Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Old Golden Oaks LLC applied for an encroachment permit and a grading permit from Amador County for a housing development project. The county deemed the applications incomplete and requested additional information. Old Golden Oaks filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the county violated the Permit Streamlining Act by requesting information not specified in the submittal checklists for the permits.The Superior Court of Amador County sustained the county’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the encroachment permit checklist allowed the county to request additional information and that the county had statutory authority to seek information necessary for compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Old Golden Oaks that the catch-all provision in the county’s encroachment permit submittal checklist violated the Permit Streamlining Act because it did not specify in detail the required information. However, the court found that the county could condition the completeness of the grading permit application on additional environmental information because the grading permit checklist informed Old Golden Oaks that the project must comply with CEQA. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding the encroachment permit but affirmed the judgment regarding the grading permit. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Old Golden Oaks v. County of Amador" on Justia Law

Larry B. Herrington, a veteran who served in the U.S. Air Force, filed a claim in September 2009 for service connection for several gastrointestinal conditions, including Barrett’s disease, chronic gastritis, reflux disease, and hiatal hernia. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regional office awarded service connection for gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD) with a non-compensable evaluation. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) later awarded a 30% evaluation for GERD by analogy to the diagnostic code for hiatal hernia, Diagnostic Code (DC) 7346, but denied an evaluation in excess of 30%.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that the Board’s selection of DC 7346 was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Mr. Herrington appealed this decision, arguing that the Veterans Court should have applied a de novo standard of review rather than the deferential standard set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the selection of an analogous diagnostic code for rating unlisted conditions involves questions of fact or the application of law to facts, which requires a deferential standard of review. The court concluded that the Veterans Court applied the correct standard of review and affirmed the decision of the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s selection of DC 7346 for rating Mr. Herrington’s GERD was appropriate and supported by the evidence. View "HERRINGTON v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Judith Jeltsje Pietersen, a Dutch citizen, and her fiancé, Daniel Gerhard Brown, an American citizen, sought to obtain a visa for Pietersen to enter the United States so they could marry. Pietersen had previously traveled to the U.S. under the Visa Waiver Program but was denied entry in February 2020 by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for alleged unlawful employment. Pietersen and Brown applied for a K-1 visa, but consular officers denied the applications, citing willful misrepresentation of a material fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).The appellants filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of State, challenging the visa denials and the guidance in the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM). They argued that the consular officers failed to properly review Pietersen’s applications and that the "reason to believe" standard used to determine inadmissibility was contrary to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the consular nonreviewability doctrine barred the claims and that the claims were otherwise meritless.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the consular nonreviewability doctrine did not bar the appellants' Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim for prospective relief. The court expressed doubts about the viability of the State Department's "reason to believe" standard and vacated the District Court’s alternative holding based on 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the INA authorizes the challenged FAM guidance. View "Pietersen v. United States Department of State" on Justia Law

Ryan Castaneira, a U.S. citizen, filed a Form I-130 petition to obtain permanent residency for his spouse, a Mexican national. USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the petition due to Castaneira's prior convictions in Georgia for crimes that appeared to qualify as "specified offenses against a minor" under the Adam Walsh Act. Castaneira argued that his convictions involved an undercover officer, not a minor, and thus should not be considered offenses against a minor. He also challenged the agency's use of the "beyond any reasonable doubt" standard to prove he posed no risk to his spouse.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Castaneira's claims. The court held that his prior convictions fell within the statutory definition of "specified offense against a minor" and that the Adam Walsh Act's grant of "sole and unreviewable discretion" to USCIS precluded judicial review of the evidentiary standard applied by the agency. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the standard of proof used by USCIS in making the no-risk determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling in part, agreeing that Castaneira's prior convictions were covered by the Adam Walsh Act. However, the appellate court vacated the District Court's jurisdictional ruling regarding the evidentiary standard. The court held that while USCIS's ultimate no-risk determinations are unreviewable, challenges to the agency's departure from its own binding precedent, such as the standard of proof, are reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether USCIS violated its own precedent by applying the "beyond any reasonable doubt" standard. View "Castaneira v. Noem" on Justia Law

The Texas Attorney General alleged that Annunciation House, a nonprofit organization in El Paso, was unlawfully harboring illegal aliens. The Attorney General sought to examine the organization's records and initiate quo warranto proceedings, which could lead to the revocation of its charter. Annunciation House, which provides shelter to immigrants and refugees, was served with a records request by state officials, who demanded immediate compliance. Annunciation House sought legal relief, arguing that the request violated its constitutional rights.The 205th Judicial District Court in El Paso County granted a temporary restraining order and later a temporary injunction against the Attorney General's records request. The court also denied the Attorney General's motion for leave to file a quo warranto action, ruling that the statutes authorizing the records request were unconstitutional and that the allegations of harboring illegal aliens did not constitute a valid basis for quo warranto. The court further held that the statutes were preempted by federal law and violated the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case on direct appeal. The court held that the trial court erred in its constitutional rulings and that the Attorney General has the constitutional authority to file a quo warranto action. The court emphasized that it was too early to express a view on the merits of the underlying issues and that the usual litigation process should unfold. The court also held that the statutes authorizing the records request were not facially unconstitutional and that the trial court's injunction against the Attorney General's records request was improper. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "PAXTON v. ANNUNCIATION HOUSE, INC." on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to a Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) rule that authorized state licenses for two residential facilities where the federal government detained mothers and children after their illegal entry into the United States. The plaintiffs, including detained mothers and Grassroots Leadership, Inc., sought to prohibit the detention of children at these facilities, arguing that the rule was invalid under state law. However, by the time the case reached the court of appeals, all the mothers and children had been released from the facilities.The trial court denied the pleas to the jurisdiction filed by the department and the facility operators, eventually ruling in favor of the plaintiffs by declaring the rule invalid and enjoining the department from granting licenses under it. The Third Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claims were moot since they were no longer detained. However, the court of appeals proceeded to address the merits of the case by invoking the "public-interest exception" to mootness and held the rule invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Texas courts are not constitutionally authorized to adjudicate moot cases, even if they raise questions of considerable public importance. The court emphasized that mootness is a constitutional limitation on judicial power, and there is no "public-interest exception" to mootness in Texas. Consequently, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment regarding its jurisdiction, vacated the judgment on the merits, and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES v. GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, INC" on Justia Law

A group of appellants, including Firearms Owners Against Crime and two firearms dealers, filed a case against the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Commissioner, alleging that PSP was not complying with the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act. The appellants claimed that PSP was intentionally understaffing its Pennsylvania Instant Check System (PICS) Operations Section, leading to significant delays in background checks for firearm purchases, sometimes exceeding seven hours. They argued that these delays violated the statutory requirement for "instantaneous" or "immediate" background checks and caused financial harm to firearms dealers due to canceled transactions.The Commonwealth Court initially issued a preliminary injunction, finding that PSP had a statutory duty to employ sufficient personnel to ensure compliance with the Act and that the delays were causing financial harm to the dealers. However, the court later sustained PSP's preliminary objections, ruling that the statute did not specify a mandatory timeframe for background checks and that the operational decisions regarding staffing were discretionary. The court also dismissed the appellants' request for a refund of the $2.00 background check fee, as the statute did not provide for such refunds.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and held that while the statute did not require "instantaneous" responses, it did mandate that PSP provide results as quickly as possible with available resources. The court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's denial of injunctive and mandamus relief, as these would compel affirmative action barred by sovereign immunity. However, the court reversed the denial of declaratory relief, allowing the appellants to seek a judicial declaration of PSP's duties under the Act. The court also vacated the order denying leave to amend the petition, allowing the appellants to include new allegations regarding PSP's response to the preliminary injunction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Firearms Owners v. Comm'r of PSP" on Justia Law

In 2023, Kenneth Bresler, a former Appeals Court staff attorney, filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court against three Appeals Court employees, Lynn Muster, Mary Bowe, and Gina DeRossi, alleging intentional interference with advantageous relations. Bresler claimed that the defendants engaged in a campaign that led to his termination. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Bresler failed to establish the "actual malice" required for such a claim and that they were entitled to common-law immunity as public officials.The Superior Court judge granted the motion to dismiss for Bowe and DeRossi but denied it for Muster. Bresler appealed the dismissal of Bowe and DeRossi, while Muster cross-appealed the partial denial of her motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court granted Bresler's application for direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that the allegations in the complaint, when taken as true, plausibly suggested that Muster and Bowe acted with "actual malice," which is necessary to state an intentional interference claim. The court found that Muster's actions, motivated by jealousy and hostility, and Bowe's subsequent negative evaluations and actions against Bresler, supported the inference of actual malice. However, the court held that the complaint did not contain sufficient factual allegations to establish actual malice or defeat common-law immunity for DeRossi.As a result, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court's order as to Muster and DeRossi and reversed it as to Bowe, allowing the claims against Muster and Bowe to proceed while dismissing the claims against DeRossi. View "Bresler v. Muster" on Justia Law

Montana Environmental Information Center and Earthworks (MEIC) submitted a formal information request to the Office of the Governor of Montana on November 29, 2021. The request sought various documents related to the Montana Department of Environmental Quality’s (DEQ) dismissal of an enforcement action against Hecla Mining and its President/CEO, as well as information on the Governor’s Office’s involvement in mining and environmental decision-making. The Governor’s Office did not respond to the request, prompting MEIC to follow up multiple times. When the requested records were not provided, MEIC filed a lawsuit against the Governor’s Office, seeking to compel production of the information.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County found that the Governor’s Office had a clear legal duty to honor MEIC’s request and issued a writ of mandamus compelling the production of the information. The Governor’s Office initially appealed but later stipulated to dismissal. MEIC then requested attorney’s fees, which the District Court denied, citing the Governor’s Office’s lack of bad faith and the potential for MEIC to obtain the information through other means.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and addressed whether a party who successfully vindicates its right to know under the Montana Constitution is entitled to a presumption towards awarding attorney’s fees. The Court held that there should be a presumption towards awarding attorney’s fees to plaintiffs who successfully enforce their right to know, as this encourages public engagement and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court vacated the District Court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration of the attorney’s fees request, considering the presumption towards awarding fees and costs. View "MEIC v. Governor" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who own or operate gasoline service stations in Puerto Rico, offered two different prices to consumers: a higher price for those using credit or debit cards and a lower price for those paying with cash. In 2013, Puerto Rico's legislature enacted Law 152-2013, amending Law 150-2008 by removing a provision that allowed merchants to offer cash discounts. Plaintiffs ceased offering the lower price due to the threat of fines and criminal prosecution. They sued the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, arguing that Law 150 is preempted by federal law and is unconstitutionally vague.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico rejected the plaintiffs' arguments and granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court found that neither the Cash Discount Act (CDA) nor the Durbin Amendment preempted Law 150. The court also declined to address the constitutional vagueness argument, noting that the complaint did not allege that Law 150 is unconstitutionally vague.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the CDA and the Durbin Amendment do not preempt Law 150. The CDA regulates the conduct of credit card issuers, not merchants or states, and does not confer an absolute right to offer cash discounts. The Durbin Amendment regulates payment card networks, not states, and does not preempt state legislation restricting cash discounts. The court also found that the plaintiffs did not properly plead a vagueness claim in their complaint, rendering the claim unpreserved for appellate review. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case. View "Asociacion de Detallistas de Gasolina de PR Inc. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" on Justia Law