Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

An inmate, Edward Brown, filed a mandamus action against Laura Sackett, an employee at the Lake Erie Correctional Institution, for allegedly failing to respond to his public-records requests. Brown requested access to a media report and video footage of an alleged assault against him in March 2022 and a copy of the contract between CoreCivic, Inc. and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) regarding the management of the institution.The lower court initially dismissed Brown's complaint, but upon reconsideration, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued an alternative writ, setting a schedule for evidence and briefs. Sackett responded to Brown's requests by stating that no records of the alleged assault existed and that the contract would require redaction, costing $206.05, including labor costs for redaction. Brown did not pay the fee, and the contract was not provided.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and found that Sackett complied with her duties regarding the February 16 request by asking Brown for more specific information, which he did not provide. Therefore, the court denied the writ of mandamus and statutory damages for this request. However, the court found that Sackett improperly included labor costs in the fee for the contract requested on February 20, as public offices can only charge actual copying costs and postage. The court issued a writ of mandamus ordering Sackett to provide the contract upon Brown's payment of $158.05 for copying and postage. Additionally, the court awarded Brown $1,000 in statutory damages for Sackett's failure to make the contract available at cost and within a reasonable time. Brown's request for court costs was denied due to his indigency affidavit. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Sackett" on Justia Law

Tony Fenstermaker, an inmate at the Southeastern Correctional Institution, requested public records from Union County Prosecuting Attorney David W. Phillips on March 20, 2024. Fenstermaker sought the records-retention schedule of the prosecutor’s office, certified statements prepared under former R.C. 309.161 for the years 2016 through 2022, and the cashbook/journal maintained under R.C. 2335.252 for the same period. Phillips acknowledged receipt of the request on March 22, 2024, but did not provide the requested records until June 28, 2024.Fenstermaker filed a mandamus action on June 10, 2024, seeking to compel Phillips to produce the records and to award statutory damages. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted an alternative writ and referred the case to mediation, which was unsuccessful. The case was returned to the regular docket, and both parties submitted evidence and briefs.The Supreme Court of Ohio found that Phillips had provided the requested records, rendering the mandamus request moot. However, the court determined that Phillips had failed to produce the records within a reasonable period, as the delay exceeded three months without sufficient justification. Consequently, the court awarded Fenstermaker $1,000 in statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) for the delay. The court denied Fenstermaker’s request for prejudgment interest, as the case was not based on tortious conduct and there was no precedent for awarding prejudgment interest in public-records cases. View "State ex rel. Fenstermaker v. Phillips" on Justia Law

In December 2023, Mary McDonald filed a petition to run as a Republican candidate for a seat on the Montgomery County Board of Commissioners. A protest was filed against her candidacy by Mohamed Al-Hamdani and Brenda Blausser, alleging she was not qualified due to her position in the Democratic Party and other statutory non-compliances. During the protest hearing, it was revealed that a confidential legal memorandum from the county prosecutor’s office had been leaked to the protesters. An investigation found that the board’s deputy director, Russell M. Joseph, had forwarded the memo from his board email to his personal email and then to Al-Hamdani.The Montgomery County Board of Elections initially denied a public-records request for emails related to the memo, citing attorney-client privilege and lack of access to the records. After further clarification, the board maintained its position, leading Joseph J. Platt to file an original action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the board to produce the emails and to organize and maintain public records properly.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the email from the prosecutor’s office to the board and the email Joseph sent from his board email to his personal email were public records and not protected by attorney-client privilege. However, the email Joseph sent from his personal email to Al-Hamdani was not considered a public record. The court granted the writ in part, ordering the board to produce the two emails, awarded Platt $1,000 in statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees subject to an itemized application. The court denied the writ regarding the organization and maintenance of records. View "State ex rel. Platt v Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Mark A. Hackel, the Macomb County Executive, filed a lawsuit in 2018 against the Macomb County Board of Commissioners (the Commission) seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus regarding the Commission's authority. The complaint was dismissed, and the dismissal was not appealed. The Commission counterclaimed, seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus to compel Hackel to provide real-time, read-only access to the county’s financial management software, arguing it was necessary for their budgeting duties. Hackel refused the request, despite the Commission including the requirement in annual appropriations ordinances since 2017.The Macomb Circuit Court denied the Commission’s motion for partial summary disposition and granted Hackel’s motion, ruling that the ordinance requiring access unlawfully infringed on Hackel’s authority under the county charter. The court dismissed the remaining claims by stipulation in August 2022. The Commission appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that the ordinance was invalid as it interfered with the county executive’s control over county departments.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Macomb County Charter allows the Commission to require the county executive to provide digital real-time, read-only access to financial information through a validly enacted local ordinance. The Court found that the ordinance did not conflict with other provisions of the county charter or state law and was therefore valid. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hackel v. Macomb County Board Of Commissioners" on Justia Law

A group called Idahoans United for Women and Families filed a petition seeking writs of certiorari and mandamus against the Idaho Division of Financial Management (DFM), the Idaho Attorney General, and the Idaho Secretary of State. The petition concerns the fiscal impact statement (FIS) and ballot titles for a citizen initiative titled the “Reproductive Freedom and Privacy Act.” Idahoans United argued that the FIS and ballot titles did not comply with Idaho law and requested the court to either certify their proposed versions or order the respondents to prepare new compliant versions.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court dismissed the petition against the Secretary of State, finding that Idahoans United failed to properly invoke the court's original jurisdiction against him. However, the court partially granted the writ of mandamus against DFM, concluding that the FIS did not substantially comply with Idaho Code section 34-1812 due to a lack of a reasonable basis for its estimated fiscal impacts, unclear and conflicting statements, and unnecessary legal terms. The court also partially granted the writ of mandamus against the Attorney General, finding that the short ballot title did not substantially comply with Idaho Code section 34-1809 because it failed to capture all distinctive features of the initiative. However, the court found that the long ballot title substantially complied with the statutory requirements.The Idaho Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and ordered DFM to provide a new FIS and the Attorney General to provide a new short ballot title by June 23, 2025. The court denied the request for attorney fees, noting that both parties prevailed in part. View "Idahoans United for Women and Families v. Labrador" on Justia Law

Verizon Wireless sought permits from the City of Milwaukee to install small cells and matching utility poles in a downtown plaza next to a major arena. The City denied most of the permits, initially citing aesthetic concerns and proximity to existing poles. Later, it claimed it lacked authority to grant the permits because the plaza was leased to Deer District LLC. Verizon sued the City, arguing the denials violated the Telecommunications Act (TCA) and Wisconsin state law. The district court ruled in favor of Verizon, finding the City's justifications insufficient and ordered the City to issue the permits. Verizon installed the poles, and the City accepted the ruling.The district court found that the City's initial reasons for denial were not supported by substantial evidence and violated the TCA. It also found the City's later rationale, based on the lease with Deer District, untimely and unconvincing. The court held that the City violated Wisconsin state law as well, and ordered the City to issue the permits. The City complied and did not appeal the decision. Deer District, an intervening defendant, appealed, challenging the district court's interpretation of the lease and state law, but not the TCA holding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Deer District's appeal for lack of Article III standing, as Deer District could not demonstrate that its injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. The court noted that the City did not join the appeal and that the injunction ran exclusively against the City. Therefore, even if the court ruled in Deer District's favor, it would not change the City's obligations under the district court's order. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. View "Cellco Partnership v Deer District LLC" on Justia Law

A student, E.I., attended El Segundo Middle School during the 2017-2018 school year and experienced bullying from classmates, particularly Skylar. Despite E.I. and her parents repeatedly reporting the bullying to school officials, including the principal and counselor, the school failed to take effective action. The bullying included verbal harassment, social media abuse, and physical aggression, which led E.I. to self-harm and develop PTSD and depression. The school’s anti-bullying policies were not adequately followed by the staff.The case was initially reviewed by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, where a jury found the El Segundo Unified School District negligent and awarded E.I. $1 million in damages. The District moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, both of which were denied by the court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The District argued several points on appeal, including errors in allowing reliance on certain Education Code provisions, claims of immunity under Government Code section 820.2, insufficient evidence of causation, improper consideration of a negligent training and supervision theory, admission of expert testimony, and attorney misconduct during closing arguments. The appellate court found that many of the District’s arguments were either waived or lacked merit. The court held that the District was not immune from liability under Government Code section 820.2, as the actions in question were operational rather than policy decisions. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the jury’s causation finding and determined that any potential errors were not prejudicial. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of E.I. View "E.I. v. El Segundo Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

A charter city in California entered into an agreement with a private developer to revitalize a nearly vacant mall into a multipurpose development. The city contributed approximately $51.36 million in local funds for public improvements, while the developer invested $143 million of its own funds and obtained additional loans. The developer selected the contractors and paid workers less than the prevailing wage, relying on a city ordinance exempting the project from the Prevailing Wage Law (PWL).The Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) determined that the project was subject to the PWL, as it involved public funds. The developer challenged this determination, but the Superior Court of Riverside County affirmed the DIR's decision, concluding that the project was not a municipal affair exempt from the PWL.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that the project was not a municipal affair under the home rule provision of the California Constitution. The court distinguished this case from others where charter cities directly managed and funded public works projects. Here, the developer controlled the construction, selected contractors, and bore the majority of the financial burden. The court concluded that the primary purpose of the project was to benefit the developer, not the city, and thus, the PWL applied. The judgment was affirmed, and the DIR was awarded costs on appeal. View "Palm Springs Promenade, LLC v. Dept. of Industrial Relations" on Justia Law

Environmental groups challenged the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) approval of the Willow Project, an oil and gas venture in Alaska's northern Arctic. BLM approved the project in 2023, allowing ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. to construct oil and gas infrastructure in the National Petroleum Reserve. BLM prepared a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) after a 2021 remand by the district court, which required BLM to reassess its alternatives analysis. BLM insisted on a full field development standard to avoid piecemeal development, which led to the exclusion of certain environmentally protective alternatives.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment in favor of BLM, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), the Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act (Reserves Act), and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The district court found that BLM had rectified the errors identified in its 2021 order and that the alternatives analysis satisfied NEPA, the Reserves Act, and ANILCA. The court also held that the plaintiffs had standing but had not shown that the defendants violated the ESA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s decision. The court held that BLM did not abuse its discretion in using the full field development standard to avoid the risks of piecemeal development. However, BLM’s final approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it did not provide a reasoned explanation for potentially deviating from the full field development standard. The court also held that BLM’s assessment of downstream emissions complied with NEPA and that BLM did not act arbitrarily in selecting mitigation measures under the Reserves Act. The court found that BLM complied with ANILCA’s procedural requirements and that the ESA consultation was not arbitrary or capricious. The court remanded the NEPA claim without vacatur, allowing BLM to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision. View "SOVEREIGN INUPIAT FOR A LIVING ARCTIC V. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT" on Justia Law

Anthony Stuart, a Navy veteran, appealed a decision by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) that denied him credit for his military service in computing his civilian retirement annuity. Stuart served in the Navy during three periods between 1974 and 1991 and was placed on the Permanent Disability Retirement List in 1994 with a 60% disability rating. He later entered federal civilian service and retired in 2015. Stuart did not waive his military retired pay to receive credit for his military service toward his Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) annuity.The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) initially decided that Stuart’s military service was not creditable toward his FERS annuity because he was receiving military retired pay. OPM explained that by statute, Stuart could not receive both military retired pay and FERS credit for his military service unless his military retired pay was awarded for specific reasons, which did not apply to him. Stuart sought reconsideration, but OPM affirmed its decision. Stuart then appealed to the MSPB, where an administrative judge upheld OPM’s decision, and the full Board affirmed, modifying the initial decision to clarify the analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the MSPB’s decision. The court held that under 5 U.S.C. § 8411(c)(2), Stuart’s military service could not be credited toward his FERS annuity because he was receiving military retired pay and did not meet any statutory exceptions. The court rejected Stuart’s argument that his military retired pay, calculated based on his disability percentage, was not “based on” his military service. The court found that the statute clearly barred double crediting of military service for both military retired pay and a civilian retirement annuity. View "STUART v. OPM " on Justia Law