Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

James and Lori Marlowe own a home on Highway 378 in Florence County, South Carolina. In 2015, the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) began construction to widen and realign a portion of Highway 378 adjacent to the Marlowes' home. During the construction, the home flooded twice, once in October 2015 and again in October 2016, during major storm events. The Marlowes filed a lawsuit against SCDOT, alleging inverse condemnation, conversion, due process violations, and negligence.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's decision on the negligence claim but reversed on the inverse condemnation claim. The Court of Appeals also held that the Stormwater Management and Sediment Reduction Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. SCDOT petitioned for a writ of certiorari on the inverse condemnation and Stormwater Act issues, which the South Carolina Supreme Court granted.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the Stormwater Act did not immunize SCDOT from liability. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision on the inverse condemnation claim, finding that there was insufficient evidence on the causation issue to allow the claim to proceed. The court held that the evidence, including expert testimony, did not rise above speculation regarding whether the construction of the new roadway caused the flooding of the Marlowes' home. Consequently, the Supreme Court reinstated the grant of summary judgment in favor of SCDOT on the inverse condemnation claim. View "Marlowe v. SC DOT" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) disapproval of State Implementation Plans (SIPs) submitted by Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to address interstate air pollution. The EPA disapproved these SIPs, arguing that they did not meet the requirements of the Good Neighbor Provision, which mandates that states prevent their emissions from significantly contributing to nonattainment or interfering with maintenance of national air quality standards in downwind states.The lower courts had not previously reviewed this case. The case was directly brought to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, where the petitioners sought to vacate the EPA's disapprovals. The petitioners argued that the EPA's actions were arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with the CAA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied the petitions for review from Louisiana and Texas, finding that the EPA's disapprovals were justified based on the states' own data and interpretations of the Good Neighbor Provision. The court concluded that the EPA had reasonably considered the relevant issues and provided adequate explanations for its decisions.However, the court granted the petition for review from Mississippi, vacated the EPA's disapproval of Mississippi's SIP, and remanded the matter to the EPA. The court found that the EPA's disapproval of Mississippi's SIP was arbitrary and capricious because it was based on updated data that was not available to Mississippi at the time of its SIP submission. The court held that the EPA failed to reasonably explain its decision to use this updated data in an outcome-determinative manner. View "Texas v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Glacier County taxpayers, alleged that the County and its Commissioners unlawfully made expenditures or disbursements of public funds or incurred obligations in excess of total appropriations, violating Montana law. The case originated from a 2015 lawsuit by Plaintiff Elaine Mitchell, who claimed the County and State failed to comply with the Single Audit Act and the Local Government Budget Act. An independent audit revealed deficit balances in many county funds, prompting the lawsuit. The plaintiffs sought various forms of relief, including declarations of non-compliance with accounting standards and laws ensuring government financial accountability.The Ninth Judicial District Court granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs on the issue of the County's improper liquidation of a tax protest fund. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to certify Count II as a class action, which the District Court granted, defining the class as property taxpayers of Glacier County who paid taxes from 2012 to 2020. The County appealed the class certification order and the denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of standing.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decisions. The Court held that Plaintiffs had standing, as they alleged concrete economic injuries from the County's actions, such as increased tax obligations and loss of county services. The Court also found that the class met the prerequisites for certification under M. R. Civ. P. 23(a), including numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation. The Court ruled that common questions of law and fact predominated over individual questions, making a class action the superior method for adjudicating the controversy. The class certification was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Gottlob v. DesRosier" on Justia Law

Nicholas Guthneck was hired by Qlarant Integrity Solutions, LLC, a Maryland company working on federally funded contracts, as a health fraud investigator in September 2020. He worked remotely from Montana. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, President Biden issued Executive Order 14042 in September 2021, mandating that federal contractors ensure their employees were vaccinated against COVID-19. Qlarant implemented a vaccination policy in October 2021, requiring employees to submit proof of vaccination by November 24, 2021. Guthneck refused to disclose his vaccination status, citing Montana law (House Bill 702, codified as § 49-2-312, MCA), which prohibits employment discrimination based on vaccination status. Consequently, Qlarant terminated his employment on November 4, 2021.Guthneck filed a discrimination complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau (HRB), which found reasonable cause to support his claim. The case was set for a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). Qlarant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Executive Order 14042 preempted Montana law. The OAH hearing officer agreed and dismissed the complaint. Guthneck appealed to the Montana Human Rights Commission (HRC), which vacated the dismissal, stating that the hearing officer lacked authority to determine preemption.Qlarant sought judicial review in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County. The District Court reversed the HRC's decision, ruling that the hearing officer had the authority to determine preemption and correctly found that Executive Order 14042 preempted § 49-2-312, MCA. Guthneck appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that the OAH hearing officer had the authority to determine whether Executive Order 14042 preempted Montana law, as it involved statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional question. The Court also held that Executive Order 14042 expressly preempted § 49-2-312, MCA, for federal contractors like Qlarant during the relevant period. Thus, Qlarant was required to comply with the federal mandate, and Guthneck's termination for refusing to disclose his vaccination status was lawful. View "Qlarant v Guthneck" on Justia Law

Several plaintiffs, including United States Sugar Corporation, Okeelanta Corporation, and Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida, challenged the United States Army Corps of Engineers' approval of the Everglades Agricultural Area Project (EAA Project). The plaintiffs argued that the Corps violated the Administrative Procedure Act by using the wrong water supply baseline in its Savings Clause analysis and by failing to conduct a separate analysis for the standalone operation of the storm water treatment area (STA). They also claimed that the Corps violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by not evaluating the effects of the standalone STA operation in its Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).The Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the Corps. The district court held that the Corps did not violate the Savings Clause by using the LORS 2008 baseline instead of the year 2000 baseline, as the water supply loss reflected in LORS 2008 was due to structural integrity issues with the Herbert Hoover Dike, not an implementation of the Plan. The court also found that the Corps' decision to use LORS 2008 was reasonable and that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the plaintiffs' first claim, agreeing that the Corps did not violate the Savings Clause. The court also affirmed the district court's decision on the plaintiffs' third claim, holding that the Corps did not violate NEPA by failing to include the standalone STA operation in its EIS, as the standalone STA had independent utility and could be evaluated in a supplemental EIS.However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the plaintiffs' second claim, finding that it was not ripe for review because the Corps had not made a final decision authorizing the standalone operation of the STA. The court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the second claim for lack of finality and ripeness. View "United States Sugar Corp. v. Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor of Kentucky issued orders prohibiting mass gatherings, including religious services, and closing non-life-sustaining organizations, which included religious organizations. Maryville Baptist Church held an Easter service in defiance of these orders, leading to a lawsuit against the Governor, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky initially declined to issue a preliminary injunction. However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a partial stay, allowing outdoor worship. Subsequently, the district court granted a preliminary injunction, permitting both indoor and outdoor worship. The Governor later allowed places of worship to reopen, and the Kentucky General Assembly limited the Governor's authority to issue similar orders in the future. The underlying action was dismissed as moot, and the Church sought attorney’s fees, which the district court denied, ruling that the Church did not prevail.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court referenced the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lackey v. Stinnie, which held that a party who receives a preliminary injunction but whose case becomes moot before a final judgment does not qualify as a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Applying this precedent, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of attorney’s fees, concluding that the Church's preliminary injunction did not constitute enduring judicial relief that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties. View "Maryville Baptist Church v. Beshear" on Justia Law

Two companies, Dine Brands Global, Inc. and The Walt Disney Company, filed separate lawsuits against the Michigan State Treasurer, Rachael Eubanks, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (UUPA). The Treasurer had initiated multistate examinations of the companies' records to check compliance with the UUPA's reporting and remittance requirements. The examinations, conducted by Kelmar Associates, LLC, identified unclaimed property dating back to 2002. The companies disputed the findings and argued that the statute of limitations barred the Treasurer from collecting the identified property.The Oakland Circuit Court granted summary disposition in favor of the companies, ruling that the examinations were not "actions or proceedings" under the UUPA and did not toll the statute of limitations. The court enjoined the Treasurer from enforcing the collection of the disputed property. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgments, agreeing that the examinations did not toll the statute of limitations.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the phrase "action or proceeding" in the UUPA includes both formal lawsuits and administrative procedures like examinations. However, the Court also held that the commencement of an examination does not toll the statute of limitations. The Court noted that the statute of limitations continues to run during an examination and that the Treasurer must initiate an examination within the applicable time frame.The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decisions that excluded examinations from the definition of "action or proceeding." The Court remanded the cases to the Court of Appeals to determine whether a holder's duty to comply with the results of an examination is distinct from the annual duty to report and remit unclaimed property, which would affect the statute of limitations for post-examination enforcement actions. View "Dine Brands Global Inc v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

Alison Mayfield, who is deaf and communicates primarily through American Sign Language (ASL), was pulled over by officers from the City of Mesa’s Police Department (MPD) for suspected reckless driving. During the traffic stop and subsequent DUI processing, Mayfield requested an ASL interpreter but was not provided one. Instead, officers used a combination of written notes, lip-reading, and gestures to communicate with her. Mayfield was ultimately charged with DUI but pleaded guilty to reckless driving.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed Mayfield’s claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), holding that her claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey and that she failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Mayfield appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Mayfield’s ADA and RA claims were not barred by Heck v. Humphrey because a ruling in her favor would not necessarily imply the invalidity of her reckless driving conviction. The court found that the district court erred in considering the original DUI charges rather than the ultimate conviction for reckless driving and that the City of Mesa had not met its burden to establish the applicability of the Heck bar.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the relevant question was whether the means of communication used by the officers were sufficient to allow Mayfield to effectively exchange information during the stop and arrest. The court concluded that Mayfield failed to plead sufficient facts to establish that MPD discriminated against her by not providing a reasonable accommodation. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Mayfield’s complaint without leave to amend, as amendment would be futile. View "MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA" on Justia Law

Two minor sisters suffered severe harm while in the custody of the Department of Children and Families (DCF). In August 2015, the older sister, then twenty-two months old, manipulated a thermostat dial from her crib, causing the bedroom to overheat. This incident led to her permanent impairment and the death of another foster child. A lawsuit was filed in the Superior Court against several defendants, including four DCF employees, alleging that their failure to fulfill their duties caused the children's harm.The Superior Court denied the employees' motion for summary judgment, which argued they were entitled to qualified immunity. The employees appealed under the doctrine of present execution, and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case on its own motion.The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the DCF employees did not violate the children's substantive due process rights, as their conduct was not the proximate cause of the harm suffered. The court held that the employees' omissions, such as failing to conduct more frequent home visits or investigate the presence of a potentially dangerous individual in the foster home, did not foreseeably lead to the children's injuries. Therefore, the employees were entitled to qualified immunity, and the Superior Court's denial of summary judgment was reversed. View "Gotay v. Creen" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between several states and the U.S. Department of Education regarding the termination of grants for Teacher Quality Partnership (TQP) and Supporting Effective Educator Development (SEED) programs. The Department sent letters to 104 out of 109 grant recipients, stating that their grants were terminated due to involvement in diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives or other reasons that allegedly conflicted with Department priorities.The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring the Department to restore the status quo and continue funding the grants. The Department appealed the TRO and requested a stay pending the resolution of the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the Department's motion for a stay. The court found that the Department's termination letters lacked specific reasons for the terminations, making it difficult for the recipients and the court to understand the basis for the decision. The court also noted that the Department had not filed an administrative record, which is necessary for judicial review.The court determined that the Department's actions were likely arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the termination letters did not provide a clear explanation and failed to consider the reliance interests of the grant recipients. The court also found that the Department had not demonstrated irreparable harm that would result from the TRO, while the grant recipients would suffer significant harm if the funding was cut off.The First Circuit denied the Department's motion for a stay pending appeal, allowing the TRO to remain in effect. The court emphasized the importance of the Department providing a reasoned explanation for its actions and considering the impact on the grant recipients. View "State of California v. US Department of Education" on Justia Law