Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate Law
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First United Security Bank and its wholly owned subsidiary, Paty Holdings, LLC (collectively, "the bank"), brought suit to recover excess funds received by Tuscaloosa County from the tax sale of real estate owned by Wayne Allen Russell, Jr., and on which First United had a mortgage. The bank foreclosed on its mortgage after the tax sale but before the demand for excess proceeds was made. The issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is an "owner" entitled under 40-10-28, Ala. Code 1975, to receive the excess proceeds from a tax sale of the real property foreclosed upon. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bank was entitled to the excess tax-sale proceeds. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "First United Security Bank v. McCollum" on Justia Law

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Sara Crossfield appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Limestone County Commission in her action to reverse the Commission's decision to vacate a portion of Dogwood Flats Road in Limestone County. In early 2013, the Commission proposed to vacate a portion of Dogwood Flats Road. Crossfield's property did not abut the portion of Dogwood Flats Road proposed to be vacated; it abutted Dogwood Flats Road approximately 400 feet north of the portion of the road that the Commission proposed to vacate. At a hearing on the matter, Crossfield alleged that she was a "party affected by the vacation of a portion of Dogwood Flat[s] Road" and asked the trial court to set aside the vacation of the road. Crossfield alleged, among other things, that the Commission had obstructed her access to Piney Creek, east and south of Crossfield's property. The Commission moved to dismiss, arguing Crossfield was not affected by the vacation and therefore lacked standing to appeal the Commission's decision regarding Dogwood Flats. The trial court granted the Commission's motion for a summary judgment and dismissed Crossfield's appeal. Crossfield's evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to her as the nonmovant, did not create a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude a summary judgment for the Commission. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Commission. View "Crossfield v. Limestone County Commission " on Justia Law

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Appellant Friends of Pennsylvania Leadership Charter School appealed an order of the Commonwealth Court which held that the retroactive real estate tax exemption provided in Section 1722-A(e)(3) of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. 17-1722-A(e)(3), was unconstitutional. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed (though by different reasoning), concluding that retroactive application of the real estate tax exemption of Section 1722-A(e)(3) was unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it violated the separation of powers doctrine.View "Friends of PaLCS v. Chester Cty Bd of Assess" on Justia Law

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In 2009, the Newtown Township Board of Supervisors enacted a Planned Residential Development Ordinance. This appeal centered on challenges to the validity of that ordinance and to the approval of a Tentative PRD Plan pursuant to it. Intervenors BPG Real Estate Investors (BPG) submitted an application under the anticipated PRD Ordinance for approval of a Tentative PRD Plan, proposing multi-use development of an approximately 218-acre tract of land that it owned. The Township Board orally approved BPG's Tentative PRD Plan, and later issued a written decision granting approval. Newtown Square East, L.P. (NSE), which owned a two-acre tract of land adjacent to BPG's tract, filed a challenge to the validity of the PRD Ordinance with the Newtown Township Zoning Hearing Board, and filed an appeal of the Township Board's approval of BPG's Tentative PRD Plan with the court of common pleas. With regard to its validity challenge before the Zoning Board, NSE argued, inter alia, that the PRD Ordinance violated Article VII of the MPC by, allegedly, failing to require that a tentative plan identify the uses of buildings and other structures, and permitting the location of buildings to be subject to free modification between the time of tentative plan approval and final plan approval. Following several hearings, the Zoning Board upheld the validity of the PRD Ordinance, finding that its minor textual variations from the relevant provisions of the MPC, Article VII, did not create an inconsistency or conflict with the enabling legislation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the ordinance. View "Newtown Square East v. Twp. of Newtown" on Justia Law

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The primary question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a municipal authority could exercise its eminent domain powers to condemn an easement over privately-owned land, where the sole purpose of the easement is to supply a private developer with land to install sewer drainage facilities needed for a proposed private residential subdivision. "While this determination may seem to interfere with the ability of municipal water and/or sewer authorities to expand their operations under circumstances where, as here, there is an overarching nexus between the taking and private development, it is not this Court’s function to ameliorate such difficulties by departing from the statutory text. [. . .] The Legislature’s decision to exempt regulated public utilities, but not municipal authorities, from the preclusive rule set forth in Section 204(a) demonstrates that it intended to allow – within constitutional limitations – the continued use of eminent domain for the provision of public services such as water and sewer access in tandem with private development for a limited, defined class of condemnors. As RAWA is not within that class, its condemnation of the drainage easement is in violation of PRPA." View "Reading Area Wat Auth v. Schuyl River Grwy, et al" on Justia Law

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This case centered on the interpretation of a state tax deduction statute. Former RCW 82.04.4292 (1980) provided that in computing their business and occupation (B&O) tax, banks and financial institutions could deduct from their income "amounts derived from interest received on investments or loans primarily secured by first mortgages or trust deeds on nontransient residential properties." Between 2004 and 2007, petitioner Cashmere Valley Bank invested in mortgage-backed securities known as real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs) and collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). Cashmere claimed that interest earned on these investments was deductible under RCW 82.04.4292. Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded Cashmere could not claim the deduction because its investments in REMICs and CMOs were not "primarily secured" by first mortgages or trust deeds. The ultimate source of cash flow was mortgage payments. However, Cashmere's investments were not backed by any encumbrance on property nor did Cashmere have any legal recourse to the underlying trust assets in the event of default. Thus, Cashmere's investments were not "primarily secured" by mortgages or trust deeds. View "Cashmere Valley Bank v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

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Landowners Merlin and Lori Zowada filed a petition with the Board of County Commissioners to establish a private road to access their landlocked tract of property through property owned by Mullinax Concrete Service Company. The Board considered six alternative routes for the private road. After the Board ruled on the petition, the Supreme Court determined that the case should be remanded to the commissioners to compare the relative merits of only two alternative routes, Route 1 and Route 6, and to determine whether the greater cost of Route 6 was justified. After further proceedings, the Board established the road along Route 6. The Zowadas sought review of that decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s findings of fact and conclusion of law, holding that the Board’s decision to establish the private road along Route 6 was supported by substantial evidence.View "Zowada v. Mullinax Concrete Serv. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

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For the tax year 2008, Appellant, a property owner and taxpayer, filed four valuation complaints challenging the Summit County Fiscal Officer’s valuation of seven parcels. The Summit County Board of Revision (BOR) rejected Appellant’s requests for decreased valuations for lack of probative evidence. On appeal, Appellant urged the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) to adopt to certain properties the contractual allocation of the purchase price of a large industrial-warehouse business Appellant sold in 2010. The BTA found that the values determined by the fiscal officer and the BOR should be retained, concluding that the 2010 sale included some but not all of the parcels at issue as well as parcels that were not at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in concluding that the allocation evidence did not suffice to establish the value of the properties; and (2) Appellant failed to discharge its burden to show the propriety of an allocated sale price.View "RNG Props., Ltd. v. Summit County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

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In consolidated property tax appeals, taxpayers challenged the valuation of their real property by the Clackamas County Assessor. In their appeals to the Magistrate Division of the Tax Court, they challenged only the valuation of the improvements on their land, not the valuation of the land itself. The Magistrate Division affirmed. Taxpayers then appealed to the Regular Division of the Tax Court, again challenging only the valuation of their improvements. In the pendency of that appeal, the legislature had enacted ORS 305.287. Under that new statute, even if a taxpayer challenged only one aspect of a property tax assessment, any other party to an “appeal” may challenge other aspects of the assessment as well. Relying on that statute, the county asserted for the first time before the Regular Division of the Tax Court that it had erroneously undervalued taxpayers’ land. The Tax Court concluded, however, that challenges before the Regular Division were not “appeals” for the purposes of that statute. As a result, the court ruled that the county could not challenge the valuation of taxpayers’ land. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Tax Court correctly concluded that ORS 305.287 did not apply to appeals to the Regular Division of the Tax Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Tax Court erred in ruling that the statute did not apply and that the county could not challenge its own land valuations.View "Village at Main Street Phase II v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

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The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Board of Adjustment (Board) filed a motion for a temporary injunction pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.04 seeking to enjoin Boone Creek Properties, Inc. (Boone Creek) from operating certain commercial recreational activities on property in Fayette County. The circuit court granted the temporary injunction, finding that the activities were in violation of a zoning ordinance and a conditional use permit issued by the Board. The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court had properly granted the injunction. Boone Creek appealed, arguing that the Board failed to satisfy the “irreparable harm” prong of rule 65.04. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when a governmental entity charged with enforcement of a civil law seeks an injunction restraining an ongoing violation of the law, irreparable harm is presumed; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by granting the requested injunction.View "Boone Creek Props., LLC v. Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law