Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In December 2020, Raymond Felts' wife was struck and injured by a motor vehicle while walking across North Main Street in Rochester within a painted crosswalk that lacked warning signs or signals. She later died from her injuries. Felts, individually and as executor of his wife's estate, filed a lawsuit in January 2022, alleging negligence and violation of RSA 231:90-:92 by the City of Rochester for failing to design, monitor, and maintain the crosswalk safely, including the absence of warning signs or signals. The City moved to dismiss the claims, arguing limited liability under RSA 231:92 for injuries arising from the construction, maintenance, or repair of public highways.The Superior Court partially granted and denied the City's motion to dismiss. The court ruled that "highway" under RSA 231:92 includes crosswalks but not pedestrian warning signs or signals, thus dismissing the negligence claim related to the crosswalk itself but allowing the claim regarding the City's failure to install warning signs or signals to proceed. The City moved for reconsideration, which was denied, leading to this interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo, focusing on statutory interpretation. The court concluded that "highways" under RSA 231:92 includes pedestrian warning signs, crossing signals, and other traffic controls. The court reasoned that the statutory language and legislative intent support a broad interpretation of "highways" to include these elements, which are integral to the safe use of public roads. Consequently, the court vacated the trial court's ruling that RSA 231:92 does not apply to the plaintiff's claim regarding the City's failure to install pedestrian warning signs and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Felts v. City of Rochester" on Justia Law

J.D., a juvenile defendant, faced multiple charges and challenged his competency to proceed. The juvenile court ordered the Department of Human Services (the "Department") to conduct an in-custody competency evaluation, which found J.D. incompetent but restorable. The court then ordered outpatient restoration services. Subsequently, J.D. was charged with additional delinquent acts, and the court extended its incompetency finding to all cases, ordering the Department to oversee inpatient restoration services and provide periodic status reports.The Department later reassessed J.D.'s competency without a court order and concluded that he had been restored to competency. J.D. moved to strike the Department's report, arguing that the Department lacked the authority to conduct the evaluation without a court order under section 19-2.5-704(2)(c). The juvenile court denied the motion, finding that the Department had the authority to conduct restoration evaluations as part of its responsibility to provide restoration services.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the Department's responsibility to provide restoration services under section 19-2.5-704(2)(b) includes the authority to perform restoration evaluations without a court order. The court concluded that restoration evaluations are part of the "services necessary to competency restoration." Therefore, the juvenile court properly accepted and considered the Department's evaluation in finding J.D. restored to competency. The order to show cause was discharged. View "In re People ex rel. J.D." on Justia Law

An inmate at the Hancock County Jail, Monica J. Johnson, died by suicide after being incarcerated from September 21 to September 29, 2018. Her estate and surviving spouse filed a medical malpractice notice of claim against Hancock County and several county officials and employees, alleging negligence in her care. The County and its employees, along with Jail Housing Officer Kayla Dumond, appealed the Superior Court's denial of their motions for summary judgment.The Superior Court (Penobscot County) denied the motions for summary judgment, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) applied to the defendants and that the defendants had not demonstrated immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the interlocutory appeal.The court concluded that the issue of whether the defendants are "health care providers" under the MHSA is not immediately appealable. Additionally, the court decided to defer to the federal court on the issue of immunity under the MTCA, as the federal court is handling a related case involving the same parties and facts. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, allowing the MHSA screening process to proceed, with the understanding that the federal court will continue with the litigation once the screening process is completed. View "Carney v. Hancock County" on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition in the Wayne Circuit Court to take jurisdiction over a minor, DVL, from the respondent-mother under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or (2). DVL, who had a history of mental illness, was taken to St. John Hospital after attempting to start a fire and threatening suicide. The hospital cleared DVL for discharge without treatment, recommending intensive outpatient services. The respondent refused to pick up DVL, citing safety concerns for her other children and herself. The trial court denied the petition, finding no evidence of neglect or abuse by the respondent, who had made numerous efforts to seek help for DVL.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision in a split unpublished decision, holding that jurisdiction was appropriate under both MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). The majority found that the respondent's actions rendered the home environment dangerous for DVL and her other children, making it statutorily unfit. The respondent sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held that the trial court did not clearly err by refusing to take jurisdiction of DVL under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or (2). The Court found that the respondent was not "able" to provide necessary care and support for DVL at home due to the danger he posed to himself and others. Additionally, the respondent's refusal to take DVL home was not considered neglectful, as she acted as a reasonably prudent person would under the circumstances. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the case to the trial court for reinstatement of its order denying DHHS's petition. View "In Re Lange" on Justia Law

James Stefanski, a former employee of Saginaw County 911 Communications Center Authority, alleged that he was constructively discharged in retaliation for reporting his supervisor's gross negligence. The incident in question involved a 911 call where the supervisor coded the call as "shots fired" instead of "someone shot," resulting in a delayed emergency medical response and the subsequent death of a woman. Stefanski reported his concerns to the director, who dismissed them as a judgment call. Following this, Stefanski experienced increased stress, missed work, and eventually resigned after being suspended for excessive absences, which he believed was a pretext for retaliation.The Saginaw Circuit Court granted summary disposition to the defendant, ruling that reporting gross negligence, a common law violation, was not protected under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA). The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, relying on a precedent that reporting common law violations, such as malpractice, does not fall under the WPA's protections.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the term "law" in the WPA includes the common law. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to determine whether gross negligence is a violation of "a" law under the WPA and whether Stefanski's actions constituted a report under the statute. The Supreme Court emphasized that the WPA should be liberally construed to protect whistleblowers and that excluding common law from its scope would undermine its purpose. View "Stefanski v. Saginaw County 911 Communications Center Authority" on Justia Law

Steven Gomes filed a lawsuit to invalidate ordinances regulating groundwater use in Mendocino, adopted by the Mendocino City Community Services District (the district). The district argued that Gomes’s claims were barred by res judicata due to a prior case, Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist. (2019) (Gomes I), which challenged the district’s groundwater management program. The trial court found the ordinances contained an invalid attorney’s fee provision but rejected Gomes’s other claims.In Gomes I, the trial court denied Gomes’s petition challenging the district’s 2007 groundwater measures, but the judgment was reversed on appeal. The appellate court found the district had authority to limit groundwater extraction and that the 2007 measures were invalid due to non-compliance with statutory procedures. The district subsequently adopted new ordinances in 2020, which Gomes challenged in the present case.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Gomes argued the ordinances imposed fees for groundwater extraction that required voter approval, which the district did not obtain. The court concluded that the claim was not barred by Gomes I, as it involved different ordinances and provisions. The court held that the fees imposed by the district were not for the extraction of groundwater and thus did not require voter approval under section 10710. The judgment was affirmed, except for the invalid attorney’s fee provision. View "Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services Dist." on Justia Law

Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. (SOS) challenged a final order by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) granting the City of Dripping Springs a permit to discharge treated wastewater into Onion Creek. The central issue was the interpretation of TCEQ’s “antidegradation” rules, specifically whether TCEQ should assess water quality degradation by evaluating the water body as a whole or by focusing on numeric changes in individual water-quality parameters. SOS argued for a strict parameter-by-parameter approach, claiming that any significant change in a single parameter, such as dissolved oxygen, should prevent permit approval.The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas upheld the permit’s issuance, finding that TCEQ’s practice of assessing overall water quality conformed to regulatory requirements. The court also rejected SOS’s argument that TCEQ’s final order was invalid for not including a “statement of the underlying facts” supporting its findings.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment. The court held that TCEQ’s whole-body approach to assessing water quality degradation was consistent with the regulatory language, which focuses on overall water quality rather than individual parameters. The court also found that substantial evidence supported TCEQ’s determination that the permitted discharge would not lower Onion Creek’s water quality by more than a de minimis extent. Additionally, the court rejected SOS’s argument that TCEQ’s final order was invalid for lacking specific underlying facts, noting that the order sufficiently informed the parties of the basis for TCEQ’s decision and complied with the relevant statutory requirements. View "Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Jackson, Mississippi's water-related utilities, which faced significant failures. The United States and the State of Mississippi brought enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) against the City for violations, including allowing raw sewage to be discharged into waterways and failing to comply with the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) orders. The district court appointed a federal receiver, Edward Henefin, as interim third-party manager (ITPM) to manage the City's water and sewer systems. Henefin, operating through JXN Water, Inc., developed new utility rates, including a discount for residents receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi ruled that the ITPM's rate-setting activities constituted a federal assistance program under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (FNA), thereby allowing access to SNAP recipient data. The United States and Mississippi opposed this, arguing that such disclosure violated the FNA's privacy protections for SNAP recipients.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ITPM's rate-setting activities did not qualify as a federal assistance program under the FNA. The court emphasized that the term "federal assistance program" implies administration by a federal entity, and the ITPM's authority derived from municipal law, not federal law. The court also noted that the statutory history and context supported a narrow interpretation of "federal assistance program." Consequently, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mississippi v. JXN Water" on Justia Law

Zyla Life Sciences, LLC (Zyla) sells FDA-approved indomethacin suppositories, while Wells Pharma of Houston, LLC (Wells Pharma) sells compounded indomethacin suppositories that are not FDA-approved but are produced in a registered compounding facility. Zyla filed suit against Wells Pharma under the unfair-competition laws of six states, arguing that Wells Pharma's sales violated state laws that mirror the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) by requiring FDA approval for new drugs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted Wells Pharma's motion to dismiss, holding that the state laws were preempted by federal law. Zyla appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Fifth Circuit held that state laws mirroring federal requirements are not preempted by the FDCA. The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in California v. Zook, which established that state laws incorporating federal law do not create a conflict and are not preempted. The court also distinguished this case from Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, noting that Buckman involved state-law claims of fraud on a federal agency, which is a uniquely federal concern, unlike the parallel state regulations at issue here.The Fifth Circuit concluded that the state laws in question do not conflict with the FDCA and do not interfere with federal enforcement discretion. Therefore, the district court's order granting Wells Pharma's motion to dismiss was reversed, Wells Pharma's cross-appeal for attorney's fees was dismissed as moot, and the district court's order denying Zyla's motion for leave to amend was vacated. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Zyla Life Sciences v. Wells Pharma" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Napa Foundation for Options in Education (Napa Foundation) filed a petition with the Napa Valley Unified School District (School District) to establish the Mayacamas Charter Middle School. The School District Board of Education denied the petition, and the Napa Foundation then submitted the petition to the Napa County Board of Education (County Board), which also denied it. The Napa Foundation appealed to the State Board of Education (State Board), which reversed the denials. The School District and the California School Boards Association’s Educational Legal Alliance (Educational Legal Alliance) filed petitions for writs of mandate to set aside the State Board’s decision.The trial court granted the writ petitions, finding that the State Board abused its discretion. The court concluded that the District Board did not provide a fair and impartial hearing process and that the County Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, including the fiscal impact of the proposed charter school on the School District.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the State Board’s determination that the District Board failed to provide a fair and impartial hearing was not supported by substantial evidence. The court also found that the County Board’s written factual findings, which detailed the negative fiscal impact of the proposed charter school, were supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that the State Board’s decision to reverse the County Board’s denial was arbitrary, capricious, and entirely lacking in evidentiary support.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgments, upholding the denials of the charter school petition by the District Board and the County Board. The court emphasized that the State Board failed to properly apply the abuse of discretion standard in its review of the lower boards’ decisions. View "Napa Valley Unified School Dist. v. State Bd. of Education" on Justia Law