Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case centers on a dispute between a city and a county sheriff regarding the responsibility for accepting and housing individuals arrested by city police officers for on-sight violations of state law, including misdemeanors, at the county jail. In late 2023, the sheriff implemented a policy refusing to accept arrestees from the city without a warrant issued by a county magistrate, even for offenses committed in the presence of city officers. After discussions, the sheriff temporarily relented, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was executed, allowing the city to transport such arrestees to the county jail. However, this arrangement ended when the sheriff again refused to accept arrestees due to issues with warrant entry procedures and declined to sign a required state form that would have resolved the procedural issue.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the sheriff and the county commission, dismissing the city’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court found the matter moot, reasoning that the MOU had expired, and concluded that the city’s request amounted to seeking an advisory opinion. The court also dismissed a counterclaim by the county commission.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama determined that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of justiciability, finding that a bona fide controversy existed regarding the sheriff’s obligation to accept arrestees without a warrant. However, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment on the pleadings on alternative grounds, holding that no law requires the sheriff to accept arrestees from the city without a warrant, nor is the sheriff required to sign the state form absent a legal obligation. The court concluded that the sheriff and county commission were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "City of Birmingham v. Pettway" on Justia Law

A law firm sought to recover over $1.7 million in fees and costs for representing the Los Angeles County Sheriff, Alex Villanueva, and the Sheriff’s Department in litigation initiated by the County of Los Angeles. Due to a conflict of interest, the County’s Board of Supervisors offered Villanueva independent counsel, allowing him to select his attorney but reserving discretion over compensation. Villanueva chose the law firm, which entered into an engagement agreement with him. The County, however, sent its own retainer agreement to the firm, which the firm refused to sign. The firm continued its representation but was never paid. After the firm demanded arbitration under its engagement agreement, the County and related plaintiffs filed suit seeking a declaration that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed and an injunction against the arbitration.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted a preliminary injunction, then summary judgment for the County plaintiffs, finding the Sheriff lacked authority to enter into the engagement agreement. The court denied the law firm’s post-judgment motion for leave to file a cross-complaint, citing both untimeliness and bad faith. The firm then filed a separate lawsuit against the County and related defendants, asserting breach of contract and related claims. The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer, dismissing the complaint with prejudice on grounds that the claims were compulsory cross-claims in the earlier action and for failure to allege compliance with the Government Claims Act.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed both the judgment in the County’s action and the dismissal of the law firm’s separate lawsuit. The court held that the Sheriff did not have authority to retain counsel on his own; only the Board of Supervisors could contract for legal services. The law firm’s claims were barred as compulsory cross-claims and for failure to comply with the Government Claims Act. View "County of Los Angeles v. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP" on Justia Law

A deputy marshal who worked at the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County received a written reprimand following an internal investigation. The Clark County Deputy Marshals Association, on his behalf, sought a hearing under Nevada statutes that provide procedural protections to peace officers, arguing that deputy marshals are employees of Clark County and thus entitled to such protections. The core dispute centered on whether deputy marshals serving the court are employees of the county or of the court itself.The Nevada Local Government Employee-Management Relations Board determined that deputy marshals are employees of the court, not the county, and therefore not entitled to the protections sought. The appellants then filed a complaint in the district court seeking a declaration that deputy marshals are county employees. All Clark County district judges recused themselves, and the case was assigned to a judge from the Seventh Judicial District Court. That court granted summary judgment to Clark County and the Eighth Judicial District Court, concluding that deputy marshals are employees of the court because their duties are judicial in nature and directly support court operations, rather than general law enforcement functions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that deputy marshals serving at the Eighth Judicial District Court are employees of the court, not Clark County. The Court reasoned that the judiciary has inherent constitutional authority to employ personnel necessary for its functions, including courtroom security and order, and that deputy marshals’ duties are fundamentally judicial. The Court also held that, although deputy marshals have peace officer powers, they are not part of a law enforcement agency and are not entitled to the procedural protections under NRS Chapter 289. The order granting summary judgment for the respondents was affirmed. View "CLARK CNTY. DEPUTY MARSHALS ASS'N. VS. CLARK CNTY." on Justia Law

A 70-year-old woman was the subject of a state petition for involuntary civil commitment, alleging she suffered from a severe mental disorder with manic and psychotic features. Over several months, she had multiple encounters with law enforcement and was charged with various offenses, including assault and disorderly conduct. The petition included a psychiatric evaluation and described significant behavioral changes affecting her safety and relationships. At the initial hearing, the woman was represented by counsel, who stated she did not want a trial and wished to be stabilized, and the court read her rights aloud.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, presided over the hearing. The court relied on the representations of counsel and the woman’s brief affirmations to find that she knowingly and intentionally waived her procedural rights, including the right to contest the commitment. The court then ordered her commitment to the Montana State Hospital for up to 90 days, issuing findings that largely repeated the petition’s allegations. The order stated that the woman and her counsel agreed to waive her rights, but the court did not directly question her about the waiver or develop a record of her understanding.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred by failing to make an adequate inquiry or develop a sufficient record to support a finding that the woman knowingly and intentionally waived her rights, as required by Montana law. The Supreme Court emphasized that merely informing a respondent of their rights or relying on general statements from counsel is insufficient. The order of commitment was reversed, reaffirming the necessity for strict compliance with statutory and due process requirements in involuntary commitment proceedings. View "In re P.G.J." on Justia Law

In this case, the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) submitted a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request to the New York State Office of Court Administration (OCA) after a 2021 internal memorandum discussing a recent court decision was leaked and appeared to have been widely distributed to judges. The NYCLU sought documents created by OCA that provided instructions or guidance to judges on interpreting or applying legal authorities, aiming to understand the scope of OCA’s practice in issuing such memoranda.OCA’s Records Access Officer denied the request, arguing it was overly broad and that any responsive documents were exempt from disclosure as intra-agency materials and protected by attorney-client and work-product privileges. On administrative appeal, OCA maintained these grounds. The NYCLU then initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The Supreme Court, New York County, partially granted the request, finding it sufficiently specific and rejecting the privilege claims. The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed, holding the request was overbroad and, alternatively, that the documents were exempt under attorney-client and work-product privileges. The NYCLU was granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals held that the parties now agree a specific, identifiable set of documents exists that is responsive to the request and can be located by OCA. The Court further held that OCA is not entitled to a blanket attorney-client privilege exemption for all such documents without demonstrating an attorney-client relationship with all Unified Court System judges or reviewing specific documents. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings, including in camera review of any documents over which OCA continues to assert privilege. View "New York Civil Liberties Union v. State Office of Court Administration" on Justia Law

The petitioner submitted a request under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) to the New York City Department of Education (DOE), seeking all emails exchanged between the DOE and a specific domain name over a period from April 2021 to August 2022. The DOE responded that the request did not "reasonably describe" the records because it could not conduct an effective search with reasonable effort, citing technical difficulties in searching its vast email database. The DOE asked the petitioner to narrow the request, but when the petitioner declined, the DOE treated the request as withdrawn.On administrative appeal, the DOE maintained that the request was not reasonably described, as its electronic searches failed to execute due to the large number of email accounts. The petitioner then initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding, seeking a court order for the DOE to provide the requested records. The Supreme Court denied the petition, and the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, holding that the request did not meet the statutory requirement of being "reasonably described" because the DOE could not retrieve the documents through a reasonable electronic search.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the lower courts and the DOE had improperly conflated the requirement that a request "reasonably describe" the records with the separate requirement that an agency retrieve records if it can do so with reasonable effort. The Court clarified that a request is reasonably described if the agency understands what is sought and knows where to look, regardless of the effort required to retrieve it. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remanded the matter to the DOE for a new determination under the correct legal standard, requiring separate consideration of whether the request was reasonably described and whether the records can be retrieved with reasonable effort. View "Wagner v New York City Dept. of Education" on Justia Law

In 1991, the predecessor to the plaintiffs conveyed land to the United States in a land exchange but retained certain water rights that could only be accessed through the conveyed property, now managed by the U.S. Forest Service. The conveyance documents did not mention these water rights or provide any right of access. Over the years, the plaintiffs and their predecessors sought permits from the Forest Service to access and develop the water rights, but the agency repeatedly expressed concerns about environmental impacts and indicated it had the authority to deny access. In 2010, the Forest Service formally opposed the plaintiffs’ efforts to maintain the water rights in state court, asserting it would not grant the necessary land use authorization.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Quiet Title Act (QTA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The court found the QTA claim time-barred by the statute’s twelve-year limitations period, reasoning that the plaintiffs or their predecessors were on notice of the government’s adverse claim well before the suit was filed in 2022. The court also dismissed the DJA claim, holding it was essentially a quiet title claim subject to the same limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that the QTA claim was untimely because, by 2006 at the latest, the Forest Service had asserted exclusive control sufficient to put the plaintiffs on notice of its adverse claim, causing the limitations period to expire before the suit was filed. The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction over two of the plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory relief and that the third, alleging a taking, was not ripe because the plaintiffs had not first sought compensation under the Tucker Act. View "Purgatory Recreation I v. United States" on Justia Law

The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) planned to conduct preconstruction geotechnical work, such as soil and groundwater testing, in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and Suisun Marsh as part of preparations for the Delta tunnel project, which aims to improve water conveyance and environmental protection. Various municipal, tribal, and public interest entities objected, arguing that DWR could not begin this work until it certified that the tunnel project was consistent with the Delta Plan, as required by the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009. The disputed geotechnical work included soil borings, groundwater monitoring, test trenches, and other activities intended to inform the project’s design and mitigation measures.The Superior Court of Sacramento County reviewed several related actions brought by these entities. The plaintiffs sought and obtained preliminary injunctions preventing DWR from conducting the preconstruction geotechnical work until it submitted a certification of consistency with the Delta Plan. The trial court found that the geotechnical work was an integral part of the tunnel project, which was a “covered action” under the Delta Reform Act, and concluded that DWR was required to certify consistency before initiating any part of the project, including the geotechnical work.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s orders. The appellate court held that the Delta Reform Act does not require DWR to submit a certification of consistency before engaging in preconstruction geotechnical work, distinguishing the requirements of the Delta Reform Act from those of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The court found that the geotechnical work was not itself a “covered action” under the Delta Reform Act and that the Act does not incorporate CEQA’s prohibition against “piecemealing.” The case was remanded for the trial court to reconsider the motions for preliminary injunction in light of this holding. View "Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

The case concerns the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), which is responsible for issuing permits for animal waste management systems. In 2019, the DEQ added three new conditions to its general permits for swine, poultry, and cattle operations: requirements for monitoring wells in floodplains, a Phosphorous Loss Assessment Tool analysis with mitigation, and annual reporting. These conditions were not present in the previous 2014 permits but were included in a draft permit as part of a 2018 settlement with environmental groups. The North Carolina Farm Bureau Federation challenged the new conditions, arguing that the DEQ had not followed the rulemaking procedures required by the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) granted summary judgment to the Farm Bureau, finding that the new conditions were “rules” under the APA and thus invalid because they had not been adopted through the required rulemaking process. The Superior Court, Wake County, reversed the OAH, holding that the conditions were not “rules” because they only applied to those who opted for general permits, not all permittees, and thus lacked general applicability. The court also cited legislative history and statutory language to support its conclusion.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court, holding that the conditions were generally applicable regulations and thus “rules” under the APA, requiring formal rulemaking. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the three general permit conditions are “rules” within the meaning of the APA and are invalid until adopted through the APA’s rulemaking process. The court clarified that while general permits themselves need not be adopted as rules, generally applicable conditions within them must be. View "N.C. Dep't of Env't Quality v. N.C. Farm Bureau Fed'n, Inc." on Justia Law

A health care provider operating imaging centers in Wake County, North Carolina, and a major hospital system both applied for a Certificate of Need (CON) to acquire a new fixed MRI scanner, as required by state law. The state’s 2021 plan determined that only one additional scanner could be approved in the county. The provider sought to place the scanner in Wake Forest, while the hospital system proposed a location in Raleigh. After a competitive review, the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services awarded the CON to the hospital system, finding its application more effective under certain comparative factors.The provider challenged this decision in the Office of Administrative Hearings, alleging the agency’s review was flawed and prejudicial. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the agency’s comparative analysis contained errors, deviated from established practices, and was based on subjective judgment rather than expertise or proper procedure. The ALJ reversed the agency’s decision and awarded the CON to the provider, also finding that the provider suffered substantial prejudice from the denial.On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the ALJ’s decision, holding that the appellants failed to challenge specific findings of fact, which made those findings binding on appeal. The court applied the whole record review standard, focusing on whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that, under current law, the ALJ’s final decision—not the agency’s—is the focus of judicial review, and a high degree of deference is owed to the ALJ’s findings. The Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment regarding the comparative analysis but reversed on the issue of substantial prejudice, finding that the provider, as a denied applicant, was inherently prejudiced by the agency’s decision. The award of the CON to the provider was affirmed. View "Pinnacle Health Servs. of N.C. LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs" on Justia Law