Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2019, Nestle Purina Petcare Company sought to switch its electric supplier for its facility in Hartwell, Georgia, from Georgia Power Company to Walton Electric Membership Corporation. Georgia Power objected, citing the Territorial Electric Service Act, arguing that the premises were not new and did not meet the requirements to switch suppliers. Georgia Power contended that the premises had long been a manufacturing and warehousing facility and that the changes made by Nestle did not amount to the premises being "destroyed or dismantled" as required by the Act.The Georgia Public Service Commission (the "Commission") ruled in favor of Nestle, concluding that the premises were "destroyed or dismantled" and not "reconstructed in substantial kind," allowing Nestle to switch to Walton EMC. The superior court reversed this decision, finding that the premises were not "destroyed or dismantled" and that the modifications did not meet the statutory requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's decision.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the appropriate standard of review was abuse of discretion. The Court determined that the Commission's decision should have been upheld. The Court held that "destroyed or dismantled" does not require complete destruction but can include substantial dismantling or stripping away of significant components. The Court also found that the premises were not "reconstructed in substantial kind" due to the significant differences in structure and function between the old and new facilities. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, allowing Nestle to switch its electric supplier to Walton EMC. View "WALTON ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY" on Justia Law

In 2022, the Georgia General Assembly enacted House Bill 839 (HB 839), which incorporated the City of Mableton within unincorporated Cobb County and provided for the creation of one or more community improvement districts (CIDs) within Mableton. Deidre White and other residents of Cobb County challenged the constitutionality of HB 839, arguing that it violated the "Single Subject Rule" of the Georgia Constitution by creating more than one unit of government, specifically Mableton and the CIDs.The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court found that HB 839 did not violate the Single Subject Rule, as the creation of CIDs within Mableton was germane to the overall objective of incorporating the city. The Appellants then appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's dismissal. The court held that HB 839 did not violate the Single Subject Rule because the creation of CIDs within Mableton had a logical and natural connection to the incorporation of the city. The court also rejected the argument that the ballot question for HB 839 contravened the precedent set in Rea v. City of LaFayette, as the creation of CIDs was related to the single objective of establishing Mableton. Thus, the court concluded that HB 839 was constitutional and upheld the trial court's decision. View "WHITE v. CITY OF MABLETON" on Justia Law

Appellant A. Thomas Jones challenged the City of Atlanta's imposition of charges through two ordinances, arguing that these charges, levied on the Department of Watershed Management (DWM) customers, are unlawful taxes. The ordinances in question impose a franchise fee on DWM's gross revenue and a payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) on DWM's real property, with the collected sums deposited into the City's General Fund. Jones contended that these charges exceed the costs they purportedly cover and are instead used to generate general revenue, violating various constitutional and statutory provisions.The trial court initially dismissed Jones's suit on procedural grounds, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision in part. Upon remand, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings, and Jones filed motions for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted the City's motion and denied Jones's motions, leading to this appeal. Jones argued that the trial court erred in its application of the standard of review and in its conclusions regarding the nature of the charges.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in granting the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court held that the trial court failed to treat Jones's allegations as true, particularly his claims that he paid the disputed charges, that the revenue generated from these charges grossly exceeded the associated costs, and that these costs were covered by other transfers from DWM to the City's General Fund. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case for further proceedings.However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Jones's motions for partial summary judgment. The Court concluded that Jones failed to demonstrate the absence of genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the charges were taxes or fees and whether the revenue generated exceeded the associated costs. The case was remanded for reconsideration of Jones's claims under the proper standard of review. View "Jones v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

Jarrod Miller, a resident of Athens-Clarke County, filed a complaint against Deborah Gonzalez, the District Attorney for the Western Judicial Circuit, alleging violations of the Open Records Act (ORA). Miller claimed that Gonzalez, in her official capacity as district attorney and custodian of public records, failed to produce requested public records related to the district attorney’s office. Gonzalez argued that neither she nor her office is subject to the ORA because district attorneys are constitutional officers of the judicial branch. She also contended that Miller lacked standing to bring the enforcement action and that prosecutorial immunity barred the suit.The Superior Court of Clarke County denied Gonzalez’s motion to dismiss Miller’s complaint. The court rejected Gonzalez’s argument that district attorneys are judicial officers exempt from the ORA, concluding that district attorneys perform executive functions. The court also found that Miller had standing to bring the enforcement action and that prosecutorial immunity did not bar Miller’s claims. Gonzalez then sought an interlocutory appeal, which was granted.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the ORA applies to district attorneys’ offices, as they are considered “offices” under the statute. The court also determined that district attorneys exercise executive power, not judicial power, and thus are subject to the ORA. Additionally, the court found that Miller had standing to sue because he directed his attorney to make the records requests on his behalf. The court further held that prosecutorial immunity does not bar official-capacity claims under the ORA, as the statute waives sovereign immunity for such claims. The court did not address the merits of Miller’s individual-capacity claims against Gonzalez. View "GONZALEZ v. MILLER" on Justia Law

Richard Andrew Justice filed a claim against the Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS) for breach of an employment contract, alleging that DPS failed to pay him for overtime hours as required under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Justice argued that the FLSA provisions were incorporated into his employment contract. The central issue was whether Justice had demonstrated the existence of a written contract sufficient to overcome DPS’s motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds.The trial court allowed limited discovery and reviewed documents submitted by Justice, including a written offer of employment and subsequent communications. The trial court ultimately granted DPS’s motion to dismiss, finding that the documents did not constitute a valid written contract and that there was no meeting of the minds regarding FLSA overtime compensation provisions. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the documents did form a written contract that included FLSA provisions, thereby waiving sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that Justice had shown the existence of a written contract with DPS, which established a waiver of sovereign immunity under the ex contractu clause of the Georgia Constitution. The Court held that the question of whether the FLSA obligations were part of the written contract was a merits question, not a sovereign immunity question, and thus was not properly before the trial court on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. JUSTICE" on Justia Law

A group of property owners sued Columbia County over stormwater drainage issues that caused damage to their property. The property, purchased in 1996, contained a metal pipe used in the County's stormwater system. Over the years, heavy rains caused the pipe to fail multiple times, leading to significant property damage. The property owners sent a notice to the County in October 2013, outlining their claims, but the County declined to make repairs. The property owners then filed a lawsuit in March 2014, seeking damages and an injunction to prevent further damage.The trial court found in favor of the property owners, ruling that the County maintained a nuisance that amounted to a taking without just compensation. The court awarded damages and issued a permanent injunction against the County. The County appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed some parts of the trial court's decision and vacated others. The Court of Appeals vacated the damages award for harms incurred after the October 2013 notice and reversed the award of attorneys' fees. However, it upheld the injunction against the County.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals' decision to uphold the injunction, ruling that it exceeded the bounds of the Georgia Constitution's limited waiver of sovereign immunity. The Court directed the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court to consider a new injunction within the constitutional limits. The Supreme Court also concluded that it should not have granted certiorari on the issue of damages for harms incurred after the October 2013 notice, as the Court of Appeals' ruling was specific to the facts of this case and did not establish a general rule of law. The petition for certiorari on this issue was therefore denied. View "Satcher v. Columbia County" on Justia Law

Ryan Milliron submitted an Open Records Act request to Manos Antonakakis, a professor at Georgia Tech, seeking records related to Antonakakis’s services to Georgia Tech as a private contractor. Milliron also sent a similar request to Georgia Tech. Antonakakis did not respond individually, but Georgia Tech provided some documents. Unsatisfied, Milliron sued Antonakakis, alleging he held additional public records in his capacity as a private contractor. Milliron claimed Antonakakis’s companies, formed to receive DARPA funding for Georgia Tech, maintained relevant records.The trial court dismissed Milliron’s complaint, ruling that only agencies, not individual employees or private contractors, are obligated to produce public records under the Open Records Act. The court also found that Milliron’s request to Antonakakis was improper because Georgia Tech had a designated open records officer. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, agreeing that Milliron’s request was not properly submitted to the designated officer.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the Open Records Act applies to records held by private contractors performing services for public agencies. The Court held that requests for such records can be made directly to the custodian of the records, including private contractors, even if the agency has a designated open records officer. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine what records Antonakakis may hold and whether they are public records under the Act. View "Milliron v. Antonakakis" on Justia Law

The case involves John R. Tibbetts, a teacher, and his employer, the Worth County School District. The District offered Tibbetts a contract for the upcoming school year, but Tibbetts did not return the signed contract within the stipulated time. The District then informed Tibbetts that his employment would end when his current contract expired. Tibbetts sued the District for breach of contract, arguing that the offered contract did not comply with Georgia's statutory requirements for teacher contracts because it was missing terms and contained blanks. Therefore, he contended, his employment contract for the prior school year was renewed by operation of law.The trial court granted the District's motion for summary judgment, holding that there was no existing written contract between the parties that operated to waive sovereign immunity under the ex contractu clause of the Constitution of the State of Georgia. The trial court found that the District offered Tibbetts a contract that complied with the statutory requirements, but that Tibbetts did not timely accept that offer.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It determined that the contract the District offered Tibbetts for the upcoming school year failed to comply with the requirements of the statute; therefore, Tibbetts’s contract for the previous school year was renewed by operation of law and constituted a contract in writing. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Tibbetts’s claim was one for breach of a written contract, and sovereign immunity was waived pursuant to the ex contractu clause.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the grant of summary judgment in favor of the District because the employment contract the District offered Tibbetts for the upcoming school year satisfied the requirements of the statute. Because Tibbetts failed to timely accept this offer, no written contract exists to support Tibbetts’s claim for breach of a written contract. Absent such a claim, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to the ex contractu clause. View "WORTH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. TIBBETTS" on Justia Law

In a dispute between the City of Winder and Barrow County, Georgia, the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed the interpretation of the Services Delivery Strategy (SDS) Act, with regard to the delivery of services to county and city residents and property owners and the funding of these services. The case initially revolved around three main issues: the maintenance of county roads and who benefits from them, the funding of services that primarily benefit the unincorporated area of the county, and whether the County could challenge the water rates charged by the City as an illegal tax.The court concluded that determining whether the maintenance of county roads primarily benefits the unincorporated area of a county cannot be resolved as a matter of law and requires analysis of the totality of the circumstances involved. The court held that services that primarily benefit the unincorporated area of the county should be funded through the mechanisms delineated in the Act, limiting the sources within a special district that can be used for funding.Finally, the court decided that a superior court adjudicating a petition under the SDS Act is not authorized to determine whether the City’s usage rates charged to water customers in unincorporated areas of the County are an illegal tax. The court reversed the rulings of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CITY OF WINDER v. BARROW COUNTY" on Justia Law

This case concerns the standard of review that the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Community Health must apply when reviewing the decision of a hearing officer on an application for a certificate of need to establish a new health service. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment, set forth the standard applicable to the Commissioner’s review, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court clarified that "competent substantial evidence" in the context of the Commissioner's review means evidence that is "relevant" such that "a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support" a finding of fact, and that is admissible. The court also determined that the Commissioner must provide sufficient detail in his order from which a reviewing court can determine whether the Commissioner has or has not improperly substituted his judgment for the findings of fact of the hearing officer. View "VANTAGE CANCER CENTERS OF GEORGIA, LLC v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH" on Justia Law