Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves two charitable organizations, Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. (CMMB) and Food for the Poor, Inc. (FFP), which were issued cease and desist orders and civil penalties by the Attorney General of California for allegedly making false or misleading statements in their charitable solicitations. The Attorney General found that both organizations overvalued in-kind donations and misrepresented their program efficiency ratios, leading to misleading donor solicitations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and found that the challenged statutory provisions, sections 12591.1(b) and 12599.6(f)(2) of the Government Code, were unconstitutional under the First Amendment as they constituted prior restraints on speech. The court vacated the civil penalties and issued permanent injunctions against the Attorney General, preventing the enforcement of these provisions. The court also reformed section 12591.1(b) to exclude violations of section 12599.6 from the Attorney General’s cease and desist authority.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s constitutional rulings but vacated the permanent injunctions, stating that the trial court abused its discretion by granting them without requiring the plaintiffs to plead and prove entitlement to such relief. The appellate court remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to seek injunctive relief and to prove they are entitled to it. The court also affirmed the trial court’s reformation of section 12591.1(b) and vacated the postjudgment orders awarding attorney fees, directing the trial court to reconsider the fees in light of the appellate court’s rulings. View "Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. v. Bonta" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge by two environmental groups against the County of San Diego's adoption of certain thresholds of significance under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). These thresholds, if met, would generally eliminate the need for developers to perform an analysis of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) for proposed projects. The plaintiffs specifically contested two thresholds: one for "infill" projects within unincorporated villages and another for projects generating no more than 110 automobile trips per day.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the County, determining that the infill threshold was consistent with CEQA and supported by substantial evidence. The court also upheld the small project threshold, noting its alignment with recommendations from the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research (OPR).The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court found that the County's infill threshold was not supported by substantial evidence, as it relied on unsubstantiated assumptions about the transportation impacts of infill development without demonstrating that such development would generally result in insignificant VMT impacts in San Diego County. Similarly, the court determined that the small project threshold lacked substantial evidentiary support, as the County did not provide evidence that projects generating fewer than 110 trips per day would likely have a less than significant transportation impact under local conditions.The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court's decision, directing the lower court to grant the petition for writ of mandate and to determine whether portions of the Transportation Guide are severable and may continue to be applied. The appellate court emphasized the need for substantial evidence to support the adoption of significance thresholds under CEQA. View "Cleveland Nat. Forest Foundation v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

A member of the public reported Gregory Kazelka for erratic driving, leading to a traffic stop by Officer Phillips of the California Highway Patrol. Kazelka admitted to drinking excessively and failed field sobriety tests. He underwent a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) test, which showed a blood alcohol content above the legal limit. Kazelka was arrested, and a subsequent chemical breath test confirmed his intoxication. However, Officer Phillips did not provide the statutory admonition that the PAS test was voluntary.The California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended Kazelka’s license following an administrative hearing. Kazelka challenged the suspension in the Lake County Superior Court, which found that the PAS test results should have been excluded due to the lack of statutory admonition and reversed the suspension.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory admonition was not a foundational requirement for the admissibility of the PAS test results. The court also determined that the exclusionary rule, typically applied in criminal cases, does not apply to administrative per se (APS) hearings. The court found that Officer Phillips’s failure to provide the admonition did not violate Kazelka’s constitutional rights and that the hearing officer did not act as both advocate and adjudicator, thus not violating due process.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, directing the trial court to deny Kazelka’s petition for writ of mandate and reinstate the DMV’s suspension order. The DMV was awarded costs on appeal. View "Kazelka v. Cal. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged an amendment to the energy facility site certificate for constructing a high-voltage electrical transmission line from Boardman, Oregon, to Hemingway, Idaho. The Energy Facility Siting Council (EFSC) had previously approved the original site certificate, which was affirmed by the court in Stop B2H Coalition v. Dept. of Energy. EFSC later approved Idaho Power’s request to amend the site certificate, expanding the site boundary and making other changes. Petitioners contested the process EFSC followed and the substance of the amendment, arguing they were entitled to a contested case proceeding and that the amendment did not comply with legal protections for watersheds and wildlife habitats.The lower court, EFSC, denied petitioners’ requests for contested case proceedings and approved the amendment. Petitioners then sought judicial review, contending that the circuit court had jurisdiction over their process challenge and that EFSC’s decisions were substantively flawed.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and held that it had jurisdiction to address the process challenge. The court found that EFSC did not err in denying the contested case proceedings, as the issues raised by petitioners were either untimely or did not present significant issues of fact or law. The court also rejected the substantive challenges, concluding that the bond requirements were adequately addressed in the original site certificate and that the expanded site boundary did not permit construction outside the micrositing corridors without further review.The Supreme Court affirmed EFSC’s final order approving the amended site certificate, holding that EFSC’s decisions were legally sound and supported by substantial evidence. View "Gilbert v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law

Praxis Packaging Solutions, operating a manufacturing facility, applied for a tax exemption for its manufacturing equipment under Michigan law. The Township of Byron's assessor denied the application, stating the equipment did not meet the statutory definition of eligible manufacturing personal property (EMPP). The denial notice informed Praxis of its right to appeal to the March Board of Review but did not provide specific deadlines or meeting dates. Praxis's agents contacted the assessor for appeal details but were not informed of the deadlines. Praxis submitted an appeal letter after the Board had adjourned, and the Board did not consider the appeal.The Michigan Tax Tribunal dismissed Praxis's petition for lack of jurisdiction, as Praxis had not first appealed to the Board. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Township's notice did not meet statutory requirements and deprived Praxis of due process, thus vesting the Tribunal with jurisdiction.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Township's notice did not violate due process. The Court found that the notice, combined with the separate notice of assessment, provided sufficient information about the appeal process. The Court emphasized that due process requires notice reasonably calculated to inform the taxpayer and provide an opportunity to be heard. Since Praxis received actual notice of the Board's meeting dates and the appeal process, the Court concluded that there was no due process violation.The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment and reinstated the Tax Tribunal's dismissal of Praxis's petition for lack of jurisdiction, as Praxis failed to timely protest the exemption denial before the Board. View "Sixarp LLC v. Township Of Byron" on Justia Law

Sycamore Cross Solar LLC applied for certificates of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) to construct and operate a solar facility in Isle of Wight County and Surry County, Virginia. The project aimed to generate up to 240 megawatts of power and included transmission lines and associated facilities. The West Virginia & Appalachian Laborers’ District Council (WVALDC) participated in the case, arguing that the State Corporation Commission (Commission) failed to consider the benefits to specific groups as required by the Virginia Clean Economy Act (VCEA) and did not impose a local hiring condition.The Commission conducted an evidentiary hearing where Sycamore, WVALDC, and Commission staff presented their cases. Sycamore's witness testified about the project's economic benefits and commitment to local hiring, though no firm commitment was made. The Hearing Examiner recommended issuing the CPCNs without a local hiring condition but suggested notifying WVALDC about hiring timelines. The Commission adopted the Hearing Examiner's findings but declined the notification requirement, leading WVALDC to seek reconsideration.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Court held that the VCEA only required the Commission to consider the benefits to specified groups, not make specific findings. The Commission's consideration of the evidence and its decision not to impose a hiring-related condition were within its discretion. The Court found no abuse of discretion, as the Commission reasonably concluded that the statutory requirements were met without the need for additional hiring conditions. View "WVALDC v. State Corporation Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge by twenty-two states, the District of Columbia, and the Governor of Kentucky against various federal agencies and officials, including the President, regarding the implementation of an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Directive and related Executive Orders. The OMB Directive, issued on January 27, 2025, required federal agencies to pause the disbursement of federal funds to review their alignment with the President's priorities. The plaintiffs argued that this directive and the subsequent funding freezes were unconstitutional and violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island issued a preliminary injunction on March 6, 2025, against the federal agencies, preventing them from implementing the OMB Directive and related Executive Orders. The court found that the rescission of the OMB Directive did not moot the case, as the funding freezes continued. The court determined that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their APA claims, as the agency actions were arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. The court also found that the plaintiffs demonstrated irreparable harm and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the defendants' motion for a stay pending appeal, concluding that the defendants failed to make a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits. The court found that the plaintiffs' challenge was not a broad programmatic attack but targeted discrete final agency actions. The court also determined that the defendants did not demonstrate irreparable harm absent a stay and that the balance of equities and public interest did not favor a stay. View "New York v. Trump" on Justia Law

The case involves the interpretation of the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) in relation to weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers. The GCA mandates that those involved in the import, manufacture, or sale of firearms must obtain federal licenses, keep sales records, conduct background checks, and mark their products with serial numbers. The Act defines a "firearm" to include any weapon that can expel a projectile by explosive action and the frame or receiver of such a weapon. With the rise of weapon parts kits that can be assembled into functional firearms, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) adopted a rule in 2022 to include these kits under the GCA's regulations.The District Court vacated the ATF's rule, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the GCA does not cover weapon parts kits or unfinished frames or receivers. The Fifth Circuit affirmed this decision, holding that the GCA's definition of "firearm" does not extend to weapon parts kits or unfinished frames and receivers, regardless of their completeness or ease of assembly.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision. The Court held that the ATF's rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA. The Court found that some weapon parts kits, like Polymer80's "Buy Build Shoot" kit, qualify as "weapons" under the GCA because they can be readily converted into functional firearms. Additionally, the Court held that the GCA's definition of "frame or receiver" includes some partially complete frames or receivers that can be easily finished using common tools. The Court concluded that the ATF has the authority to regulate these items under the GCA. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Bondi v. Vanderstok" on Justia Law

A Utah-based transportation business, All Resort Group, became insolvent in 2013 due to poor management and financial malfeasance. Two shareholders misappropriated $145,000 in company funds to pay their personal federal tax liabilities. In 2017, the company filed for bankruptcy, and the trustee sought to recover the misappropriated funds under §544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, invoking Utah’s fraudulent-transfer statute as the applicable law.The Bankruptcy Court ruled in favor of the trustee, holding that §106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code waived the Government’s sovereign immunity for the state-law cause of action nested within the §544(b) claim. The District Court adopted this decision, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that §106(a) abolished the Government’s sovereign immunity in an avoidance proceeding under §544(b)(1).The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Tenth Circuit’s decision. The Court held that §106(a)’s sovereign-immunity waiver applies only to the §544(b) claim itself and not to the state-law claims nested within that federal claim. The Court emphasized that waivers of sovereign immunity are jurisdictional and do not create new substantive rights or alter pre-existing ones. The Court concluded that §106(a) does not modify the substantive requirements of §544(b) and that the trustee must still identify an actual creditor who could have voided the transaction under applicable law outside of bankruptcy proceedings. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2023, Basin Authority, a Wyoming Child Support Agency, notified Rodolfo P. Munoz that he was in arrears on his child support obligation and began garnishing his social security. Mr. Munoz filed a complaint against the State of Wyoming, the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS), and some of its employees, as well as Basin Authority and several of its employees. He alleged breach of contract and violations of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed Mr. Munoz’s complaint after a hearing.The district court of Big Horn County granted the motions to dismiss filed by the State Defendants and the Basin Authority Defendants. The court found that Mr. Munoz had not made allegations against the State Defendants and that they were not subject to suit under § 1983 because they are not “persons” within the meaning of the statute. The court also found that a breach of contract claim is not actionable under § 1983 and that the alleged agreement was void and unenforceable. Mr. Munoz’s objection and response to the State Defendants’ proposed order on the motion to dismiss and his motion for reconsideration were denied.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and summarily affirmed the district court’s decision. The court noted that Mr. Munoz failed to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure and did not present cogent arguments supported by pertinent authority. The court emphasized that even pro se litigants must adhere to procedural rules and present coherent arguments. The court concluded that summary affirmance was appropriate due to the deficiencies in Mr. Munoz’s brief and his failure to present relevant legal arguments. View "Munoz v. State of Wyoming" on Justia Law