Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

John Fanning founded Jerk LLC (Jerk) and Jerk.com in 2009. From 2009 to 2014, Jerk operated Jerk.com. In 2014, the Federal Trade Commission (Commission) filed an administrative complaint charging Jerk and Fanning with engaging in deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Commission entered a summary decision finding Fanning personally liable for misrepresentations contained on Jerk.com. Fanning petitioned for review. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the Commission’s finding of liability and the recordkeeping provisions and order acknowledgement requirement of the Commission’s remedial order; but (2) vacated Fanning’s compliance monitoring provisions, holding that these provisions were overbroad and not reasonably related to Fanning’s violation. View "Fanning v. Fed. Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

When Carlo Gimenez Bianco (Gimenez) refused to remove his emotional support dog from his condominium unit in violation of the Castillo Condominium Association’s “no pets” bylaw, the Association forced Gimenez to vacate and sell the unit. Gimenez brought a complaint of disability discrimination with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which filed a charge of discrimination against the Association. An administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a recommended decision concluding that the Association had not violated the Fair Housing Act. The Secretary of HUD set aside the ALJ’s recommended decision and found the Association liable for discrimination. On remand, the ALJ issued a recommended decision proposing to award Gimenez $3,000 in emotional distress damages and assessed a $2,000 civil penalty against the Association. The Secretary increased the proposed award of emotional distress damages to $20,000 and increased the civil penalty to $16,000. The First Circuit denied the Association’s petition for review and granted the Secretary’s cross-petition for enforcement of his order, holding (1) the Secretary’s final order was supported by substantial evidence in the record; (2) the ALJ did not err in refusing to apply res judicata to pretermit Gimenez’s HUD charge; and (3) the Secretary’s final order was not tainted by procedural error. View "Castillo Condo. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Colombia, sought to register permanent residence or adjust status. In support of his application, he submitted evidence, including a visa and Form I-94, that he was legally admitted to the United States when he was thirteen years old. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied his application on the basis that the documents were fraudulent. Petitioner was then placed in removal proceedings. Emphasizing his young age at the time of his alleged admission, Petitioner asserted that he did not know that his documents were fraudulent. An immigration judge (IJ) determined that Petitioner had failed to establish that he was lawfully present in the United States following a prior admission. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) the courts below did not err in their determinations that Petitioner’s testimony before the IJ was not credible; and (2) the BIA did not err by summarily affirming the IJ’s decision to give no weight to Petitioner’s favorable polygraph test. View "Acosta v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras who entered the United States illegally, conceded removability but requested cancellation of removal. An immigration judge held that Petitioner was not eligible for cancellation of removal because he had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his Maine assault conviction was not a “crime of domestic violence.” The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit initially denied Petitioner’s petition for review. Petitioner then petitioned for rehearing, presenting a developed argument based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Moncrieffe v. Holder. The First Circuit granted the petition, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded, holding that Moncrieffe controls in this case and that, in accordance with Moncrieffe, Petitioner was not convicted of a “crime of violence.” View "Sauceda v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1994, Petitioner crossed the U.S.-Mexican border in violation of United States law. The day after he entered the country, Petitioner was served an Order to Show Cause charging him as being deportable. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Petitioner deportable. Petitioner later filed a second motion to reopen the deportation proceedings. The motion was granted. In 2014, Petitioner applied for suspension of deportation and voluntary departure, arguing that he was eligible for suspension of deportation because the law in effect in 1994 required a noncitizen to be continuously physically present in the United States for seven years before applying for suspension of deportation and that he easily met this requirement. An IJ concluded that the so-called “stop-time” rule applied retroactively to Petitioner because his deportation proceedings remained pending on the date the stop-time rule went into effect and that the stop-time rule cut off Petitioner’s physical presence after one day, rendering him ineligible for suspension of deportation. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA’s interpretation of the stop-time rule was reasonable and that the BIA properly applied the stop-time rule to Petitioner. View "Santos-Quiroa v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Pakistan, was ordered removed in 2002. After Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider, which the BIA rejected. More than a decade later, Petitioner filed a second motion to reconsider. The BIA denied that motion as well. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s second motion to reconsider, holding that the BIA did not err in concluding that the circumstances of Petitioner’s case were not sufficiently extraordinary to warrant an equitable exception to the time and number bars applicable to Petitioner’s motion. View "Omar v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, entered the United States without inspection. Petitioner was issued a notice to appear and conceded removability but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT, concluding (1) Petitioner failed to carry his burden to show either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, and (2) Petitioner had not established that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured upon his return to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not err in finding that Petitioner failed to establish either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Chen v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Elena Granada-Rubio and two of her sons illegally entered the United States. Granada-Rubio applied for asylum for herself and her two sons, as well as withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Granada-Rubio’s application for relief and ordered her and her sons removed to El Salvador. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Granada-Rubio’s petition for review, holding (1) the IJ and the BIA were warranted in finding that Granada-Rubio had not been persecuted based on her membership in a legally cognizable particular social group; (2) because Granada-Rubio did not qualify for asylum, she also did not qualify for withholding of removal; and (3) Granada-Rubio’s claim for protection under the CAT failed as well. View "Granada-Rubio v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1996, Petitioner, a citizen and native of the Dominican Republic, obtained permanent resident status after marrying an American citizen. In 2008, Petitioner and his wife divorced. In 2011, Petitioner was served with a notice to appear. Petitioner sought relief from removal in the form of an adjustment of status from conditional permanent resident to permanent resident. In addition, Petitioner asked for a waiver of the usual requirement to present his status-change request jointly with his spouse. The Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered Petitioner removed, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish that he had entered into his marriage in good faith. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s decision in its entirety. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA concluding that Petitioner failed to carry his burden of proof that he married in good faith. View "Valdez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

M&K Engineering, Inc. filed an I-140 Immigration Petition for Alien Worker for its employee. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) initially approved the visa petition. The Director of the USCIS Texas Service Center subsequently revoked the approval of the visa petition. M&K’s owner Henry Bernardo administratively appealed the revocation decision. The USCIS Administrative Appeals Office affirmed the decision and dismissed the appeal. Bernardo, as owner of M&K, then filed a complaint in the Massachusetts federal district court challenging the revocation of the visa petition approval. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that 8 U.S.C. 1252(1)(2)(B)(ii), which bars judicial review of the Attorney General’s and the Secretary of Homeland Security’s discretionary decisions under Title 8, Chapter 12, Subchapter II, applies to the revocation of visa petition approvals under 8 U.S.C. 1155. View "Bernardo v. Johnson" on Justia Law