Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Russia invaded and subsequently asserted control over Crimea, an area internationally recognized as part of Ukraine. Ukrainian businesses operating in Crimea—including an electricity distributor and a group of petrol station owners—had their assets seized and operations transferred to Russian-controlled entities without compensation. These businesses, having made investments under Ukrainian law and while the 1998 Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the Encouragement and Mutual Protection of Investments (“Investment Treaty”) was in effect, pursued arbitration against Russia for expropriation and treaty violations.The Ukrainian companies initiated separate arbitrations under the Investment Treaty’s arbitration clause. The arbitral tribunals found Russia liable for breaches and awarded significant damages to the companies. Russia challenged the arbitral jurisdiction and the awards in foreign courts, but those efforts were unsuccessful. The companies then filed petitions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce the awards under the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act. Russia moved to dismiss, arguing the courts lacked subject-matter and personal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The District Court rejected Russia’s arguments, finding jurisdiction appropriate under the FSIA’s arbitration exception and personal jurisdiction proper upon valid service.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the District Court correctly exercised jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the FSIA’s arbitration exception applied because the companies established the existence of an arbitration agreement, a qualifying arbitral award, and a treaty potentially governing enforcement. The court further held that foreign states are not entitled to the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections against personal jurisdiction. The judgments of the District Court were affirmed. View "Stabil LLC v. Russian Federation" on Justia Law

A Jordanian business entity entered into an agreement with the Republic of Iraq in 1995 to settle Iraq’s unpaid debt for delivered goods by providing specified quantities of sulfur and urea, valued at $53 million. The agreement contemplated delivery at the Iraq-Jordan border, and although the supplier anticipated reselling these materials in the United States, this downstream transaction was not included in the written agreement. Iraq did not fulfill its obligations under the agreement, leading the supplier to pursue payment through interactions with Iraqi officials, who orally acknowledged the debt and suggested legal action might facilitate payment.After Iraq failed to deliver the goods, the supplier obtained a judgment in its favor from a Jordanian court in 2015 for the full amount. The Jordanian Court of Cassation affirmed the judgment. However, when the supplier sought to enforce the judgment in Jordan, the Jordanian Court of Appeal held that Iraq had not waived its sovereign immunity in the enforcement proceeding, preventing collection. Iraq has not satisfied any part of the judgment.The supplier then initiated an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking recognition of the Jordanian judgment. Iraq moved to dismiss, invoking sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court found that no FSIA exception applied and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding that Iraq had not made an explicit waiver of immunity and that Iraq’s conduct did not cause a direct effect in the United States as required by the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. Thus, the supplier’s claim is barred by Iraq’s sovereign immunity. View "Mohammad Hilmi Nassif & Partners v. Republic of Iraq" on Justia Law

ARcare, Inc., a nonprofit community health center receiving federal funding, suffered a data breach in early 2022 when an unauthorized third party accessed confidential patient information, including names, social security numbers, and medical treatment details. After ARcare notified affected individuals, several patients filed lawsuits alleging that ARcare failed to adequately safeguard their information as required under federal law. Plaintiffs reported fraudulent invoices and that their information was found for sale on the dark web.The actions were removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, where six class actions were consolidated. ARcare sought to invoke absolute immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) of the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (FSHCAA), which provides immunity for damages resulting from the performance of “medical, surgical, dental, or related functions.” ARcare moved to substitute the United States as defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act, arguing the data breach arose from a “related function.” The district court denied the motion, finding that protecting patient information from cyberattacks was not sufficiently linked to the provision of health care to qualify as a “related function” under the statute.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the statutory immunity issue de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of immunity, holding that the FSHCAA’s language does not extend statutory immunity to claims arising from a health center’s data security practices. The court reasoned that “related functions” must be activities closely connected to the provision of health care, and data security is not such a function. Therefore, ARcare is not entitled to substitute the United States as defendant, and the denial of statutory immunity was affirmed. View "Hale v. ARcare, Inc" on Justia Law

A five-month-old child died from an anoxic brain injury after being found with her face against a blanket while in the care of Amanda Cooke, a state-registered childcare provider. Cooke had placed the child for a nap in the basement, an area not approved for sleeping, without a baby monitor or the ability to observe the child by sight or sound. Contrary to safe sleep regulations, a blanket was left in the sleeping area. After the incident, the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) found that Cooke denied the child critical care by failing to provide proper supervision and issued a founded child abuse assessment, which resulted in her placement on the central child abuse registry and revocation of her childcare registration.An administrative law judge initially reversed the agency’s determination regarding denial of critical care, reasoning that Cooke’s conduct should be measured against a generic reasonable and prudent person, not a childcare provider with specialized training. The Director of HHS rejected this and affirmed the agency’s original finding, concluding that the “facts and circumstances” of Cooke being a trained, state-registered provider must be considered. The Iowa District Court for Polk County reversed the agency’s decision, holding that the standard for proper supervision was an objective one and should not account for Cooke’s training or professional status, and remanded the case for reconsideration.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the proper legal standard for adequate supervision under Iowa Code section 232.68(2)(a)(4)(b) includes consideration of the objective circumstances, such as Cooke’s status as a state-registered childcare provider and her duty to follow safe sleep regulations. The Court found that Cooke failed to provide the supervision that a reasonable and prudent person would exercise under similar facts and circumstances, reversed the district court’s order, and reinstated the founded child abuse assessment. View "Cooke v. Iowa Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Several technology companies challenged instructions issued by the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that guided the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) in deciding whether to institute inter partes review (IPR) proceedings. These instructions, known collectively as the NHK-Fintiv instructions, outlined factors for the Board to consider when parallel patent litigation was occurring in district court. The challengers argued that these instructions resulted in too many denials of IPR petitions and were contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and issued without the required notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California initially found all challenges to the PTO’s instructions to be judicially unreviewable. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that while the challenges based on statutory and arbitrary-and-capricious grounds were unreviewable, the claim regarding the lack of notice-and-comment rulemaking could proceed. On remand, the district court determined that the instructions were exempt from notice-and-comment requirements because they were “general statements of policy,” not substantive or legislative rules.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court agreed that the Director’s instructions were general statements of policy exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). It emphasized that there is no statutory right to IPR institution, that the instructions do not bind the Director, and that the Director retains unreviewable discretion to institute or deny IPR. The court found that none of the legal standards or precedents cited by the challengers required a different result, and it affirmed the district court’s judgment rejecting the APA-based challenge. View "APPLE INC. v. SQUIRES " on Justia Law

The respondent was charged with two separate attempted aggravated felonious sexual assaults involving different victims. After being declared incompetent to stand trial, the State dismissed the criminal charges and instead filed civil petitions seeking his commitment as a sexually violent predator under New Hampshire law. The Superior Court held two evidentiary hearings—one in 2023 and one in 2024—to determine whether the State could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent committed the charged acts, and to assess whether his incompetence affected the outcome of these hearings.The Superior Court (Will, J.) ruled that the applicable statute did not require either party to bear the burden of proving whether the respondent’s incompetence affected the outcome of the hearings. The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent committed the acts in both hearings and that his incompetence did not substantially interfere with his ability to assist counsel. After the 2024 hearing, the court alternatively found that even if the respondent’s incompetence had substantially interfered, the State’s evidence was so strong that his limitations could not have had a substantial impact on the proceedings. The respondent appealed these findings, arguing the State should have borne the burden of proof regarding the effect of incompetence.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the appeals. It held that the State bears the burden under RSA 135-E:5, II to prove that a respondent’s incompetence did not substantially impact the outcome of the hearing. The court clarified that the State can satisfy this burden either by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent’s incompetence did not substantially interfere with his ability to assist counsel, or by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the strength of its case was such that the respondent’s limitations could not have substantially impacted the proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated the order from the 2023 hearing and remanded for further proceedings, but it affirmed the order from the 2024 hearing. View "State v. Levier" on Justia Law

A mining company sought to secure water rights in the Dixie Creek-Tenmile Creek basin to support a mining operation. The Nevada State Engineer issued a decision concerning the relinquishment of groundwater rights by the Nevada Division of State Lands (NDSL), which effectively reduced the amount of water available for future appropriation in the basin. The mining company did not hold any established water rights in the basin but had filed several applications for future rights and had objected to NDSL’s filings. The State Engineer did not notify the company of his decision, and the company only learned of it months later through a third party.After learning of the decision, the company petitioned the Fourth Judicial District Court for judicial review, claiming the relinquishment adversely affected its interests and the prospects of its water rights applications. The State Engineer moved to dismiss, arguing that the company lacked standing and that the petition was untimely. The district court agreed, finding that the company was not an aggrieved party under NRS 533.450(1) and had no standing, and also found the petition was untimely.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Supreme Court determined that under NRS 533.450(1), unless a decision is made pursuant to certain enumerated statutes, the party seeking review must have a personal or property right affected by the challenged decision. The mining company had no such existing right; its interest was speculative and based only on pending applications. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the petition for lack of standing and did not reach the issues of timeliness or equitable relief. The holding clarifies that only parties with a personal or property right affected by a State Engineer’s decision may seek judicial review under the relevant statutory provision. View "Gold Standard Ventures (US) Inc. v. Thorson" on Justia Law

A candidate for the Arkansas House of Representatives, District 92, was certified to appear on the Republican primary ballot. Another Arkansas citizen, who did not reside in District 92, sued to have the candidate declared ineligible based on a past guilty plea to a felony public trust crime. The plaintiff sought to prevent election officials from counting or certifying any votes cast for the candidate.The Pulaski County Circuit Court considered the statutory framework that allows any Arkansas citizen to bring an action to enforce eligibility requirements for public office if the responsible prosecuting attorney fails to act. The court found that the prosecuting attorney knew of the candidate’s prior conviction and failed to act, and that the plaintiff, as a citizen, had standing. The court ruled the candidate ineligible to run or hold office and ordered that votes for the candidate not be counted. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and expenses.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court’s findings that the plaintiff had standing, that the prosecuting attorney’s failure to act was sufficient, and that the candidate was ineligible under the plain language of Arkansas’s statutory disqualification provisions for those pleading guilty to public trust crimes, even if records were sealed. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings. On cross-appeal, the Supreme Court held that the statute mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses to a prevailing citizen plaintiff. Thus, it reversed the denial of fees and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. The Supreme Court’s disposition was to affirm on the direct appeal and reverse and remand on the cross-appeal. View "Reed v. Yang" on Justia Law

A field consultant for a public teachers’ union brought a lawsuit after a school board held a closed executive session during a grievance hearing involving a teacher’s transfer and removal of extracurricular duties. The board’s attorney presented the school district’s legal position and rationale in an open meeting before the board entered executive session to receive additional legal advice. The board later voted in public to deny the grievance, and the plaintiff, who was not the aggrieved teacher, claimed the executive session violated North Dakota’s open meetings laws. She sought disclosure of the executive session recording as a remedy. The District Court of Grand Forks County granted summary judgment to the school district, finding no waiver of the right to enter executive session, that the requirements for the attorney consultation exemption were met, and that the plaintiff’s due process rights were not violated by her lack of access to the executive session transcript. The court declined to review the executive session recording, relying instead on declarations from board representatives and the parties’ stipulation that no material facts were in dispute. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the school board did not waive its right to an executive session by publicly stating its legal position and that the statutory requirements for entering executive session were satisfied. The court also found no due process violation from not providing the plaintiff access to the transcript. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by not conducting an in camera review of the executive session recording before granting summary judgment. The judgment of dismissal and the award of costs to the school district were reversed, and the case was remanded for the district court to review the recording and proceed accordingly. View "Haskell v. Grand Forks Public Schools" on Justia Law

An officer employed by the Chesapeake Sheriff’s Office was demoted following an internal-affairs investigation into a jailhouse incident involving deputies under his supervision. After his demotion, the officer requested access to certain internal-affairs records, including documentary and video materials, under both the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) and the Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act (Government Data Act). While his personnel file was provided, his requests for internal-affairs records were denied on grounds that they were exempt from disclosure under the VFOIA and that he lacked standing under the Government Data Act. The officer filed suit in the General District Court against the sheriff in his official capacity, seeking the records. After an adverse decision, he appealed to the Circuit Court, which also denied his claims. The Circuit Court concluded that the internal-affairs records were exempt from disclosure under the VFOIA and that, under the Government Data Act, the officer was not a “data subject” because the records were not indexed or searchable by his name or other identifying particulars. The court also found that these records were not part of his personnel file. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s rulings, agreeing that the officer was not a “data subject” under the Government Data Act and was not entitled to the records under either statute. The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed only the claims under the Government Data Act. The Court held that the sheriff’s office violated the Act by refusing to provide the officer access to internal-affairs records related to his actions or inactions as a supervising deputy, because the statutory definition of “data subject” is not limited to records formally indexed by name but also includes records that may be located using an individual’s name or identifying particulars. The Court affirmed the denial of relief under the VFOIA but reversed as to the Government Data Act and remanded for in camera review and redaction of non-personal information. View "Keil v. O'Sullivan" on Justia Law