrage and detention charges in maritime shipping. These charges are imposed by ocean carriers and marine terminal operators on shippers, truckers, and other entities for delays in the movement or return of shipping containers. The rule sought to clarify which parties could be billed for these charges, limiting invoices to those in a contractual relationship with the billing party—typically shippers or consignees. However, the rule categorically excluded motor carriers from being billed, even when they had a direct contract with the ocean carrier.Prior to review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Federal Maritime Commission promulgated the rule and responded to public comments. Initially, the Commission suggested that motor carriers in contractual privity could be billed, but later issued a correction stating that motor carriers could not be billed under any circumstances, regardless of contractual relationship. The World Shipping Council, representing ocean carriers, petitioned for review, arguing that the rule was arbitrary and capricious, among other challenges.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the Commission’s rule was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the Commission failed to reasonably explain its exclusion of motor carriers from the set of billable parties, despite its stated rationale of limiting billing to those in contractual privity. The court granted the petition for review, severed and set aside the portion of the rule (46 C.F.R. § 541.4) that confined billing to shippers or consignees, and left the remainder of the rule intact. View "World Shipping Council v. FMC" on Justia Law

A Swiss healthcare company entered into a contract with the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to modernize and operate a medical clinic. After the relationship deteriorated, with Equatorial Guinea refusing to allow the company to run the clinic, the company initiated arbitration in Switzerland and was awarded damages. The parties settled the first arbitration, but the company later sought further damages in a second arbitration. Equatorial Guinea challenged the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, arguing that the contract’s dispute-resolution clause required the company to first seek relief in Equatoguinean courts before pursuing international arbitration. The arbitral panel found the clause ambiguous but ultimately concluded that exhaustion of local remedies was not required and awarded the company over $9 million.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the company’s petition to confirm the arbitral award. The court found it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s arbitration exception. On the merits, the court deferred to the arbitrators’ interpretation of the dispute-resolution clause, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, and confirmed the award.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that the district court had jurisdiction but disagreed with its deferential approach to the arbitrators’ interpretation of the dispute-resolution clause. The appellate court held that, in this context, the question of whether exhaustion of local remedies was required is a substantive arbitrability issue for courts, not arbitrators, to decide. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve the proper interpretation of the dispute-resolution clause. View "Marseille-Kliniken AG v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea" on Justia Law

Texas submitted a State Implementation Plan (SIP) to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2012, asserting that its emissions did not significantly contribute to ozone pollution in downwind states and therefore no additional mitigation was necessary. The SIP included charts of declining ozone levels in certain metropolitan areas, a brief discussion of wind patterns, a map of 2010 ozone levels, and some raw measurement data, but did not analyze or quantify Texas’s impact on other states’ air quality. Texas’s submission focused on areas geographically close to Texas and did not address whether its emissions might interfere with maintenance of air quality standards in other states.After determining the SIP was technically complete, the EPA delayed substantive review pending the Supreme Court’s decision in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., which clarified the agency’s authority under the Clean Air Act’s Good Neighbor Provision. During the delay, EPA provided Texas with updated modeling data showing that Texas emissions contributed to downwind ozone problems, but Texas did not supplement its SIP. In 2016, EPA formally disapproved the SIP, finding it failed to address statutory requirements, particularly by not evaluating impacts on maintenance areas and by relying on outdated control measures. Texas and industry groups petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review, arguing EPA’s process was procedurally and substantively flawed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that EPA’s review complied with statutory and procedural requirements, and that the agency acted within its authority in disapproving the SIP. The court found EPA’s reasoning was not arbitrary or capricious, and that the SIP’s failure to analyze Texas’s impact on all relevant downwind areas, including maintenance areas, justified disapproval. The court also rejected arguments that EPA was required to approve the SIP due to procedural delays or reliance on updated data. View "State of Texas v. EPA" on Justia Law