Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In June 2015, Appalachian Materials submitted an application to the Ashe County Director of Planning for a permit to build an asphalt plant under the Polluting Industries Development Ordinance (PID Ordinance). The application included aerial images, topographical maps, a marked floorplan, and a pending state air quality permit application. The Planning Director initially indicated the application met the ordinance's requirements but could not issue a permit until the state permit was received. Public opposition led to a temporary moratorium on polluting industries in October 2015. Appalachian Materials received the state permit in February 2016, but the Planning Director denied the application in April 2016, citing proximity to commercial and residential buildings and other issues.The Ashe County Planning Board reversed the Planning Director's decision, finding the application was complete and met the PID Ordinance requirements. The Board determined the mobile shed and barn near the proposed site were not commercial buildings and that there were no material misrepresentations in the application. The superior court affirmed the Board's decision.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Board's decision, holding the application was not complete until the state permit was received, thus falling under the moratorium. The court also found the mobile shed and barn were commercial buildings, and the application did not meet the setback requirements.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals, holding the application was complete when initially submitted in June 2015, triggering the Permit Choice statutes. The court found the mobile shed and barn were not commercial buildings under the PID Ordinance and upheld the Board's determination that there were no material misrepresentations. The court directed the Board to issue the permit under the PID Ordinance. View "Ashe County v. Ashe Cnty. Plan. Bd" on Justia Law

A fourteen-year-old boy, Tanner Smith, was vaccinated against COVID-19 at his school clinic without his or his mother Emily Happel's consent. The school clinic, operated in partnership with Old North State Medical Society (ONSMS), administered the vaccine despite lacking the required parental consent. Plaintiffs, Smith and Happel, sued the Guilford County Board of Education and ONSMS for battery and violations of their state constitutional rights.The Superior Court of Guilford County dismissed the case, agreeing with the defendants that the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act preempted the plaintiffs' state law claims, granting them immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that the PREP Act's broad immunity shielded the defendants from liability for all of the plaintiffs' claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the PREP Act's immunity only covers tort injuries and does not bar state constitutional claims. The court concluded that the PREP Act does not preempt claims brought under the state constitution, specifically those related to the right to control a child's upbringing and the right to bodily integrity. The court affirmed the dismissal of the battery claim but reversed the dismissal of the state constitutional claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Happel v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

During the Fall 2020 semester, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, North Carolina State University (NCSU) and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) transitioned to online classes and closed their campuses. Students, including the plaintiffs, sought refunds for mandatory fees and parking permits paid for services and facilities they could no longer access. The Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina moved to dismiss the lawsuit, citing sovereign immunity, which generally protects the State and its agencies from being sued.The Superior Court of Wake County denied the motion to dismiss the breach of contract claims but dismissed the constitutional claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that sovereign immunity does not apply to valid contract claims against the State. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that implied contracts existed between them and the universities for the provision of services and facilities funded by the fees.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals that sovereign immunity does not bar the breach of contract claims at this stage. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the plaintiffs had alleged the existence of express contracts, not implied ones. The court held that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged that the universities made offers to provide specific services and facilities in exchange for mandatory fees, which the plaintiffs accepted by paying those fees. Therefore, the court modified and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, allowing the breach of contract claims to proceed. View "Lannan v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Harvey in 2017, the City of Houston amended its ordinances to increase elevation requirements for construction in floodplains. A developer, The Commons of Lake Houston, Ltd., sued the City, claiming the amendments caused a regulatory taking of its property under the Texas Constitution. The developer argued that the new requirements rendered a significant portion of its property undevelopable, leading to financial losses.The trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed and dismissed the case. The appellate court held that the developer could not establish a valid takings claim because the City amended the ordinance as a valid exercise of its police power and to comply with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) criteria.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the appellate court's reasoning. The Court held that a regulation could cause a compensable taking even if it results from a valid exercise of the government’s police power or is designed to comply with the NFIP. The Court also found that the developer’s claim was ripe for adjudication, as the City had effectively made it clear that the developer could not obtain the necessary permits under the new ordinance. Additionally, the Court determined that the developer had standing to assert its claim, as it possessed a vested interest in the property affected by the ordinance.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether the amended ordinance caused a compensable taking under the Texas Constitution. View "THE COMMONS OF LAKE HOUSTON, LTD. v. CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS" on Justia Law

Texas Game Warden Dustin Delgado arrested Joshua McClain for driving while intoxicated after observing his truck swerve and conducting field sobriety tests. McClain later sued Delgado for false arrest. The district court denied Delgado qualified immunity. However, because McClain did not carry his burden to show Delgado violated his constitutional rights, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially reviewed the case. Delgado moved for summary judgment on both the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, arguing that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion for the malicious prosecution claim but denied it for the false arrest claim. Delgado appealed the denial of qualified immunity for the false arrest claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Delgado had reasonable suspicion to stop McClain based on his swerving and probable cause to arrest him after observing clues of intoxication during field sobriety tests. The court found that McClain did not establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Delgado's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's denial of Delgado's motion for summary judgment, granting Delgado qualified immunity. View "McClain v. Delgado" on Justia Law

Three Coast Guard servicemembers, Eric Jackson, Alaric Stone, and Michael Marcenelle, objected to a COVID-19 vaccination mandate issued by the Coast Guard, which operates under the Department of Homeland Security. Their requests for religious accommodations were denied, and they faced reprimands for refusing the vaccination. They filed a class action lawsuit against the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Assistant Commandant for Human Resources, alleging violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the case as moot after the Department of Defense rescinded its vaccination mandate, and the Coast Guard followed suit. The Plaintiffs' motion for relief from final judgment was also denied, leading to their appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal de novo. The appellate court found that the case was not moot because the Coast Guard had not issued policies protecting unvaccinated servicemembers from discrimination, unlike the Navy, which had implemented such protections. The court noted that the Plaintiffs could still face adverse actions based on their vaccination status and that a court order could provide effective relief. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Noem" on Justia Law

McKenzie County, North Dakota, sued the United States and the Department of the Interior, claiming ownership of mineral royalties under certain lands. The County argued that previous litigation had settled the matter in its favor. The United States contended that the prior litigation involved different lands and that the County’s claim was untimely. The district court ruled in favor of the County, and the United States appealed.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota had previously granted judgment for the County, concluding that the 1930’s Condemnation Judgments and a 1991 Judgment quieted title to the disputed minerals in favor of the County. The district court held that the County’s claim was not barred by the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations and that the All Writs Act and Rule 70 empowered it to enforce its prior judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the All Writs Act could not be used to circumvent the Quiet Title Act’s requirements. The court determined that the 1991 Judgment did not include the tracts listed in the 2019 Complaint and that the County’s claim under the Quiet Title Act was untimely. The court concluded that the County knew or should have known of the United States’ adverse claim to the mineral royalties by December 2003, thus triggering the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations. The Eighth Circuit instructed the district court to enter judgment in favor of the United States. View "McKenzie County, ND v. United States" on Justia Law

The petitioner, owner of an apartment building in Manhattan, filed an application with the Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) in 2019 to amend its 2016 and 2017 annual registration statements. The petitioner claimed that the registrations erroneously stated that unit 1B was temporarily exempt from rent stabilization due to owner/employee occupancy, while it should have been permanently exempt due to a high rent vacancy in 2002. The petitioner sought to withdraw the erroneous registrations and submit new ones removing unit 1B from the total of rent-stabilized units.The Rent Administrator denied the application, stating that registration amendments could only correct ministerial issues, not substantive changes like recalculating rental history or removing an apartment from rent-stabilized status. The Deputy Commissioner of DHCR upheld this decision, agreeing that the requested amendments went beyond the scope of an amendment application proceeding. The petitioner then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul DHCR's determination.The Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, reasoning that DHCR rationally determined the requested correction was substantive rather than ministerial. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, noting that DHCR's interpretation of the Rent Stabilization Code (RSC) as precluding the requested amendments was rational and reasonable.The Court of Appeals of New York reviewed the case and held that DHCR's interpretation of the RSC, which limits amendments to ministerial issues, was entitled to substantial deference. The court found that DHCR's decision to deny the petitioner's application was rational, as it aimed to protect tenants from fraud, preserve agency resources, and ensure rent stabilization disputes were litigated in the proper forum. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed, with costs. View "Matter of LL 410 E. 78th St. LLC v Division of Hous. & Community Renewal" on Justia Law

Several applicants sought licenses to operate video gaming terminals under Pennsylvania's Video Gaming Act, which requires applicants to demonstrate "good character, honesty, and integrity." The Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board denied the applications of Todd Teitelbaum, Michael Brozzetti, and Frank Brozzetti, citing their involvement in the skill games industry, which the Board viewed as unregulated and problematic. The Board's decision was based on general criticisms of the skill games industry, including the lack of regulatory safeguards and the economic impact on casinos and the lottery.The Commonwealth Court reviewed the Board's decision and reversed it, finding that the Board's rationale was insufficient. The court noted that the Board's decision relied solely on generalizations about the skill games industry and did not provide specific evidence regarding the applicants' personal character, honesty, or integrity. The court highlighted the absence of any criminal convictions, tax evasion, connections to organized crime, or other nefarious conduct by the applicants. The Commonwealth Court concluded that the Board's decision was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and agreed with the Commonwealth Court that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious. The Supreme Court noted that the Board failed to provide specific evidence regarding the applicants' personal qualities and relied solely on general criticisms of the skill games industry. However, the Supreme Court vacated the Commonwealth Court's order to issue the licenses, remanding the case to the Board for further consideration of the applications without directing any particular outcome. The Supreme Court emphasized that the Board's discretion is not absolute and must be based on reason and specific evidence related to the applicants. View "Brozzetti v. PGCB" on Justia Law

Jason Earlywine was employed as a teacher by the Board of Education of Paris Independent School District (BEP) from August 2007 to June 2019. In 2011, a student accused him of inappropriate conduct, leading to his placement on paid administrative leave, which was later changed to unpaid leave. He faced a criminal charge of Sexual Abuse in the First Degree, but the trial court granted him a directed verdict in January 2015, and the charge was expunged. Earlywine was reinstated in February 2015 but was terminated in 2019 for unspecified reasons. In 2020, he sued BEP to recover lost wages during his unpaid leave.The Bourbon Circuit Court initially handled the case, determining that BEP was within the waiver of immunity under KRS 45A.245(1) but transferred the case to Franklin Circuit Court due to venue appropriateness. BEP appealed, arguing governmental immunity and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals ruled that BEP's immunity was waived under KRS 45A.245(1) but concluded that Earlywine's failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case, affirming that BEP is subject to the waiver of immunity under KRS 45A.245(1). However, it reversed the Court of Appeals' conclusion regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies, stating that this issue is subject to exceptions and should not have been addressed on interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court remanded the case to Franklin Circuit Court for further proceedings, allowing Earlywine to argue any applicable exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. View "BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PARIS, KENTUCKY V. EARLYWINE" on Justia Law